



*\»\V«K*!kAV 



LIBRAiyd OF CONGRESS. 



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 






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(Brcat Commanbers 

EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON 



GENERAL SHERMAN 



®l)e ®rcat €ommaubcr6 Scrici 

Edited by General James Grant Wilson. 



Admiral Farragut. By Captain A. T, Mahan, U. S. N. 
General Taylor. By General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. 
General Jackson. By James Parton. 

General Greene. By General Francis V. Greene. 
General J. E. Johnston. 

By Robert M. Hughes, of Virginia. 
General Thomas. By Henry Coppee, LL. D. 

General Scott. By General Marcus J. Wright. 

General Washington. 

By General Bradley T. Johnson. 
General Lee. By General Fitzhugh Lee. 

General Hancock. By General Francis J. Walker. 
General Sheridan. By General Henry E. Davies. 
General Grant. By General James Grant Wilson. 
General Sherman. By General Manning F. Force. 

IN PREPARATION. 

Admiral Porter. 

By James R. Soley, late Assist. Sec. of Navy. 
General McClellan. By General Peter S. Michie. 
Commodore Paul Jones. By S. Nicholson Kane. 



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY, NEW YORK. 




loi: f< coMEAiry 




y 



GREAT COMMANDERS 
* • • • 

GENERAL SHERMAN 



BY 



General MANNING F. FORCE 




* ,»•'. 



NEW YORK 

D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

1899 



1 



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28551 



Copyright, 1899, 
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 



A// r lights reserved. 



TWOeOPIfu .:£-CEIVED. 









PREFACE 



General Sherman was the most picturesque 
figure in the civil war. His character was abso- 
lutely pure and spotless. He had a vigorous and 
penetrating intellect, prompt and clear in compre- 
hension and in decisio". While steadfast in his 
opinions, he was subordinate in conduct ; he held 
to his judgment in issue against President Lincoln, 
but yielded as unquestioning obedience to Mc- 
Clernand as to Grant. He was an omnivorous 
reader, and was a storehouse of felicitous anecdote. 
His cheerful disposition and inexhaustible fund of 
conversation made him always a delightful com- 
panion. Frank as a child and outspoken in his 
likes and dislikes, Sherman was often engaged in 
controversy. 

The war filled only a few years of his life, but 
comprised most of hi§^.at:*t"ivity '.and achievements. 
Accordingly, his bj^Vaphy naturally grcu-ips itself 
into these parts — beiore,*(^PWk-#iTig^,jfmd after *!he war, 
and so it is written''jn..the following ^p.agp's. The 
efifort in this narrative^'has been to..gi^e,<rti the sim- 
plest form a statement of the 'fSfts without com- 
ment. The completion of the publication of the 
First Series of the War Records gives opportunity 
for a fair approximation to a correct statement. 



izn: 



/ 



^i 



vi GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Exacting occupation and loss of energy, conse- 
quent upon a temporary partial failure of health, 
caused delay in the preparation of this little book, 
and, with the approval of the editor, I asked Gen- 
eral J. D. Cox to write the period from the expedi- 
tion to Meridian to the setting out upon the march 
to the sea, and the entire period subsequent to 
the review in Washington at the close of the war. 
As for the first of these two periods, he not only 
can say. Omnia quae vidi ct pars fui, but he had 
already gone over it in his previous publications. 
For the second, his intimate acquaintance with the 
public affairs, as well as with General Sherman, 
gave him special qualification. General Cox kindly 
gave prompt consent, and so, as often happens, an 
apparent evil resulted in good fortune. 

M. F. Force. 

December, i8g8. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 

I. — Ante bei.lum . 
II. — The beginning of the war 
III. — The battle of Shiloh . 
IV. — From Corinth to Memphis 

V. — The Mississippi movement 

VI. — ViCKSBURG campaign 

VII. — Chattanooga and Meridian 
VIII. — Military division of the Mississippi 
IX.— Campaign of Atlanta . 
X. — Campaign of October — Development of 
march to the sea 
XI. — The march to the sea 
XII. — The Carolinas 
XIII. — The end of the war . 
XIV. — Post bellum 



21 

36 
78 
98 
117 
151 
187 
204 

225 

243 
265 

293 

311 



vu 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 

FACING 
PAGE 

Portrait of General Sherman . . . Frontispiece 
Engraved on steel by Charles Schlecht, from a photograph 
by Napoleon Sarony taken in 1887. 

Sherman and his corps commanders ..... 204 1^ 
From a photograph, taken in 1865, by Matthew Brady, 

Mr. Lincoln's Atlanta letter 224 -^ 

The Peacemakers ......... 295 ^^ 

From a painting by George P. A. Healy. 

Tomb of General Sherman in St. Louis cemetery . . 347 ^ 



LIST OF MAPS. 

Battlefield of Shiloh ........ 36 

The Vicksburg campaign . . . . . . • n? 

The Atlanta campaign : 

No. 1 206 

No. II 219 

No. Ill 232 

Atlanta to Savannah, Ga. ....... 243 

Savannah to Columbia, S. C. . . . . . . 288 

Columbia to Raleigh, N. C 295 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



CHAPTER I. 

ANTE BELLUM. 

William Tecumseh Sherman came from 
brainy stock. His brother Charles, his father, 
grandfather, and great-grandfather were judges; 
Roger Sherman, signer of the Declaration of In- 
dependence, William M. Evarts, Senator and Judge 
Hoar were collateral kindred. All were descended 
from Edmond Sherman, who emigrated from Ded- 
ham, Essex County, England, and was in Boston 
with three sons before 1636. Taylor Sherman, born 
in 1758 and didd in 181 5, great-great-great-grand- 
son of Edmond Sherman, was lawyer and judge 
in Norwalk, Conn. He received two sections of 
land in Ohio as compensation for his services as 
one of the commissioners who settled the title and 
boundaries of the Fire Lands in the Connecticut 
Western Reserve in Ohio. 

Charles Robert, son of Taylor Sherman, was 
admitted to the bar in Norwalk, married there 
Mary Hoyt, migrated to Ohio, and settled in Lan- 
caster in 181 1, being then twenty-one years old. 
He was held in high esteem, and was appointed 
judge of the Supreme Court of the State in 1821, 
and remained on the bench till his death, in 1829. 
He conceived a great admiration for Tecumseh, 
who figured conspicuously in Ohio in the War of 
1812, and when his third son was born, February 



2 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

8, 1820, gave him the name WilHam Tecumseh, 
He died poor, but left to his large family of chil- 
dren the rich inheritance of a good name. The 
widowed mother was unable to care for them, but 
friends gladly took to their homes and adopted 
the children of Judge Sherman. William Tecumseh 
was adopted by a neighbor and friend of his fa- 
ther, Thomas Ewing. 

Lancaster lay amid a stretch of fertile lands by 
the winding river, almost under the rocky emi- 
nence of Mount Pleasant. When Sherman was a 
boy the original pioneers who planted their cabins 
there in the trackless forest had barely passed 
away. It was a small town; its population in 1846 
was only 2,120. But it had a notable society — 
notable for ability, character, and graceful hospi- 
tality. The central figure was Thomas Ewing, 
He was a man of powerful frame and majestic 
bearing. He was in youth a noted athlete. He 
could jump higher, leap farther, and run faster than 
any competitor, and was famed for being the only 
man who could throw an axe over the courthouse. 
His mind was as vigorous as his body. He was 
recognized as the master intellect in Ohio. The 
State sent him several times to the national Senate, 
and he was a member of the Cabinet under Presi- 
dent Harrison and President Taylor. Politics never 
weaned him from his devotion to law. In the first 
cases that he tried he excited surprise, and won 
reputation by discovering unexpected points which 
determined the cases in his favor. Daniel Web- 
ster in his last days often associated Mr. Ewing 
with him in important cases. After Webster's 
death, Ewing was the leader of the American bar. 
James G. Blaine said of him: " He was a grand 
and massive man, almost without peers. With no 
little familiarity and acquaintance with the leading 
men of the day, I can truly sav T never met one 
who impressed me so profoundly." 



ANTE BELLUM. 3 

The lawyers of Lancaster, competing with him 
in ahnost every case, were kept continually on their 
mettle; and the bar of this little country town com- 
prised, besides Mr. Ewing and Judge Sherman, 
Hocking Hunter, recognized as one of the most 
accurate and soundest lawyers in the State, and 
Henry Stanbery, whose reputation was national, 
who became Attorney-General of the United States, 
as well as others, also able, though less known. 
Governor Medill, who filled with distinction many 
important ofilices, both State and national, lived in 
Lancaster after 1832. Young Sherman was for- 
tunate to grow up under the care of good teach- 
ers, and more fortunate in having the unconscious 
training of daily contact with choice spirits. 

In the spring of 1836 he was appointed a cadet 
at West Point. Mr. Ewing being then in the Sen- 
ate, young Sherman made a visit to the capital on 
his way to the academy. Leaving Lancaster in 
May, three days* travel by day and night brought 
him to Cumberland, Md. Though the railroad was 
then running to Cumberland, he drove thence to 
Washington. Jackson was then President. The 
Senate sat in the little chamber now occupied by 
the Supreme Court of the United States. Martin 
Van Buren. Vice-President, presided. Clay, Cal- 
houn, and Webster towered above their fellow-sena- 
tors. But among them, besides Mr. Ewing, were 
Silas Wright, the strongest man New York has 
sent to Washington ; Benton, the indomitable man 
from Missouri ; Cass ; Preston, of South Carolina, 
esteemed the most elegant orator in the Senate ; 
Willie P. Mangum, of North Carohna; and Ber- 
rien, of Georgia. John Quincy Adams added luster 
to the House of Representatives. A week spent in 
daily contact with these leaders was a course of 
intellectual training. 

Though fragmentary railways had quickened 
travel, it was still a two days' journey from Wash- 



4 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

ington to New York. The route was by railroad to 
Baltimore, by steamboat thence to Havre de Grace 
or Elkton, then by railroad across to the Dela- 
ware River, and by steamboat vip the river to Phila- 
delphia. There the traveler rested for the night. 
Next morning the journey was resvmied by steam- 
boat up the Delaware to Bordentown, by railroad 
across New Jersey to Amboy, and by steamboat 
to New York. Sherman traveled by this route, 
stopping to visit friends in Philadelphia and New 
York, and reached West Point June 12th. There 
were one hundred and forty cadets in the class, of 
whom only forty-two graduated. Among his class- 
mates were George H. Thomas, Stewart Van 
Vliet, George W. Getty, Richard S. Ewell, William 
Hays, Bushrod R. Johnson, and Thomas Jordan, 
who survived to take active part in the civil war. 

His letters written at the academy breathe the 
same childlike and yet manly frankness which char- 
acterized him always : " Bill is very much elated 
at the idea of getting free of West Point next June. 
He does not intend remaining in the army more 
than one year, then to resign, and study law prob- 
ably. No doubt you admire his choice, but, to 
speak plainly and candidly, I would rather be a 
blacksmith. Indeed, the nearer we come to that 
dreadful epoch, graduation day, the higher opin- 
ion I conceive of the duties and life of an officer 
of the United States army, and the more confirmed 
in the wish of spending my life in the service of 
my country. Think of that! The church bugle 
has just blown, and in a moment I must put on my 
side arms and march to church to listen to a two- 
hours' sermon, with its twenty divisions and twen- 
ty-one subdivisions ; . . . but I believe it is a gen- 
eral fact that what people are compelled to do they 
dislike. I fear I have a difiticult part to act for the 
next three years, because I am almost confident 
that vour father's wishes and intentions will clash 



ANTE BELLUM. 5 

with my inclinations. In the first place, I think 
he wishes me to strive and graduate in the en- 
gineer corps. This I can't do. Next, to resign and 
become a civil engineer. . . . While I propose and 
intend to go into the infantry, be stationed in the 
far West, out of reach of what is termed civiliza- 
tion, and there remain as long as possible. 

" You no doubt are not only firmly impressed 
but absolutely certain that General Harrison will 
be our next President. For my part, though, of 
course, but a ' superficial observer,' I do not think 
there is the least hope of such a change, since his 
friends have thought proper to envelop his name 
with log cabins, gingerbread, hard cider, and such 
humbugging, the sole object of which plainly is to 
deceive and mislead his ignorant and prejudiced 
though honest fellow-citizens, while his qualifica- 
tions, his honesty, his merits and services are mere- 
ly alluded to." 

He graduated in June, 1840, sixth in his class, 
and was appointed second lieutenant in the Third 
Artillery. In the autumn he reported to his regi- 
ment in Florida, where his time was mainly spent 
in fishing and hunting, diversified with occasional 
expeditions to capture parties of Seminole Indians. 
In November, 1841, he was promoted first lieu- 
tenant. Here he wrote: "We hear that the new 
Secretary of War intends proposing to the next 
Congress to raise two rifle regiments for the West- 
ern service. As you are at Washington. I presume 
you can learn whether it is so or not, for I should 
like to go in such a regiment if stationed in the 
far West; not that I am in the least displeased with 
my present berth, but when the regiment goes 
North it will, in all likelihood, be stationed in the 
vicinity of some city — from which God spare me! " 
In another letter he writes: " If you have any re- 
gard for my feelings, don't say the word * insinua- 
tion ' again. You may abuse me as much as you 



6 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

please, but I'd prefer of the two to be accused of 
telling a direct falsehood than stating anything 
evasively or underhand, and if I have ever been 
guilty of such a thing, it was unintentionally." 

In March, 1842, he moved with his company 
to Fort Morgan, at the entrance to the Bay of Mo- 
bile, and in June the garrison sailed in a brig to 
Fort Moultrie, in Charleston harbor. He remained 
there till 1846, and became at home with the charm- 
ing society of Charleston. In the summer of 1843 
he made a visit to Lancaster, Ohio, and became 
engaged to Ellen, daughter of Mr. Ewing. Re- 
turning to his post at Fort Moultrie, he went by 
stage to Portsmouth, on the Ohio; thence by boat 
to Cincinnati ; thence by boat to St. Louis ; then 
down the Mississippi to New Orleans; by boat 
across Lake Pontchartrain to Mobile, and up the 
Alabama River to Alontgomery; thence partly by 
stage, but mainly by rail, to Savannah, and then 
by sea to Charleston harbor. The journey took 
six weeks ; two weeks and a half were spent in 
visits to the cities, and three and a half weeks were 
spent in actual travel night and day. 

While at Fort Moultrie he was not idle or given 
wholly to society. He wrote to a son of Mr. Ewing: 
" Every day I feel more and more in need of an 
atlas such as your father has at home, and, as a 
knowledge of geography in its minutest details is 
essential to a tnie military education, idle time 
necessarily spent here might be properly devoted 
to it. I wish, therefore, you would procure for me 
the best geography and atlas (not school) extant." 

In June, 1844, he wrote: "Since my return I 
have not been running about in the city or the 
island as heretofore, but have endeavored to inter- 
est myself in Blackstone, which, with the assistance 
of Bouvier's Dictionary, I find no difficulty in un- 
derstanding. I have read all four volumes, Starkie 
on Evidence, and other books semilegal and semi- 



ANTE BELLUM. 7 

historical, and would be obliged to you if you 
would give me a list of such books as you were 
required to read, not including your local or State 
law. I intend to read the second and third vol- 
umes of Blackstone again, also Kent's Commen- 
taries, which seem, as far as I am capable of judg- 
ing, to be the basis of the common-law practice. 
This course of study I have adopted from feeling 
the want of it in the duties to which I was lately 
assigned." Later he wrote: '* I have no idea of 
making the law a profession — by no means ; but, as 
an officer of the army, it is my duty and interest 
to be prepared for any situation that fortune or 
luck may offer. It is for this alone that I prepare, 
and not for professional practice." 

In February, 1844, he was relieved from duty 
on court-martial to report to Colonel Churchill, at 
Marietta, Ga., and aid in taking evidence in cases 
of claims against the Government. While at Mari- 
etta he made frequent visits to Kenesaw Mountain. 
On the same duty he traveled on horseback to the 
Etowah River, Alatoona, Rome, Wills Valley, Sand 
Mountain, and Raccoon Range to Bellefonte, Ala., 
and returned by Rome, Alatoona, and Marietta 
to Atlanta, making unconsciously a preparatory 
reconnoissance for his Atlanta campaign. 

In 1846, when war with Mexico was impend- 
ing, he received a regular recruiting detail, and 
reported at New York on the ist of May. He 
was assigned early in May to station at Pittsburg, 
with a subrendezvous at Zanesville, Ohio, which 
was conveniently near to his friends at Lancaster. 
The news of General Taylor's first battles in Texas 
inflamed him with desire to be ordered to the field. 
He received at Pittsburg at 8 p. m. an order trans- 
ferring him to Company F, then under orders for 
California. Working all night, he made out his 
money accounts and property returns, and next 
morning left them, with the cash balance and cloth- 



8 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

ing and otlier property and receipts to be signed 
by his successor, in the hands of the physician of 
the recruiting depot, and set out at once on his 
journey to New York. Company F was filled up 
to one hundred and thirteen enlisted men and five 
officers. They embarked on the storeship Lexing- 
ton, with six months' provisions and with six 
months' pay drawn in advance, and set sail on the 
14th of July. The soldiers did the work on deck, 
were drilled whenever the weather permitted, were 
carefully supervised in their health and cleanliness, 
and on arriving at Monterey, Cal, after a voyage of 
one hundred and ninety-eight days, every man was 
able to march to post with all his equipments. 

California was extensive, but thinly inhabited. 
About a score of little towns and settlements, small 
aggregations of one-story adobe houses; a few re- 
maining missions, each with a colony of Indian 
converts attached; and ranches sparsely scattered 
in spots favored with water, comprised the popula- 
tion. Commodore Sloat, and afterward Commo- 
dore Stockton, of the navy ; General Kearny, with 
two companies of United States dragoons; Colonel 
Fremont, with a battalion of volunteers ; and Colo- 
nel Cook, with a regiment of volunteers, made the 
conquest and suppressed an insurrection. Cali- 
fornia was quiet, while Scott and Taylor with their 
commands were winning glory on the borders of 
the Gulf of Mexico. 

Company F arrived at Monterey early in Janu- 
ary, 1847. With six months' rations, and grist- 
mill, sawmill, and other stores, and twenty-eight 
thousand dollars in money, and with Sherman for 
acting quartermaster and commissary, they were 
soon in quarters on the hill just west of the town. 
When appropriate stafT officers arrived, Sherman 
was relieved of these temporary duties, and served 
as aid to General Kearny. In the absence of more 
serious occupation, a dispute had arisen as to who 



ANTE BELLUM. g 

held supreme command in California. Commo- 
dore Stockton claimed it as successor to Commo- 
dore Sloat, who was the first to take possession for 
the United States. General Kearny claimed it as 
the senior military officer in the Territory. Colonel 
Fremont claimed it as protege of Senator Benton, 
a prominent and influential politician. This ab- 
surd contention lasted till Kearny and Fremont 
went East at the end of May, and Colonel R. B. 
Mason, who had arrived, in undisputed command 
on land, while Commodore Biddle, arriving, had 
like undisputed authority afloat. 

Colonel Mason appointed Sherman his assist- 
ant adjutant general, and soon found him useful. 
When Commodore Sloat took possession of Cali- 
fornia he issued a proclamation declaring the in- 
habitants to be American citizens, and calling upon 
them to elect officers. The little town of Sonora, 
made up mostly of immigrants from the United 
States, thereupon elected Mr. Nash, one of their 
number, alcalde. General Kearny, holding that 
California was simply conquered territory — Mexi- 
can still though conquered — and was held and con- 
trolled by military power until its status should 
be determined by competent authority, appointed 
Mr. Boggs alcalde, and ordered Nash to turn the 
office over to him. Colonel Mason, soon after suc- 
ceeding to command, received a letter from Boggs 
stating that Nash claimed that a military com- 
mander had no right to eject him from a civil 
office. Colonel Mason wrote to the captain of a 
company stationed at Sonora, directing him to 
notify Nash to vacate and turn over his books, 
papers, and accounts to Boggs, and, in case of re- 
fusal, to compel compliance by force. The captain 
replied that the settlers were greatly excited, and 
supported Nish in his refusal, and further stated 
on his own account that he was an officer of vol- 
unteers soon to be mustered out, and, as he ex- 



lO GENERAL SHERMAN. 

pected to remain in Sonora as a permanent settler, 
he asked to be excused from enforcing the order. 
The legitimacy of military authority was directly 
put in issue. Scanty as were Colonel Mason's re- 
sources, he proposed at once to peremptorily com- 
pel obedience. Sherman requested him to put the 
matter into his hands, and promised success. 

Receiving permission, he left Monterey, ac- 
companied by a single private soldier, and traveled 
on horseback to Yerba Buena, where San Fran- 
cisco now stands. Commodore Biddle listened 
with great interest to Sherman's statement of the 
matter, and gave him a boat, manned by a mid- 
shipman and eight men, and allowed one of his 
lieutenants to go in company. They sailed up the 
bay, reached the mouth of Sonora Creek by dark, 
and a landing on the creek near the town by mid- 
night. Next evening Nash was seized while at 
supper, hurried into the boat, taken down the bay 
to the flagship, and put into the hands of the com- 
modore. Sherman returned overland to Monterey, 
while Nash was sent around by water. Nash was 
released by Colonel Mason upon his promise to 
make no attempt to regain his office. Boggs en- 
tered upon his duties without opposition, and there 
was no further attempt to dispute the authority 
of the military in the enemy's country in time of 
war. 

In the spring of 1848 workmen putting up a 
sawmill for Captain Sutter at Colonia, on the 
American fork of the Sacramento River, found 
particles of gold in the earth. The discovery could 
not be kept secret. People, dropping other pur- 
suits, thronged to the valley of American fork. 
The gravel beds by the river teemed with their 
camps and resounded with the ceaseless rattle of 
their rockers. Sherman's restless activity per- 
suaded Colonel Mason that it was his duty to make 
a personal inspection of the " diggings " before 



ANTE BELLUM. II 

sending a report of the discovery of gold to the 
Government at Washington. 

News came in the early sunmier of the termina- 
tion of the war. The only remaining volunteer regi- 
ment was mustered out, and swarmed to the gold 
fields. The only troops left were a company of 
dragoons and one battery. Colonel Mason pre- 
vented their desertion in mass by giving liberal 
furloughs, and thus giving every soldier in turn 
a chance at the mines. Men at the placers gath- 
ered in gold sometimes a hundred dollars in a day; 
sometimes more. Prices of labor and commodities 
became extravagant. Day laborers received six- 
teen dollars per day; domestics could not be hired 
for less than three hundred dollars per month. Col- 
onel Mason authorized officers to draw rations in 
kind, and by clubbing together and waiting on 
themselves they could live. In the autumn Sher- 
man, with two other officers, camped out near 
Coloma, and contributed the capital to a store. 
Each received a profit of fifteen hundred dol- 
lars, which enabled them to live through the 
winter. 

On the 23d of February, 1849, General Persifor 
F. Smith arrived. Two regiments and a battalion 
came to re-enforce the two companies. The Pa- 
cific coast was made a military division, comprising 
the two departments of California and Oregon. 
Colonel Mason was relieved, and Sherman was ap- 
pointed acting adjutant general of the division, and 
served as such until Major Joseph Hooker, the 
regularly assigned adjutant general of the division, 
arrived. Sherman was then appointed by General 
Smith aid-de-camp. 

The news of the discovery of gold spread, and 
grew in magnitude as it spread. Immigrants poured 
in by land and by sea from all quarters of the globe. 
Some halted to build up towns and thrive by trade. 
The little village by the mission of Yerba Buena 



12 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

expanded into the city of San Francisco, and on 
Sutter's ranch by the river sprang up the city of 
Sacramento. In the rush to the mines all other 
employments were abandoned and all engagements 
broken. General Sherman says in his Memoirs 
that six hundred abandoned vessels lay and rotted 
at their moorings in front of San Francisco, and 
that the regular steam packets on arriving anchored 
alongside of a man-of-war to retain their crews 
till the time for their return. In the excessive 
throng some were unable to find employment in 
mining, and others were unable to do the work. 
Under the stress of circumstances, men who had 
been merchants and capitalists earned their bread 
as laborers and hostlers, and Harvard graduates 
eked out a living by serving as hotel waiters and 
cooks for miners' messes. The camps of Ameri- 
cans organized communities, adopted laws, and 
established tribunals to enforce them. The rules 
defining mining rights evolved by them, and sup- 
plemented later by the miners in Colorado, were 
adopted substantially by Congress and enacted into 
a statute. 

General Smith and some of his staff had brought 
their families to California, with a retinue of serv- 
ants. The attendants, white and colored, vanished 
as soon as the ship touched land. After a vain ef- 
fort to keep house without any assistance and a 
hopeless struggle to live there upon officers' pay, 
the families returned to their old homes. Army 
officers were in request as surveyors and engineers, 
and General Smith encouraged them to accept em- 
ployment. Sherman obtained a two months' leave, 
and used the time so profitably in laying out town 
sites and surveying and platting ranches that he 
records he returned to duty with a net prclit of six 
thousand dollars from his two months' work. On 
the 1st of January, 1850, he sailed with dispatches 
from General Smith to General Scott, and deliv- 



ANTE BELLUM. 1 3 

ered them in person to the general in New York 
at the end of the month. 

Lieutenant Sherman reported to General Scott, 
who then had his headquarters in New York, and 
was warmly received. After a few days he pro- 
ceeded to Washington, where he was very cordially 
received by General Zachary Taylor, then Presi- 
dent. Mr. Ewing was Secretary of the Interior, 
and lived in the house across the avenue from the 
War Department, afterward occupied by Mont- 
gomery Blair. Lieutenant Sherman obtained a six 
months' leave of absence, and. after a visit to his 
friends in Ohio, returned to Washington, and on 
May 1st married Miss Ellen Boyle Ewing, to whom 
he had become engaged in his visit to Ohio in the 
autumn of 1843. ^^i^s Ewing was a notable figure 
in Washington. She inherited from her father 
a stately presence, vigorous intellect, and reso- 
lute character; from her mother, benignity and 
devout religious faith. She was admired by men 
and loved by friends of her own sex. Some la- 
mented that she bestowed her hand upon an un- 
known lieutenant — unknown to them. All that was 
distinguished in Washington gathered at the wed- 
ding — the President and Cabinet, the diplomatic 
corps, the army and navy; Clay, Webster, and 
Corwin, and their compeers, and the justices of 
the Supreme Court. They little dreamed that the 
unknown lieutenant was to achieve a fame that 
would outshine the most noted of their number. 

The President, General Taylor, was taken ill 
on the 4th of July, and died a few days after. His 
indomitable courage, simple ways, and purity of 
character had endeared him to the people, and his 
direct honesty, good sense, firmness, and patriot- 
ism had inspired confidence in his administration in 
the troubles which were already making themselves 
felt. His death was a shock to the nation. Lieu- 
tenant Sherman acted as an aid-de-camp at the 



14 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



funeral. He reported for duty at St. Louis in Sep- 
tember, and found among the officers there Swords 
and Van VHet, who were afterward prominent 
quartermasters in the war of the rebeUion, and 
Buell, Hancock, Andrew J. Smith, and Bragg. 

An act was passed by Congress providing for 
the appointment of four additional captains in the 
commissary department, and Sherman was ap- 
pointed one of the four. There being some irregu- 
larity in the office of the commissary stationed at 
New Orleans, he was relieved and Sherman was 
appointed in his place. He went to New Orleans 
in September, 1852, and in the following winter 
the house of Lucas and Symonds, of St. Louis, pro- 
posed to establish a bank in San Francisco under 
the name of Lucas, Turner and Company, in which 
Sherman was to be a partner. He obtained a six 
months' leave of absence and embarked for San 
Francisco in March, 1853. Competent assistants 
were employed to have charge of the details and 
routine business, and Major Turner, of St. Louis, 
remained as manager. Sherman showed such apti- 
tude for the business that he resigned from the 
army, and in November Turner returned to the 
Last, leaving Sherman the responsible manager of 
the bank. In mastering and managing this new 
occupation he displayed his characteristic traits of 
character. He was quick and clear in his grasp 
of facts and principles, prompt in judgment, reso- 
lute and energetic in action, and cool in emergen- 
cies. With all his nervous and vivacious tempera- 
ment, he was a prudent, conservative, and safe 
man of business. 

The speculator Meigs, who enjoyed unlimited 
credit and was a large borrower, was indebted in 
a considerable sum. Sherman conceived a distrust 
of him, and, against the opinion of his cashier and 
the judgment of other bankers, insisted upon the 
settlement of two thirds of his debt and additional 



ANTE BELLUM. 1 5 

securit}^ for the remainder. When the crash came 
and Meigs fled, leaving unsettled debts to the 
amount of nearly one million dollars, many of his 
creditors were ruined, while Sherman's loss was 
trifling. In February, 1855, a nm upon the bank 
of Page, Bacon and Company, by far the largest 
house in San Francisco, caused the bank to close 
its doors and fail. The people in a panic rushed to 
all the banks, drawing out their deposits till nearly 
all closed. Sherman, apprehending trouble, had 
strengthened his funds, and when the crash came 
acted with such prompt vigor that the run upon 
his bank spent its force without causing any dis- 
turbance or delay in paying over his counter every 
demand made upon it. While the city was strewn 
with financial wrecks, the bank of Lucas, Turner 
and Company weathered the storm without injury, 
and gained increased credit by the ordeal. 

The abundance of gold, the recklessness of the 
miners, and the absence of established government 
drew many gamblers and desperadoes to California. 
When regular government was established, cor- 
ruption in elections was believed to result in putting 
into office men who were in league with the crimi- 
nal class, and who screened them from punishment. 
In May, 1856, James King, an editor who advo- 
cated law and order, and fearlessly assailed the 
gamblers and their allies, and who was one of the 
most popular men in San Francisco, was deliber- 
ately murdered in broad day in a public street in 
the heart of the city. The murderer at once gave 
himself up to the sheriff. This last straw aroused 
the people. A large number, embracing many of 
the best men in the city, organized themselves into 
a Vigilance Committee, a secret organization, to 
purge the community independently of the ofificers 
of the law. The first step proposed was to rescue 
the murderer of King from the friendly custody of 
the sheriff and dispose of him. 



1 6 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Sherman had no hesitation as to his cottrse. • 
He was clear that it was tlie duty of every citizen 
to aid in having the law enforced by the officers 
of the law, and that the assumption of citizens to 
form themselves into an unauthorized body for the 
punishment of criminals independent of the law and 
its officers was a menace to the State. The gov- 
ernor, who was earnest in having Casey, the mur- 
derer, punished by due course of law. consulted 
freely with Sherman, and appointed him major gen- 
eral of militia for the district embracing San Fran- 
cisco. Sherman found enough citizens of his way 
of thinking to form several companies, and was 
promised by General Wool, the commander of the 
military department, a supply of arms and am- 
nnmition. This preparation was at the point of 
success when General Wool withdrew his promise, 
and, all other arms being already in the posses- 
sion of the Vigilance Committee, Sherman's move- 
ment fell to the ground, and the State was pow- 
erless. Casey was taken from the jail and hanged. 
Some other dangerous characters were made 
away with, and the rest were banished. The city 
was purged, order established, and a feeling of se- 
curity restored. The Vigilance Committee be- 
came a permanent institution, and still exists. It 
has several times since been called into action, 
but only in great emergencies, and has always 
restricted its activity to the occasion which called 
it out. 

Sherman held that, great as the immediate bene- 
fit was, the same good would have been obtained if 
the same combined energy had been used to stimu- 
late and strengthen the constituted machinery of 
government, without sapping its authority. And 
who can tell how much the success of the California 
Vigilance Committee and the approbation that it 
received has encouraged and stimulated the Ku- 
klux of the South, the White Caps of the North, 



ANTE BELLUM. 1 7 

and lynching parties and insurrectionary labor 
unions throughout the land. 

The feverish prosperity of California had passed 
its climax. The influx of population, with the at- 
tendant competition in all branches of business and 
employment, put an end to inordinate profits. The 
shrinkage and readjustment which ensued was ac- 
companied by failures, bankruptcies, and withdraw- 
al of foreign capital. Acting on the suggestion of 
Sherman, the home office determined to close out 
their San Francisco business and withdraw the 
means employed in it. In May, 1857, the San 
Francisco house ceased business, and transferred 
undrawn deposits to other banks. Sherman re- 
turned to the East, leaving one of the firm to col- 
lect outstanding credits and dispose of real estate. 

Lucas and Company (as the house was called) 
still availed themselves of his services, and gave 
him employment. He and a partner were ap- 
pointed agents in New York of the St. Louis firm. 
He had been in business barely a month when, on 
the 2 1 St of August, the Ohio Life and Trust Com- 
pany, in Cincinnati, failed. It was the most im- 
portant financial corporation in the West, and was 
esteemed safe as the Bank of England. The 
shock to credit spread in waves that soon covered 
the West, and then extended to the Eastern States. 
It spread to and over Europe, and through Persia 
and India to China and Japan. The world was 
girdled with financial wrecks. Sherman's firm had 
not contracted debts, but Lucas and Company, in 
St. Louis, unable to turn securities into money fast 
enough, failed. The business of the New York 
agency was wound up, and Sherman took the 
moneys and assets to St. Louis. 

Declining to make another venture in business, 
he entered into partnership with his brother-in-law, 
Thomas Ewing, Jr.. afterward chief justice of the 
Supreme Court of Kansas, and conspicuous in the 



l8 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

war of the rebellion, but then practicing law at 
Leavenworth, Kas. In the spring of 1859 he left 
the firm to open and improve a farm upon a tract 
of land in Kansas owned by Thomas Ewing, Sr. 
But the yearning for military life, probably never 
extinguished, returned. He wrote in June to his 
friend Don Carlos Buell, then on duty with Secre- 
tary-of-War Floyd, asking if there was any chance 
of his being appointed a paymaster in the army. 
Buell replied, advising him to apply for the place 
of superintendent of a military school which was 
about to be opened in Louisiana. He made appli- 
4 cation by letter, receiving prompt notice in J*rfy 
J^ that he had been elected superintendent, with re- 
quest to report in Louisiana as soon as possible. 

In the autumn he reported to the Governor of 
Louisiana, and was cordially welcomed by him and 
by all who were interested in the undertaking. He 
found on the grounds of the institution, near Alex- 
andria, a large building, but not so much as a chair 
or table in it. Setting energetically to work, he 
succeeded in having the building furnished and 
equipped, a full corps of professors appointed, 
courses of study and rules of government adopted, 
and on the 1st of January the academy opened with 
a good attendance of cadets. The Legislature made 
liberal appropriations. The governor took personal 
interest in the institution, and the first term closed 
at the end of July with general approl:)ation. In 
the summer vacation Sherman went to Washington 
to solicit from the War Department arms for his 
academy. Louisiana had already received more 
than its quota from the General Government, but 
Secretary Floyd approved with alacrity a requisi- 
tion for two hundred muskets and accouterments, 
and promptly forwarded them. 

The school opened on the ist of November with 
a largely increased number of cadets. Abraham 
Lincoln was elected President the same month. 



ANTE BELLUM. 



19 



The whole country was seething with the discussion 
of slavery, and the secession of the Southern States 
from the Union was openly advocated. Sherman 
did not vote at the election, and avoided political 
discussion. But when it was necessary to speak 
he gave his opinion frankly, and did not hesitate to 
say that secession was treason and was war. Presi- 
dent Buchanan, in his message to Congress in De- 
cember, said that no State had the right under the 
Constitution or otherwise to secede from the Union; 
but that if a State should wrongfully determine to 
secede, neither the President nor Congress could 
interfere by force to prevent the accomplishment 
of the purpose and stay the dissolution of the Union. 
In the same month South Carolina seceded. Other 
States followed. In December the Governor of 
Louisiana seized the unguarded forts on the Missis- 
sippi, and on the loth of January, by an overwhelm- 
ing force, compelled the surrender of the arsenal 
at Baton Rouge. The time had arrived when every 
one had to take his side. Sherman wrote to the 
governor on the loth of January, i860: 

Sir : As I occupy a quasi military position under the 
laws of the State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I 
accepted such position when Louisiana was a State in the 
Union, and when the motto of this seminary was inserted in 
marble over the main door : " By the liberality of the General 
Government of the United States. The Union — esto per- 
pchta." Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it be- 
comes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraw from the 
Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the 
Constitution ns long as a fragment of it survives, and my 
stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In 
that event, I beg' you will send or appoint some authorized 
agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war be- 
longing to the State, or advise me what disposition to make 
of them. And furthermore, as president of the Board of 
Supervisors, I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me 
as superintendent the moment the State determines to se- 
cede, for on no earthly account will I do any act or think 



20 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

any thought hostile to or in defiance of the old Government 
of the United States. 

With great respect, your obedient servant 

W. T. Sherman, :::>uperintcndcnt. 

The governor accepted the resignation wdth 
regret and with warm expressions of friendship and 
esteem. The Board of Supervisors passed resolu- 
tions of- regret at his leaving and thanks for his 
past service. Every one spoke kindly and regret- 
fully. While he was settling his accounts and turn- 
ing over property, Bragg, Beauregard, and other 
officers of the army were abandoning the service 
of the United States, and General Twiggs, on duty 
in Texas, sitrrendered all the troops in the State, 
comprising a large part of the regular army, to- 
gether with all the military posts, their armament, 
and all Government stores to an improvised colonel 
of militia. 



. CHAPTER II. 

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 

Sherman, while disapproving of the institution 
of slavery, opposing its spread, and objecting to 
some of Its features, was not excited over its con- 
tinuance within existing limits, and objected to 
interference with it within those limits. But he was 
intensely loyal to the United States and the main- 
tenance of the Union; was shocked and pained at 
the desertion of his brother officers from their flag; 
was outraged at the seizure of Government forts 
and buildings and stores; and was bewildered by 
the apparent acquiescence of the Government at 
Washington. While the South was seething with 
excitement, breaking away from the Union, seizing 
the forts and other public buildings and property 
of the United States, forming a new nation, erect- 
ing a new government, and preparing for war, 
Sherman was arranging his affairs, settling up his 
accounts, and turning over the property belong- 
ing to the seminary. He was again adrift, without 
employment, and left New Orleans about the ist 
of March to rejoin his family and find means of 
supporting them. He thankfully accepted the of- 
fice of president of a street railway company at St. 
Louis, offered to him through the influence of his 
friends in that city. 

The people of the North were slow in attaining 
to a realizing sense of the state of affairs in the 
South. They knew little of war. and were incredu- 
lous of its near presence. To Sherman this seemed 

21 



22 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

the apathy of indifference. Upon the request of his 
brother, then in the House of Representatives, he 
went to Washington, and with him called on the 
President. When in the conversation Sherman said 
that the people of the South were preparing for war, 
Lincoln replied, " I guess we'll manage to keep 
house." Sherman said no more, and soon left. 
The two men, who did not yet know each other, 
parted — Lincoln, troubled undoubtedly by the 
statement, but veiling his feeling with a flash of 
levity; Sherman, disappointed, disheartened, de- 
pressed, angry. 

He entered upon his duty as president of the 
railway company on the ist of April. A few days 
later he was asked to accept the office of chief clerk 
of the War Department, with promise of early pro- 
motion to assistant secretary of war. He had just 
entered upon his new engagement, and had not yet 
recovered from the effect of what he considered a 
rebuff in Washington, and declined. 

Beauregard opened fire upon Fort Sumter on 
the 1 2th of April. This was act of open war upon 
the United States, and the loyal nation, roused 
like a strong man from his slumber, sprang to its 
feet. On the 15th the President called for seventy- 
five thousand volunteers to serve three months, and 
then added ten regiments to the regular army. A 
force of Virginia troops seized upon Harper's Ferry. 
A Massachusetts regiment, responding promptly to 
the President's call, was attacked while passing 
through Baltimore. Travel upon both the roads 
leading to Washington was stopped, and the capi- 
tal was cut off from all communication with the 
North and W^est. The blockade lasted till General 
Butler landed at Annapolis and opened the way 
to the city. 

Sherman, notwithstanding his signal proof of 
loyalty, found his friends becoming troubled about 
him, and undoubtedly became dissatisfied with his 



THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 23 

position. On the 8th of May he wrote to the Secre- 
tary of War: " I hold myself now, as always, pre- 
pared to serve my country in the capacity for which 
I was trained. I did not and will not volunteer for 
three months, because I can not throw my family 
upon the cold charity of the world. But for the 
three years' call made by the President an officer 
can prepare his command and do good service. I 
will not volunteer as a soldier, because, rightfully 
or wrongfully, I feel unwilling to take a mere pri- 
vate's place, and, having for many years lived in 
Louisiana and California, the men are not well 
enough acquainted with me to elect me to my ap- 
propriate place. Should my services be needed, the 
records of the War Department will enable you to 
designate the station in which I can render most 
service." 

On the 14th of May Sherman was appointed 
colonel of the Thirteenth Infantry in the regular 
army, and, on reporting at Washington, was as- 
signed to duty with Lieutenant-General Scott. Ai 
soon as the road to Washington was opened troops 
from the North and West poured in. Massachu- 
setts, New York, and Pennsylvania sent organized 
and drilled regiments. Most of the troops were 
men who enlisted full of ardor, but wholly without 
military instruction. Thev came to march to vic- 
tory and return home in triumph before the end of 
their enlistment. The Governor of Rhode Island 
came as colonel of one of his regiments. The 
Seventh New York camped on Mr. Stone's place, 
with wall tents for privates as well as officers, and 
comforted by a shipload of special supplies. When 
the troops with their multifarious baggage were 
moved across the river and organized into brigades 
and divisions, Sherman was assigned to command 
a brigade of four New York and one Wisconsin 
regiments, with a regular battery attached, being 
the Third Brigade of Tyler's division. 



2A GENERAL SHERMAN. 

It is an easy matter to make paper org-aniza- 
tions, but it is slow work to make actual soldiers. 
The people, thoughtless of the want of preparation, 
ignorant of the need of preparation, persisted in the 
demand for an onward movement, till General Scott, 
in July, ordered General McDowell, with the force 
about Washington, to advance and attack General 
Beauregard in his position on Bull Run, while Gen- 
eral Patterson, of Pennsylvania, with a large com- 
mand in the Shenandoah Valley, should watch and 
hold there General Joseph E. Johnston, and prevent 
his marching to aid Beauregard. 

Sherman went up to visit his brother, John 
Sherman, who was a volunteer aid-de-camp to Gen- 
eral Patterson. George H. Thomas was there, com- 
manding a brigade in Patterson's army. The Sher- 
mans and Thomas, being in a room together, dis- 
cussed the possibilities of the war. W. T. Sherman 
and Thomas spread a map of the United States upon 
the floor, and, kneeling down, tracing campaigns, 
designated Richmond, Nashville, Vicksburg, Chat- 
tanooga, and Atlanta as vital points to be taken. 
In their service it so happened that they, one or 
both, were immediately concerned in the capture 
of all of these but Richmond, and in repulsing at- 
tempted recapture of two of them. 

McDowell moved out from the camps on the 
1 6th of July, and on the 17th had his force in hand 
at Centerville. On the i8th, in a reconnoissance 
in force to Blackburn's Ford, on Bull Run, Sher- 
man for the first time heard artillery in actual con- 
flict. At 2 A. M. the army marched out to battle. 
General McDowell, with the great part of his com- 
mand, made a detour to the right to gain the left 
of Beauregard before crossing Bull Run. He 
crossed easily, and was successful at first in driving 
the enemy. But Johnston had succeeded in eluding 
Patterson, and had already joined Beauregard. The 
Confederate left, which had gradually fallen back. 



THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 25 

was largely re-enforced, and made a stand in a 
favorable position on the edge of a commanding 
plateau. Successive portions of the national line 
made successive assaults, but failed to drive the 
enemy from his position. No longer incited by 
success, and not held together by the cohesion of 
discipline, the irregular line broke in places, and 
streams of fugitives poured to the rear. By 3 p. m. 
the battle was lost. 

Tyler's division was left near Bull Run. in the 
neighborhood of the Stone Bridge, to guard against 
any attempt of the enemy to cross there and deliver 
a counter-attack. The sound of IVIcDoweH's attack 
could be heard advancing till about noon. The roar 
of battle then became stationary. General Tyler 
then sent Sherman with his brigade to support. 
Crossing by a ford which he had discovered, he 
marched toward the sound of the gims, and reported 
to General McDowell on the field. It was his place 
to march to attack over ground swept by artillery 
and musketry. He put in his regiments successive- 
ly, one at a time, and each in turn, after a gallant 
advance, broke and retired. About half past three 
the brigade crumbled. Many men had left the 
field. The loss in killed and wounded was severe. 
Sherman formed what was left into as good a square 
against cavalry as could be formed under the cir- 
cumstances, and retreated across the Stone Bridge, 
and followed the panic rout to Centerville. There 
he gathered enough of each regiment to put them 
into bivouac in regimental lines. In obedience to 
an order given by General Tyler, he resumed the re- 
treat at midnight, and reached his camp near the 
defenses of Washington about noon next day. 
Here he at once rendered the important service of 
making the guards at the aqueduct and neighbor- 
ing ferries strong enough to stem the multitudinous 
rout and turn the demoralized fugitives back to 
their camps. Of General McDowell's total loss of 



26 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

481 killed and 1,1 11 wounded, Sherman's brigade 
lost III killed and 205 wounded. 

When the news spread through the land that, 
instead of the expected victory, the National troops 
were defeated and had returned to Washington in 
disorder, the first feeling was bitter disappointment 
and mortification. Then came a general recogni- 
tion of the fact that war was a more serious matter 
than had been supposed, and then came the fixed 
resolve to carry the war through to successful issue, 
whatever might be the cost in toil or money or 
sacrifice. The soldiers were roused from their 
dream of easy conquest. Excepting men who had 
served in the Mexican War and some members of 
uniformed regiments in the older States, we were 
so profoundly ignorant of military matters that we 
were not aware that we were ignorant. It was 
commonly supposed that a knowledge of company 
drill made a man a soldier. It was now perceived 
that men who would carry on war must learn the 
business of war, as a man must learn any business 
if he would succeed in it. They set to work to learn 
through instruction and by practice the ways of 
marching, camping, picket duty, reconnoitering, 
skirmishing, and fighting battles; the repair and 
building of roads and bridges; the collection, trans- 
portation, and distribution of supplies; the function 
and conduct of courts-martial; the multifarious 
paper business of reports, returns, and correspond- 
ence; and, above all, the necessity for discipline 
and prompt, unquestioning obedience of orders. 
It was not easy for citizens of a republic, who know 
no superior but the law, to constrain themselves 
to obey a man without asking why. But when they 
discovered that military law is part of the law of 
the land; that military officers are officers of the 
law, and obedience to their authority is obedience 
to the law, it became easy to obey without lowering 
their self-respect. And as the war continued they 



THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 



27 



found that their own safety depended upon the en- 
forcement of discipHne, and that an unorganized 
mob of men differs from the same men transformed 
into a discipHned army, just as a pile of iron ore 
differs from the same ore smelted and wrought into 
a working engine. 

Immediately after Bull Run Sherman found his 
command scattered, restless, disorderly, and, to 
some extent, mutmous. He had made considerable 
progress in the training of his men when, on the 
17th of May, he was appointed brigadier general of 
volunteers, and was, August 24th, assigned to duty 
under Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, com- 
mander of the Department of the Cumberland. 
George H. Thomas, by the same order, received the 
same appointment and assignment. 

All the States south of Maryland, Kentucky, 
and Missouri were in open insurrection and war 
against the United States. Maryland was safe; 
Missouri was reasonably safe; Kentucky was quiv- 
ering between insurrection and loyalty. Sympathy 
with the South was common, especially among men 
having property and among the young men. But 
among the men of stanch loyalty were the names 
of Clay, Crittenden, Breckenridge, Anderson, Ham- 
ilton Pope, Guthrie, Speed, Harlan, Rousseau, 
Goodloe, Woolford, Landrum, and other well- 
known families. Among mechanics and men of 
moderate means loyalty to the National Government 
prevailed. Affinity of institutions allied Kentucky 
to the South, but the spirit of Henry Clay and John 
J. Crittenden bound a large part of the population 
by stronger tie to the United States. 

Governor Beriah McGoffin called the Legisla- 
ture into extra session in January, 1861, and recom- 
mended to it the convening of a sovereignty State 
convention, the purchase of arms, and the mobiliza- 
tion of the State militia. He did not succeed in 
having any of these measures adopted. When the 



28 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

governor issued his call, a great meeting of la- 
boring men was held in Louisville, which declared, 
without qualification, in favor of remaining in the 
Union and of sustaining the Government, and is- 
sued an address to the workingmen of the country 
as the class particularly concerned in the preserva- 
tion of the Union. At an election held shortly after- 
ward in Louisville to fill a vacancy in the Legis- 
lature, the new party secured the election of an 
uncompromising Union man, and in April elected 
another such mayor of the city. 

When President Lincoln issued his call for 
troops after the firing upon Fort Sumter, Gov- 
ernor McGoffin called the Legislature again into 
session to force the State out of the Union and into 
the Confederacy. Thereupon the Union Club, a se- 
cret society, was formed in Louisville to bring ear- 
nest Unionists together, and numbered six thousand 
members. This society was instrumental in the 
raising of two regiments and a battery of municipal 
troops, or home guards, which under the law were 
subject, not to the governor, but only to the mayor. 
The object of the society being secured before the 
summer was over, and its existence being no longer 
necessary, it died out in the autumn. 

When the Legislature, convened in April by 
the governor, met, it passed a joint resolution de- 
claring Kentucky neutral in the war. This was not 
a surrender, and was not a compromise, so much 
as a truce. It prevented secession for the present, 
and enabled parties to ripen their plans. Subse- 
quently, at the same session, laws were passed pro- 
viding for the purchase of arms to be distributed 
to the militia, not by the governor, but by a board 
of LTnion men; to provide for the raising of home 
guards for local defense ; and requiring the enlisted 
men, as well as the officers of the militia, to take 
an oath of allegiance to the United States as well 
as to the State of Kentuckv. 



THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 



29 



The Legislature adjourned about the close of 
May. A special election of members of Congress 
was held in June, and nine of the ten members 
elected were pronounced Union men. A new Legis- 
lature was elected in August, and three fourths of 
the members elected were Union men. Recruiting 
soldiers for the National Government became open 
through the State, and General Buckner moved 
his Confederate recniiting camp across the State 
line into Tennessee. Squads of recruits united and 
were formed into regiments, which rendezvoused at 
Camp Dick Robinson, south of the Kentucky River, 
forming a brigade under the command of General 
William Nelson. 

General Sherman and General Thomas reported 
to General Anderson in Cincinnati on the ist of 
September at the house of Lars Anderson, where 
they met a group of trusty Kentucky gentlemen as- 
sembled for advice and consultation. A Confed- 
erate force under General ZollicofTer, near Cum- 
berland Gap, another under General Buckner, near 
Clarksville, and a third under General Pillow, on 
the Mississippi River, were just beyond the State 
line in Tennessee waiting for the decision of Ken- 
tucky, while General Anderson had under his com- 
mand Nelson's brigade and a recruiting force under 
General Rousseau in Indiana, across the river from 
Louisville. Sherman was sent to solicit re-enforce- 
ments. He found Governor Morton, of Indiana, 
busy raising regiments, which as fast as they were 
mustered in were assigned to the Army of the 
Potomac, then commanded l)y General McClel- 
lan. At Springfield he found the Governor of Illi- 
nois equally busy raising regiments, which were 
ordered from Washington to report to McClellan 
or else to General Fremont, who commanded in 
Missouri. He went to St. Louis, and succeeded in 
obtaining audience of General Fremont through 
the intervention of an old California friend, who 



30 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



was in some capacity on General Fremont's staff. 
Here again he met refusal, General P'remont say- 
ing he must first drive the enemy out of Missouri, 
and he could not give aid to other fields until this 
should be accomplished. Sherman returned to 
Louisville. 

On the 3d of September General Pillow ad- 
vanced into Kentucky by an order of General Polk, 
and seized Hickman and Columbus. On the 6th 
General Grant entered Kentucky and occupied 
Paducah. There was much correspondence by 
telegraph and otherwise between the Confederate 
authorities, civil and military, as to whether or not 
General Polk's breach of the neutrality of Kentucky 
was a justifiable act of necessity. Jefferson Davis, 
President of the Confederacy, acquiesced, and the 
troops remained in possession of Columbus. On 
the 1 2th of September the Legislature of Kentucky 
passed a joint resolution requiring the governor 
to order the Confederate troops to leave the State. 
President Davis appointed General A. S. Johnston 
to the command of all the forces in Tennessee. 
General Johnston assumed command, and on the 
17th sent General Buckner to Bowling Green, Ky. 
General ZoUicoffer advanced his force to Cumber- 
land Ford a few days earlier. The dream of neu- 
trality was ended. 

When Buckner moved to Bowling Green a de- 
tachment pushed forward and burned a railroad 
bridge within thirty miles of Louisville. The news 
reached Louisville at night. General Anderson sent 
General Sherman across the river, and in an hour 
Rousseau had his men, one thousand, in line. The 
Home Guard of Louisville, under command of 
Hamilton Pope, volunteered, and at midnight, on 
a train secured by Mr. James Guthrie, General 
Sherman moved to the front with his extemporized 
command. It was ascertained that Buckner was 
not advancing. Sherman placed his troops upon 



THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 31 

Muldrauglis Hill. Troops began to arrive, and 
by the ist of October Sherman had there the equiva- 
lent of two brigades. 

General Anderson, worn out in his enfeebled 
health by the anxieties of the situation, relinquished 
command on the 8th of October, and Sherman, by 
seniority, assumed command. But in assuming 
command he wrote to the War Department, as he 
had stated orally to the President in Washington, 
that he wished to hold a subordinate command, and 
was assured that General Buell, then on his way 
from California, would, on arriving, relieve him. 
General Thomas superseded General Nelson at 
Camp Dick Robinson. General A. McD. McCook 
was put in command of the force pushed forward 
from Muldraugh's Hill to Nolin Creek. The en- 
tire force under Sherman's command was eighteen 
thousand men. He was confronted by more than 
double that number, and Johnston could at any time 
force his way to the Ohio River. Sherman was 
anxious, and with his impetuous frankness did not 
fail to express his anxiety. 

On the evening of the i6th of October Secretary- 
of-War Simon Cameron, with Adjutant-General 
Lorenzo Thomas, accompanied by some friends, 
arrived at Louisville on their return to Washing- 
ton from St. Louis, and had an interview with Gen- 
eral Sherman. General T. J. Wood and Mr. Guthrie 
were present. Sherman gave to the Secretarv a 
full statement of the political condition of Ken- 
tucky, the probability of recruiting troops from 
the inhabitants, the force already in the field and 
its distribution, the numbers and position of the 
enemy, and pointed out the scanty means at hand 
to defend a line extending from the Alleghanies to 
the Mississippi, and the ease with which the enemy 
could select his route and penetrate to the Ohio 
before any adequate force could be concentrated to 
oppose him. According to Adjutant-General Thom- 



32 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



as, " on being asked the question what force he 
deemed necessary, he promptly rephed two hundred 
thousand men." According to the statement of 
General T. J. Wood, written August 24, 1866: " For 
the purpose of expelling the rebels from Kentucky, 
General Sherman said that at least sixty thousand 
soldiers were necessary. . . . General Sherman ex- 
pressed the opinion that to carry on the war to 
the Gulf of Mexico and destroy all armed opposi- 
tion to the Government in the entire Mississippi 
Valley at least two hundred thousand troops were 
absolutely requisite." General Sherman says his 
remark was: " I argued that for the purpose of de- 
fense we should have sixty thousand men at once, 
and for ofifense would need two hundred thousand 
before we were done." While this estimate was 
largely in excess of what was commonly supposed 
to be sufficient, subsequent experience showed that 
his judgment was correct. But newspapers getting 
news of it, spoke of his insane demand, and then 
callea him insane, and demanded his release from 
command. It was the fate of Cassandra, treated 
with contumely by the people for giving true but 
unwelcome warning. 

Secretary Cameron ordered by telegraph re-en- 
forcements and arms, and Sherman diligently or- 
ganized his command, watched the enemy, and 
made dispositions to resist any advance. General 
McClellan required from him daily reports, and 
such as are published are model reports, full of in- 
formation, svtccinct and clear in statement, and sa- 
gacious in suggestion. General Buell arrived and 
assumed command on the 15th of November, and 
General Sherman was ordered to report for duty 
to General H. W. Halleck, commanding the De- 
partment of the Missouri. 

General Sherman, on reporting at St. Louis, 
was ordered on the 23d of November to visit the 
different stations and inspect troops, camps, equip- 



THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 



33 



ment, supplies, and transportation and routes for 
supplies. He reported on the 27th that he had 
ordered the whole force from Lexington forward to 
check the advancing enemy. This order was coun- 
termanded by General Halleck on the same day. 
Sherman telegraphed on the 28th that he had or- 
dered Pope's and Turner's divisions to advance. 
On the same day General Halleck telegraphed that 
Mrs. Sherman was in St. Louis, and directed Sher- 
man to return to the city at once. On the 2d of 
December Halleck wrote to General McClellan : 
" As stated in a former communication, General W. 
T. Sherman, on reporting here for duty, was or- 
dered to inspect troops (three divisions at Sedalia 
and vicinity), and if, in the absence of General 
Pope, he deemed there was danger of an immedi- 
ate attack, he was authorized to assume command. 
He did so, and commenced the movement of the 
troops in a manner which I did not approve and 
covmtermanded. I also received information from 
officers there that General Sherman was completely 
' stampeded,' and was stampeding the army. I 
therefore yesterday gave him a leave of absence for 
twenty days to visit his family in Ohio. I am satis- 
fied that General Sherman's physical and mental 
system is so completely broken by labor and care 
as to render him for the present entirely unfit for 
duty. Perhaps a few weeks' rest may restore him. 
I am satisfied that in his present condition it would 
be dangerous to give him a command here." 

General Sherman being greatly annoved and 
Mrs. Sherman distressed at the newspaper discus- 
sion of his alleged insanity, he asked for a twenty 
days' leave of absence, and made a visit to Lan- 
caster. He wrote from Lancaster to General Hal- 
leck on December 12th: 

" I believe you will be frank enough to answer 
me if you deem the steps I took at Sedalia as evi- 
dence of a want of mind. They may have been 



34 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



the result of an excess of caution on my part, but 
I do think the troops were too much strung out, 
and should be concentrated, with more men left 
along to guard the track. The animals, cattle 
especially, will be much exposed this winter. I 
set a much higher danger on the acts of unfriendly 
inhabitants than most ofBcers do, because I have 
lived in Missouri and the South, and know that in 
their individual characters they w'ill do more acts 
of hostility than Northern farmers or people could 
bring themselves to perpetrate. In my judgment. 
Price's army in the aggregate is less to be feared 
than when in scattered bands. 

" I write to you because a Cincinnati paper, 
whose reporter I imprisoned in Louisville for visit- 
ing our camps after I had forbidden him leave to 
go, has announced that I am insane, and alleges 
as a reason that my acts at Sedalia were so mad 
that subordinate of^cers refused to obey. I know 
of no order that I gave that was not obeyed, except 
General Pope's to advance his division to Sedalia, 
which order was countermanded by you, and the 
fact communicated to me. These newspapers have 
us in their power, and can destroy us as they please, 
and this one can destroy my usefulness by depriv- 
ing me of the confidence of ofBcers and men. I 
will be in St. Louis next week, and will be guided 
by your commands and judgment." 

General Halleck wrote on the 17th of December 
to P. B. Ewing, who had written to him inclosing 
some newspaper clippings: " I hope General Sher- 
man will not let these squibs trouble him in the 
least. They can do him no serious injury. When 
the general came here his health was much broken 
by long and severe labor, and his nervous system 
somewhat shaken by continuous excitement and 
responsibility. Those who saw him here may have 
drawn wrong inferences from his broken-down ap- 
pearance and rather imprudent remarks, but no 



THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. 



35 



one who was personally acquainted with him 
thought anything- was the matter with him except 
a want of rest. I have no doubt but that the quiet 
of home will in a short time enable him to resume 
his duties and silence all these scandalous and 
slanderous attacks." 

On the 1 8th Halleck wrote in answer to Sher- 
man's letter of the 12th: "Your movement of 
troops was not countermanded by me because I 
thought it an unwise one in itself, but because I 
was not then ready for it. I had better informa- 
tion of Price's movements than you had, and I 
had no apprehension of an attack. I intended to 
concentrate the forces on that line, but I wished 
the movement delayed until I could determine on 
a better position. After receiving Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel McPherson's report, I made precisely the loca- 
tion you had ordered. I was desirous at the time 
not to prevent the advance of Price by any move- 
ment on our part, hoping that he would move on 
Lexington; but finding that he had determined to 
remain at Osceola for some time at least, I made 
the movement you proposed." 

On returning to St. Louis, Sherman was as- 
signed to command the camp of instruction and 
post at Benton Barracks, and was, on the 13th of 
February, directed to proceed at once to Paducah, 
Ky., and on the 14th was assigned to command 
the district of Cairo. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 

General Halleck now began his advance 
down the Mississippi and up the Tennessee and 
Cumberland Rivers. General Curtis, with about 
ten thousand men in southwest Missouri, was ad- 
vanced into Arkansas, where, in battle at Pea 
Ridge, on the 7th and 8th of March, he routed and 
dispersed the greatly superior forces of Price and 
McCullough, united under the command of Van 
Dorn. General Grant, after much importunity, 
finally succeeded in obtaining, on the 30th of Janu- 
ary, permission and order from General Halleck 
to proceed up the Tennessee and attack Fort 
Henry. The next day he moved on transports, 
accompanied by Commodore Foote with his fleet, 
and on the 6th of February the fort, after a short 
but destructive bombardment, surrendered to the 
fleet. On the nth Commodore Foote sailed down 
the river to return up the Cumberland, and Grant 
moved by land next day to Fort Donelson. The 
fort surrendered on the morning of the i6th. On 
the 1 8th General Halleck pointed out to General 
Pope the situation of Madrid Bend, and directed 
him to organize an expedition to reduce this ap- 
parently impregnable bar to passage down the 
Mississippi. 

Upon the surrender of Fort Donelson the Con- 
federate Government ordered the evacuation of 
Columbus, on the Mississippi, and General A. S. 
Johnston withdrew from Bowling Green and re- 
36 




Battlefield of Shiloh. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 37 

treated through Nashville to Murfreesboro. Gen- 
eral Buell occupied Nashville. General Halleck 
immediately began preparation for further advance 
up the Tennessee. On the ist of March he dis- 
patched to Sherman at Paducah, to be forwarded 
to Grant : " Transports will be sent to you as soon 
as possible to move your column up the Tennes- 
see River. The main object of this expedition will 
be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, 
near Eastport, Miss., and also the railroad connec- 
tions at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is 
thought best that these objects be attempted in the 
order named. Strong detachments of cavalry and 
light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid 
movements reach these points from the river with- 
out serious opposition. Avoid any general engage- 
ments with strong forces. It will be better to re- 
treat than to risk a serious battle. This should 
be strongly impressed on the officers selected for 
expeditions from the river. General C. F. Smith, 
or some very discreet officer, should be selected for 
such commands." 

On the 4th of March Halleck telegraphed to 
General Grant : " You will place Major-General 
Smith in command of expedition, and remain your- 
self at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my or- 
ders to report strength and position of your com- 
mand? " On the 15th of March he reported to the 
adjutant general of the army : " In accordance with 
your instructions of the loth instant, I report Gen- 
eral Grant and several officers of high rank in his 
command, immediately after the battle of Fort 
Donelson, went to Nashville without any authority 
or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from in- 
vestigation that General Grant did this from good 
intentions, and from a desire to subserve the pub- 
lic interests. 

" Not being advised of General Buell's move- 
ments, and learning that General Buell had ordered 



38 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nash- 
ville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. 
During the absence of General Grant and a part 
of his general officers numerous irregularities are 
said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These 
were in violation of the orders issued by General 
Grant before his departure, and probably, under the 
circumstances, were unavoidable. 

" General Grant has made the proper explana- 
tions, and has been directed to resume his com- 
mand in the field. As he acted from a praiseworthy 
though mistaken zeal for the public service in 
going to Nashville and leaving his command, I re- 
spectfully recommend that no further notice be 
taken of it. There never has been any want of mili- 
tary subordination on the part of General Grant, 
and his failure to make returns of his forces has 
been explained as resulting partly from the failure 
of colonels to report to him on their arrival and 
partly from an interruption of telegraphic com- 
munication. All these irregularities have now been 
remedied." In all subsequent orders referring to 
movements the injunction to avoid getting into a 
serious engagement was repeated. 

General Grant remained at Fort Henry in quasi 
arrest while the troops of his district were assem- 
bling, under the command of General Smith, for 
the expedition up the Tennessee, and forwarded 
re-enforcements after the expedition had sailed. 
General Sherman, on arriving at Paducah, was busy 
forwarding troops, supplies, and dispatches, and 
in organizing a division for his own command. 
He left Paducah March loth, and Smith, with five 
divisions — McClernand's, Plurlbut's, Lewis Wal- 
lace's, Sherman's, and his own, commanded by W. 
H. L. Wallace — arrived at Savannah on the 13th. 

By order of General Smith, General Sherman 
sailed with his division up the river to Yellow 
Creek on the 14th to send out a force to break the 



THE RATTLE OF SHILOH. 



39 



railroad, if that could be done without bringing 
on a serious engagement. Before starting he sug- 
gested to General Smith that another division be 
sent to Pittsburg Landing to await there his re- 
turn. A heavy rain, flooding the country, had 
swollen the streams and submerged the roads, so 
that the attempt was ineffectual, and he dropped 
down the river to Pittsburg Landing on the 15th, 
where he found Hurlbut's division still on their 
boats. Sherman landed his division on the i6th 
to make a reconnoissance in force, and reported to 
General Smith, on the 17th, that Hurlbut's division 
would be landed that day. General Grant reported 
to General Halleck on the i8th: "I arrived here 
last evening, and found that General Sherman and 
Hurlbut's divisions were at Pittsburg, partially de- 
barked ; General Wallace, at Crump's Landing, six 
miles below, same side of the river; General Mc- 
Clernand's division at this place encamped ; and 
General Smith's, with unattached regiments on 
board transports, also here. I inmiediately ordered 
all troops, except McClernand's command, to Pitts- 
burg, and to debark there at once and discharge 
the steamers, to report at Paducah for further or- 
ders. ... I shall go to-morrow to Crump's Land- 
ing and Pittsburg, and if I think any change of po- 
sition for any of the troops needed I will make the 
change. Having full faith, however, in the judg- 
ment of General Smith, who located the present 
points of debarkation, I do not expect any change 
will be made." 

On the 26th of March General B. M. Prentiss re- 
ported for duty, and was assigned to command the 
unattached troops at Pittsburg Landing and others 
as they should arrive, and to organize them into 
a division, to be called the Sixth. Hickenlooper's 
battery, that arrived on the 5th of April, and regi- 
ments that arrived on the 5th and 6th, reported to 
Prentiss, and fought in his command on the 6th. 
4 



40 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



On the 26th of March Pittsburg Landing was made 
a mihtary post, and General C. F. Smith, senior 
officer, was assigned to the command. On the 
31st Grant changed district headquarters by order 
from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing, leaving an 
office at Savannah, but did not move his personal 
quarters to the landing till after April 6th. 

On the nth of March General McClellan, hav- 
ing taken command of the Army of the Potomac 
in the field, was relieved from command of all mili- 
tary departments except the Potomac, and the two 
departments under the command of Generals Hal- 
leck and Hunter, together with so much of that 
of General fjuell as lay west of the meridian of 
Knoxville, were consolidated as the Department of 
the Mississippi, under the command of General 
Plalleck. For some time Halleck had been urging 
Buell to join him at Savannah ; now, on the i6th 
of March, he ordered Buell to move his forces as 
rapidly as possible to Savannah. 

The road from Memphis to Chattanooga gave 
through railroad communication between the Mis- 
sissippi and the East. A parallel line from Vicks- 
burg through Jackson, Miss., was not continuous, 
there being a gap from Selma to Montgomery, 
in Alabama. The Memphis road was intersected 
at Corinth by the road from Mobile to Columbus, 
Ky., and at Grand Junction by the New Orleans, 
Jackson and Northern. General Johnston deter- 
mined to gather his forces at Corinth to save that 
important line of communication, and strive to 
achieve a victory there by which he could regain 
the territory lost in Tennessee and Kentucky. Sum- 
moning thither Bragg from Florida, Polk and 
Beauregard from Mississippi and West Tennessee, 
and new levies supplied by the governors of the 
Southern States, and moving thither the force gath- 
ered at Murfreesboro, he assembled at Corinth by 
the beginning of April something over fifty thou- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 41 

sand effectives. This number probably included 
officers as well as armed men, though later in the 
war the Confederate reports of eft'ectives included 
only armed enlisted men. Among the officers, be- 
sides Beauregard, Bragg, and Polk, were Hardee, 
Cheatham, and Cleburne. 

General Grant had six divisions : Lewis Wal- 
lace at Crump's Landing was encamped, one bri- 
gade at the landing, one at Stony Lonesome, two 
miles out from the landing, and the third at Adams- 
ville, three miles beyond Stony Lonesome. The 
other divisions were at Pittsburg Landing, five 
miles farther up the river. The camping ground 
was bounded on the east by the Tennessee, on the 
north by Snake Creek, and on the northwest and 
west by Owl Creek, an affluent of Snake Creek. 
All these were bordered by precipitous bluff banks. 
The western portion of the south front was pro- 
tected by a small affluent of Owl Creek, called by 
different names — Oak, Rea, and Shiloh Creek — 
and in some of the reports called Owl Creek. The 
eastern portion of the south front was covered by 
Locust Creek, which empties into Lick Creek near 
the river. A line of well-constructed earthworks 
along this front would have been impregnable 
against assault at that stage of the war. General 
Halleck, while he does not appear to have ordered 
the erection of defensive works, sent forward in- 
trenching tools, and supposed that the position 
w-as fortified. McPherson, the only engineer offi- 
cer, by direction laid out a line for intrenchment. 
This was back from the creeks, inconvenient for 
water supply, and would require the front line of 
camps — Sherman and Prentiss — to move their 
camps. As the place was to be held only until 
General Halleck should come to the front and 
begin the forward movement, such work seemed to 
be a waste of labor. And it was felt that a large 
portion of troops, new regiments of men fresh from 



42 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



their farms and workshops, who had come to the 
field to do deeds of war, would be disconcerted and 
discouraged if they were set to work digging, and 
were directed to fence themselves in from attack 
by the foe, whom they expected to march against 
and overcome. It was only after they found the 
value of earthworks by actual experience that the 
volunteers willingly performed the labor of erect- 
ing them. So, instead of fortifying the ground, 
the time was spent in giving the men instruction 
and practice in drill. 

The divisions of Sherman and Prentiss occu- 
pied the front. One of Sherman's brigades, Stu- 
art's, formed the extreme left of the line, being 
close to the river and facing Locust Creek. His 
other three brigades formed the right of the line — 
McDowell, on a ridge overlooking the bridge by 
which the road to Purdy crossed Owl Creek ; 
Buckland, to the front and left of McDowell, and 
separated from him by a ravine, and a little back 
from the valley of Oak Creek, which stream there 
wound through a morass tangled with thickets and 
decayed fallen timber. Two of Plildebrand's regi- 
ments extended Buckland's line up along the bank 
of Oak Creek, while his third regiment, Appier's, 
was apart, some hundred yards to the left, by a 
spring which v/as the source of one branch of Oak 
Creek. The right of Prentiss was a full half mile 
to the front of Sherman's left, and hidden from 
view ; his left was a greater distance to the front 
and right of Stuart's right, but in sight from it. 
McClernand was to the rear and left of Sherman ; 
Hurlbut, a mile out from the landing, across the 
Corinth road ; and W. H. L. Wallace on the plateau 
at the angle between the river and Snake Creek. 

Neither General Grant nor his subordinates 
had any apprehension of being attacked in this 
position by Johnston's army. It was proposed to 
put General Buell into camp at Hamburg, several 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 



43 



miles up the river, on his arrivah Reconnoitering 
parties, always cramped by instructions not to 
bring on an engagement, reported the presence of 
parties of the enemy's cavalry on the roads. Gen- 
eral Buckland, on Thursday, April 3d, by direction 
of General Sherman, marched his brigade out three 
miles, and thence sent out small parties. Nothing 
was found but small detachments of hostile cav- 
alry. Taylor's cavalry had gone out at midnight 
by Sherman's order, and, halting till daybreak when 
four miles out toward Corinth, advanced until they 
struck the enemy's cavalry pickets and captured 
one of them. General Chalmers, by a dispatch 
dated " Headquarters Advance," reported this at- 
tack upon the pickets of his cavalry. Friday, the 
4th, Clauton's Confederate cavalry swooped down 
on Buckland's picket line and captured and car- 
ried off a lieutenant and six men. Two companies 
of infantry were sent out in pursuit. Later Colonel 
Buckland followed with three more companies, and 
charged upon a large party of cavalry which had 
surrounded one of the missing companies and drove 
it. A battalion of cavalry sent by General Sher- 
man then came up and drove the enemy till they 
came in full view and under -the fire of a line of 
infantry and artillery. Colonel Buckland reported, 
" We ascertained the enemy was in force." Major 
Ricker, of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, reported " three 
or four pieces of artillery, at least two regiments 
of infantry, and a large cavalry force." General 
Sherman reported that he inferred the force was a 
brigade of two regiments of infantry, one regi- 
ment of cavalry, and one battery of artillery, sent 
to a point on the ridge road, about five miles in ad- 
vance of his camp, forwarded from a consider- 
able force at Pea Ridge or Monterey. General 
Grant reported to General Halleck that there were 
" three pieces of artillery and cavalry and infantry. 
How much can not, of course, be estimated. I 



44 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (gen- 
eral one) being made upon us, but will be prepared 
should such a thing take place." General Hardee 
reported : " Camp near Mickey's, April 4, 1862. 
The cavalry and infantry of the enemy attacked 
Colonel Clanton's regiment, which was posted, as 
I before informed you, about five hundred or six 
hundred yards in advance of my lines. Colonel 
Clanton retired, and the enemy's cavalry followed 
until they came near our infantry and artillery, 
when they were gallantly repulsed with slight loss." 
In his subsequent full report he states that Mickey's 
was sixteen miles from Corinth and eight from 
Pittsburg Landing ; that he arrived there in the 
morning of the 4th ; that it was General Cleburne's 
command that was attacked ; and that they biv- 
ouacked there for the night. Saturday, General 
Grant changed the assignment of the cavalry, and 
the regiments moved to their new positions. 
Otherwise the National camp was quiet. The pick- 
ets of the Seventy-seventh Ohio noticed rabbits and 
squirrels in great numbers coming from the woods 
in front and passing through their line. Buckland's 
pickets observed cavalry to the front, and Sherman 
being advised, and having no cavalry to send out, 
ordered the pickets to be strengthened and to be 
vigilant. Prentiss sent out a party in the after- 
noon which advanced three miles obliquely in ad- 
vance of his front, and returned without having 
seen anything. 

General Johnston selected forty thousand of his 
efifectives for attack upon Grant. This force was 
organized into three corps, commanded respective- 
ly by Generals Hardee, Bragg, and Polk, and a re- 
serve under General Breckenridge. General Beau- 
regard had no corps, but was second in general 
command. Hardee's corps comprised Hindman's 
division and a separate brigade, commanded by Cle- 
burne. Bragg's corps was composed of two di- 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 



45 



visions — Ruggles and Withers. Polk's corps also 
was constituted of two divisions — Clark's and 
Cheatham's. The reserve embraced three brigades, 
commanded respectively by General Bowen and 
Colonels Trabne and Statham. General Johnston, 
receiving information in the night of Wednesday, 
April 2d, that Buell was advancing rapidly toward 
the Tennessee, moved out from his camp at Cor- 
inth Thursday afternoon. General Hardee, having 
the advance, reached Mickey's, eight miles from 
Pittsburg Landing, Friday morning, was encoun- 
tered there by General Buckland's detachment, 
bivouacked there that afternoon, and moved into 
position and deployed about lO a. m. Saturday. 
The remaining troops struggled along through in- 
adequate roads made miry by rain, impeded by 
mud and by misunderstandings, and finally reached 
their respective positions about 4 p. m. The at- 
tack intended to be made at eight o'clock Saturday 
morning was postponed to daybreak Sunday. As 
the long columns were all day sweeping through 
the forest, stretching into long parallel lines, the 
squirrels and rabbits, startled from their homes, 
scudding past the National pickets, were the only 
messengers who brought news of the movement 
to the national camp. 

At 3 A. M. Sunday, the 6th, three companies of 
the Twenty-fifth Missouri, of Peabody's brigade of 
Prentiss's division, moved out to the front, and 
about half past five o'clock encountered the ene- 
my's cavalry and forced them back to a line of 
infantry concealed behind a fence. A sharp en- 
gagement ensued, and then the party withdrew. 
Major Hardcastle, of the Third Mississippi, re- 
ports that on the night of the 5th, being sent out 
to picket the front of Wood's brigade, he deployed 
his battalion a quarter of a mile to the front of the 
brigade, and posted small parties one hundred and 
two hundred yards farther to the front, cavalry 



46 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

videttes being advanced still farther to the front ; 
that about dawn the videttes fired on an advancing 
force and retired. The infantry posts successively 
did the same, and a sharp engagement followed, 
which lasted an hour, in which he lost four killed 
and twenty wounded before the attacking party 
withdrew, and, seeing his brigade form in line at 
half past six o'clock, he fell back and took his place 
in line. The three companies of the Twenty-fifth 
Missouri, returning to camp, met Colonel Moore 
with five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri 
half a mile out from the brigade camp, who dis- 
patched the wounded to camp, retained the others, 
and sent for the remainder of his regiment. When 
his other five companies arrived, he marched by 
the flank about three hundred yards to the north- 
west corner of a cotton field, which was the See 
farm, and there came under fire. 

General Johnston, instead of placing his corps 
one in the center and the others in wings or re- 
serve, formed each corps in line of regiments 
doubled on the center at intervals that permitted 
them to deploy into line before going into action. 
Hardee's corps, so deployed, with the addition of 
Gladden's brigade extending his right, made a 
front of two miles. Bragg's corps formed in like 
manner one thousand yards in the rear of Hardee, 
Polk in the rear of Bragg's left, and Breckenridge in 
rear of Bragg's right. 

It is impossible to reconcile the discrepant 
statements as to distance and time. But it is rea- 
sonably certain that the distance between Hardee's 
line and Prentiss's camp was three miles or more, 
and that Johnston's army was not in motion before 
six o'clock. As the long lines pressed forward 
through forest, over ground broken by ridges and 
ravines, the rate of advance was determined by the 
rate of the slowest portion, and at times the second 
line would overtake the first. Batteries had to 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 



47 



swerve from their direct course to find practicable 
passage. It was impossible for brigades to main- 
tain the prescribed intervals or preserve the gen- 
eral alignment. About seven o'clock Shaver's 
brigade struck the Twenty-fifth Missouri in See's 
cotton field, and recoiled from a heavy fire deliv- 
ered from a rising ground in the field. Colonel 
Moore, re-enforced by the remainder of the Twen- 
ty-first, fell back behind a ridge, which shielded 
his men, and stubbornly held his ground. As 
Johnston's army advanced, his line of skirmishers 
met the National pickets, who fell back fighting. 
The line of sputtering fire along the front, by its 
continuance and increasing nearness, was heard in 
the National camp, and aroused surmise and sjiecu- 
lation in some, excited uneasiness in others. \Vhen 
the infantry engagement (for Shaver's battery had 
been detached from him) resounded, the whole 
camp was startled. Prentiss marched his division 
out a quarter of a mile from his camp. Colonel 
Moore, falling back to his left and rear, connected 
with Prentiss and formed the right of the line. 
Gladden's brigade attacked. General Gladden was 
killed, and his command fell back in confusion, 
carrying with it the two right regiments of Shaver's 
brigade. Chalmers's brigade came up with Jackson 
in reserve, and the attack was renewed with such 
vigor that Prentiss's entire division gave way, but 
rallied just in front of their camp. After another 
fierce contest the division gave way, fell back 
through the camp, and retreated in disorder to 
rally On the summit of rising ground half a mile in 
rear of their camp. 

Meanwhile the battle had joined along the front 
of two miles. General Bragg says in his report 
that, after encountering the National pickets and 
brvishing them away, " in about one mile more we 
encountered him in strong force along almost the 
entire line. His batteries were posted on emi- 



48 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

nences, with strong infantry supports. Finding 
the first Hne now nnequal to the work before it, 
being weakened by extension and necessarily 
broken by the nature of the ground, I ordered my 
whole force to move up steadily and promptly to 
its support. From this time — about 7.30 o'clock — 
until night the battle raged with little intermis- 
sion." Colonel Thompson, aid-de-camp to General 
Beauregard, in his report to the general says : " At 
6.30 o'clock 1 l)rought an order from you to Gen- 
eral Breckcnridge, who commanded the reserve, 
that he must hurry up his troops, as General Polk 
was moving forward, which was promptly delivered 
and promptly obeyed. About 7.30 o'clock I rode 
forward with Colonel Jordan to the front to ascer- 
tain how the battle was going. There I learned 
from General Jolmston that General Hardee's line 
was within half a mile of the enemy's camps. About 
ten o'clock you moved forward with your staff and 
halted within about half a mile of their camps, at 
which time our troops were reported to be in full 
possession of the enemy's camps." 

A squadron of Georgia cavalry felt along the 
National picket line Saturday. General Buckland 
strengtliened his pickets Saturday night, and Gen- 
eral Sherman ordered the Seventy-seventh Ohio 
of Hildcl)rand's brigade to go out early Simday 
morning to See's farm. General Buckland was 
wakeful through the night, and, receiving word 
while at breakfast Sunday morning that his pickets 
were attacked in force, had the long roll sounded, 
formed his brigade in line, and reported to General 
Sherman. The division was soon formed. The 
Fifty-third ( )hio was on the left. Four guns of 
Waterhouse's battery on its right, the other two 
guns advanced a hundred yards to the front, be- 
yond Oak Creek ; Hildebrand to its right ; Tay- 
lor's battery, commanded by Lieutenant Barrett 
(Captain Taylor serving as cliief of artillery of the 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 



49 



division), on rising ground, commanding the front 
of both Hildebrand and Bnckland, Buckland form- 
ing the right of the hne, McDoweh being to the 
right and rear of Buckland on a separate ridge, 
overlooking Owl Creek, where it was crossed by 
a bridge, and having Behr's battery with him. 

General Cleburne's brigade, forming the left of 
Hardee's corps, impeded by crossing ravines and 
ridges through woods, and by the obstinate re- 
sistance of the National pickets, reached the farther 
side of Oak Creek about eight o'clock. General 
Patton Anderson's brigade was in reserve and two 
hundred and seventy yards in rear of the other two 
brigades of Ruggles's division, which were one 
thousand yards in rear of Hardee. General Ander- 
son speaks of the difficulty of the ground and the 
persistence of the National skirmish line, but in the 
inequalities of the advance he pushed into the front 
line of Ruggles's division, and then into Hardee's 
line, on Cleburne's right, and in front of Hilde- 
brand's brigade. 

The muskets of the Forty-third Illinois of Mc- 
Clernand's division being still, Sunday morning, 
loaded since Friday evening, permission was ob- 
tained to proceed to the front and fire them oflf. 
Distant report of firearms was heard, and was re- 
ported to General McClernand. He sent word to 
Colonel Reardon, commanding the Third Brigade, 
to form his command. Colonel Reardon, being ill 
in bed, sent word to Colonel Raith, of the Forty- 
third Illinois, to assume command. The colonel 
of the Forty-ninth refused to believe that the dis- 
tant firing was from the enemy, and delayed call- 
ing out his regiment. The brigade was finally 
formed and, moving forward, took position on the 
left of Sherman's division, sending a skirmish line 
out to the front. Colonel Marsh, of the Twentieth 
Illinois, commanding tlie Second Brigade, heard 
firing off to the front. This continuing some time, 



50 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

being, in fact, the musketry engagement between 
General Shaver and the Missouri regiments, or- 
dered his regimental commanders to be in readi- 
ness to form. And soon, in pursuance of order 
received, he advanced and formed on the left of 
the Third Brigade. About eight o'clock the First 
Brigade was ordered to form on the left of the 
Second with three regiments, and detach the fourth 
regiment to the riglit of the Second Brigade. 

Wood's brigade of Hardee's corps, containing 
six regiments and two battalions, pressed forward 
against McClernand. Gibson's brigade of Bragg's 
corps, filling the interval between Wood and Patton 
Anderson, confronted the Fifty-third Ohio and the 
right of McClernand. A part of Russell's brigade 
of Polk's corps acted on the right of Wood against 
McClernand's left, and was soon supported by 
Bushrod Johnson's brigade of the same corps. 

General Hurlbut, receiving word about half past 
seven o'clock from General Sherman that he was 
attacked, directed General \'eatch to form his bri- 
gade and march to General Sherman's line. Veatch 
had just gone when word came from General Pren- 
tiss asking for aid. Forming his two remaining 
brigades, Williams's and Lauman's, he advanced, 
and met Prentiss's command falling back in dis- 
order. Continuing his advance to the south of the 
peach orchard, he met the enemy and came under 
fire a little after nine o'clock. General Prentiss ral- 
lied and reformed his command and formed in line, 
his left joining liurlbut's right. General W. H. L. 
Wallace, commanding Smith's division, moved 
from his camp at nine o'clock. General McAr- 
thur, having sent one regiment — Thirteenth Mis- 
souri — to General Sherman and two regiments to 
guard the bridge over Snake Creek, where the road 
to Crump's Landing crossed, advanced with his 
two remaining regiments to General Hurlbut's left 
and extended Hurlbut's line toward the river. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 



51 



Wallace took his two other brigades to the aid of 
Prentiss, resting his left on Prentiss's right. The 
right of Wallace's line rested fixed all day on the 
edge of a broad and deep ravine, filled with woods 
and dense thickets, which served as an impassable 
barrier, dividing the National line into two por- 
tions. Wallace's right rested against it all day, 
McClernand's left touched and skirted it, but these 
two divisions were at no time in touch with each 
other. Colonel Stuart, at his isolated camp of three 
regiments, received w^ord at about half past seven 
o'clock from General Prentiss that the enemy was 
in force in his front. Shortly after Stuart's pickets 
sent in word that a force was advancing on the 
Bark road. Before long a battery was seen going 
into position on the heights beyond Locust Creek, 
eleven hundred yards distant. Stuart formed his 
brigade in front of his camp, facing south, a quar- 
ter of a mile to the front and left of Hurlbut's left. 

In consequence of the formation of A. S. John- 
ston's three corps into three long parallel lines, 
and also owing to the broken and wooded ground 
over which they advanced, the front line, by the 
time it delivered its attack, was pierced in places 
by portions of the other two lines ; the brigades of 
some divisions were separated from each other by 
portions of other commands pushed between, and 
even some brigades were severed, the different regi- 
ments being sent to re-enforce different portions 
of the line. In the course of the battle division and 
brigade commanders received orders directly from 
General Johnston, General Beauregard, and all the 
corps commanders. All orders were obeyed with 
alacrity and without question, except some in front 
of the Hornet's Nest, in the eager desire to press 
forward to victory. 

Before nine o'clock the whole of Sherman's and 
McClernand's divisions, as well as Prentiss's, was 
fully engaged. Colonel Thompson, aid-de-camp 



52 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



to General Beauregard, in his report, made imme- 
diately after the battle, states, " From eight to half 
past eight o'clock the cannonading was very heavy 
along the whole line." Hildebrand was attacked 
about eight o'clock. B. R. Johnson's brigade came 
under artillery fire at half past eight o'clock, and 
about fifteen minutes later made attack upon the 
left brigade, Hare's, of McClernand's division. 

The little stream which flowed through the val- 
ley or ravine bordering the front of Sherman's 
camp was fed by springs, and, spreading over the 
loamy bottom, turned it into a marsh. Being ob- 
structed by fallen timber and clumps of under- 
growth, it was a serious impediment to troops ad- 
vancing across it under fire. Bushrod Johnson's 
brigade was broken in wading through the mud of 
the valley, and his battery was taken over with 
great difficulty. When the crossing was efifected, 
two of the regiments were missing, and it was 
learned, after inquiry by the brigade commander, 
that they had been detached by order of General 
Bragg. Advancing with his battery and his three 
remaining regiments, he fell upon Hare's brigade, 
the left of McClernand's line, just after it had got 
into position. After a sharp conflict, Johnson's 
command broke and fell back. He renewed the at- 
tack, with the same result. He tried in vain to 
move his men forward again. His battery lost its 
commander and half the men, and all the guns 
were silenced but one. Johnson himself was 
wounded, and then drew what was left of his com- 
mand out of lire. 

Wood's brigade fell upon McClernand's second 
brigade, commanded by Colonel Marsh, with a 
furious onset and deadly fire. When Marsh had 
lost five field officers and many company officers 
killed and wounded, his command became disor- 
ganized and fell back in disorder. Marsh rallied 
and reformed them about two hundred vards in 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 53 

the rear. Wood wheeled his brigade to the left, 
against the flank of McClernand's right brigade, 
commanded by Colonel Reardon, who refused his 
left and confronted Wood. Meanwhile Colonel 
Preston Smith, assuming command of Johnson's 
brigade, regained the two detached regiments and 
reformed his conmiand ; then joining A. P. Stew- 
art's brigade, w-hich had just come to the front, they 
fell upon Hare's brigade, and compelled it to fall 
back to the line formed by Colonel Marsh. 

The three regiments of Russell's brigade strug- 
gled with difficulty through the swamp and briers 
of the little valley, under a destructive fire from 
Waterhouse's battery, and as they began to ascend 
the farther slope the Fifty-third poured additional 
volleys, which they could not endure, and they 
fell back through the swamp. After they were ral- 
lied, reassembled, and formed, another attempt was 
made, with the same result. Then Colonel Appier 
called out to his men to fall back and save them- 
selves. The Fifty-third, hearing the command, and 
not knowing what danger threatened, fled to the 
rear in confusion. The adjutant, E. C. Dawes, 
with Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, rallied the regi- 
ment and returned with it to its post. Colonel 
Appier returned and again gave the order, *' Fall 
back and save yourselves ! " Two companies re- 
mained firm and attached themselves, with Adju- 
tant Dawes, to the Seventeenth Illinois. The re- 
maining eight companies drifted to the rear, and, 
becoming separated from their colonel, took posi- 
tion near the landing, and afterward returned to 
the front with the lieutenant colonel. 

Patton Anderson, reaching for Hildebrand's 
brigade lower down the little valley, found it a 
greater obstacle than it offered to the troops on 
his right. Barrett's battery, crowning the blufif on 
the farther side, nearly on a line with the left of 
Anderson's brigade, poured merciless volleys upon 



54 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

the unresisting- battalions toiling through the 
morass and thickets. Fragments of regiments, ad- 
vancing as they emerged and reached solid ground, 
charged up the slope gallantly, but without cohe- 
sion and without impetus, and were swept back 
by the fire of the Fifty-seventh and Seventy-seventh 
Ohio. Hildebrand repelled two such assaults upon 
these two regiments before the Fifty-third Ohio 
finally gave way. 

Buckland's brigade was on the blufif overlook- 
ing the little stream near its junction with Owl 
Creek. The little valley there was wider, the morass 
deeper, and fallen timber massed the tangle of 
vines and briers. Barrett's battery swept its whole 
front, and a projecting spur near the right of the 
line served as a bastion, whence a company en- 
filaded the assaulting enemy. General Cleburne, 
with his large brigade and Trigg's battery, consti- 
tuting the extreme left of the Confederate army, 
was brought by its position to the front of Buck- 
land. Trigg's battery did not descend into the val- 
ley, but in an artillery duel with Barrett's battery 
was soon silenced and withdrawn. Cleburne's 
regiments pertinaciously forced their way over and 
through the obstacles, but, separated and broken, 
the concentric fire from front and both flanks rolled 
them back at every essay. Cleburne rode from 
one wing to another to encourage his dashing but 
disrupted battalions, only to impel his ranks to 
fresh slaughter. The Sixth Mississippi, having lost 
three hundred killed and wounded, including both 
field officers, out of an aggregate of four hundred 
and twenty-five, withdrew and took no subsequent 
part in the battle. The Second Tennessee, having 
its colonel severely and its major mortally wound- 
ed and its ranks sorely thinned, withdrew from the 
field for the rest of the day. The Twenty-third 
Tennessee drifted to another part of the field. In 
the rush which ensued when Sherman drew his 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 55 

division back Cleburne was separated from his 
command until, at 2 p. :\i., he found his remaining 
three regiments halted under the brow of an abrupt 
hill. Of the twenty-seven hundred and fifty mus- 
kets which he carried into the assault on Sherman 
Sunday morning, he was able to assemble only 
eight hundred for the contest on Monday. 

When the Fifty-third Ohio broke. Colonel 
Raith's brigade was exposed on both flanks, and 
was ordered by General ]\IcClernand to fall back 
and join his other brigades. Sherman had tena- 
ciously held his line two hours ; but now, ten 
o'clock, the enemy having passed to his rear, or- 
dered it to fall back and form on the Purdy road. 
When Waterhouse had traversed half the distance 
he halted and w^ent into action, trying to stem the 
pursuit by firing at short range ; but the tumultuous 
rush overran his battery and captured three guns, 
while he barely escaped with the other three. Hil- 
debrand's two remaining regiments w^ere thrown 
into disorder and partly dispersed. He served as 
a volunteer on General AlcClernand's stafif the rest 
of the day, while Major Fearing and the greater 
part of the Seventy-seventh and a portion of the 
Fifty-seventh formed on the Purdy road, on the 
left of the Thirteenth Missouri, which was incor- 
porated into Sherman's command during the rest 
of the battle. Buckland withdrew in order, cover- 
ing his wagons, which retired before him. Mc- 
Dowell, who had not yet been attacked or dis- 
turbed, moved along the Purdy road, which passed 
through his camp, to the position assigned. Mc- 
Dowell's wagon train proceeded along the road, 
and his battery (Behr's), galloping to its place, in- 
terfered with the formation of the line. Captain 
Behr being quickly killed, his men scampered ofif 
with their caissons, leaving a break in the line. 
Sherman drew' his maimed division back to the left 
and rear, connecting with McClernand's right, and 
5 



56 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

these two commanders operated together during 
the rest of the day. 

Sherman and McClernand together kept a co- 
herent Hne through the day. There were charges 
and countercharges, repulses alternately on both 
sides. Confederate charges were sometimes re- 
pulsed with serious loss. At one time the national 
line, surging back with a great impulse, regained 
half a mile of lost ground, and reoccupied a greater 
part of McClernand's camp. A rally, a re-enforced 
mass, an impetuous countercharge, checked the na- 
tional divisions, and pushed them back farther than 
before. The Confederate columns were continual- 
ly re-enforced by brigades or regiments coming 
to the front from the second and third lines and 
the reserve corps, while Lewis Wallace expected 
on one flank, and Nelson expected on the other, 
failed to appear, and the National line was thin- 
ning, crumbling, contracting. About 4.30 p. m. 
what was left of the two divisions was on the east 
side of Tillman or Brier Creek, on the ground 
where they rested for the night, so far back from 
the woods that the force which they had engaged 
passed between and so around to the rear of Pren- 
tiss and W. H. L. Wallace. But the weary bat- 
talions were still fresh enough to promptly repulse 
with disastrous loss an attack made by Pond's bri- 
gade, the closing operation of the day on that part 
of the field. 

In falling back from the position taken on the 
Purdy road, McDowell's brigade was separated 
from the rest of the division by the Confederate 
troops pouring through the gap made by the de- 
fection of Behr's battery. By prompt and rapid 
use of one gun that remained manned he saved his 
brigade from being surrounded and wholly cut 
off. In falling back through woods and tents, and 
over ridges and ravines, the Fortieth Illinois be- 
came separated, was attacked by and repelled a 



■^ 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 



57 



Confederate regiment, found its way to the rear 
of McClernand's division, and remained there for 
the night. Trabue's brigade, brought forward from 
the reserve corps after a regiment and two bat- 
tahons of infantry and two batteries and a squadron 
of cavalry had been detached from it to aid some 
other hard-pressed brigade, was reduced to four 
regiments. At about half past twelve o'clock Tra- 
bue found McDowell's two regiments in line with- 
in the edge of timber bordering a field. As he 
moved into position to attack the Forty-sixth Ohio 
promptly opened fire. A destructive fight at close 
quarters ensued. McDowell was re-enforced by 
the Forty-sixth Illinois from Veatch's brigade ; 
Trabue, by General A. P. Stewart, with part of his 
brigade and a portion of Patton Anderson's bri- 
gade. McDowell was forced to give way. The 
Forty-sixth Ohio was completely dispersed, and 
did not reassemble till after the battle. The Sixth 
Iowa, commanded by Captain Williams, retired 
to the artillery near the landing. In the hour and 
a half that this contest lasted, the Forty-sixth Ohio 
lost thirty-seven killed and one hundred and 
eighty-five wounded ; the Sixth Iowa lost fifty-two 
killed and ninety-four wounded. Of Trabue's re- 
ported casualties in the two days — eight hundred 
and forty-four — the much greater portion hap- 
pened in this engagement. 

Bouton's brigade, which had just arrived and 
had not been assigned, and the Fifty-third Ohio 
were ordered by General Sherman's assistant adju- 
tant general and his chief of artillery to leave the 
landing and aid McAllister's battery in repelling 
the final attack on Sherman and McClernand. 
Pond's brigade was ordered by General Hardee to 
advance and silence the batteries. He proceeded 
north along the bottom of the ravine of Tillman's 
or Brier Creek, then to the east up a lateral ravine 
to take the batteries on the flank. When he drew 



58 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

near the batteries withdrew, and the supporting 
infantry poured in such a destructive fire that 
Pond's brigade precipitately withdrew, the Eight- 
eenth Louisiana, the advance regiment, leaving 
two hundred and seven dead and wounded in the 
ravine. That ended the battle for the day on that 
part of the field. 

When Prentiss fell back through his camp and 
rallied and reformed behind Plurlbut, Chalmers 
made an ineffective attack, which must have been 
on General Hurlbut's right, and was by order re- 
called and sent to the extreme right of the Con- 
federate army. Delaying half an hour for a guide, 
then marching south and crossing Locust Creek 
before proceeding toward the river, he finally 
reached high land, facing Stuart's camp. Some 
skirmishers, whom Stuart had sent across Locust 
Creek, fired into the Fifty-second Tennessee, and 
threw it into such disorder that General Chalmers 
was able to rally only two companies, and sent the 
remainder of the regiment to the rear, where it 
remained during the rest of the battle. As Chal- 
mers crossed Locust Creek with his remaining five 
regiments and Gage's battery, his right being on 
the river blulT, Stuart fell back behind his camp, 
across a ravine, and took position on a wooded 
ridge with a field in front, his command being re- 
duced to two regiments by the defection of the 
Seventy-first Ohio. The Fifty-fourth and Fifty- 
fifth Illinois on the one side, and Chalmers's bri- 
gade and Gage's battery on the other, fired at each 
other across this open field until Chalmers's am- 
munition was exhausted. After his ammunition 
was replenished he found Stuart posted on another 
ridge farther to the rear. Another stubborn fight 
ensued, and when Stuart retired again Chalmers 
found himself near and then mingled with the 
surge of troops that rolled up to envelop the rear 
of Prentiss and Wallace. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 59 

Jackson's brigade was in rear of and was not 
engaged with Gladden and Chalmers in the attack 
upon Prentiss, but joined them after Prentiss had 
broken and retired, and was ordered to follow 
Chalmers to the extreme right. With his four regi- 
ments and Girardy's battery, he formed on the left 
of Chalmers on the south side of Locust Creek. 
Crossing this " deep and almost impassable ra- 
vine," as Jackson calls it, he fell upon General ]\Ic- 
Arthur and his two regiments. In a series of ob- 
stinate struggles McArthur, forced successively 
from position after position, only to seize new 
vantage where he could renew the fight, was even- 
tually obliged to retire with Stuart to the north bank 
of the ravine near the landing, and join the force 
gathering there to make a final stand. 

Gladden's brigade, now commanded by Colonel 
Adams, after resting some time in Prentiss's camp, 
moved to the right and attacked Hurlbut, whose 
line was then advanced beyond the peach orchard 
and along the south side of the large field. A shell 
exploded amid the Thirteenth Ohio Battery ; of- 
ficers and men abandoned their guns and fled. The 
remainder of the division was steady, and, after a 
sharp struggle, Adams drew his command off, and 
Hurlbut shifted his line back to the north side of 
the field behind the fence. Two regiments — the 
Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky — were left 
along the west side of the field. General Cheat- 
ham, having sent Bushrod Johnson's brigade to 
the front of McClernand's, was ordered by General 
Beauregard to go with his other brigade to the 
extreme right of the battle and go in where he 
found the fighting hottest. About ten o'clock he 
reached the south side of the field and engaged 
Hurlbut, firing across the field. When General 
Breckenridge arrived with Bowen and Statham's 
brigades, and formed on Cheatham's right, Cheat- 
ham was ordered to charsre. His men advanced 



6o GENERAL SHERMAN, 

steadily under a galling lire till they had crossed 
half of the field, when the Kentucky regiments, 
rising upon their flank, poured in an unexpected 
enfilading fire, which shattered their ranks and 
drove them from the field in confusion. 

General Johnston was resolved to break the Na- 
tional left and push forward and interpose between 
General Grant and the river. He had now massed 
twenty-eight regiments and six batteries against 
the twelve regiments and two batteries of Hurlbut, 
McArthur, and Stuart. Hurlbut's men, replenish- 
ing their exhausted cartridge boxes and caissons, 
steadily repelled every assault. His right kept con- 
nected with Prentiss, but, as Stuart and McArthur 
were gradually forced back, his left swung back 
to keep in contact with them, and he had to weaken 
his right to fill and strengthen his attenuated left. 
At half past two o'clock General Johnston, person- 
ally leading the Forty-fifth Tennessee to a charge 
against the Forty-first Illinois, which Breckenridge 
was unable to induce it to make, received a wound 
from which he cjuickly bled to death. General 
Bragg, who had been sending successive conmiands 
in fruitless charges against Prentiss and Wallace, 
hearing of the death of A. S. Johnston, repaired 
to that portion of the field, where he " found a 
strong force, consisting of three parts without a 
common head — Brigadier-General Breckenridge, 
with his reserve division pressing the enemy ; 
Brigadier-General Withers, with his splendid di- 
vision greatly exhausted and taking a temporary 
rest ; and Major-General Cheatham, with his divi- 
sion of Major-General Polk's corps to their left 
and rear." This was toward four o'clock. He 
assembled all into a coherent body and advanced 
against the exhausted defenders. At about half 
past four o'clock General Hurlbut notified Pren- 
tiss he would have to let go and retire. Sullenly 
withdrawing, he made one vain effort to form and 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOII. 6l 

renew the fight. He then fell back behind the deep 
ravine running into the river just above the land- 
ing. Colonel Webster, of General Grant's staff, had 
here gathered nearly fifty guns and planted them 
along the crest of ground. Hurlbut added what 
was left of his two fighting batteries, and proceeded 
at once to organize the regiments and detachments 
and unorganized men into a force to support the 
batteries. He estimated the number of men so 
ranged in ranks at about four thousand. The rem- 
nants of his brigades were deployed in order, their 
right resting on the left of the artillery. Other de- 
tachments were gathered up and placed in continu- 
ation of the line to the left, and a battery was sta- 
tioned still farther to the left, near the river, pro- 
tected by the backwater which there covered the 
bottom of the ravine, but without other support. 

Several of Prentiss's regiments were irretriev- 
ably broken by passing through their camp, at 9 
A. M., and drifted to the rear. Two were placed in 
reserve to Hurlbut. Tlie remaining five filled the 
space between Hurlbut's right and the main Cor- 
inth road. They lay down in a sunken road, or an 
old road washed and gullied by rain, making a natu- 
ral trench. Wallace's two brigades, or ten regi- 
ments, extended from the road to the great, densely 
crowded ravine, filled with tangled growth, and lay 
on the ground. Hickenlooper, with four guns of 
his battery, two having been left on the field of 
action because all their horses were killed, was 
posted by Prentiss at the Corinth road, which led 
directly to the landing. The line was slightly re- 
fused on both sides, leaving Hickenlooper at the 
apex of a salient. The land to the front fell away 
by a gentle slope, and was partially covered by 
dense and matted thickets. An assailing force, 
struggling upward through the thickets, could see 
only the battery, but was exposed not alone to its 
fire, but also to the fire of six thousand invisible in- 



62 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

fantry. General Grant, having just visited Sherman 
a Httle before his Hne gave way and sent word to 
Lewis Wallace to come to the field, visited Prentiss 
and W. H. L. Wallace, approved their dispositions, 
and charged them to hold this ground at all haz- 
ards to the last extremity. Colonel Webster estab- 
lished lines of ordnance wagons to supply the fight- 
ing troops, and through the day of constant firing 
on this ground the store of ammunition was con- 
tinually replenished as soon as it was exhausted. 

After several desultory attacks had been re- 
pulsed Colonel Randall L. Gibson was ordered to 
carry the position with his Louisiana brigade about 
noon. The regiments struggled through the en- 
tanglement of thickets and approached undisturbed 
till they were near the battery, wdien a sheet of 
flame poured from the whole length of the Na- 
tional line, and the assailants who were able broke 
in confusion and hastened out of reach of the fire. 
The brigade was assembled and again charged, 
and again rolled back in fragments. A third trial 
was made, with the same result. A stinging order 
from General Bragg sent the discouraged regi- 
ments the fourth time up the slope, to be hurled 
back the fourth time. General Hindman made a 
gallant assault, and met with a sore repulse. When 
he was wounded, A. P. Stewart took his place and 
made a persistent attack with his brigade and two 
of Pond's regiments, and finally drew of¥ his com- 
mand, as he says, for a supply of ammunition. 
Shortly after 2 p. m. Shaver's brigade made a sturdy 
efifort and failed, and renewed and failed again. 
General Bragg, then hearing of General A. S. 
Johnston's death, moved around to the extreme 
right, near the river, and there was a lull in front 
of the Hornet's Nest for an hour. About four 
o'clock General Ruggles ordered Patton Ander- 
son to make the attempt with his brigade. Vet- 
eranized by its experience in Sherman's front in 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 63 

the morning and its success in subsequent en- 
gagements, the brigade marched boldly to the en- 
counter. Before long its shattered fragments came 
streaming back, driven by the resistless fire which 
they provoked. 

General Ruggles dispatched his stafif to gather 
in all the batteries they could find. He succeeded 
in planting eleven batteries in line. General Polk 
massed behind them all the serviceable infantry 
that he could find. Hickenlooper withdrew his four 
guns, falling back along the road toward the land- 
ing till he reached the Hamburg and Savannah 
road, then turning to the left upon it, found him- 
self with General Sherman, near the intersection 
of the Hamburg and Savannah road with the road 
from the landing to Purdy. By five o'clock Bragg, 
with his composite command following Hurlbut, 
was arriving in rear of Prentiss. About the same 
time Hardee, with an aggregate of disconnected 
brigades, was rounding the impassable wood which 
protected W. H. L. Wallace's right, and was reach- 
ing his rear. And at the same time Polk ordered 
forward his massed infantry against the front of 
Wallace and Prentiss, after a bombardment by 
Ruggles's batteries. W^allace ordered his division 
to cut their way out through the forces closing 
upon their rear. He was killed while leading them. 
Five of his regiments, accompanied by portions of 
Prentiss's command, fought their way through and 
reached the landing. The rest were caught and 
surrounded by the closing together of the masses. 
Prentiss bent his left wing aroimd till his com- 
mand formed an elongated ellipse open at one end, 
two lines back to back, joined at one end by a 
sharp curve. The conflict was desperate and san- 
guinary. It became a useless slaughter, and Pren- 
tiss surrendered. The Fourteenth Iowa, of Wal- 
lace's division, was the last to surrender. Colonel 
Shaw compared watches with his captor, and noted 



64 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

that the time was a quarter to six o'clock. About 
twenty-two hundred surrendered. The battle was 
ended for the day. 

The meeting of the forces under Bragg and 
Hardee covered the river bluffs with a tumultuous 
and elated multitude. The gunboats began to 
throw large shells into their midst, and there was 
a scurrying to find shelter in hollows and moving 
out of range. But General Bragg proposed to 
push the advantage to a finish. He ordered his 
division commanders to form and charge upon the 
long line of guns and the force assembled by Hurl- 
but on the farther side of the deep ravine. Rug- 
gles set about to collect his scattered regiments. 
Withers found of Gladden's brigade only a colonel 
and two hundred and twenty-four men, and let 
them alone. Chalmers's brigade, with Gage's bat- 
tery, was quickly ready. The men of Jackson's 
brigade were filling their empty cartridge boxes, 
but quit and formed at command. Gage's battery, 
halting on the hither side of the ravine, undertook 
to engage the National batteries on the farther side, 
but was quickly silenced and dismantled, and with- 
drew to the rear, where it remained out of the fight 
during the battle of the next day. 

Chalmers and Jackson descended into the ra- 
vine and reached the farther side, but the roar of 
the massed artillery, the shells from the gunboats, 
which had moved to the mouth of the ravine, and 
the fire of Hurlbut's infantry prevented the auda- 
cious brigades from ascending the steep bank. 
Jackson's men, without ammunition, refused to 
make the attempt. Chalmers's men m^de some 
abortive attempts to charge up the slope. General 
Beauregard, receiving a dispatch that General 
Buell was not marching toward Pittsburg Land- 
ing, but was aiming for Florence, and feeling con- 
fident of early victory in the morning, sent staff 
ofificers to recall the exhausted and hungry troops 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 65 

to quarters for the night. The order was given 
directly to division, brigade, and even regimental 
commanders. Jackson's brigade withdrew, and so 
scattered that he did not see any one or part of 
any one of his regiments the next day. Chalmers 
did not receive the order, but soon finding that he 
was alone and waging an idle contest, followed 
Jackson. 

General Nelson, of General Buell's army, was 
ferried across the river with two regiments of Am- 
men's brigade, while Chalmers's men, who could 
not be induced to charge up the slope of the ravine, 
were still firing. The Thirty-sixth Indiana was 
marched out in front of Chalmers's front, and the 
Sixth Ohio in support. The Thirty-sixth had two 
men killed and one wounded. The whole of Nel- 
son's division was on the ground by nine o'clock, 
and bivouacked in line a few hundred yards in 
front of Hurlbut's men. Late in the night General 
Crittenden arrived with his division, and formed 
on the right of Nelson. After Chalmers had with- 
drawn and all firing had ceased the head of Lewis 
Wallace's division reached the bridge across Snake 
Creek. It was dark before the last regiment, the 
Twentieth Ohio, reached the bridge. The division 
bivouacked on the eastern slope of the ravine of 
Brier or Tillman's Creek. General Sherman 
formed on the road leading to the landing, his 
right being near its intersection with the road on 
which Wallace arrived, and so having Wallace to 
his right and rear. Buckland with his regiment 
was on the right, and Colonel Cockerill's was next. 
Colonel Buckland's third regiment, the Forty- 
eighth* Ohio, was detained for the night at the land- 
ing, where it had gone for ammunition. Next to 
Buckland was Colonel Hildebrand, with the Sev- 
enty-seventh Ohio and a part of the Fifty-seventh. 
His third regiment, the Fifty-third (Dhio, biv- 
ouacked to the rear, in front of the camp of the 



66 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Second Iowa. The Sixth Iowa, of McDowell's 
brigade, spent the night at the landing, commanded 
by Captain Walden. The regiments of McCler- 
nand's division gathered together, but not formed 
in their brigades, extended from Sherman's left to 
Hurlbut's camp. Hurlbut's aggregation of com- 
mands and detachments extended from McCler- 
nand to the landing. The men slept in ranks on 
the ground, without fires and in a heavy rain. The 
Confederates occupied the camps of McClernand, 
Sherman, and Prentiss for the most part, while 
many slept on the ground without shelter. Gen- 
eral Cheatham, with a portion of each of his bri- 
gades, withdrew to the camp of Saturday night, 
and Colonel Pond, with his battery and all of the 
regiments of his brigade but one, bivouacked, in 
company with Wharton's Texas rangers, on the 
west side of Brier or Tillman's Creek, opposite 
Lewis Wallace. The formation of corps had dis- 
appeared. No complete division bivouacked in a 
body. It does not appear that there was a single 
brigade, excepting one in Breckenridge's corps, 
that held all its regiments together. Beauregard's 
encampment of Sunday night was an aggregation 
of disintegrated commands. 

With the first dawn Monday morning, the 7th, 
Colonel Pond to his dismay found that the troops 
had fallen back in the night, leaving him exposed 
alone a mile from support, and separated only by 
the ravine from the National line, which lay four 
hundred yards to his front. He made the battery 
(Ketchum's) open fire while he drew ofT his infan- 
try and the Texas cavalry. Wallace's batteries en- 
gaged Ketchum, and the battle was resumetl. 

General Nelson about six o'clock marched out 
south, along the Hamburg road. He proceeded 
more than a mile before he began to come upon 
fragmentary detachments of the enemy. Near 
Stuart's camp he came upon a force which General 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 6/ 

Withers had gathered up and organized, partly of 
battered brigades, partly of disconnected regiments 
thrown into improvised brigades with temporary 
commanders. After a sharp engagement he fell 
back to the north side of the peach orchard, his 
line crossing the Hamburg road and being at right 
angles to it. Crittenden's division connected with 
Nelson's right. McCook put Rousseau's brigade 
on the right of Crittenden, but facing to the left. 
Kirk's brigade was placed to the rear of Rousseau's 
right. When W. H. Gibson's brigade arrived later 
in the forenoon, a portion of it was placed on the 
right, extending it to the wooded ravine separating 
General Buell's command from Grant's. Buell's 
line when formed was almost identical with the line 
of Wallace, Prentiss, Hurlbut, and McArthur at 
eleven o'clock Sunday morning. 

Lewis Wallace, sweeping around by Owl Creek, 
formed the right of Grant's attack. Sherman, as- 
sembling Buckland's brigade, Stuart with two of 
his regiments and the Thirteenth Missouri in line, 
and Hildebrand with his Seventy-seventh and part 
of the Fifty-seventh Ohio in reserve, was next to 
Wallace. The Fortieth Illinois followed McCook, 
and formed on the left of his line when he parted 
from Crittenden. A detachment of the Sixth Iowa 
marched in reserve to McCook. The Fifty-third 
Ohio, commanded by the lieutenant colonel, served 
with McClernand. McClernand, marching directly 
to his camp, came there upon the left of Sherman. 
Hurlbut's first brigade, much attenuated, formed on 
the left of McClernand's line, and constituted part of 
it. Colonel Veatch marched in reserve to General 
McCook's division till McCook parted from Crit- 
tenden, and then by General McCook's order 
formed on his left, extending his line. Colonel 
Tuttle took command of what was left of W. H. L. 
Wallace's division, and moved in reserve to Gen- 
eral Buell, where he was joined by Colonel Crocker 



68 ' GENERAL SHERMAN. 

with three res-inients of McCleniancrs division. He 
sent tlie Second Iowa to General Nelson when 
there was a break in his line ; the Seventh Iowa 
t(~» (iencral C^rittenden to aid in a cdinri^^e upon a 
ballery; the Tliirtcenth lalir in llie day joined 
(leneral McCook ; and the Kij>hth and hLij.,diteenth 
Illinois formed on the left of Crittenden's line when 
he i^arted from Nelson. General IJra^g com- 
manded the Confederate left. Hardee on the riq-ht, 
and IN ilk and lireckenrid^e helweon (lie two. 
Jhere was no defmite boundary of cijunnands, and 
some brigades and some separate regiments re- 
ceived direct commands from each of them in suc- 
cession. General Beauregard took his station near 
Shiloh church. 1die most C()m])act body of troops 
was there in the beginning of the day, and through 
the cond)at connnands that were forced to give 
Avay retired tcnvard tliat ])oint. 

(leneral Lewis Wallace, marching along the 
upland bordering Owl Creek after the retreat of 
I'ond's brigade and battery, had an encounter with 
Wharton's 'Pexas cavalry and forced it back, and 
then, after an engagement with Trabue's brigade, 
forced it soiUli of the I'urdy road. I'atton Ander- 
son coming u]), engaged \\'allace's first brigade, 
while the second and third continued the contest 
wiili 'Trabue. Sherman mcn'cd out to McCler- 
nand's cam]-) ami waited till he heard beyond the 
intervening woods the advance of lUiell's troops 
against the yielding enemy. Moving forward with 
lUickland and .Stuart, he joined Wallace's left, and, 
after souie iireliminary skirmishes with detach- 
ments, came upon the consolitlated U)vcc mider 
IJeauregard's innnediate connnand. and i-»hmged 
into the raging fight. McClernand. moving di- 
rectly from his bivouac to his camp, brushing be- 
fore him some batteries and their supports, joined 
the left of Sherman. While the conflict raged Mc- 
Cook's division, in ranks well aligned, was seen 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOII. 69 

a(lvancin<i;- Ijcyoiid the point of the woods, with 
wcll-ordcrcd impetuosity ])ressing back their stiib- 
honi foes. Shennan, McClernand, and Wallace 
mention in their re])orts the impression made on 
them by the steady ])iish of the drilled and disci- 
plined division. 

Nelson in his march the day before frotn Sa- 
vannah to the shore opposite I'ittsburg Landing, 
over a miry road through a swamp overflowed by 
high water^ had been obliged to leave his artillery 
behind. When he advanced again he was so an- 
noyed by the enemy's battery that Mcndenhall's 
battery was sent to him from Crittenden's division, 
'i'his quickly silenced the antagonist. Ilazen, rush- 
ing forward with his brigade, captured the guns 
and drove the infantry supports. Bowen's brigade 
coming u]), dashed unexpectedly upon Hazen's 
men, disordered by the pursuit, and they fell back 
in confusion, leaving a gap in Nelson's line. His 
separated brigades were in danger of crumbling 
when Terrill's regular battery, coming u]) at a gal- 
lop, pushed out to the skirmish line to get a good 
])Osition, and silenced and cri])pled Bowen's bat- 
tery. Nelson fell back. 'Perrill retired his guns 
by ])rolonges ; having them in battery at every halt 
without wheeling, he kept the ])ursuers at bay with 
volleys of canister. Nelson rallied his conunand 
and again advanced, overcoming stubborn resist- 
ance. At about two o'clock he was in Stuart's 
c;inip, and the enemy finally withdrew from his 
front, lie turned to the west, and advancing be- 
yond Crittenden's front, Mendenhall's battery took 
in reverse and drove away a battery which had 
blocked Crittenden's advance. Crittenden swung 
his left forward, and Tcrrill, going farther to the 
front, took in reverse a battery which was harass- 
ing McCook. and upon his silencing that McCook 
advanced. General Crittenden maintained his po- 
sition through the day, not being ordered by Gen- 



70 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

eral Buell to advance, and being unwilling to leave 
the flank of Nelson exposed. But he was engaged 
with troops stationed in the dense thicket, which 
filled a wet hollow along the base of the slope in 
his front and in the woods beyond. Portions of his 
command made charges into the thickets and the 
woods, and retired and charged again. When 
Mendenhall silenced the battery in the woods, it 
was captured by a charge, and the enemy disap- 
peared from Crittenden's, front. 

McCook, with his two brigades, Rousseau and 
Kirk, moved forward to a more commanding posi- 
tion. Facing to the west, he was in front of the 
Confederate center. He sustained and repelled 
vigorous assaults till W. H. Gibson's brigade ar- 
rived. Then moving forward, adding the Fifteenth 
Michigan to Rousseau's brigade, and as he let 
go from Crittenden annexing Veatch's three regi- 
ments to his left, he pushed back his assailants 
till he passed by the intervening woods. Then 
reaching McClernand's camp, he came into view 
of Grant's troops, and then into contact with them. 
Grant pressing to the south, and Buell pressing to 
the west, had bent back the wings of the Confed- 
erate army and compressed it into a compact mass. 
A score of batteries and about half as many di- 
visions of infantry fought with a desperation which 
surpassed any previous conflict on the field. A 
fierce charge upon McCook by all the force that 
could be massed in his front was met, sustained, 
overcome, and hurled back. As the baffled line 
retired. General Grant, gathering up two regiments 
— the First Ohio and another — personally direct- 
ing them, launched them in a charge which shat- 
tered the last defensive line. At the same time 
General Beauregard, taking the flags of two regi- 
ments, called upon the men to follow him in a 
charge. Just then Colonel Whittlesey, of the 
Twentieth Ohio, directed Thurber's battery to 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 



71 



sweep his front with rapid volleys. Beauregard's 
men would not follow him. His aid-de-camp, Col- 
onel Thompson, remonstrated against any further 
attempt to prolong the contest. The retreat had 
begun on the right nearly two hours before, and, 
posting a brigade and a battery to hold the ground, 
the general led off what was left of his army. T. 
J. Wood's division of Buell's army, which had just 
arrived, followed a short distance, and the battle 
was over. 

No battle of the war has excited more contro- 
versy than the battle of Shiloh. The discussion 
about surprise is a dispute about words. Nothing 
can be added to the accuracy of the statement 
made by General Rawlins in his address to the 
Society of the Army of the Tennessee at the meet- 
ing in Cincinnati in 1866: " We did not expect to 
be attacked in force that morning, and were sur- 
prised that we were ; but we had sufficient notice 
before the shock came to be under arms and ready 
to meet it." General Johnston marched his army 
out from Corinth, and on Saturday deliberately put 
it into camp, arranged in lines of attack, within a 
few miles of the National picket line, without any 
one in the National camp having a suspicion of that 
fact, though there were some who were satisfied 
there was a large force in front. But as for the 
foolish story of the assailing force breaking into 
the camps while the men were yet in bed, it is 
enough to say that the records show beyond any 
chance of controversy, and the Confederate reports 
show more plainly than those of General Grant's 
army, that no camp was entered before nine o'clock, 
and, excepting Prentiss's, none was entered before 
ten o'clock ; and, further, that no camp was en- 
tered before a serious engagement in which the 
assailants suffered repulse before prevailing. It is 
from the Confederate reports that we learn also 
that the retiring pickets fought stubbornly as thev 
6 



72 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



fell back, and, wherever opportunity was afforded 
by the formation of the ground or by dense growth, 
they made a stand and held the following skirmish- 
ers at bay. 

The numbers engaged can not be given posi- 
tively. The accepted numbers are : Under General 
Grant, Sunday, thirty-two or thirty-three thousand ; 
brought by Lewis Wallace, five thousand ; brought 
by General Buell, twenty thousand ; and the num- 
ber of combatants brought into battle on the Con- 
federate side about forty thousand. 

The casualties, according to the last revision 
of the War Department, were : In the Army of the 
Tennessee, killed, fifteen hundred and thirteen ; 
wounded, six thousand six hundred and one ; cap- 
tured and missing, two thousand eight hundred 
and thirty ; total, ten thousand nine hundred and 
forty-four. In the Army of the Ohio, killed, two 
hundred and forty-one ; wounded, eighteen hun- 
dred and seven ; captured and missing, fifty-five. 
Aggregate killed, seventeen hundred and fifty-four ; 
wounded, eight thousand four hundred and eight ; 
captured and missing, two thousand eight hun- 
dred and eighty-iive ; total, thirteen thousand and 
forty-seven. The Confederate loss is given as 
follows : Killed, seventeen hundred and twenty- 
eight ; wounded, eight thousand and twelve ; miss- 
ing, nine hundred and fifty-nine; total, ten thou- 
sand six hundred and ninety-nine. It is agreed 
that many of the reported missing were, in fact, 
dead or wounded. In one instance this is obvious. 
In his report of Colonel Pond's disastrous charge 
Sunday afternoon, Colonel Mouton, of the Eight- 
eenth Louisiana, says, " Here two hundred and 
seven officers and men fell either dead or wound- 
ed," while in the reported list of casualties for the 
entire two days the statement for that regiment is : 
Killed, thirteen; wounded, eighty; missing, one 
hundred and eighteen. General Grant says in his 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 73 

Century article, and repeats in his autobiography, 
of the Confederate report : " This estimate must 
be incorrect. We buried by actual count more of 
the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of Mc- 
Clernand and Sherman alone than here reported, 
and four thousand was the estimate of the burial 
parties for the whole field." Sherman's division 
lost three hundred and twenty-five killed, twelve 
hundred and seventy-seven wounded, and two hun- 
dred and ninety-nine missing; total, nineteen hun- 
dred and one. 

General Lewis Wallace's tardy appearance on 
the field has been the subject of much controversy. 
General Grant, on his way from Savannah to 
Pittsburg Landing Sunday morning, stopped at 
Crump's Landing, found General Wallace there 
on a steamboat awaiting him, ordered Wallace to 
have his command ready to march, and was in- 
formed that the troops were already under arms. 
General Grant, on reaching Pittsburg and going 
out to the front, gave or sent to Captain Baxter 
a verbal order for Wallace to move, which order 
Captain Baxter wrote out before starting. He 
took a steamboat to Crump's, and, finding that 
Wallace had taken his first brigade out to the camp 
of his second brigade, two miles from the river, 
rode out thither and repeated the order to Wal- 
lace, at the same time handing him the writing. 
Captain Baxter arrived at eleven o'clock or a lit- 
tle later ; the two brigades had dinner at half past 
eleven, and Wallace started at twelve by the Savan- 
nah and Corinth road. This road, passing through 
the camp of the second brigade, intersected the Pitts- 
burg Landing and Purdy road near the camp of 
General Sherman's first brigade, his extreme right. 
General Grant, becoming anxious, sent Captain 
Rowley at one o'clock to hasten Wallace. Going 
to the camp of the second brigade, and learning 
there Wallace's route, he overtook him at half past 



74 



CI'lNI'.RAl, SIII'.RMAN. 



two o'rlork. ( iciu'i.il W'nil.ut' li\(.'S tin- pl.icc ;is 
oil llu- I'liiily ro.id. IK', 11 I Ik- ii ossiiiL; oI ( )\\l (reck, 
close to Ml" I >( i\\ I'll's I'.iiiii), inoir lluiii .1 iiiiK- di- 
rcclly ill i"(\ir ol llu' loirc wliirli was pri'ssinj; Slior- 
iiiaii ami i\lr( Icniaiid low.nd tlu> river. Wallace 
couiilcniiarclicd iiis coliiiuii and found a lillle 
crossroad wliicli led to \]\c rivi-r road, and on uliirli 
lie was overtal^rn at hall past (luce hv ( oioncl 
]\awliiis and (aplain Mi riursdii, ol' ( iraiU's stalV, 
who wtir \cy\ iinpalicnl al ihr delav. The head 
ol llu- division irarhcd tlu' hridqi' over Snake 
C'liH'k allcr sinisrt, ahoiil sc\(ai o\dork, having;' 
marched lilleeii miles, and hixouaeked on the east- 
ern slope ol the \alley ol' I'.rier or rillman (, 'reek. 
Tlu- conleiilion has heen that Wallace was in 
fault (i) in lakiii!^- the outer road when he was ex- 
[>ressly ordered to take the river road ; ( .:) in coiin- 
tcrmarchini; his eolunin instead ol' kuin^ to (he 
n-ar and marehiii;; K-lt in I'ront ; (j,) in IaL;i;iii;;' on 
the wav when nlinost si)iH"d was ;iii obvious im- 
perati\e iieeessil\. ( i ) The order was to advance 
and siii)porl (he ri_L;li( ol' the line. Ihree of ( ii'iu-ral 
(M'ant's staff say that the order was to ad\anre by 
the river road. ( iencral \\ .illaet- and six of his of- 
ficers, who heard and read the order, say that no 
road was naiiu-d. If thei\> were no (eslimony, the 
antecedent probability would bc> that no ro.id was 
mentioned. l'"oi" in orderiii!; \\ .ill.iee to luaiih up 
from (, rimip's l.,indinL; ( iiant would not think of 
nnv road but the one fidin ('rump's 1 ..indin^ to 
I'illsbiii!.;- I.andiii!.;. .and naturally would not think 
o{ naming' the road. W'h.ilcwer th(" f.iel w.is. eer- 
tainlv Wallace and his oflicers understood that no 
road was mentioned, and thereupon, beiiii' ;i( die 
second bri^.adi^ camp. \\\o miles ti-om thi- ri\-er, 
thev nalurallv took tlu- ."^axann.ih and ('oriiilh road, 
which w.is the direct road to Sherman's rii^lit. ;ind 
was the rv>.id b\ which W .illace had sent IcttiMS 
lo Sherman. (._') It was .i mistake to lose time bv 



Tin: IJATTLK OI' SillLOif. 75 

a countermarch, instearl of simply facing to the 
rear, when time was so j)reciotis. (3) It is difficult 
to fix the route of Wallace's march with the evi- 
dence now attainable, including the provision- 
al charts of the Shiloh iiattlefield Commission. 
Progress over the deep and slippery mud of the 
river bottom, being the last part of the journey, 
was so toilsome that the field officers of the rear 
regiment dismounterl and let exhausted men who 
fell out of the ranks take turns in riding. The 
charge or intimation that Wallace willfully lin- 
gered soimrls strange indeed to those who remem- 
t)er that this was the same Wallace who retrieved 
the disaster on the right at J-'ort I>)onelson, opened 
the battle Monday morning at Shiloh, and with a 
small force, by desperate fighting, delayed Early a 
vital day in his march on to Washington. 

(jeneral I'ragg said some time after the battle, 
and it has been repeated by many, that the fire of 
the gtmboats Sunday evening was noisy but harm- 
less. The reports of brigade and regimental com- 
manders made at the time quite generally men- 
tion being ordered to mrjve out of range of the 
gunboat fire ; some specify the loss so suffered. 
Some examples of these reports are as follows : 
General Clark, commanding a division, says that 
at the close of the rlay he was about to aid in fol- 
Imving up the National troops, but was checked 
by the fire of the gunboats. General Gibson says 
he was f>rflered to retire his brigade from the fire 
of the gunboats, in which movement consirlerable 
disorder enstu-d. General f'atton Anderson took 
his brigade into a hollow for shelter, in moving 
frr^m which he lost several killed and many wcjund- 
ed. Colonel John C. Moore, Seconrl Texas, re- 
ports that two of his men were mortally wounded 
by a shell. Captain l^oole, commanding a Florida 
battalion, says : " One or two of my command were 
either killed or mortallv wounded while imder this 
fire." General S.A. M.Wood, coming unrler the fire 



76 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

of the gunboats, " pressed forward to a position 
most secure from the shelHng," in which position 
he had ten kihed and m»ny wounded by the shells. 
General Trabue says : " We endured a most ter- 
rific cannonade and shelling from the enemy's gun- 
boats. My command, however, had seen too much 
hard fighting to be alarmed, and the Fourth Ken- 
tucky stood firm, while some of our troops to the 
front fell back through their lines in confusion. 
In Company D of this regiment I lost at this place 
eleven men, and Lieutenant Keller, of the Fifth 
Regiment, was wounded." Colonel Venable, of the 
Fifth Tennessee, says that the gunboat fire was un- 
bearable, killing and wounding several of his men. 
There has been much controversy as to the re- 
sponsibility for establishing the troops on the west 
bank of the river, and for the position of the camps. 
Sherman, receiving from General Smith, in the 
forenoon of March 14th, an order to go on the ex- 
pedition to Yellow Creek, wrote to him : " I would 
suggest as a precautionary measure, after I pass 
up the river with one gunboat and my division, 
that the other gunboat and one division — say Hurl- 
but's or Wallace's — move up to Pittsburg Landing 
and there await my return. ... If the force at 
Corinth be already large, Cheatham may remain at 
or near Pittsburg Landing and embarrass our re- 
turn." Returning to Pittsburg Landing on the 
i6th, he wrote to General Smith's assistant adju- 
tant general on the 17th: " I will be governed by 
your orders of yesterday to occupy Pittsburg 
strongly." On the same day Sherman made an 
order that " General Hurlbut will disembark and 
establish his camp on a line perpendicular to the 
road about a mile from the river." Sherman's di- 
vision did not move out to occupy the ground 
which he had designated for it till the 19th, and, as 
two of his brigades temporarily occupied the 
ground designated by him to Hurlbut, the latter 
did not move till the 20th. 



THE BATTLE OF SHILOH. 77 

General Grant, being reinstated, arrived at Sa- 
vannah the evening of the 17th, and next day sent 
thence to Pittsburg Landing all the steamboats, 
to debark there all the troops on them, including 
Smith's division, and return at once to Paducah. 
General Smith being in command at Pittsburg 
Landing, Sherman on the 20th wrote to General 
Lauman, temporarily in command of Hurlbut's di- 
vision : " General Smith is on the Hiawatha unwell, 
and requests that I should give the necessary di- 
rections for camping the troops as they arrive. I 
direct that you select a line parallel to the river, 
or nearly so, about one mile distant from the river, 
and encamp them by brigades, so that they can 
promptly form into line of battle and move out as 
such by the road leading into the interior." 

On the 1 8th General Grant wrote to General 
Halleck from Savannah : " I arrived here last even- 
ing, and found that Generals Sherman's and Hurl- 
but's divisions were at Pittsburg, partially de- 
barked ; General Wallace at Crump's Landing, six 
miles below, same side of the river ; General Mc- 
Clernand's division at this place encamped ; and 
General Smith's division, with unattached regi- 
ments, on board transports also here. ... I shall 
go to-morrow to Crump's Landing and Pittsburg, 
and if I think any change of position for any of the 
troops needed I will make the change. Having 
full faith, however, in the judgment of General 
Smith, who selected the present points of debarka- 
tion, I do not expect any change will be made. 
There are no intermediate points where a steamer 
can land at the present stage of water." General 
Smith ordered the occupation of Pittsburg Land- 
ing and Crump's Landing ; General Sherman, 
under authority from General Smith, selected there 
the camp grounds of Sherman's and Hurlbut's di- 
visions. General Grant, as well as Smith and Sher- 
man, approved such occupation and selection. 



CHAPTER IV. 

FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 

Tuesday morning, April 8th, General Sher- 
man, with the brigades of Buckland and Hilde- 
brand, all the regiments being present and ranks 
well filled, and accompanied by the Fourth Illinois 
Cavalry, went out by order of General Grant to 
examine the roads. General T. J. Wood, of Gen- 
eral Buell's army, went out by another road with 
two brigades of his division. Four or five miles 
out the Confederate cavalry by a sudden charge 
stampeded the Seventy-seventh Ohio, but was in 
turn driven back and followed up more than a 
mile. General Sherman found much property and 
stores, wagons and gun carriages, and a hospital 
camp, but did not penetrate to or gain knowledge 
of Breckenridge's camp at Mickey's, where he re- 
mained until Thursday. 

It is agreed on both sides that the reported 
number of missing includes many killed and 
wounded. This is especially true of the Confed- 
erate reports, as they could not be verified by in- 
spection of the field of battle. The number of men 
buried there within a few days must have been 
quite four thousand, and this number was rapidly 
increased by ensuing deaths. About five hundred 
horses were interred. Constant rains saturated the 
soil. The earth, the streams, the air, were filled 
with poison. The hospitals were moved out be- 
yond the old picket line, and the camps were trans- 
ferred bevond the hospitals. The entire territory 
•78 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 79 

of the battlefield was uninhabited except by a small 
force at the landing and the Twentieth Ohio on a 
spur overlooking the crossing of Owl Creek, near 
the site of the old camp of Sherman's first brigade. 
Immediately after the battle General Halleck 
ordered General Pope to abandon the expedition 
against Fort Pillow and proceed up the Tennessee, 
called strenuously upon the Government for re- 
enforcements, and went himself to Pittsburg Land- 
ing to take command in person. General Halleck 
reached reached the landing April nth; General 
Pope reported to him there April 21st, and was 
ordered to disembark his command at Hamburg 
Landing. The force collected under Halleck 
amounted to one hundred thousand men, and was 
organized with right, center, left, and reserve. The 
Army of the Mississippi constituted the left. The 
Army of the Ohio, except General Thomas's di- 
vision, formed the center. Sherman's and Hurl- 
but's divisions, with two new divisions commanded 
by Generals Davies and McKean, made up of the 
remains of the divisions of Prentiss and W. H. L. 
Wallace, filled up by newly arrived regiments, to- 
gether with Thomas's division, commanded by 
General T. W. Sherman, composed the right, under 
the command of General Thomas. General Mc- 
Clernand had the reserve, being his own and Lewis 
Wallace's divisions. General Pope divided his 
command into two wings, commanded respectively 
by General Rosecrans and Schuyler Hamilton. 
General Grant was second in command to the col- 
lective army, without any specific command. Of 
the ofificers subordinate to General Halleck, nine 
were already, or afterward became, army com- 
manders — Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Buell, Pope, 
Thomas, Rosecrans, McPherson, and Logan. Gen- 
eral Beauregard, re-enforced immediately after his 
return to Corinth by Van Dorn and Price with a 
force containing seventeen thousand effectives, 



3o GENERAL SHERMAN. 

summoned from Arkansas after their disastrous de- 
feat at Pea Ridge by Curtis, and by all the troops 
and new levies which the Confederate Government 
could raise, mustered an army of one hundred and 
twelve thousand men on the rolls on the 28th of 
May, while by reason of sickness, caused by " bad 
food, neglect of police duty, inaction, and labor, 
and especially the water, insufficient and charged 
with magnesia and rotten limestone," the effective 
total was reduced to fifty-two thousand seven hun- 
dred and six. 

General Buell states that the average distance 
of the National lines from Corinth was fifteen miles. 
The soft ground from the camps to the landing 
was cut and churned by trains into a morass almost 
impassable for saddle horses and a despair to 
wagon teams. The army was absor.bed in the prob- 
lem of getting supplies to the front, and paralyzed 
by the order reiterated by General Halleck to avoid 
being drawn into a general engagement. The Con- 
federate outposts and patrols covered the country 
up to the National picket line. 

On the 27th of April General Pope moved about 
five miles out from the river. Next day a recon- 
noitering party discovered that Monterey was held 
in force l)y the enemy. On the 29th an expedition 
commanded by General Stanley found Monterey 
evacuated ; destroyed the tents and stores left be- 
hind, followed General Anderson some miles south 
to the farther side of a creek, and returned to camp. 
On the 2d and 3d of May General Buell crossed 
Lick Creek and advanced to within twelve miles 
of Corinth. On the 4th General Thomas moved 
and intrenched. On the 7th Buell and Thomas 
made another advance and intrenched. General 
Pope sent a reconnoissance to Farmington on the 
3d of May, leading to a sharp engagement, wliich 
resulted in the enemy being driven with loss into 
Corinth, and next day moved his command to a 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 8 1 

strong position within five miles of Corinth. On 
the 9th of May two of his brigades had a hot en- 
counter with a large force near Farmington, but 
were recalled to camp to avoid the necessity for a 
general engagement. The army advanced, mov- 
ing, halting, intrenching, and remaining in posi- 
tion while building roads and bridges for another 
advance. General Sherman, on the extreme right, 
in some well-planned movements, executed with 
spirit, carried successively several commanding 
positions. On the evening of the 17th Buell and 
Pope advanced to a road running parallel with the 
enemy's works, and two miles distant from them, 
and intrenched. Two creeks, a marshy valley, and 
thick woods intervened between this line and Beau- 
regard's works. Every day some force skirmished 
forward and fortified, until by the 28th some points 
were so held within one thousand yards of them. 

General Beauregard made an order on the 26th 
preparing for evacuation, and began moving his 
sick and his stores. His troops left on the night ni 
the 29th. The field batteries marched a mile to 
the rear on the various roads at sunset. The heavy 
guns were taken out from the fortifications at 8 
p. M. and loaded upon cars. Besides the traveled 
roads, numerous ways had been cut through the 
woods, anrl by means of all the infantry, moving 
out at 10 p. M., quickly evacuated the place. The 
rear guard followed at midnight, and the cavalry 
pickets remained on post imtil morning. Loco- 
motives whistled at times through the night, and 
the troops remaining cheered, as if welcoming ar- 
riving re-enforcements. But little of value was left 
undcstroyed. The smoke and explosions toward 
morning of stores set on fire and abandoned ex- 
cited suspicion in the besiegers, and by seven 
o'clock Corinth was entered by parties from the 
right, center, and left. 

As soon as it was ascertained that Corinth was 



82 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

abandoned, General Pope started in pursuit. Beau- 
regard halted at Baldwin, nine miles south of 
Booneville. Preparation was completed, and a de- 
tailed order was issued on the 5th of June for at- 
tack on the next day, but was countermanded by 
General Halleck by telegraph. Beauregard re- 
sumed his retreat on the 7th, and went into camp 
at Tupelo ; the pursuing force returned to camps 
in the neighborhood of Corinth. General Hal- 
leck's march of fourteen miles in twenty-five days 
seemed more like the practice of a military school 
than an actual campaign. Of^cers and men learned 
much of discipline, making of reports and returns, 
picket duty, and the construction of earthworks, 
roads, and bridges. They became soldiers in fact 
as well as in name. And the capture of Corinth, 
permanently depriving the Confederacy of the 
route to the east from Memphis to Chattanooga, 
confining communication to the southern route by 
Vicksburg, Meridian, and Mobile, isolated Mem- 
phis and determined its fall. Fort Pillow was aban- 
doned on the 1st of June. The Confederate fleet 
was annihilated in an engagement with the na- 
tional gunboats and rams in front of Memphis on 
the 6th, and on the same day the detachment left 
by General Pope with the fleet entered Memphis 
and took possession. 

General Pope telegraphed to General Halleck 
on June 3d : " The roads for miles are full of strag- 
glers from the enemy. Not less than ten thousand 
men are thus scattered about who will come in 
within a day or two." On the 8th he reported : 
" They have lost by desertion of Tennessee, Ken- 
tucky, and Arkansas regiments near twenty thou- 
sand men since they left Corinth." General Buell 
reported on the 9th : " The loss of the enemy in 
the retreat has undoubtedlv been very great from 
disasters, sickness, etc. The deserters all esti- 
mate at from twenty to thirty thousand." General 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 83 

Halleck, on receiving General Pope's first report, 
dispatched to the Secretary of War : " General 
Pope with forty thousand men is thirty miles south 
of Corinth, pushing the enemy hard. He already 
reports ten thousand prisoners and deserters from 
the enemy, and fifteen thousand stand of arms cap- 
tured." This was understood to mean that Pope 
had captured ten thousand armed men. Secretary 
Stanton telegraphed it as such to every State, and 
it was published in the newspapers all over the 
country. It was soon known that the number of 
men captured was inconsiderable, and Pope suf- 
fered in public opinion, being believed to have 
made a statement which he never made or author- 
ized or contemplated. 

General Grant, reprimanded and put in quasi 
arrest after the capture of Fort Donelson, and de- 
prived of active command and ignored after the 
battle of Shiloh, was entirely disheartened, and 
found the situation unbearable. He obtained leave 
of absence and resolved to get away. General 
Sherman, hearing of it, went immediately to him, 
and, telling first his own experience, remonstrated 
so earnestly and effectively that Grant reconsidered 
his purpose and remained. 

General Halleck had about Corinth over one 
hundred thousand men present for duty, besides 
Mitchell's division of sixty-five hundred marching 
toward Chattanooga, all ably officered, elated with 
success, and ready to undertake any enterprise. 
General Beauregard had in cantonment at Tupelo 
less than sixty thousand effectives, dispirited by 
repeated loss and successive retreats, and encum- 
bered by eighteen thousand sick. If Halleck had 
followed up with his army, embracing Grant, Sher- 
man, Sheridan, Pope, Buell, Thomas, Rosecrans, 
McPherson, and Logan, Beauregard would have 
given battle and been crushed and destroyed, or 
would have continued his retreat until his army 



84 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

melted away, scattered and dissipated. But a vig- 
orous protracted pursuit of a defeated army was 
the last lesson learned in the war, and Halleck was 
the person least ready to undertake to learn the 
lesson. At that time, when the South was strain- 
ing every nerve to recuperate and re-enforce its 
debilitated corps, and in the early summer months, 
the most favorable season for a campaign, the very 
worst thing that could be done with the National 
army was to keep it idle in camp. And that is 
what General Halleck did. 

But on the 3d of June McClernand with his 
own and Lewis Wallace's division was ordered 
to Bolivar and Jackson, and, a little later, Wal- 
lace's division was sent to Arkansas ; on the 9th 
Sherman with his own and Hurlbut's divisions was 
sent along the railroad toward Memphis ; and 
Buell with his army, including Thomas and his 
division, was ordered to advance along the rail- 
road to Chattanooga. Pope was called East to 
serve in Virginia, leaving his command to Rose- 
crans, and then two of the divisions were sent to 
Buell, leaving three with Rosecrans. On the i8th 
of July Halleck went to Washington to take com- 
mand of the armies of the United States. 

Meanwhile after a thorough inspection, together 
with an investigation, had been made into the con- 
dition of the Confederate troops at Tupelo by 
order of President Davis, General Beauregard was 
relieved and General Bragg was appointed in his 
place. Bragg was a very able soldier, sagacious, 
prompt, resolute, and a rigid disciplinarian. But 
he was unpopular, and had few intimate acquaint- 
ances. He was reserved, positive, and uncompro- 
mising in disposition, and abrupt and brusque in 
manner. It has been said, however, that he was 
not unpopular with the rank and file, and was so 
with the superior offtcers because he was as im- 
perious to them as he was to enlisted men. He 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 85 

quickly improved the health, tone, and discipline 
of the army at Tupelo, and on the 22d of July he 
rapidly moved by rail about thirty-five thousand 
of the troops via Mobile to Chattanooga. After 
securing re-enforcements, he started about the 
middle of August for the Ohio River, and Gen- 
eral Buell, who was still toiling, repairing railroad, 
and rebuilding bridges from Corinth toward Chat- 
tanooga, was obliged to quit this work and march 
with all possible diligence to save Cincinnati and 
Louisville from capture. 

General Grant was left in command of the 
troops in West Tennessee, about forty-two thou- 
sand for duty. The Memphis and Chattanooga 
Railroad, running along his front two hundred 
miles, was ruined beyond repair by any resources at 
his command between Chewalla and Grand Junc- 
tion, and exposed to incessant raids throughout its 
whole extent, and could not be used. Communica- 
tion betw^een Memphis and Corinth was through 
Jackson, a railroad intersection far to the rear. 
General Bragg left about sixteen thousand men, 
under the command of General Earl Van Dorn, 
guarding the Mississippi River, and about the 
same number under General Price at Tupelo. Van 
Dorn was skillful and enterprising ; Price was a 
pertinacious fighter. 

The position of the small posts along the rail- 
road became so precarious that in August all west 
of Grand Junction were withdrawn by General 
Sherman to Memphis ; the post at Grand Junction 
was withdrawn to Bolivar, and by the middle of 
September all detachments to the eastward of Cor- 
inth retired to that point, except that Colonel Mur- 
phy remained with his regiment at luka to protect 
the shipment thence of the depot of quartermaster, 
commissary, and ordnance supplies. At the end 
of August General Armstrong with two brigades 
of cavalry, numbering four thousand men, ad- 



86 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

vanced into Tennessee. Colonel Leggett, with two 
regiments of infantry, two guns, and four com- 
panies of cavalry, met them five miles from Bolivar, 
and opposed them so audaciously that Armstrong, 
having sufifered considerable loss, withdrew from 
the field after a contest of seven hours. General 
Armstrong came upon Colonel Dennis marching 
on Britton's Lane with two regiments, two guns, 
and two companies of cavalry ; Colonel Dennis 
took position on a wooded hill commanding the 
lane. General Armstrong made repeated charges 
upon the hill, suffering repulse each time, and 
finally withdrew, leaving one hundred and sixty- 
nine killed and many wounded on the field. He 
returned to Mississippi after doing some trifling 
injury to the railroad. Colonel Leggett and Colo- 
nel Dennis, as w^ell as Colonel Crocker, commander 
of the post at Bolivar, were promoted to the rank 
of brigadier general for their success. 

General Grant was anxiously watching for in- 
dications of the design of the enemy, and by the 
nth of September became satisfied that an attack 
would be made on Corinth by Van Dorn and 
Price. He at once had the garrisons of Tuscumbia 
and luka called into Corinth, the troops at Bolivar 
moved to Corinth, and a force transferred from 
Memphis to Bolivar. Price and Van Dorn, in fact, 
proposed to capture Corinth and force Grant back 
into Kentucky, but Van Dorn was not ready. Gen- 
eral Price occupied luka, which Colonel Murphy 
abandoned without making any attempt to destroy 
the great store of supplies remaining there. Con- 
fident that he could retake luka and get back to 
Corinth before Van Dorn could appear before it. 
Grant dispatched Rosecrans to approach luka from 
the south, occupying both of the roads running 
from the town to the south, while Ord with an- 
other column should reach the town from the 
northwest. Ord was in place on time. Rosecrans. 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 8/ 

delayed at first by difificnlties in the road, made up 
by forced marching, so that late in the afternoon 
of the 19th his advance division, Hamilton's, en- 
countered one of Price's divisions. Little's, within 
two miles of luka. A fierce fight ensued. Hamil- 
ton lost one fourth of his command in killed and 
wounded — seven hundred out of twenty-eight hun- 
dred. Price reported eighty-six killed and four 
hundred and eight wounded ; while Rosecrans's 
provost marshal certified that he had buried two 
hundred and sixty-five of Price's men who were 
found dead on the field of battle, and a hundred 
and twenty more, being a portion of the wounded 
whom Price had left behind and who died in hos- 
pital. In the course of the night Rosecrans ad- 
vised Grant, who was with Ord, of the engage- 
ment, and of his intention to attack Price in the 
morning. When morning came it was discovered 
that the bird had flown. Rosecrans had .occupied 
only one of the roads, and Price had moved out 
through the night by the other and was already 
beyond pursuit. The troops immediately moved 
back to their respective cjuarters at Corinth, Jack- 
son, and Bolivar. 

General Price, reaching Baldwin on the 23d, 
reported by letter to Van Dorn at Holly Springs. 
Five days later they joined forces at Ripley, num- 
bering together twenty-three thousand muskets. 
Van Dorn assumed command, and, moving next 
day, reached Pocahontas on the ist of October, and 
was near Corinth on the 2d. On the morning of 
the 3d Van Dorn advanced, skirmishing with the 
National outposts, and at ten o'clock came upon 
Rosecrans's four divisions in line about two miles 
in advance of the works recently constructed on 
the outskirts of the town. Attack was made with 
vigor, and was met with equal courage. A hot 
engagement ensued, which lasted without inter- 
mission through the day. When it ceased, at nearly 
7 



88 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

.6 p. M., the National troops were within the new 
works, and the assailants were halted a few hun- 
dred yards from them. 

Assault upon the works was made at nine 
o'clock next morning". The assault was made with 
great determination. The National line was pierced, 
and 1 lattery I'owell was carried, but after a hand- 
to-hand fight the assailants were driven out and 
the redoubt reoccupied. Later Fort Robinett was 
entered. After a conflict of fury and desperation 
it too was regained, and the temporary captors — 
what was left of them — withdrew in disorder. Far- 
ther to the National left a portion of Maury's di- 
vision of Price's corps overcame Davies's division 
and forced their way into the town. There they 
were subjected to fire in front and both flanks, with 
artillery and musketry, and retired with heavy loss. 
The attack on Corinth had been planned with skill 
and deliAiered with special gallantry. It had been 
met with indomitable resolution and had failed. 
By noon (ieneral V^an Dorn with his Confederates 
had left the field and was in full retreat, spending 
the night at Chewalla. 

The National loss was three hundred and fif- 
teen killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, 
and two hundred and thirty-two missing ; total, 
twenty-three hundred and fifty-nine. The Confed- 
erate returns make their loss five hundred and five 
killed, twenty-one hundred and fifty wounded, 
twenty-one hundred and eighty-three missing ; 
total, forty-eight hundred and thirty-eight. Gen- 
eral Rosecrans's medical director reported that 
after the battle fourteen hundred and twenty-three 
Confederate soldiers were buried on the field. 
Among the killed were Brigadier-General Hackle- 
man and Colonel Kirby Smith, of the Forty-third 
Ohio, a young oflficer of the regular army of most 
brilliant promise. On the Confederate side. Colo- 
nel Rogers, of the Second Texas, a notably gal- 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 89 

lant officer, was killed in the bloody struggle within 
Fort Robinett. 

General Rosecrans, from consideration of the 
fatigue of his command, decided not to begin 
pursuit till next morning. General McPherson, 
who arrived at Corinth in the afternoon, was or- 
dered to lead in the pursuit in the morning. Gen- 
eral Ord, who had been sent by General Grant 
with his own division and General Hurlbut's to 
intercept the expected retreat of Van Dorn, ar- 
rived at the north bank of the Hatchie, at the 
bridge near Pocahontas, on the morning of the 
4th. On the morning of the 5th Van Dorn left 
Chewalla and marched to Pocahontas. His ad- 
vance obtained possession of the bridge. Ord 
drove them from it, and, following closely, gained 
the other bank. He attacked with spirit the more 
numerous but fatigued and somewhat disordered 
Confederate force, and repelled them from the 
bridge. Van Dorn turned south, found another 
crossing six miles below, where he took his com- 
mand over the river in the night and then con- 
tinued to Holly Springs. Rosecrans left Corinth 
the morning of the 5th, and only reached Chevvalla 
that night. He joined Hurlbut next day, (Jrd 
being wounded, and traveled as far as Ripley over 
the road by which Van Dorn had escaped. The 
Confederate force in Mississippi was too much 
crippled by these repeated disasters to think of 
resuming the ofifensive. President Davis sent 
Lieutenant-General Pemberton to take command, 
and his active command was largely re-enforced by 
returned prisoners of war and new levies. Grant, 
relieved from apprehension of attack, immediately 
began to project plans for invading Mississippi. 

General Sherman, while engaged in his strictly 
military functions, keeping advised of the position 
of General Van Dorn and ascertaining his plans, 
and carrying on the erection of Fort Pickering, 



90 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



was also occupied with the more trying task of 
regulating the civil administration of Memphis. 
Arriving there in July, he found all civil adminis- 
tration suspended and the population disloyal. He 
restored the mayor to his ofBce, defining with 
precision his jurisdiction and authority; suggested 
the re-establishment of courts, prescribing what 
jurisdiction they should exercise, and stating in 
what cases the military would aid in the enforce- 
ment of civic authority. He permitted the publi- 
cation of newspapers, but defined the manner in 
which the publication should be conducted. He 
regulated in great detail the manner in which the 
use of land and houses belonging to disloyal per- 
sons should be appropriated. He corresponded 
with the Secretary of the Treasury, combating the 
policy of the Government in permitting dealers to 
purchase cotton from within the enemy's lines. In 
all these communications his grasp of the subject 
in hand and his directness and precision of state- 
ment are very notable. His argument to the Secre- 
tary of the Treasury as a statement of the military 
question was unanswerable ; the Government could 
not deny that, but avoided it by consideration of 
the pressing need of some means of paying the ob- 
ligations of the United States to Europe. 

Headquarters Fifth Division, 
Memphis, T-k^-h., July 27, 1862. 

John Park, Mayor of Mejupkzs, Present. 

Sir : Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as 
all similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful 
consideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the 
civil law, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my 
power to restore them to their proper use — viz., the protec- 
tion of life, liberty, and property. Unfortunately, at this 
time, civil war prevails in the land, and necessarily the mili- 
tary, for the time bein^f, must be superior to the civil au- 
thority, but it does not therefore destrov it.. Civil courts 
and executive officers should still exist and perform duties, 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 



9T 



without which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass 
into disrespect — an end to be avoided. I am glad to find 
in Memphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in 
existence, but in the co-exercise of important functions, and 
I shall endeavor to restore one or more civil tribunals for 
the arbitration of contracts and punishment of crimes, which 
the military have neither the time nor the inclination to in- 
terfere with. Among these, first in importance is the main- 
tenance of order, peace, and quiet within the jurisdiction ot 
Memphis. To insure this, I will keep a strong provost guard 
in the city, but will limit their duty to guarding public prop- 
erty held or claimed by the United States, and for the arrest 
and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are 
disorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This 
guard ought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor 
crimes. This should be done by the city police. I under- 
stand that the city police is too weak in numbers to accom- 
plish this perfectly, and I therefore recommend that the City 
Council at once take steps to increase this force to a number 
which, in their judgment, day and night can enforce your 
ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order, so that any change 
in our military dispositions will not have a tendency to leave 
your people unguarded. I am willing to instruct the provost 
guard to assist the police force when any combination is 
made too strong for them to overcome, but the city police 
should be strong enough for any probable contingency. The 
cost of maintaining this police force must necessarily fall 
upon all citizens equitably. 

I am not willing, nor do I think it good policy, for the 
city authorities to collect the taxes belonging to the State 
and county, as you recommend ; for these would have to be 
refunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax 
on all interested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with 
the proper municipal body, will frame a good bill for the in- 
crease of your police force and for raising the necessary 
means for their support and maintenance, I will approve it 
and aid you in the collection of the tax. Of course I can not 
sugge'^t how this tax should be laid, but I think that it should 
be made uniform on all interests, real estate, and personal 
property, including money and merchandise. All who are 
protecterl should share the expenses in proportion to the in- 
terests involved. 

1 am, with respect, your ol^edient servant, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-Gencral commatiding. 



92 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



Headquarters Fifth Division, 
Memphis, Tenn., Attgust ii, 1862. 

Hon. S. P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury. 

Sir : Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my 
discussion ot the cotton question. I will write plainly and 
slowly, because I know you have no time to listen to trifles. 
This is no trifle : when one nation is at war with another, all 
the people of the one are enemies of the other ; then the 
rules are plain and easy of understanding. Most unfortu- 
nately, the war in which we are now engaged has been com- 
plicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the other 
are not enemies. It would have been better if, at the outset, 
this mistake had not been made, and it is wrong longer to 
be misled by it. The Government of the United States may 
now safely proceed on the proper rule that all in the South 
are enemies of all in the North ; and not only are they un- 
friendly, but all who can procure arms now bear them as 
organized regiments or as guerrillas. There is not a gar- 
rison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sight of 
the flagstaff without being shot or captured. It so happened 
that these people had cotton, and, whenever they appre- 
hended our large armies would move, they destroyed the 
cotton in the belief that, of course, we would seize it and 
convert it to our use. They did not and could not dream 
that we would pay money for it. It had been condemned to 
destruction by their own acknowledged government, and 
was therefore lost to their people ; and could have been, 
without injustice, taken by us and sent away, either as abso- 
lute prize of war or for future compensation. But the com- 
mercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents 
would buy a pound of cotton behind our army, that four 
cents would take it to Boston, where they could receive thirty 
cents in gold. The bait was too tempting, and it spread 
like fire when here they discovered that salt, bacon, powder, 
firearms, percussion caps, etc., were worth as much as gold ; 
and, strange to say, this traffic was not only permitted but 
encouraged. Before we in the interior could know it hun- 
dreds, yea thousands, of barrels of salt and millions of dollars 
had been disbursed, and I have no doubt that Bragg's army 
at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received enough 
salt to make bacon, without which they could not have 
moved their armies in mass, and from ten to twenty thou- 
sand fresh arms and a due supply of cartridges have also 
been got, I am equally satisfied. As soon as I got to Mem- 
phis, having seen the effect in the interior, I ordered (only as 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 93 

to my command) that gold, silver, and Treasury notes were 
contraband of war, and should not go into the interior, where 
all were hostile. It is idle to talk about Union men here : 
many want peace, and fear war and its results, but all prefer 
a Southern, independent government, and are fighting or 
working for it. Every gold dollar that was spent for cotton 
was sent to the seaboard to be exchanged for banknotes and 
Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here and are taken 
in ordinary transactions. 1 therefore required cotton to be 
paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end ot 
the war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee 
— viz., the United States quartermaster. Under these rules 
cotton is being obtained about as fast as by any other pro- 
cess, and yet the enemy receives no " aid or comfort." Un- 
der the " gold " rule the country people who had concealed 
their cotton from the burners, and who openly scorned our 
greenbacks, were willing enough to take Tennessee money, 
which will buy their groceries ; but now that trade is to be 
encouraged and gold paid out, I admit that cotton will be 
sent in by our own open enemies, who can make better use 
of gold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton. 

I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, 
but my views on this may be ventured. If England ever 
threatens war because we don't furnish her cotton, tell her 
plainly if she can't employ and feed her own people to send 
them here, where they can not only earn an honest living, 
but soon secure independence by moderate labor. We are 
not bound to furnish her cotton. She has more reason to 
fight the South for burning that cotton than us for not ship- 
ping it. To aid the South on this ground would be hypoc- 
risy which the world would detect at once. Let her make 
her ultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in 
Europe that will counteract in the balance. Of course her 
motive is to cripple a power that rivals her in commerce and 
manufactures that threaten even to usurp her history. In 
twenty more years of prosperity it will require a close calcu- 
lation to determine whether England, her laws and history, 
claim for a home the continent of America or the isle of 
Britain. Therefore, finding us in a death struggle for exist- 
ence, she seems to seek a quarrel to destroy both parts in de- 
tail. Southern people know this full well, and will only accept 
the alliance of England in order to get arms and manufac- 
tures in exchange for their cotton. The Southern Confed- 
eracy will accept no other mediation, because she knows full 
well that in old England her slaves and slavery will receive 
no more encouragement than in Nenu Encrland. France 



94 



GENERAL SHERxMAN. 



certainly does not need our' cotton enough to disturb her 
equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more 
respectful consideration than on the part of her present 
ally. But I feel assured the French will not encourage 
rebellion and secession anywhere as a political doctrine. 
Certainly all the German states must be our ardent friends, 
and, in case of European intervention, they could not be kept 
down. With great respect, your obedient servant, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-Gencral. 

On the 24th of October the War Department 
by order transferred General Rosecrans to super- 
sede General Buell in the command of the Army of 
the Cumberland, and transmuted the force under 
General Grant's command into an army corps, en- 
titled Thirteenth Army Corps. The force at that 
time numbered about forty-eight thousand five 
hundred men. On the 4th of November General 
Grant assembled at Grand Junction and La Grange 
two divisions from Bolivar, under command of 
General J. B. McPherson, and three divisions from 
Corinth, under General C. S. Hamilton, prepara- 
tory to making an advance into Mississippi. Two 
weeks later, by order of General Grant, General 
Sherman met him at Columbus, Ky., and they con- 
ferred upon the mode of carrying out the move- 
ment, the ultimate object of which. General Grant 
said, was the capture of Vicksburg. Grant moved 
south through Holly Springs with the force which 
he had assembled, Sherman advanced from Mem- 
phis with three divisions, and General Steele, with 
a division from the troops stationed at Helena, 
Ark., advanced from the Mississippi toward Gren- 
ada. Pemberton, finding his rear threatened by 
Steele, abandoned his fortified line along the Tal- 
lahatchie, fell back to Grenada, and took up a new 
line along the Yallabusha. General Grant reached 
the Tallahatchie at the railroad crossing on the ist 
of December, and General Sherman arrived at a 
point a few miles west next day, to find the cross- 
insfs undefended. 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 



95 



On the 8th General Sherman, in obedience to 
a letter from General Grant, met ^ him at Oxford, 
and again conferred upon the plan of campaign. 
After Grant had fully stated his plans, and before 
Sherman left. Grant sent to General Halleck by 
telegraph : " General Sherman will command the 
expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a 
force of about forty thousand men, will land above 
Vicksburg (up the Yazoo if practicable), and cut 
the Mississippi road and the road running east from 
Vicksburg, where they cross Black River. I will 
co-operate from here, my movements depending 
on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry 
force at my command, I will be able to have them 
show themselves at different points on the Talla- 
hatchie and Yallabusha, and when an opportunity 
occurs make a real attack. After cutting the two 
roads. General Sherman's movements to secure the 
end desired will necessarily be left to his judg- 
ment. I will occupy this road to Coffeeville." 

To this Halleck replied at once, approving the 
plan, but adding, " The President may insist upon 
designating a separate commander." Sherman left 
for Memphis next day, taking with him one divi- 
sion, Morgan L. Smith's, and hastened prepara- 
tions for the expedition down the Mississippi. The 
situation in Mississippi was becoming so serious 
that General Joseph E. Johnston was appointed to 
supreme command between the Alleghany Moun- 
tains and the Mississippi River, and he hardly 
reached Chattanooga to confer with General Bragg 
before Jefferson Davis arrived and accompanied 
General Johnston to Mississippi, having first or- 
dered Bragg to send re-enforcements, numbering 
nine thousand men, to Pemberton. 

By order of General Bragg, General Forrest, 
on the nth of December, left Columbia, Tenn., 
and, crossing the Tennessee at Clifton on the 14th 
and 15th by means of an old fiatboat, succeeded 



96 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

in substantially wrecking the railroad and telegraph 
between Columbus and Humboldt, and eluding or 
defeating all troops sent to meet him, except in the 
fight at Parker's Cross Roads, where he was de- 
feated with severe loss by General Sullivan. On 
the 1st of January he raised the old fiatboat, which 
had been sunk, and recrossed to Clifton. 

On the 19th of December, while General Grant's 
cavalry were absent on an expedition to destroy 
the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at Tupelo, General 
Van Dorn, having assembled all the cavalry of the 
Confederate army, started upon a raid upon the 
roads in General Grant's rear. General Grant ad- 
vised by telegraph the commanders of posts along 
the railroad, and ordered them to be prepared to 
resist attack. Colonel Robert C. Murphy, who had 
abandoned the stores at luka to Price, was com- 
manding at Holly Springs, where the supplies for 
General Grant for the winter were accumulated. 
He received the warning, paid no heed to it, gave 
no information of it to his command, but permitted 
Van Dorn with his troops to enter and occupy the 
town, unmolested save by the sporadic, spontane- 
ous fire of some of the men who saw the columns 
in gray marching by their tents. Van Dorn spent 
a day burning up the vast stores, and then pro- 
ceeded to feel the roads at other points — Bolivar, 
Middleburg, Grand Junction, and Davis's Mills — ■ 
but was repelled at every attack. Murphy was 
court-martialed and cashiered. An investigation 
was made, which brought to light such a taint of 
treasonable disloyalty in several regiments that 
other courts-martial followed, more officers were 
dismissed from the service, and non-commissioned 
officers were transferred to other regiments and 
surrounded by more wholesome influences. 

General Grant had advanced to the Yokana- 
patafa River, with Colonel Leggett's brigade at 
Water \"alley as advanced post. Upon learning 



FROM CORINTH TO MEMPHIS. 97 

of the disaster at Holly Springs, he immediately 
put the army on short rations and fell back behind 
the Tallahatchie, leaving Leggett south of the river 
as rear guard. Part of the force was withdrawn 
in December to repair the railroad from Memphis 
to Corinth. McPherson's command remained till 
General Grant was advised by General Halleck of 
the repulse of Sherman near Vicksburg, and was 
ordered to re-enforce the river expedition with all 
disposable troops at his command. 



CHAPTER V. 

THE MISSISSIPPI. 

General Sherman went ener^^ctically to work 
on reaching- ]\leni])his. He organized the new 
troops sent forward by General McGlernand into 
two (Hvisions, nnder command of General A. J. 
Smith and General G. W. Morgan, and added them 
to the division of M. L. Smith and the division at 
Helena, commanded by General F. Steele. The 
fleet of transports arriving on the 19th, he began 
embarking on the same day. He sailed next day, 
and, stopping on the way to take up Steele's di- 
vision, reached iMillikcn's Rend on the 25th. Gen- 
eral Halleck notified General Grant by telegraph 
on the 18th that the President had apjjointcd Gen- 
eral McClernand to command the expedition down 
the river. General Grant sent copies of the dis- 
patch to both Sherman and McClernand via Co- 
lumbus, the only telegraph route ; but Forrest hav- 
ing just cut the line, the copies never reached their 
destination. 

The fortification of \'icksburg was begun by 
direction of General P)eauregard in April, 1862. 
After the surrender of New Orleans, General Mar- 
tin L. Smith, an accomplished engineer officer, was 
put in charge, and, pushing the work day and 
night, had six batteries completed with their arma- 
ment when the advance of Farragut's fleet ap- 
peared in the latter part of May. General Wil- 
liams, commanding the detachment of troops with 
the fleet, deciding that nothing could be done 
98 



THE MISSISSIPPI. 



99 



against the completed works with his command, 
Farragut returned, reaching New Orleans about 
the ist of June. Here he found urgent orders fnjm 
the Navy Department to capture Vickslnirg, and 
so clear the Mississippi River. C(jmmodore h^ar- 
ragut arrived before Vicksburg on the 25th of June 
with his fleet, accompanied by Commodore Por- 
ter and his mortar fleet, and carrying General Wil- 
liams with four thousand men. Commodore Davis 
arrived at the same time from Memphis with his 
fleet. General Williams set some twelve hundred 
negroes to work attemjiting to cut a canal across 
the neck of the peninsula opjjosite Vicksburg. The 
fleets bombarded with their guns and mortars, and 
General Williams with his fieldpieces. All the ten 
batteries originally designed by General Beaure- 
gard had now been completed, and their guns on 
the summit of the lofty blufifs fired composedly on 
the vessels far below. The damage to the batteries 
and their defenders was slight; the injury to the 
fleet was not serious. The 27th of July Farragut 
sailed down the river and Davis left for Mempliis. 
On the 26th of December (jeneral Sherman, 
leaving A. J. Smith's division at Milliken's i>end 
to destroy the railroad leading to the West from 
Vicksburg, proceeded with the other three divi- 
sions thirteen miles up the Yazoo to attack the 
batteries above Vicksburg and gain the plateau be- 
hind the city. The land between the Yazoo at 
that i)lace and the blufi's which were to be assailed 
was low, flat, subject to overflow, intersected with 
ponds, bayous, and morasses, covered with forest, 
undergrowth, and fallen timber, and under full 
view throughout from the bluffs. The ground 
chosen was bordered on the westerly side, on Sher- 
man's right as he faced the enemy, by a large arm 
of the Yazoo, or a bayou, called Old River; on the 
left, and about four miles distant, Chickasaw Bayou 
extended from the Yazoo to the front ; while along 



lOO GENERAL SHERMAN. 

the front stretched a chain of ponds, constituting 
an ancient abandoned bed of the river. 

On the 27th and 28th the command advanced 
to the chain of ponds and reconnoitered. Steele's 
division was on the left, beyond Chickasaw Bayou ; 
Morgan next, toward the right, separated from 
Steele by Chickasaw Bayou ; on Morgan's right 
was Morgan L. Smith ; and on the extreme right 
was A. J. Smith, who had rejoined the command 
the night of the i6th. Steele's route was blocked 
by a large pond, which communicated at one end 
with the Yazoo and at the other with Chickasaw 
Bayou. He was marched back to the Yazoo, fer- 
ried down stream, landed, and sent to the front, 
still forming the extreme left, but now between 
Chickasaw Bayou and G. W. Morgan. Morgan 
L. Smith was severely wounded, and General D. 
Stuart succeeded to the command of the division. 
The road to Vicksburg in front of A. J. Smith was 
found to be obstructed by unfordable waterways, 
from which the bridges had been removed, and by 
impassable swamps. Morgan used the only pon- 
toon train in the expedition to cross a small pond, 
supposing it to be the main chain of ponds in 
front, but, on arriving at the main pond, called 
" The Lake," he was so fortunate as to find a prac- 
ticable crossing. A narrow sandbar extended 
across " The Lake " in front cf M. L. Smith's di- 
vision, but beyond it was a high levee, above which 
on the slope of the bluff was a battery. A. J. Smith 
with the greater part of his division was moved 
up to M. L. Smith's division, now commanded by 
General David Stuart. The troops bivouacked in 
the assigned position during the night of the 28th. 
The enemy's batteries were near the foot of the 
blufif, from three to five hundred yards from Sher- 
man's line. 

About noon of the 2Qth General Sherman 
opened with artillery along his line. A. J. Smith's 



THE MISSISSIPPI. lOI 

division on the extreme right made a demonstra- 
tion out on the Vicksburg road. The Sixth Mis- 
souri, of M. L. Smith's division, temporarily com- 
manded by D. Stuart, crossed the narrow sand 
bar and reached the high levee. Unable to sur- 
mount this, and subjected to a vertical fire to which 
they could make no return, they scooped hollows 
into the face of the levee and squatted in this con- 
strained shelter until night gave them opportunity 
to slip back to camp one by one. De Courcv's 
brigade from Morgan's division and Blair's brigade, 
together with the Fourth Iowa of Thayer's bri- 
gade, made their way through a wilting fire to the 
Confederate works. Morgan and Steele with the 
rest of their respective divisions failed to follow, and 
the crippled brigades, unsupported, made no effec- 
tive lodgment, and returned with shattered ranks. 
The assault failed. It was a desperate assault to un- 
dertake, but General Sherman thought that if Mor- 
gan had heartily supported Blair a lodgment could 
have been made which would have opened the way 
for the rest of the force and insured success. Gen- 
eral Sherman's loss was nineteen hundred and 
twenty-nine, of which number one hundred and 
ninety-one were killed, nine himdred and eighty- 
two wounded, and seven hundred and fifty-six 
missing. The loss of Blair's brigade was seven 
hundred and forty-three. The Confederate loss 
during the two days of skirmishing and the as- 
sault on the 29th was fifty-seven killed, one hun- 
dred and twenty wounded, and ten missing. 

General Sherman, failing here, determined to 
attempt an assault at Haines's Bluft', farther up the 
Yazoo, and on the night of the 30th General Steele 
was sent with his division and a brigade to make 
the attack under cover of Porter's fleet. General 
Sherman was to resume the assault by Chickasaw 
Bayou when he should hear the guns of Steele's 
•attack. Steele sent word before night that a fog 



I02 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

prevented movement by the boats. Next day word 
was received that the moon would be shining all 
night and disclose the landing. Meanwhile it being 
obvious that the Confederates were receiving re- 
enforcements, General Sherman re-embarked the 
expedition on the 2d of January, 1863. 

He went immediately to the mouth of the river 
on learning that General McClernand was there. 
McClernand showed the order of the .Secretary of 
War, with the approval of the President endorsed, 
appointing him to command the expedition. Sher- 
man turned over the command, made report of 
what had been done, learned of the loss of Holly 
Springs and the retreat of Grant, and, by direction 
of McClernand, brought the transports with the 
troops to Milliken's Bend. On the 4th of Janu- 
ary General McClernand issued his order organ- 
izing the expeditionary force into two army corps, 
the first comprising the divisions of G. W. Mor- 
gan and A. J. Smith, and commanded by General 
Morgan ; the second commanded by General Sher- 
man, and comprising the division of Stuart, for- 
merly of M. L. Smith, and that of Steele. On the 
same day General Sherman called upon General 
McClernand on his boat and urged that an expedi- 
tion be sent to capture Fort Hindman, or Arkan- 
sas Post, on a bend of the Arkansas, about forty 
miles from its mouth. They visited the admiral 
on his boat in the night, and it was finally agreed 
that McClernand would take the whole of his 
command and that Porter would go with his 
fleet. 

The fort, a square work, with a bastion at each 
corner, surrounded by a ditch, stood on a bluff at 
the head of a sharp bend of the Arkansas, and 
commanded the river with its guns for more than 
a mile along each arm of the bend. It was armed 
with seventeen guns and defended by five thou- 
sand troops, commanded by General T. J. Church- 



THE MISSISSIPPI. 103 

ill. It could be approached from the Mississippi 
either by entering the Arkansas at its mouth, or, 
by a shorter route, entering the White River at 
its mouth and passing thence by a cut-off to the 
Arkansas. The fleet reached the mouth of White 
River on the 8th ; the troops disembarked on the 
morning of the loth, about three miles below the 
fort, and advanced toward it, Sherman having the 
right and Morgan the left. The opposing troops 
fell back slowly, halting toward evening in a line 
with the north face, extending from the northwest 
bastion to an impassable swamp and bayou. Sher- 
man and Morgan followed, and formed a line ex- 
tending from the bayou to the river below the fort. 
General Sherman in person during the night cau- 
tiously advanced under cover of timber till he was 
near enough to hear the hum of voices, with the 
sound of tearing down wooden buildings, ham- 
rrrering, and other noises indicating the construc- 
tion of works, and remained listening till the bugle 
call of reveille in the Confederate camp notified 
him it was time to withdraw. While McClernand's 
force was getting into position. Porter moved his 
fleet close to the fort and opened a fire so heavy 
and destructive that the garrison could not reply, 
but could only seek shelter. 

Next morning the National line moved forward 
to about four hundred yards from the fort and the 
line of infantry intrenchments, about a mile in 
length, which the Confederates had thrown up in 
the night. At noon Porter opened with his whole 
fleet at a few hundred yards' distance ; his heavy 
ordnance plowed deep furrows in the ramparts, 
broke up the guns, and tore open the bombproofs. 
The garrison had to take refuge in the ditch of 
the fort. At the same time the forty-five field- 
pieces disposed along McClernand's line bom- 
barded the new works thrown up in the night. 
When they ceased, Sherman's and Morgan's men 



104 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



Sprang forward to the assault, and the Confederate 
artillery and infantry met them with continuous 
volleys at short range and over bad ground. When 
the assaulting line had reached to about one hun- 
dred yards of the works, a large white flag and 
sundry small ones were raised above the works, 
and a cry ran along the Confederate line, " Run 
up the white flag, by order of General Churchill ! " 
One of the Confederate brigade commanders re- 
fused to stack arms, and held his men to the para- 
pet in position to defend it. He said he had re- 
ceived no order to surrender. Steele's division, 
facing the front of the parapet, were held halted 
by Major Hammond, of General Sherman's stafi, 
till General Churchill came up with General Sher- 
man and gave the order to surrender. General 
Churchill denied having given any previous order 
to surrender, while Colonel Garland, who surren- 
dered first, told General Churchill that he received 
the order to surrender from one of General Church- 
ill's staff. The question who first gave the order 
was never settled. 

The Confederates lost about one hundred killed 
and a greater number wounded ; prisoners number- 
ing forty-seven hundred and ninety-one were sent 
North next day. This number includes an Arkan- 
sas regiment which marched into the fort some 
hours after the surrender, unaware of the fact. The 
National loss, killed, w^ounded, and missing, was 
ten hundred and sixty-one. Seventeen guns, more 
or less damaged, and a large amount of stores — 
quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance — was 
captured. General McClernand remained three 
days shipping the captured stores and leveling the 
fort. General McClernand received on the 15th 
an order from General Grant to return to Milli- 
ken's Bend unless he had some object not visible 
from a distance. The expedition was all at Napo- 
leon by the 17th. General Grant made a visit of 



THE MISSISSIPPI. 105 

two days and returned to Memphis, and the expe- 
dition proceeded to MilHken's Bend. 

When the first rumor was heard of a separate 
expedition down the Mississippi, General Halleck 
telegraphed in reply to a dispatch of inquiry from 
General Grant, November 6, 1862: "You have 
command of all troops sent to your department." 
General McClernand, on the 8th of January, 1863, 
while proceeding to Arkansas Post, sent a letter 
to General Grant, in which he said something about 
going beyond and co-operating with General Cur- 
tis's force in Arkansas. General Grant wrote in 
reply, ordering him to return to the Mississippi 
unless he was acting under orders of superior au- 
thority. He telegraphed to General Halleck, and 
received reply : *' You are hereby authorized to re- 
lieve General McClernand from command of the 
expedition against Vicksburg, giving it to the next 
in rank or taking it yourself." An order of the 
War Department, dated December 18, 1862, di- 
rected all the troops in General Grant's command 
to be organized into four army corps, to be num- 
bered Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth,.and Seven- 
teenth, to be commanded respectively by McCler- 
nand, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson. 

The new organization of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee gave to General McClernand the command 
of the corps which had been Morgan's, with the 
addition of the troops at Helena. Sherman con- 
tinued in command of his corps, increased by a 
brigade commanded by Hugh Ewing. The corps 
of McPherson comprised the divisions of McAr- 
thur, Logan, and Quinby. All the remaining 
troops in northern Mississippi, West Tennessee, 
and west Kentucky in General Grant's department 
composed Hurlbut's command, and were classified 
as Sixteenth Corps. 

The result of General Grant's inquiries during 
the visit at Napoleon impressed him more clearly 



I06 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

with the difficulty of his undertaking and the neces- 
sity for a large and well-equipped force. To at- 
tack Vicksburg from the front was impossible. 
The land north of the city, the low tract between 
the Yazoo and the Mississippi, was under water. 
The land to the south was dry, the bluffs of Vicks- 
burg continuing down the river. The only visible 
chance was to cross the Mississippi below the city 
and its fortifications, and a canal across the tongue 
of land in Louisiana running out toward Vicksburg 
seemed the most available means of getting the 
army below the city. When Grant so reported in 
a letter written on the 20th of January, the Presi- 
dent and Halleck cordially approved the scheme. 

Some years before the war the State of Louisi- 
ana began to cut a canal across this peninsula. 
General Beauregard, in drafting his scheme for the 
defense of Vicksburg, laid stress upon the erection 
of batteries placed so as to prevent the construc- 
tion of such a canal. And General Williams, com- 
manding the land force with Farragut's second ex- 
pedition, excavated the entire length of the canal, 
though not to an available depth. When General 
Grant arrived on the 30th of January, and found 
the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Corps at work on a 
canal beginning in an eddy above the point and 
ending in an eddy below, where there would be no 
aid from the river current, he saw the task was 
hopeless, but allowed the work to continue as giv- 
ing occupation to the men. Work continued till 
the 7th of March, when high water broke bounds 
and flooded the peninsula, making further work, 
except by dredge boats, impracticable. Soon after 
the batteries at Warrenton were armed with heavy 
guns, and reached with their fire the whole length 
of the canal, and it was definitely abandoned. 

Another project was to make a way by means 
of Lake Providence, an ancient abandoned chan- 
nel of the Mississippi, and separated from it by 



THE MISSISSIPPI. 



107 



the river levee. A little thread of a stream led 
from the end of the lake through a forest for six 
miles, most of the way being obstructed by stand- 
ing timber, and part of the way being lost in a 
marsh. But at the end of six miles it connected 
with Bayou Macon, a navigable stream. Having 
once reached this point, a boat, by dcxtrously fol- 
lowing the meshes of a network of bayous for two 
hundred miles, would reach the Mississippi, one 
hundred and fifty miles below Vicksburg. This 
work of cleaning out Baxter Bayou, and making a 
navigable channel from Lake Providence to Bayou 
Macon, was assigned to General McPherson. On 
the 1 8th of March he cut the levee which separated 
the lake from the river to fill up the little Bayou 
Baxter, so that proper implements could be floated 
to accomplish certain work which could be suc- 
cessfully done only by machinery, and reported 
that the passage would be ready for use by the end 
of the month. Before that time arrived, however, 
it had become unnecessary. 

The great levee of the Mississippi filled and 
blocked, nearly opposite Helena, the entrance to 
a bayou which had been a navigable channel, and 
had been used as a portion of an inland waterway 
from Memphis via the Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, 
and the Yazoo Rivers. On the 23d of January the 
Confederates sent troops to obstruct this channel, 
which was easily done, as the bayou called Yazoo 
Pass was narrow and flowed through a thick for- 
est. General Grant, learning of this route, sent 
Colonel James H. Wilson of his stafT to cut through 
the levee, which was accomplished two days later 
by exploding a mine. The Confederates con- 
structed a work called Fort Pemberton, filling the 
space between the Tallahatchie and the Yallabusha, 
where they approach within five hundred yards of 
each other, five miles above the point where their 
junction forms the Yazoo. Levees were cut and 



I08 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

the land in front of the fort Hooded, niakinj^ it in- 
accessible to infantry. 

After vexatious delays, owing- to the difficulty 
of obtaining steamboats small enough to navigate 
the narrow and tortuous streams, it was the 23d 
of February by the time that General Ross left 
Helena with the first detachment ; and it was the 
2d of March when his battered boats emerged from 
Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater. ten miles in a di- 
rect line from the Mississippi; and the nth of 
March when the expedition arrived before Fort 
Pemberton. After a futile bombardment, the ex- 
pedition withdrew. Cjcneral Grant, on receiving 
report of the actual finding of a navigable water- 
way to the highland in rear of Vicksburg. ordered 
General McPherson to gather up his corps from 
Lake Providence. Memphis, and afloat on trans- 
ports movmg with his whole command as fast 
as suitable boats could be procured. General 
Quinby. pushing forward with the first detach- 
ment, met Ross retreating, and took him back to 
participate in another attempt. After a vain search 
for dry land on which his men could camp, he pro- 
posed to march over to the Yallabusha. farther 
back, cross the Yallabusha on a bridge, and pass 
down the farther bank to the rear of Fort Pember- 
ton. The boat, returning to Helena for necessary 
supplies and material, met on the ist of April a 
messenger bringing an order for the abandon- 
ment of the expedition. 

General Sherman received a letter from General 
Grant on the morning of the i6th of March, stat- 
ing that he had just returned from a reconnois- 
sance up Steele's Bayou with Admiral Porter, and 
directing Sherman to have at the landing his 
pioneer corps and one regiment to cut aAvay trees, 
and to report in person for further instruction. In 
an hour General Giles A. Smith with the required 
detail was at the landinq:, and General Sherman 



THE MISSISSIPPI. 109 

took the tug sent for him. After a conference Gen- 
eral Grant directed General Sherman to " proceed 
as nearly as practicable up Steele's Bayou through 
Black Bayou to Deer Creek, and thence with the 
gunboats there by any route they may take to get 
nito the Yazoo River, for the purpose of determin- 
ing the feasibility of getting an army through that 
to the east bank of that river, and at a point from 
which they can act advantageously against Vicks- 
burg," and added some detailed instructions. 

The proposed route by Steele's Bayou, Black 
Bayou, Deer Creek, Rolling Fork, Sun Flower 
River, and Yazoo River was two hundred miles, 
and was tortuous beyond description. Up to Deer 
Creek the thin rim of bordering bank hardly sepa- 
rated it from the expanse of water and swamp, 
dotted with clumps of dry earth and covered by 
thick forest and undergrowth. Admiral Porter, 
with his fleet of five ironclads, four mortar boats, 
and two tugs, found that the waterway was so nar- 
row that his boats could not turn ; some of the 
bends were so sharp that steering was not prac- 
ticable, and the bow and stern of the boats had to 
be controlled by hawsers from the shore ; the water 
in places was so filled with a growing plant that, 
the propellers became clogged and useless, and 
could be released only by backing and partially 
unwinding the impediment ; overhanging trees 
swept off smokestacks, pilot houses, and all ex- 
posed woodwork; and felled trees floating in the 
river were such obstructions that the boats were 
used as rams and butted them against the bank. 

General Sherman sent Giles A. Smith's brigade 
and Kirby Smith's brigade up the Mississippi to 
Gwin's plantation, where Steele's Bayou, making 
a bend, approaches within a mile of the Missis- 
sippi, and proceeded himself on the 17th with his 
stafif up the bayou. He overtook Porter just as the 
fleet was emerging from the difificulties of Black 



no GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Bayou into the broader stream of Deer Creek, 
which llovved through land mostly solid and par- 
tially occupied by plantations. Sherman continued 
with Porter a few miles, and returned in a tug 
loaned to him by the admiral to comply with the 
admiral's recpiest to have Jilack JJayou cleared. 
Setting the Eighth Missouri to work, he sent the 
two small steamboats which had brought up this 
regiment and the pioneers back to G win's ])lanta- 
tion, and brought up Cules A. Smith with two more 
regiments. During the 19th Porter's heavy guns 
were heard, and in the night a messenger arrived 
with a letter from Porter stating that he was 
blocked and beset, and asking for speedy aid. 
Sherman immediately sent Giles A. Smith forward 
with all the force at hand, and proceded himself 
in a canoe down stream in the night for re-enforce- 
ments. Pie met one of the steamboats coming up 
with a second load of soldiers. He filled an empty 
coal barge with others who were detailed to work 
on the bayou, and, towing it with a navy tug, re- 
turned up stream. When the boats could ])rocee(l 
no farther in the darkness, he landed and marched 
through canebrake and swamp with the troops, 
carrying lighted candles, till they reached open 
land by Deer Creek, and there lay down to rest. 
Resuming the march at daylight, stimulated by 
the nearer sound of the navy guns, they hurried 
on till they met a party of Giles A. Smith's com- 
mand sent down to prevent the enemy from ob- 
structing the channel in the rear of the gunboats. 
General Sherman came just in time to encounter 
a Confederate detachment arriving for that pur- 
pose, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove them off. 

Admiral Porter, after Sherman left him, had 
continued pushing slowly up Deer Creek until he 
arrived, on the 18th, nearly to Rolling Fork, en- 
countering obstacles, but seeing no enemy. On 
the 19th a field battery opened upon his boats, and 



THE MISSISSIPPL III 

sharpshooters, dispersed everywhere under cover, 
shot every man on them who ojjpeared outside 
of sheher. Unable to get his men out to remove 
obstructions while the enemy sunk a coal boat in 
rear of the fleet, he thought of blowing up his ves- 
sels, but first sent to Sherman for relief. When 
the relief came the sunk coal boat v/as removed, 
and the vessels, backing dov.n stream with slow, 
toilsome, and aided progress, made thirty miles 
in three days and escaped the toils. The expe- 
dition failed, and was so reported to Grant on 
the 27th. 

These futile eflforts demonstrated that the army 
could not be conveyed across the submerged low- 
land that lay between the Yazf^x) and the Missis- 
sippi, extending from Vicksburg nearly to Mem- 
phis, and that Vicksburg could not be turned by 
the north. To attack it in front was impossible. 
It only remained to march o\'erland to the .south 
and find some crossing below, or else to abandon 
the expedition, return to Memphis, rebuild the rail- 
road, and march down Central Mississippi, keep- 
ing his line of communication and supply pro- 
tected. General .Sherman preferred the latter plan. 
Militar}' authorities generally agree, at least that, 
considering the great risk of defeat and the disas- 
trous consequences of defeat below Vicksburg, the 
approach by land from Memphis should have been 
made in the first place. General Grant, always te- 
nacious of purpose, thought it better to take the 
risk than demoralize his army and shock the peo- 
ple by confession of failure. And he trusted some- 
thing to disconcerting the enemy by the boldness 
of an attack from the south. General Sherman 
wrote General Grant a letter giving his view. Gen- 
eral Grant made no reply, pursued his own plan, 
and long after the campaign was completed re- 
turned the letter without comment. General Sher- 
man, having done his part by giving his views. 



112 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

supported his chief as loyally and as heartily as if 
his own suggestion had been accepted. 

Headquarters Fifteenth Army Corps, 

Camp near Vicksburg, April 8, i86j. 

Colonel]. A. Rawlins, 

Assistant Adjutant-General to General Grant. 
Sir: I would most respectfully suggest (for reasons 
which I will not name) that General Grant call on his corps 
commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the 
best general plan of a campaign. Unless this be done, there 
are men who will, in any result falling below the popular 
standard, claim that tlieir advice was unheeded, and that 
fatal consecjuence resulted therefrom. My own opinions are : 

1. That the Army of the Tennessee is now far in advance 
of the other grand armies of the United States. 

2. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved 
from St. Louis to the vicinity ot Little Rock, Ark., supplies 
collected there while the river is full, and land communica- 
tion with Memphis opened via Des Arc on the White and 
Madison on the St. Francis River. 

3. That as much of the Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and 
Tallahatchie rivers as can be gained and fortified, be held, 
and the main army be transported thither by land and water ; 
that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, 
and, as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and 
the swamp road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry. 

4. That the line of the Yallabusha be the base from which 
to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central 
crosses Big Black, above Canton ; and lastly, where the 
Vicksburg and Jackson Railroad crosses the same river (Big 
Black). The capture of Vicksburg would result. 

5. That a minor force be left in this vicinity, not to ex- 
ceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float 
and transport them to any desired point ; this force to be 
held always near enough to act with the gunboats when the 
main army is known to be near Vicksburg — Haines's Bluff, 
or Yazoo City. 

6. I do not doubt the capacity of Willow Bayou (which I 
estimate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) as a mili- 
tary channel to supply an army large enough to operate 
against Jackson, Miss., or the Black River Bridge ; and 
such a channel will be very vulnerable to a force coming 
from the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal will 
be most useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a 



THE MISSISSIPPI. 



113 



fleet that should navigate the lower reach of the Mississippi 
between Vicksburg and the Red River. 

7. The chief reason for operating solely by water was the 
season of the year and high water in the Tallahatchie and 
Yallabusha Rivers. The spring is now here, and soon these 
streams will be no serious obstacle, save in the ambuscades of 
the forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected 
at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable for 
us to allow the enemy to hold it and make crops this year. 

I make these suggestions with the request that General 
Grant will read them, and give them, as I know he will, a share 
of his thoughts. 1 would prefer that he should not answer 
this letter, but merely give it as much or little weight as it 
deserves. Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive 
from me the same zealous co-operation and energetic sup- 
port as though conceived by myself. I do not beheve that 
General Banks will make any serious attack on Port Hudson 
this spring. I am, etc., 

W. T. Sherman, Major -General. 

General Sherman had trouble again with the 
newspapers. Thomas W. Knox, correspondent of 
the New York Herald, accompanied Sherman's 
expedition to Helena, knowing it was against or- 
ders, and published in his correspondence a state- 
ment of the organization of the expedition and 
personal abuse of the general. In conversation he 
said he had no personal ill will, but that he had 
tried to break General Sherman down because he 
was opposed to newspaper men. A court-martial 
in February found that Knox had willfully dis- 
obeyed orders in accompanying the expedition, but 
the court attached no criminality thereto ; found 
that he had published the organization of the ex- 
pedition, but also found that he had not thereby 
given information to the enemy ; found that he 
was guilty of violation of orders of the War De- 
partment by publishing correspondence concern- 
ing the operations of the army without sanction by 
the general in command, and sentenced him to be 
removed beyond the lines of the army, not to re- 
turn again under pain of imprisonment. On ap- 



114 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



peal, President Lincoln, on the 20th of March, 
revoked the sentence so far as to permit Knox 
to return and to stay if General Grant should con- 
sent ; otherwise to leave. General Grant, on the 
6th of April, refused to give permission unless Gen- 
eral Sherman would first consent ; and Knox, hav- 
ing made neither retraction nor apology, nor ex- 
pressed regret, Sherman refused. 

General Sherman did not, perhaps, recognize 
a difference between a government carrying on a 
war on behalf of a people and a people aroused 
carrying on a war through the instrumentality of 
the government. He did not appreciate the crav- 
ing for information of a people wrought to a fever 
of enthusiasm. He was military in every fiber. 
His care was to make his army efificient. He saw 
that the presence of any non-combatant was, to 
some extent, an incumbrance, and the presence of 
a stirrer up of disaffection was a mischief. When 
clearly satisfied as to what his duty was, no oppo- 
sition, no fear of consequences, would deter him 
from performing it. The letters of Lincoln, Grant, 
and Sherman in this case are characteristic. 

Executive Mansion, 
Washington, March 20, i86j. 
Whom it may concern : 

Whereas it appears to my satisfaction that Thomas W. 
Knox, a correspondent of the New York Herald, has been, 
by the sentence of a court-martial, excluded from the military 
department under command of Major-(ieneral Grant, and 
also that General Thayer, president of the court-martial 
which rendered the sentence, and Major-General McCler- 
nand, in command of a corps of that department, and many 
other respectable persons, are of opinion that Mr. Knox's of- 
fense was technical rather than willfully wrong, and that the 
sentence should be revoked ; now, therefore, said sentence is 
hereby so far revoked as to allow Mr. Knox to return to 
General Grant's headquarters, and to remain if General 
Grant shall s^ive his express assent, and to again leave the 
department if General Grant shall refuse such assent. 

A. Lincoln. 



THE MISSISSIPPI. 115 

Before Vicks^vrg, A/>n7 6, iS6j. 
Thomas W. Knox, Correspondent Nexv York Herald : 

The letter of the President of the United States author- 
izing you to return to these headquarters, and to remain with 
my consent, or leave if such consent is withheld, has been 
shown me. You came here first in positive violation of an 
order from General Sherman. Because you were not pleased 
with his treatment of army followers who had violated his 
order, you attempted to break down his influence with his 
command and to blast his reputation with the public. You 
made insinuations against his sanity, and said many things 
which were untrue, and, so far as your letter had influence, 
calculated to affect the public service unfavorably. Gen- 
eral Sherman is one of the ablest soldiers and purest men 
in the country. You have attacked him and been sen- 
tenced to expulsion from this department for the offense. 
While I would conform to the slightest wish of the President 
where it is formed upon a fair representation of both sides of 
any question, my respect for General Sherman is such that 
in this case I must decline, unless General Sherman first 
gives his consent to your remaining. 

U. S. (iRANT, Major-General. 

Headquarters Fifteenth Army Corps, 

Camp near Vicksburg, Ap)il S, i86j. 

Major-General (]iRANT : 

Dear Sir : I received last night the copy of your answer 
to Mr. Knox's application to reside near your headquarters. 
I thank you for the manner and substance of that reply. 
Many regard Knox as unworthy the notice he has received. 
This is true, but I send you his letter to me and my answer. 
Observe in his letter to me, sent long before I could have 
heard the result of his application to you, he makes the as- 
sertion that you had no objection, but rather wanted him 
back, and only as a matter of form required my assent. 
He regretted a difference between a " portion of the army 
and the press." The insolence of these fellows is insupport- 
able. I know they are encouraged, but I know human na- 
ture well enough, and that they will be the first to turn 
against their patrons. Mr. Lincoln, of course, fears to incur 
the enmity of the Herald, but he must rule the Herald or 
the Herald will rule him ; he can take his choice. 

I have been foolish and unskillful in drawing on me the 
shafts of the press. By opposing mob law in California I 
once before drew down the press, but after the smoke 



Il5 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

cleared off, and the people saw where they were drifting to, 
they admitted I was right. If the press be allowed to run 
riof and write up and write down at their pleasure, there is 
an end to a constitutional government in America and an- 
archy must result. Even now the real people of our country 
begin to fear and tremble at it, and look to our armies as the 
anchor of safety, of order, submission to authority, bound 
together by a real government, and not by the clamor of a 
demoralized press and crowd of demagogues. 

As ever, your friend, W. T. Sherman. 



TURNING OPERATION 

TICKSBUKG CAMPAIGIS^ 
1863 




CHAPTER VI. 

VICKSBURG. 

The plan to attack Vicksburg from the south 
had no possible chance of success except by first 
obtaining control of the river below the city and 
then by veiling in some degree the point of real 
attack. The Confederates had on the 25th of Feb- 
ruary in their fleet below, the Queen of the West, 
the most powerful ram on the Mississippi, and the 
Indianola, which had the heaviest armament, both 
of them captured from the National command. The 
Indianola, captured on the 24th, was sunk near 
the Mississippi shore, being repaired from the in- 
juries received at the time of capture. Admiral 
Porter had an imitation monitor constructed — a 
flatboat covered with a deck, having a slight frame 
turret with a huge wooden gun projecting from 
it. Some barrels, placed one above another, made 
a stack, whence issued smoke from burning wet 
straw ; all was painted black. It was set adrift 
just before dawn on the morning of the 26th of 
February. All the batteries along the river poured 
their hottest fire into the little craft as it seemed 
to steam leisurely by, contemptuously secure in 
its own invulnerability. Telegrams were sent down 
the river and to Richmond, excitedly announcing 
the passage down stream of a monitor. As it 
turned the point, the Queen of the West was just 
rounding the bend below, ascending. At the sight 
of the strange vessel emerging unharmed from the 
furious cannonade, the Queen of the West fled 

117 



Il8 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

clown stream, joined by her consorts, entered one 
of the western affluents of the river, and took no 
further part in the war. The mock monitor was 
carried by an eddy to the right bank, and, lying 
there with the stern ashore, seemed to be survey- 
ing the Indianola opposite and lower down. Then 
pushed out by some of General McClernand's men 
who were bivouacking near by, it was carried by 
the current directly toward the Indianola. The 
workmen wrecked the guns and set fire to the hull, 
and the Confederate fleet vexed the river no more. 

About lo p. M., April i6th, Admiral Porter 
started with seven gunboats and three loaded trans- 
ports. The enemy illumined the river with bon- 
fires on both shores. The batteries maintained 
continuous cannonade, while the passing fleet raked 
the shore batteries at short range. Every vessel 
was hit, but little serious damage was done except 
the loss of one transport and several coal barges. 
On the 22d of April six transports loaded with sup- 
plies, and towing twelve barges, all manned by 
volunteers from the army, chiefly from Logan's di- 
vision, passed down, losing only one transport. 

Toward the end of March Steele's division of 
Sherman's corps was sent to the Deer Creek coun- 
try, about one hundred and fifty miles north of 
Vicksburg, to subsist his command on the coun- 
try and destroy what he could not use. On the 
9th of April General Pcmberton telegraphed to 
Richmond that Grant's real movement appeared to 
be through Deer Creek, while there were rumors 
of a movement across the Mississippi, below Vicks- 
burg, which he did not credit. He was ordered 
by General Joseph Johnston to send some of his 
troops to Chattanooga. Toward the end of April, 
when Grant was about to cross the river. Pember- 
ton directed five thousand men in Vicksburg to 
be held in readiness to move to Grand Gulf ; but, 
being perplexed by a demonstration which Sher- 



VICKSBURG. 



119 



man made up the Yazoo against Haines's Bluff, 
and uncertain which was the real movement and 
which was the demonstration, he was holding the 
men in Vicksburg when Grand Gulf was evacuated. 

About the middle of April detachments sent 
from Memphis and La Grange advanced slowly 
into northwestern Mississippi. The Confederate 
troops in northern Mississippi concentrated to op- 
pose them. The northeastern portion of the State 
being left bare, General Grierson, with seventeen 
hundred cavalry, dashed across the boundary and 
was destroying railroad far within the State before 
there was any suspicion of his movement. By rap- 
idly moving from place to place, sending out de- 
tachments in diverse directions to destroy special 
objects, he distracted General Pemberton, who, 
having but a scanty amount of cavalry, was in con- 
stant receipt of messages reporting the presence 
of National troops at points remote from each other 
at the same time. He wore out brigades, dispatch- 
ing and recalling them, and hurrying them to points 
where they were too late or were never needed. 
Grierson reached the National force at Baton Rouge 
on the 2d of May with slight loss, having destroyed 
much railroad and other property, and withdrawn 
General Pemberton's attention from Grant at the 
very time that Grant was pushing for the passage 
of the Mississippi. 

On the 20th of April the first order to march 
was issued. At that time McClernand's four di- 
visions were assembled near New Carthage ; two 
of McPherson's divisions at Milliken's Bend, with 
third on the way thither from Lake Providence ; 
two of Sherman's divisions just below Milliken's 
Bend, and the third, Steele's, in the northern 
Yazoo country, but under orders to rejoin the 
corps. Portions of the route lay through saturated 
ooze, in which wheels sunk to the hub, and which 
gave no purchase to the struggling teams. In 
9 



I20 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

places doubled teams barely moved a single field- 
piece, and the way was strewn with fragments of 
wagons and their contents. A futile effort was 
made by the fleet on the 29th of April to disman- 
tle the works which crowned the summit of the 
bluf¥ at Grand Gulf, which was there over one 
hundred feet high, and the army continued to 
march to a point opposite Bruinsburg, an imagi- 
nary village at the mouth of Bayou Pierre. Mc- 
Clernand began moving his corps across the river 
at daylight of April 30th, and finished at noon. 
Four hours were then taken for issue of rations 
before the march began. 

The bottom land at Bruinsburg is but little 
above high water. The blufT is a hundred feet 
high. The ascent was by a roadway cut into the 
bluff. The tenacious soil preserved the perpen- 
dicularity of the side walls of the cut, so that the 
roadway was, in fact, a narrow trench with lofty 
vertical sides. A small party could have prevented 
an army from ascending by it. Fortunately no de- 
fender was present or near. McClernand's corps, 
once in motion, advanced with vigor till after mid- 
night, when the advance encountered the enemy 
within four miles of Port Gibson. After a slight 
skirmish, the troops lay down to wait for daylight. 

Green's brigade (Confederate) was just arriv- 
ing at Port Gibson when it encountered McCler- 
nand's advance. When Tracy's brigade arrived, 
a little before break of day of the ist of May, they 
took position about three miles from Port Gibson, 
across the two roads into which the road from 
Bruinsburg forks. Green taking the southern fork 
and Tracy the northern. The country was a con- 
fused jumble of sharp ridges, with deep intervening 
valleys filled with impenetrable thickets of cane 
and brush, through which it was difficult for a man 
to force his way, and over which it was impossible 
to preserve alignment or formation. General Mc- 



VICKSBURG. 121 

Clernand early in the morning led the attack on 
Green's brigade with Hovey's and Carr's divisions, 
and sent Osterhaus to assault Tracy. About nine 
o'clock a persistent charge carried the hill, cap- 
turing two guns and four hundred prisoners. Just 
then Baldwin arrived and posted his brigade ad- 
vantageously on a ridge a mile in the rear, and 
Green fell back and joined him. Osterhaus early 
had a slight success, and was able to make no far- 
ther advance. About noon Colonel Cockerell ar- 
rived with three regiments, two of which were 
assigned to Baldwin and one to Tracy. In the 
afternoon Logan arrived with two brigades, ac- 
companied by Grant and McPherson. Stevenson 
was sent to McClernand upon his demand for aid, 
and J. E. Smith was sent to strengthen Osterhaus. 
The Confederates fought with judgment and gal- 
lantry. Forced from one position, they retired to 
another and continued the conflict. It was sunset 
before they gave up the field, and dark before Grant 
entered Port Gibson. The Confederate force was 
eighty-five hundred ; the National army numbered 
twenty-three thousand. According to the Confed- 
erate reports, their loss was four hundred and forty- 
eight killed and wounded and three hundred and 
eighty-seven missing. The National loss was eight 
hundred and fifty killed and wounded and twenty- 
five missing. General Grant reported five hun- 
dred prisoners taken, besides the wounded. 

On the morning of the 3d of May General Mc- 
Pherson moved for Hankinson's Ferry, on the Big 
Black River. At the same time General Bowen, 
having evacuated Grand Gulf, was pushing for the 
same point. McPherson arrived in time to drive 
away a rear guard who were beginning the de- 
struction of the frail bridge over which the Con- 
federate troops had just crossed. Stevenson's di- 
vision, which had been held in Vicksburg by fear 
that Sherman's demonstration at Haines's Bluf¥ 



122 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

was the real attack, had finally reached the ferry, 
tired and worn, only in time to be ordered to re- 
trace their steps in haste. 

While McPherson rested three days at the ferry, 
and McClernand at Willow Springs, army wagons 
were sent back for ammunition and captured wag- 
ons for rations. Officers' blankets were carried on 
captured mules, and officers and men slept with- 
out tents. Sherman received on the 30th of April 
an order from Grant to cease his demonstration 
before Haines's Bluff and follow McPherson, leav- 
ing one division to guard trains and supplies. 
Leaving General Blair to convoy the supply trains 
when they should be ready, he pushed along the 
road obstructed by wagons of the Seventeenth 
Corps, and crossed the river at Grand Gulf on the 
7th of May. 

According to information received, Pemberton 
had drawn his detachments into Vicksburg, and 
General Joe Johnston was assembling a new force 
at Jackson. On the 7th General McClernand 
moved by the direct road toward Edwards' Sta- 
tion, on the railroad between Vicksburg and Jack- 
son, to be followed by Sherman, and McPherson 
proceeded toward Jackson by Utica and Raymond. 
In the morning of the 12th Logan, having the ad- 
vance of McPherson's corps, met parties of mount- 
ed men, who fell back firing, compelling him to de- 
ploy two regiments, one on each side of the road, 
to push them back. Gregg's brigade, just arrived 
from Port Hudson, was discovered on the farther 
side of a small creek supporting two batteries. 
Both lines advanced. The Eighth Michigan Bat- 
tery was run forward to the bridge over which the 
road crossed the creek ; the Second Brigade rushed 
to the creek, using the farther bank as a breast- 
work, while on its right the Confederates took pos- 
session of the creek, using it as a cover against 
the First Brigade. The Third Brigade, on the right 



VICKSBURG. 123 

of the First, crossed the creek and turned the flank 
of the enemy. Crocker's division beginning to 
come up, Gregg withdrew his command and re- 
treated. McPherson advanced to Raymond and 
beyond before going into bivouac for the night. 
The National loss was sixty-six killed, three hun- 
dred and thirty-nine wounded, thirty-seven miss- 
ing; total, four hundred and forty-two. Of these, 
four hundred and forty were in Logan's division 
and two in Crocker's. Gregg's loss, according to 
his reported statement, was seventy-three killed, 
two hundred and fifty-one wounded, and one hun- 
dred and ninety missing. Randall W. McGavock, 
colonel of Tenth Tennessee, is mentioned in this 
statement as mortally wounded. Gregg in his re- 
port of the battle says McGavock was killed. 

Finding that a force was gathering in Jackson, 
Grant ordered McPherson to approach Jackson 
by way of Clinton, and Sherman to march thither 
through Raymond and Mississippi Springs. Gen- 
eral Joseph Johnston, who had just arrived from 
Chattanooga to take supreme command, learning in 
the night of the 13th that a force was approaching 
from Mississippi Springs, in addition to the col- 
umn approaching from Clinton, put General John 
Adams in command of the army trains, and di- 
rected him to move them out on the road toward 
Canton. He placed General Gregg in command 
of the troops who were to hold the National force 
in check until the trains should be out on the road. 
Gregg's command comprised his own brigade, 
commanded by Colonel Farcjuharson ; Gist's bri- 
gade, commanded by Colonel Cokjuit, General 
Gist being detained east of Pearl River with other 
troops ; Walker's l^rigade ; two field batteries ; and 
Third Kentucky mounted infantry. General Gregg 
moved Colquit out beyond the fortifications of the 
city, three miles toward Clinton, and planted his 
brigade on the summit of rising ground which 



124 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



sloped down to a swampy hollow. The open 
ground extended in undulating meadow for a mile 
to the front. Both his flanks were protected by 
woods. Farquharson was posted off to the right 
of Colquit, and Walker in reserve. The Third 
Kentucky, with a regiment and a battery from 
Walker's brigade, was sent to guard the road from 
Mississippi Springs. 

Sherman, advancing after a brief conflict, forced 
his antagonist back into the fortifications ; while 
General Sherman engaged the works in front, Cap- 
tain Pitman, engineer, and the Ninety-fifth Ohio 
found an unoccupied space on the flank. Steele's 
division, rapidly moving to this point, came upon 
the Confederates from the rear, and took two hun- 
dred and fifty prisoners. The rest escaped and 
joined the trains on the Canton road, McPherson 
sent Crocker's division against Colquit. The di- 
vision was deployed at nine o'clock, but a heavy 
downpour of rain delayed the movement till nearly 
eleven. Then the deployed line advanced as if on 
parade, under fire while on rising ground, and 
pausing in the hollows to close up gaps made by 
casualties and dress the line. When the steady ap- 
proach neared the works, Colquit drew out his 
command, and, falling back, was joined by Walker. 
Farquharson, being already north of the Clinton 
road, marched across the country to the Canton 
road, and all retreated with the wagon train seven 
miles to the north. Sherman's loss was six killed, 
twenty-two wounded, and four missing; McPher- 
son's, thirty-six killed, two hundred and twenty- 
nine wounded, and three missing. The casualties 
in Gist's brigade, as reported by Colonel Colquit. 
were seventeen killed, sixty-four wounded, and 
one hundred and eighteen missing. There are no 
reports from the rest of Gregg's command. Gen- 
eral McPherson estimated the Confederate loss in 
killed, wounded, and missing at eight hundred and 



VICKSBURG. 



125 



forty-five. The armament of the fortifications — 
thirty-five guns and their ammunition — besides 
large stores of pubhc property, were captured. 

General Grant learned in Jackson that Johnston 
had sent an order to Pemberton to attack Grant's 
rear. McPherson was ordered to move early next 
morning, the 15th, back through Clinton, leaving 
Sherman in Jackson to destroy public property. 
McClernand, whose divisions were on the roads 
converging toward Edwards's Station, was ordered 
to advance cautiously. Pemberton, who for sev- 
eral days had been making a brilliant display of in- 
capacity, had finally resolved to move to the south 
and cut Grant's communications, unaware that 
Grant had cut loose from the Mississippi and had 
no communications, but fully aware that this move- 
ment was in flat disobedience of Johnston's order 
directing Pemberton to move north and efifect a 
junction with him. 

On the morning of the i6th Pemberton, lying 
on a crossroad just south of Champion's Hill, re- 
ceived from Johnston a reiteration of the order 
to join him, and proceeded to obey, first sending 
his wagons by the road over Champion's Hill, 
and ordering the troops to follow. Champion's 
Hill is an aljrupt elevation in the plain a little to 
the east of Baker's Creek ; it is less than one hun- 
dred feet high, is over one mile in length from east 
to west, terminates in a point toward the west, and 
has a width of more than half a mile at its eastern 
face. The road running west from Clinton to 
Vicksburg, instead of continuing in the lowland 
around the northern and west slopes of the hill 
to the bridge over Baker's Creek, turns directly 
to the south, making a right angle, ascends the 
northeast corner to the summit, and there, turn- 
ing again to the west, follows the summit of the 
ridge and continues west to the bridge. 

Hovev, commanding one of McClernand's di- 



126 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

visions, bivouacked for the night at Bolton, on 
the Chnton road, about four miles in advance of 
McPherson. A crossroad led south to Osterhaus 
and Carr, who were on the Middle road to Ed- 
wards's Station. A. J. Smith was more than a mile 
farther south of them, on the direct road from 
Raymond to Edwards's Station, and Blair was in 
their rear in Raymond. Pemberton lay in line 
facing to the east, his left at the base of the south- 
east corner of Champion's Hill, where a crossroad 
ascended that joined the Clinton road on the sum- 
mit, and his right across the southern or direct 
Raymond road to Edwards. 

Early in the morning Pemberton sent his train 
to cross Baker's Creek on the way to join John- 
ston. When his column was about to march, Lor- 
ing's pickets were attacked by A. J. Smith's skir- 
mishers, and Bowen's by Osterhaus's, and Pember- 
ton found he had a battle on his hands. Hovey's 
skirmishers met Stevenson's pickets not far from 
Champion's house about ten o'clock, and pushed 
them back to the northeast base of the hill. About 
eleven o'clock McPherson arrived with General 
Grant. Hovey charged up the long slope, and 
after a fierce and stubborn fight drove back the 
right wing of Stevenson's division, carried the sum- 
mit, and captured eleven guns. Meanwhile two of 
Logan's brigades, J. E. Smith's and Leggett's, 
were brought against the steep and rugged north- 
ern face of the hill, on Hovey's right, and forced 
the left of Stevenson's division back up the slopes. 
Logan brought his Third Brigade up in extension 
of his right, and by a quick charge broke Steven- 
son's line and captured a complete battery. Ste- 
venson, finding the National troops were working 
their way dangerously near the road to Baker's 
Creek bridge, shifted his line to the left to cover 
the line of retreat. Pemberton ordered Bowen to 
close up to connect with Stevenson. Bowen found 



VICKSBURG. 127 

Hovey in possession of the summit, and fell upon 
him with a furious assault. The struggle was se- 
vere, but Hovey was forced back and, still fight- 
ing, pushed down the hill, losing all the captured 
guns but two. Crocker soon appearing with his 
division, joined Hovey's jaded but plucky men ; 
together they surged up the hill with irresistible 
onset. Bowen was overcome, routed, scattered. 

Loring, still in the lowland south of the hill, 
was hastening to Bowen's relief when the broken 
division, pouring down the hill, disordered his 
ranks. The artillery of the pursuers opened upon 
him, and Osterhaus attacked him in force. Bowen 
escaped across Baker's Creek by the ford. One 
brigade of Stevenson's division reached the bridge. 
Carr's division of McClernand's corps by a rapid 
movement then seized the bridge, forcing the re- 
mainder of Stevenson's command to the ford. 
Bowen remained at the ford to hold it for Loring 
till forced by the approach of the National troops to 
let go. Loring's wagons had gone forward with 
the train. Wandering in the night to find a lower 
ford, he lost his battery in a swamp. Late in the 
night he reached the ford, but there learned that 
Edwards's Station was already occupied by Grant. 

The National loss was four hundred and ten 
killed, eighteen hundred and forty-four wounded, 
and one hundred and eighty-seven missing, mak- 
ing a total of twenty-four hundred and forty-one. 
Of this loss, one hundred and fifty was sustained 
by the four divisions under McClernand's com- 
mand, and twenty-two hundred and ninety-one by 
the divisions under the immediate command of 
Grant and McPherson. The Confederate loss, ac- 
cording to division and brigade reports, was : 
Killed, three hundred and eighty ; wounded, ten 
hundred and eighteen ; missing, twenty-four hun- 
dred and forty-one ; total, thirty-eight hundred and 
thirty-nine. General Pemberton in his report of 



128 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

casualties omits Loring's division, and differs from 
Stevenson as to the loss in his division. Where a 
victory was so vital and so crushing, it seems un- 
gracious to suggest that it might have been more 
complete. Yet the suggestion forces itself that if 
the four divisions with McClernand had fought 
with the same alacrity and ardor as the other three, 
the result would have been the capture of Pem- 
berton and his entire command, and the immediate 
completion of the campaign. 

Pemberton's shattered legions trudged wearily 
to the Big Black and crossed through the night. 
The high bluff which formed the west bank of the 
river and dominated the plain in front was left va- 
cant, to be occupied by Loring's division in sup- 
port of the troops holding the bridge head on the 
lowland east of the river. But Loring was wander- 
ing about east of Baker's Creek, and never came. 
Bowen's division did not cross, but remained to 
aid Vaughan's brigade, fresh from Vicksburg, in 
holding the bridge head. The Big Black there 
forms a deep re-entrant curve. The bridge head 
was a line of earthwork a mile in length, running 
north and south, the northern end resting upon 
the river and the southern end touching a cypress 
swamp which bordered on the river below. Twenty 
gims were in position ; along the front of the works 
and parallel to them was a bayou extending from 
the river above to the swamp below. Trees and 
boughs had been thrown into the slough, making 
it at once a ditch and abattis. 

Early on the morning of the 17th McClernand 
moved from Edwards's Station. Osterhaus in front, 
followed by A. J. Smith, advanced over the rolling, 
cultivated land along the south side of the road, 
and deployed when near the Confederate intrench- 
ments. Smith deployed on his left. Artillery 
opened fire, and skirmishers pushed forward and 
engaged. While this mild combat was going on. 



VICKSBURG. 



129 



Carr's division advanced through woods that bor- 
dered the north side of the road, extending to the 
river, near the northern extremity of the intrench- 
nients. While the defenders of the works were 
engaged with the force in their front, Carr's com- 
mand, leaping from the woods, rushed over the 
intervening ground, plunged through the bayou, 
clambered over the works, and was within them. 
The Confederate troops were dismayed. The fear 
of being cut off from retreat made a panic. There 
was a mad rush for the bridges. Osterhaus and 
Smith hastened up. Eighteen of the twenty guns, 
with their ammunition, fourteen hundred muskets, 
and seventeen hundred and fifty-one prisoners were 
captured. The bridges prepared for combustion 
were fired, and the battle was over by nine o'clock. 
McClernand's loss was thirty-nine killed, two hun- 
dred and thirty-seven wounded, and three missing ; 
all but ten killed, twenty-one wounded, and two 
missing were of Carr's division. Neither Bowen 
nor Vaughan made reports, and the number of 
killed, wounded, and drowned is not known. 

General Sherman, in Jackson, on the morning 
of the 16th, received order from General Grant to 
send forward one division immediately, and to fol- 
low with the other as soon as his work of destroy- 
ing railroad and other public property should be 
accomplished. In pursuance of this order, Sher- 
man arrived at Bolton after dark, and was there 
informed by one of General Grant's stafif that he 
was to go to Bridgeport and there cross the Big 
Black. Sherman reached Bridgeport at noon next 
day. General Blair, who had arrived with the sup- 
ply train at Raymond on the 15th, and been at- 
tached to McClernand's command on the i6th, ar- 
rived at Bridgeport a few hours earlier. Sherman 
having the only pontoon train in the army, his 
bridge was laid by night, and two divisions of his 
corps were over by daybreak of the i8th. Captain 



I30 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

llickenloopcr, chief engineer of the Seventeenth 
Corps, and Captain Tresilian, chief engineer of 
Logan's division, constructed a bridge for the Sev- 
enteenth Corps. A framework of stout timbers, 
filled with cotton bales standing on end and tightly 
compressed, and the whole covered by a Hooring, 
was built on the shore, launched, and held in place 
by cables. A twenty-pound J'arrott gun sank the 
structure fourteen inches, _ leaving an excess of 
buoyancy of sixteen inches. 

General Sherman, starting early in the morning 
of the 1 8th, approached the northeast corner of the 
defenses of Vicksburg, and, by order of General 
Grant, moved into position facing the north front 
of the works, from the Grave Yard road to the 
river. lYMuberton, finding the line occupied by 
his command too extended for his force, withdrew 
his troops, in the night of the i8th, to his inner 
line, being not only shorter but also much stronger. 
In the morning of the 19th Sherman occupied the 
abandoned line, and sent a cavalry regiment out 
to Haines's IMuff. The works were found aban- 
doned, fourteen heavy guns in position uninjured, 
and the magazines full of ammunition and stores. 
The cavalry colonel signaled to a gunboat in the 
Yazoo River, turned over the place to the com- 
mander, and, having opened conmiunication with 
the fleet, returned to camp. 

McClernand and McPhcrson began to arrive 
toward evening of the i8th, and were placed facing 
the east front of the Confederate line, McPherson 
next to Sherman and McClernand on McPherson's 
left. The works were attacked the afternoon of 
the iQth. Assault was made at the Grave Yard 
road by Blair's division of the Thirteenth Corps. 
The road was swept by a crossfire of artillery and 
musketry. Tuttle's brigade was held in reserve by 
the road, while Ewing's and Giles Smith's brigades 
charged on the right of the road and Kilby Smith's 



VICKSBURG, 131 

on the left. The charging hnes descended the gul- 
lied bank of the ravine, pushed through thickets 
and entanglement of felled trees, clambered up the 
farther side, and reached the base of the parapet, 
but could get no farther. They remained tiiere till 
night, and were then withdrawn. The Tlfteenth 
and Seventeenth Army Corps advanced toward the 
works and engaged them with musketry and field 
artillery, but did not assault. The loss of the as- 
sailants in killed and wounded was nine hundred 
and thirty-four. Of these, seven hundred and five 
were in Sherman's corps. 

The defensive line of Vicksburg was a continu- 
ous ridge, forming a natural rampart encircling 
the city, resting upon the river aljove the city, and 
three miles below it. The ridge was of uniform 
height, making a level summit, narrow except 
where projecting spurs added width. General 
Pemberton said the length of the line was eight 
miles. General Grant's engineers after the siege 
estimated it at five and a half miles. Beginning 
at Fort Hill, tlie site of an early Spanish fort, a 
high point overlooking the river north of the city, 
it ran due east for a mile, then turning abruptly 
to the south, and continuing in that direction to 
the Jackson Railway, it there began to curve west- 
ward, and finally ran west before reaching the river 
below the city. The front of the first mile, facing 
the north, was precipitous, in places vertical, mak- 
ing a wall one hundred feet high, rising from the 
sloping bottom of a deep valley. Along the east 
fr(jnt ran a deej) ravine, crossed in three places by 
ridges forming natural causeways, over which ran 
three roads leading fjut frfjm the city. The Grave 
Yard road was a little distance south of the north- 
east angle, the Baldwin road was close by the 
Jackson Railway, and the Jackson road nearly mid- 
w^ay between the other two. Opposed to the north 
front was a ridge of very irregular contour, the 



132 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

summit being from four hundred to six hundred 
yards from the Confederate works. The land to 
the east of the city was a labyrinth of ridges and 
ravines, preventing any movements in line, but 
protecting the camps of the investing army from 
the fire of the besieged. 

Batteries, mostly open to the rear, but some 
inclosed, were erected on commanding points, and 
were connected by massive infantry intrenchments, 
continuous along the entire line except at one place. 
Just south of the railroad Waul's Texas Legion 
occupied a wooded portion of the main ridge, un- 
fortified until after the 22d of May, which was pro- 
tected by a fortified spur projecting to the east 
along the railroad and then turning to the south, 
forming a valley between it and Waul's line. 
Smith's division held the northern front, and 
around the angle to and across the Grave Yard 
road. Forney's division, with the battery of Waul's 
Legion, and re-enforced in case of attack by Bow- 
en's reserve division, extended from Smith to the 
railroad. S. D. Lee's brigade of Stevenson's di- 
vision, with the Texas Legion, filled the line from 
the railroad to Garrett's Fort, and Stevenson's 
other three brigades continued from Garrett's Fort 
to the river. Sherman covered Smith's front, 
Steele's division beginning at the river, Blair's con- 
tinuing around across the Grave Yard road, and 
Tuttle in reserve. McPherson was opposed to 
Forney. Ransom's brigade, detached from McAr- 
thur's division, was next to Blair ; Logan's division 
next to Ransom, crossing the Jackson turnpike 
road ; and Quinby, who had resumed command of 
his division, temporarily commanded by Crocker, 
between Logan and McClernand's right. Logan 
and Quinby held each one brigade in reserve. Mc- 
Clernand had one brigade north of the railroad, 
in front of Forney's right. The rest of his com- 
mand was in front of S. D. Lee, extending from 



VICKSBURG. 



133 



the railroad to Garrett's Fort. From McClernand 
to the river, a distance of more than two miles, the 
ground was unoccupied. When casualties and 
sickness diminished the number of defenders, For- 
ney contracted his division toward the south and 
Smith his to the west, leaving a vacant space about 
the Grave Yard road. Green's brigade of Bowen's 
reserve division filled the vacancy. The day on 
which General Green moved in he raised his head 
to look over the parapet and see the ground in 
front. A rifle ball passed through his head, killing 
him instantly. 

The experience of the 19th showed that the de- 
fenses could not be carried by a dash, and that 
the veteran troops within the works had recovered 
their accustomed spirit. General Grant ordered a 
prepared assault to be made at 10 a. m. on the 22d. 
All the guns in position opened fire in the morn- 
ing. At ten o'clock the bombardment ceased, and 
the assaulting parties w'ith their supports leaped 
forward. A spur with rugged surface, projecting 
from the north face of the defensive line, gave a 
possible though hardly practicable approach to the 
works. Wood's brigade of Steele's division at- 
tempted the ascent. As they toiled up, clambering 
over the rough ascent, exposed to fire from the 
whole line, the ranks were thinned at every step. 
A detachment made their way to the base of the 
works, but finally the rest had to seek shelter in 
hollows and behind fallen timber. Blair again at- 
tacked by the Grave Yard road. A way had been 
cut down into and across the ravine below the 
road. The division charged in column of fours. 
When the troops emerged from the ravine on to 
open ground, a fire blazed from the parapet of the 
fort and the infantry intrenchments. A portion 
of Ewing's brigade rushed on to the right and 
gained the ditch of the fort, and planted their colors 
in the face of the parapet. Giles Smith moved his 



134 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



brigade along the main ravine to the left, and from 
cover engaged the intrenchments. Kilby Smith 
found a ridge, from behind which he supported 
Ewing by firing at the defenders who showed them- 
selves above the parapet. 

Ransom, whose brigade formed the right of 
McPherson's corps, pushed through the tangle 
which filled the lower part of the main ravine and 
ascended till they met a fire through which they 
could not advance. He fell back behind a swell 
of ground, where the brigade returned the fire of 
the enemy. Logan assailed the massive work at 
the Jackson road and the intrenchments to the 
south of it. The fort stood upon a rising ground, 
and so dominated the vicinage that the Seventeenth 
Corps called it Fort Hill, making some confusion 
in the reports. The hill was too steep to afford 
room for a ditch. The face was scarped a depth of 
twenty feet from the summit and surmounted by 
a rampart ten feet high, presenting a front thirty 
feet high. A portion of the assaulting force reached 
the base of the fort ; the rest were driven by the 
murderous fire to halt in sheltered hollows. Ste- 
venson, having more open ground to pass over, was 
unable to reach the long line of mtrenchments in 
his front, and, placing his command under cover 
in a ravine, fired at heads that appeared above the 
works. Of Ouinby's division there is but scanty 
report. He lay in front of a long line of intrench- 
ments, protected by heavy abattis. The slope was 
open and cut up by ravines. His troops advanced 
steadily, hewed their way through the abattis, but 
met a withering fire which prevented their reaching 
the works. Finding shelter, they maintained their 
position, returning the fire of the enemy. 

Benton's brigade, the right of McClernand's 
corps, was immediately north of the railroad, facing 
the right of Forney's division. In their front was 
a redan, having two heavy guns and manned by 



VICKSBURG. 



135 



the Second Texas, besides artillerists. One gun 
was disabled by the bombardment. Benton, sup- 
ported by Burbridge's brigade, made a vigorous 
charge and reached the front of the fort. The 
assailants poured such a fire through the torn and 
widened embrasures that the Texans lay on the 
ground, except one rank that stood close against 
the parapet. Two regiments came to re-enforce 
the defenders. A fieldpiece was dragged up the 
hill by the assailants. The Texans drew their gun 
back into the fort, loaded it, and ran it to an em- 
brasure, but the gunners were killed before they 
could fire. More re-enforcements came to the fort, 
and Boomer's brigade of Quinby's division, with- 
drawn from AlcPherson's front, arrived to aid Ben- 
ton and Burbridge. Colonel Boomer was killed 
while moving into position. The assailants could 
not be driven away; but the ditch was ten feet 
deep and the parapet rose ten feet above the escarp, 
and they could not effect an entrance. So the 
combat raged till dark, when the assailants with- 
drew. Boomer's brigade taking down the gun 
which McClernand's men had left behind. 

Lawler's brigade, supported by Landrum's, as- 
saulted the redoubt immediately south of the rail- 
road on the projecting spur, defended by the Twen- 
tieth and Thirtieth Alabama. The bombardment 
had battered away the upper part of an angle of 
the parapet, making a breach. The Twenty-second 
Iowa, taking advantage of favorable depressions, 
gained the front of the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Graham and most of the regiment occupied the 
ditch, while two sergeants and fifteen men clam- 
bered over the breach into an inclosed space formed 
by the parapets and a traverse. An officer and 
thirteen men were in this confined space ; the rest 
of the garrison fied, abandoning the adjoining in- 
fantry intrenchments as well as the forts. Sergeant 
Griffith took the captured party to General McCler- 



136 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

naiul. while Sergeant Messeng-er and the men re- 
mained in the fort. General Lee ctnnnianded, 
urged, entreated the two fugitive regiments to re- 
possess the work. lUit nothing could move them. 
If Lawler and Landrum could have assembled 
their brigades just then and pushed forward, noth- 
ing could have prevented their piercing the Con- 
federate line. l>ut Colonel Stone, of the Twenty- 
second Iowa, while standing on the sununit, look- 
ing across the little valley at the wootled ridge held 
by Waul's Legion, was wounded and left the field, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlap. of the Twenty-first 
Iowa, standing with him was killed. The assault- 
ing troops were dispersed over the slopes and in 
the hollows. Two companies of Waul's Legion 
volunteered to retake the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pettus. who was in temporary connnand of the 
Twentieth Alabama, taking a musket, went with 
them as a volunteer. After a short confiict, the 
Iowa men were killed. The redoubt was recap- 
tured at twelve o'clock, an hour after it had been 
abandoned, and the chance of piercing the line was 
lost. Lighted shells thrown over the parapet killed 
many of those who were in the ditch. At nightfall 
some escajKHl. The rest, including Colonel Graham, 
were taken prisoners. 

About noon it was manifest that the assault 
along the line had failed. General McClernand, 
unaware of the fact that Sherman's men were in 
the ditch of the fort at Grave Yard road, with their 
colors planted on the slope of the parapets and 
INIcPherson's men at the base of the rampart on 
the Jackson road, also that Blair. Ransom, and 
Logan were waging desperate conflict, began at 
1 1. 15 A.M.. and continued through the day. send- 
ing to General Grant sanguine accounts of his suc- 
cess, and urgent appeal to push the attack at other 
points and send re-enforcements to him. As late 
as 3.15 P. M. he reported, " My men are in two of 



VICKSBURG. 137 

the enemy's forts." Grant directed McPherson to 
send him two of Quin?jy's brigades, and, yielding 
his own judgment, ordered the assault to be re- 
newed at three o'clock. Re-enforcements were 
sent to the front from the reserves. There w^as 
another rush and another repulse ; a useless at- 
tack, a fruitless slaughter. The troops could not 
retreat, and lay where shelter could be found till 
night, and then withdrew. The National loss in 
the day was five hundred and two killed, twenty- 
five hundred and fifty wounded, and one hundred 
and forty-seven captured ; total, thirty-one hun- 
dred and ninety-nine. The Confederate loss is not 
reported. In Forney's division it was forty-two 
killed and one hundred and seventeen wounded. 
In Cockrell's brigade of Bowen's division, twenty- 
eight killed and ninety-five wounded. The total 
probably did not much exceed five hundred. 

Sherman and McPherson were sorely aggrieved 
by the insistence of McClernand in causing the dis- 
astrous assault in the afternoon. They, as well 
as Rawlins and Logan, had frequently before com- 
plained to General Grant of his absorption of the 
achievements of the army and insubordinate con- 
duct. On the 30th of ^lay he made a congratu- 
latory order to his corps, filled with extravagant 
laudation of his own command, and ungratefully 
as well as unjustly reflecting on the conduct of 
the other corps on the 22d. In violation of orders, 
this was published in the newspapers without being 
first submitted to headquarters. Grant relieved 
him of his command, and ordered him to repair 
to Springfield, 111., and there report to the adjutant 
general of the army by letter. McClernand, dis- 
regarding party ties, had promptly insisted on the 
validity of the election of Lincoln as President, 
and offered his services to the country at the first 
outbreak of the war. He had been constantly on 
dutv, and was ambitious of distinction. President 



138 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Lincoln, grateful for bis stand at the be.^inninp^, 
appointed him by a personal (;r(ler c(jmmander i)i 
the expedition down the Mississippi River. When 
General Grant, with the a])proval of General lial- 
leck, exercising his authority as commander of the 
military department within which the exi)editi(jn 
was to operate, made McClernand's command an 
integral part of the army which (irant organized 
against Vicksburg, and McGlernand found himself 
a subordinate instead of a separate commander, and 
the President refused to interfere further in his 
behalf, he was exasperated and restive. But, after 
all, as is manifest from McClernand's reports, the 
trouble was largely due to his exuberant egotism, 
which exaggerated his own exploits and belittled 
the achievements of others. 

The night of the 22d was a night of toil along 
the Confeflerate lines. The entire force of engi- 
neers, with large working parties, strove through 
the night, repairing the battered works, strengthen- 
ing weak points, filling up and obliterating the em- 
brasures in the lunette north of the railroad, re- 
moving disabled guns, and bringing other pieces 
in their place. As long as the siege lasted the 
nights were employed in repairing damage done 
through the day and constructing new works in 
rear of exposed points. 

The assailants, satisfied that Vicksburg could 
not be carried by storm, settled down cheerfully to 
the task of regular siege. Regular approaches by 
sap, wide enough for the passage of artillery, were 
begun in front of all the works assaulted on the 
22d. The saps by the Grave Yard road and the 
Jackson road were pushed with special vigor. The 
besieging batteries bombarded every day. Sharp- 
shooters on both sides watched through loopholes 
for every head that appeared above the opposing 
parapets. At times a general fire of musketry 
sheeted the Confederate parapets with their mis- 



VICKSF'.URG. 139 

siles. Un^lcr this continued hail of fire the guns 
of the Confederates were gradually disabled or si- 
lenced, till few continued to reply. The National 
batteries were advanced from riflge to ridge till 
they were planted close to the line of defense. 

When the sa]>s came near, the Confederates 
fired turpentine balls, that set fire to the saj; rollers 
and stopi>ed the work till new rollers were con- 
structed so covered as to be protected from fire. 
When the base of the works was reached, lighted 
shells were thrown over, killing the men of the 
working party. John VV. J-riend, of the Twentieth 
<'>ihio, in General Logan's pioneer corps, devised 
wooflen mortars from a section of a tree trunk, 
bored and strapped with iron. They were easily 
carried to the front, and, with a small charge of 
powder, would lift a shell over the enemy's parapet 
and drop it within the work. Countermines were 
started, and one was successfully exploded, blow- 
ing up the sap by the Grave Yard road. 

Meanwhile batteries were established on the 
peninsula in front o£^ the city. Sharpshooters hid- 
den in the brush fired across the river. Admiral 
I'orter placed a battery of heavy mortars behind 
the peninsula, which exploded their huge shells 
over the city. A hundred-pounder gun was planted, 
which General Pemberton and the commander of 
the river batteries reported to be " very destruc- 
tive." Gunboats guarded the river above and below 
the city. General Lauman's division arrived on the 
25th of May and occupied a portion of the space 
between McClernand and the river. General Her- 
ron reported with his flivision on the 15th of June; 
Lauman shifted to the right, and connected with 
McClernand ; Herron extended from Lauman to 
the river. The investment of the city was com- 
plete. About the 1st of June the meat ration was 
reduced one half, and the ration of sugar, rice, and 
beans v/as largely increased. About the ist of 



I40 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



July General Pemberton reports : " Our stock of 
bacon having been about exhausted, the experi- 
ment of eating mule meat as a substitute was tried, 
it being issued only to those who desired to use 
it, and I am gratified to say it was found by both 
officers and men not only nutritious, but very pal- 
atable, and every way preferable to poor beef." 
He states in his report that at the time of the sur- 
render the commissary had in store forty thou- 
sand pounds of pork and bacon, fifty-one thousand 
two hundred and forty-one pounds of rice, five 
thousand bushels of peas, ninety-two thousand two 
hundred and thirty-four pounds of sugar. He also 
says, " There was at no time any absolute suffer- 
ing for want of food. . . . The question of subsist- 
ence, therefore, had nothing whatever to do Avith 
the surrender of Vicksburg." But the surrender or 
capture of Vicksburg was only a question of time, 
unless some exterior force should compel the rais- 
ing of the siege. 

General Johnston, learning on the night of the 
17th of May that Pemberton ^lad fallen back into 
Vicksburg, immediately sent to him : " If you are 
invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately sur- 
render. Under such circumstances, instead of 
losing both place and troops, we must if pos- 
sible save the troops. If it is not too late, evacu- 
ate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march 
to the northeast." To this Pemberton replied, 
with the unanimous concurrence of his general 
officers, it was impossible to withdraw the army 
with such morale and material as to be of further 
service to the Confederacy, and that he decided 
to hold Vicksburg as long as possible. It was 
impossible, for while the council was considering 
Grant's army was moving into position around 
the city. 

General Johnston was now confronted with the 
task of raising the siege or by attack or maneuver 



VICKSBURG. 141 

aiding Pemberton to break out and escape. He at 
once demanded re-enforcements, and the authori- 
ties in Richmond promptly sent all troops that 
could be taken from Bragg's army in Tennessee 
and from South Carolina and Georgia. There was 
controversy between him and Richmond as to the 
numbers under his command. Finally, he reported 
that from actual returns his efifective force was 
twenty-four thousand and fifty-three. This did not 
include Jackson's cavalry, which did not reach him 
till the 4th of June, nor did it include some irregu- 
lar cavalry, a few hundred in number. His regu- 
lar field return sent to Richmond on the 25th of 
June includes the force present on the 2d of June, 
and also Jackson's command and the irregulars — 
present for duty, thirty-one thousand two hundred 
and twenty-six ; total present, thirty-six thousand 
three hundred and fifteen. Deducting Jackson and 
the irregulars, leaves the force present on the 2d 
of June : Present for duty, twenty-seven thousand 
one hundred and eleven ; total present, thirty-one 
thousand three hundred and forty-eight, and at 
the same time the " effective present " was twenty- 
four thousand and fifty-three. On the 29th of May 
Pemberton dispatched to Johnston, " I have eight- 
een thousand men to man the lines and river front ; 
no reserves," meaning, of course, " efifectives." At 
that time he had over thirty thousand officers and 
men present. After making the largest allowance 
for sick, special duty, and detached service, the 
residue present for duty must have exceeded eight- 
een thousand by several thousand. When the Con- 
federate reports name the force engaged in a cam- 
paign, whether or not expressly stating " effec- 
tive," it appears that the number intended is the 
number of muskets present for duty, counting artil- 
lerists as muskets, or the number of armed enlisted 
men prepared for action, excluding officers. Gen- 
eral J. D. Cox and Colonel E. C. Dawes, after a 



142 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



thorough study of the Atlanta campaign, arrived 
at the same conckision. 

Earnest as Johnston was to collect a force to 
raise the siege. Grant was equally diligent in ob- 
taining re-enforcements to resist the attempt. 
Hurlbut having already sent Lauman's division, 
now early in June added two divisions, under Gen- 
eral Washburne ; Burnside sent from Ohio two di- 
visions of the Ninth Gorps under General i'arke ; 
and Schofield sent Herron's division from Mis- 
souri. Johnston having sent a division to Yazoo 
City, Parke and Washburne were retained at 
Haines's BlufY. Johnston's accumulation of force 
becoming formidable, an army of observation was 
formed under the command of General Sherman, 
comprising the force at Haines's Blufif and three 
other divisions, one from the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, 
and Seventeenth Gorps each. 

The Big Black south of the railroad was bor- 
dered on both shores from the railroad to the Mis- 
sissippi by dense forest. There was neither bridge 
nor ford, and the roads leading to the three ferries, 
miles apart, were rough and narrow ways through 
the woods. An army which should lay bridges at 
the ferries, and cross over into the angle formed by 
the Mississippi and the r>ig Black, would have to 
conquer or be captured. Sherman accordingly 
traced his line of defense from the railroad cross- 
ing of the Big Black to Haines's BlufT, on the 
Yazoo. Osterhaus with his division at the rail- 
road crossing fortified the high bluff which rises 
vertically from the shore of the river and dominated 
the country beyond ; very strong and extensive 
fortification was constructed at Haines's Bluff, and 
works thrown up at key points along the line. The 
roads leading from this line to the Big Black ran 
for the most part upon narrow ridges, separated by 
valleys filled with impassable thickets. Recon- 
noitering parties sent up the country between the 



VICKSBURG. 



143 



Yazoo and the Big Black, and across the Big 
Black toward Jackson, kept Sherman advised as 
to the dispositions of Johnston. 

During the entire siege Johnston and Pember- 
ton were in constant communication by messen- 
gers. On the 29th of May Johnston wrote : " I 
am too weak to save Vicksburg. Can do no 
more than attempt to save you and your gar- 
rison." Again on the 14th of June, " All that we 
can attempt is to save yoti and your garrison." 
On the 22d of June he sent word, " If I can 
do nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender 
the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the 
last moment if you and General Taylor com- 
municate." 

On the 25th of June the mine under the work 
on the north side of the Jackson road was ex- 
ploded, blowing out a portion of the parapet. Six 
men working in a countermine, besides others in 
the fort, were buried and killed. Legget's brigade 
was standing by under cover. The Forty-fifth Illi- 
nois rushed into the breach and scrambled upon 
the loose earth before the smoke cleared away. The 
garrison retired behind an inner parapet wdiich had 
been constructed fifteen feet in rear of the salient. 
The colonel of the Sixth Missouri, bringing his 
regiment up in re-enforcement, was instantly killed. 
The Confederates from behind the new line poured 
down volleys, and threw down lighted shells upon 
the Illinois men crowded in the cavity. A wooden 
barricade was erected for their shelter, but was 
soon shattered by a gun brought into play by the 
Missourians. After two hours of desperate fight- 
ing without gaining the inner defense, the Forty- 
fifth was relieved by the Twentieth Illinois. 
Through the night the regiments were relieved 
every two hours, and at daylight the attempt to 
scale was given up and the assaulting party with- 
drawn. The Confederate loss by the explosion and 



144 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



the subsequent fighting was twenty-one killed and 
seventy-three wounded. 

On the I St of July a larger mine was sprung 
under the fort on the south side of the road, mak- 
ing a cavity fifty by thirty feet across and twenty 
feet deep, almost destroying the redan and badly 
shattering the inner defense. A large number of 
the men manning the work were killed or wounded. 
Inmiediately after the explosion a heavy fire of 
artillery and musketry and a mortar was opened 
upon the breach. Engineer-in-Chief Lockett says 
that, in the hour that he spent there after the ex- 
plosion, " at least a dozen of its garrison were 
killed or wounded by the mortar alone." Seven 
men were thrown within the National lines. Six 
were killed, but the seventh, a negro, was only 
stunned. He went to General Logan's headquar- 
ters as a servant, and remained there until the di- 
vision left Vicksburg. 

The same day Pemberton asked the general 
officers for their opinion as to the practicability 
of an evacuation. The agreeing response was, the 
men were so debilitated that there was no chance 
of an evacuation. Thereupon he wrote to General 
Grant, proposing surrender, and the garrison 
stacked arms on the 4th of July. 

The National loss in killed and wounded was : 





Killed. 


Wounded. 


Aggregate. 


Assault on 19th of May 


43 
502 

147 


194 

2,550 

613 




Assault on 22d of May 




May i8th to July 4th 










692 


3,357 


4.047 



The loss from the ist of May to July 4th; in- 
cluding skirmishes by Sherman's force, was: 
Killed, fifteen hundred and fourteen ; wounded, 
seventy-three hundred and ninety-five; aggregate, 



VICKSBURG. 145 

eighty-nine hundred and nine. The surrender com- 
prised twenty-one hundred and sixty-six officers, 
twenty-seven thousand two hundred and thirty en- 
hsted men, and one hundred and hfteen citizen em- 
ployees ; in all, twenty-nine thousand five hundred 
and eleven. General i^eniljerton gives the totals of 
killed, wounded, and missing during the siege of 
two divisions, but nothing of the others or the river 
batteries. The compilers of the war records have 
made a computation of the loss so far as can be 
found in the reports that are preserved, making 
the number of killed eight hundred and five. But 
the materials are incomplete. The report of Ste- 
venson's division comes down only to the 13th of 
June, two weeks after Lauman appeared in his front 
and before Herron arrived. No report is included 
of two of the brigades in Smith's division or of the 
river batteries. The number of killed must have 
been over four hundred, making loss by death over 
fifteen hundred. The morning report of the medi- 
cal director for the 4th of July shows under medi- 
cal treatment that day twenty-one hundred and 
thirteen wounded and thirty-seven hundred and 
sixty-five sick ; total, fifty-eight hundred and sev- 
enty-eight. While the above is the number of 
killed as calculated from the reports now on file, 
two observations may fairly be made : One is, the 
brigade and division reports, supported by regi- 
mental returns, have larger numbers reported killed 
than those which give only lumping sums for a 
division or brigade. The other is, that General 
Pemberton during the siege understood his loss to 
be much greater than what is given above. He 
dispatched to General Johnston on the 29th of 
May : " Since investment we have lost about one 
thousand men — many officers." And he added, 
June TOth, " We are losing many officers and men." 
The report of one hundred and twenty-nine 
total missing is obviously incorrect. Moore's bri- 



146 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

gade is reported as losing none, while one of his 
regiments — Second Texas — reports fifteen. Lee's 
brigade reports seven up to the 13th of June, while 
one regiment lost fourteen captured on the 22d of 
May. Herron's division, in skirmishes after the 
13th of June, the date of Stevenson's report, cap- 
tured thirty-eight from Stevenson's division. The 
number of deserters was large. Assistant-Secre- 
tary-of-War Dana, in his daily reports to Secretary 
Stanton, continually mentions the arrival of de- 
serters. Sometimes he speaks of a party of them 
coming, and once he mentions the arrival of two 
parties. There seems to have been a stream of 
them along the river bank to the south, until 
stopped by Colonel Clark, Thirty-fourth Iowa, 
moving his regiment to the bank of the river. He 
reports, " Rebel deserters were brought in every 
day in large numbers by the pickets." General 
Osterhaus, stationed at the Big Black bridge, says, 
in his report of the 30th of May, the Eighth Ken- 
tucky " left Vicksburg six hundred strong on May 
19th, and marched by way of Cayuga and Chrystal 
Springs to Meridian, where it was mounted and 
marched back by Jackson." The Eighth Kentucky 
belonged to Loring's division. At all events, Pem- 
berton must have had about thirty-two thousand 
officers and men present when Grant undertook to 
invest the place with about forty thousand. 

In compliance with a request from General 
Johnston, General Taylor, commanding a district 
in Louisiana, sent a division to attack the National 
troops encamped on the west bank of the Missis- 
sippi, near Vicksburg. The attack was made on 
the 7th of June, entirely failed, and the defeated 
assailants were pursued to the interior of the State. 
Later it was determined to capture Helena and 
strongly fortify it, with the view of aiding John- 
ston \o prevent the capture of Vicksburg; or, if 
that failed, to block the navigation of the Missis- 



VICKSBURG. 147 

sippi, and so neutralize the loss of Vicksbiirg. Gen- 
eral Price assaulted the defenses of Helena on July 
4th, and was repulsed with heavy loss in killed, 
wounded, and captured. Port Hudson, besieged by 
General Banks since the 21st of May, capitulated 
on the 8th of July. General Gardner's return for 
the 30th of June was : Present for duty, twenty- 
eight hundred and three; aggregate present, four 
thousand and ninety-eight; yet upon the surren- 
der fifty-nine hundred and fifty-three officers and 
men gave individual paroles, each one counter- 
signed by General Gardner, besides several hundred 
sick in hospital who gave no parole. The Missis- 
sippi was regained. Its navigation was free from 
its source to its mouth. The Confederate armies 
east of the river could no longer draw re-enforce- 
ments or supplies from the region to the west. Lee 
abandoned the field of Gettysburg and began his 
retreat to Virginia on the 4th of July. The daw^n 
of final victory illumined the horizon. 

Johnston gave orders to his army on the 28th 
of June to advance and concentrate opposite the 
fords above the railroad bridge. On the night of 
the 3d of July he sent a messenger to advise Pem- 
berton that he would make a diversion by attack on 
the 7th. He learned in the night of the 4th of the 
surrender, and started forthwith for Jackson. Sher- 
man, advised by Grant on the 3d of the probable 
surrender next day, put his force in motion on the 
afternoon of the 4th. Bridges were constructed 
across the Big Black. Ord with the Thirteenth 
Corps and Steele with the Fifteenth completed their 
crossing on the 6th ; Parke with the Ninth fol- 
lowed. Johnston reached Jackson on the evening 
of the 7th. Sherman arrived on the 9th, and made 
his investment on the lOth. 

The fortifications inclosed the city, resting upon 
the river above and below. Sherman's line was 
formed with Ord on the right, Steele in the cen- 



148 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

ter, and Parke on the left, the flanks resting upon 
the river. Moving into position on the 12th, Lau- 
nian incautiously advanced close to the enemy's 
works, and in such direction as to uncover and ex- 
pose his flank. A crossfire from the batteries in- 
flicted severe loss before he could extricate his di- 
vision. General Ord, commanding the Thirteenth 
Corps, relieved General Lauman from his command 
next day. General Sherman approved the order 
relieving him, giving as his reason his policy of 
sustaining the authority of his corps commanders. 
General Sherman was not willing to waste the 
lives of his men in open assault over level ground 
upon formidable works, well constructed and well 
armed. His supply of ammunition was inadequate 
for a siege, and a train of empty wagons was sent 
back to Vicksburg for more. Meanwhile the troops 
were employed in constructing batteries and in- 
trenchments and keeping up a moderate fire. At 
the same time parties were sent out daily to gather 
subsistence and forage, and expeditions to thor- 
oughly destroy the railroad as far north as Canton 
and as far south as Brookhaven. Johnston's bat- 
teries returned the fire, and the skirmishers kept 
up the rattle of small arms. In all this racket the 
besiegers could not hear the constant rumble of 
wagons carrying sick and wounded and stores from 
the beleagviered city across the river to the rail- 
way on the farther side. Sherman's ammunition 
arrived in the night of the i6th. Men with spades 
and picks could be heard at work strengthening 
the defenses till midnight. But when morning 
came it was found that Johnston's army was gone 
and the bridges destroyed. Sherman's loss during 
the siege was one hundred and twenty-nine killed, 
seven hundred and sixty-two wounded, two hun- 
dred and thirty-one missing ; total, eleven hundred 
and twenty-two. Of these, five hundred and nine- 
teen were in Lauman's division. Johnston reported 



VICKSBURG. 



149 



his loss as " estimated at seventy-one killed, five 
hundred and four wounded, and about twenty-five 
missing." But Sherman captured and took to 
Vicksburg seven hundred and sixty-five prisoners. 
General Steele, having- repaired a bridge, crossed, 
and with three brigades advanced to Brandon, 
thirteen miles, pushing Jackson's jaded cavalry be- 
fore him. 

Johnston had set fire to a building filled with 
commissary stores which he could not carry away. 
The country tramped over by both armies for two 
months was stripped and desolate. Citizens of 
Jackson and Canton appealed to General Sherman 
to afford relief and save the people from famine. 
He obtained authority from General Grant to give 
two hundred barrels of flour and one hundred bar- 
rels of pork to Jackson, and fifteen thousand rations 
to Canton. These were delivered at Big Black 
River to committees, who gave their pledge that 
the supplies should be distributed equitably to the 
needy, and that no part of them should be applied 
to any other purpose. The committees were taken 
from the best men in the two cities. Among those 
constituting the Jackson committee were Chief- 
Justice Sharkey and William Yerger, men of rare 
excellence. 

The railroad running north and south through 
Jackson was utterh' destroyed for a distance of one 
hundred miles, and Jackson ceased to be a strategic 
point for the rest of the war. The men, worn out 
with fatigue, loss of sleep, and nervous strain for 
two months, now that the campaign was over and 
the fervid heat of summer had come, lost their 
strength and yearned for home. Sherman returned 
across the Big Black by easy marches. Herron's 
division returned to Missouri, and Parke to Gen- 
eral Banks. The Thirteenth Corps was sent to 
Texas. Grant was made major general,. and Sher- 
man and McPherson brigadier generals in the regu- 



ISO 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



lar army, and promotions were freely given to of- 
ficers of the volunteers. Leaves of absence and 
furloughs thinned the camps. Sherman with the 
four divisions of his corps occupied the west bank 
of the Big Black, while Armstrong's division of 
Confederate cavalry watched on the opposite side. 



CHAPTER VII. 

CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 

The city of Chattanooga lay in a bend of the 
Tennessee River on its southern bank. The river 
above the city flows to the west of south, then turn- 
ing to the north of west, around the city, turns 
again to the south, continuing beyond tlie Hniits 
of the city, till it strikes the northern point of Look- 
out Mountain, and again turns sharply to the 
north. This sharp bend of the river enfolds a long, 
narrow point, called Moccasin Point. At the neck 
of this point is Brown's Ferry, nine miles from the 
city by water, while it is little more than a mile 
overland from the ferry to the northern bank of 
the river opposite the city. The river continues to 
the north till it strikes the base of Walden's Ridge, 
turns again to the southwest, between Walden's 
Ridge and Raccoon Mountain, and passes Kelly's 
Ferry. By land it is nine miles from Kelly's to 
Brown's Ferry. 

Missionary Ridge and the range of Lookout 
Mountain, running south from the river, about four 
miles apart, inclose Chattanooga Valley between 
them. The northern extremity of Missionary 
Ridge does not strike the river, but, passing by the 
bend which is immediately above the city, it con- 
tinues to the north of east, parallel to the river, 
and about a mile and a half distant from it. The 
northern end of the ridge is intersected by cuts, 
making a group of precipitous hills ; thence south- 
ward it is a continuous ridge, with a narrow crest 
II 151 



152 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



rising a little over four hundred feet above the 
plain. The northern extremity of Lookout Moun- 
tain rises steeply from the river five hundred feet 
to a broad plateau, then occupied as a farm. The 
plateau extends back to a cliff which rises vertically 
to the level summit of the range, fifteen hundred 
feet above the plain. A road scarped along the 
eastern face of the mountain descended toward the 
north till it nearly reached the plateau, and there, 
turning abruptly toward the south, continued to 
the valley below. Lookout Creek flows north to 
the river along the western base of Lookout Moun- 
tain, making a deep, narrow valley between the 
mountain and high hills rising from its western 
bank. Chickamauga River flows to the north, near 
the eastern base of Missionary Ridge, till, curving 
around the northern end of the ridge, it flows due 
west to the river. 

When General Rosecrans fell back to Chatta- 
nooga after the battle of Chickamauga, he removed 
the troops posted on Lookout Mountain down into 
the city, and began at once to fortify. A strongly 
intrenched line was constructed in the form of an 
arc of a circle, covering the city, the flanks rest- 
ing upon the river, and the curved front extending 
out into the valley. In the eastern portion of the 
line was a commanding eminence projecting like a 
great bastion, and crowned by Fort Wood. Gen- 
eral Bragg followed closely up and constructed a 
line of connected batteries along the crest of Mis- 
sionary Ridge, together with a secondary line of 
intrenchment along its base. A curved line of 
w^orks, parallel to the National defense and two 
miles distant from it, stretched across the valley 
from Missionary Ridge to Lookout. Opposite to 
Fort Wood, and about halfway between it and the 
base of Missionary Ridge, was a high, rocky hill, 
with a rough ridge extending to the south, called 
Orchard Knob, and also Indian Hill. This Bragg 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 



153 



occupied and planted a battery upon it. He placed 
troops, batteries, and a signal station on the sum- 
mit of Lookout, and constructed a line of intrench- 
ments and rifle-pits along the western face of the 
mountain, down on the slope below the clif¥. The 
principal camp and important defensive works were 
upon the plateau at the northern extremity. 

The railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga 
crosses the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, and 
thence, passing around the southern base of Rac- 
coon Mountain and down Lookout Valley, skirts 
the base of the north extremity of Lookout Moun- 
tain, and so enters the city. When Bragg occu- 
pied Lookout, he cut Chattanooga off from rail- 
road communication with the north. There was a 
road along the northern bank of the river from 
Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Bragg posted a line 
of sharpshooters along the southern bank from 
Lookout Mountain to a point opposite Walden's 
Ridge, who commanded the road and prevented its 
use. The only access from Bridgeport to Chatta- 
nooga remaining was by wagons over a road up 
the Sequachie Valley to Anderson's crossroads, 
thence by an almost impracticable route over the 
rocks and through the forest of Walden's Ridge, 
and then down to the city, a distance of sixty miles. 
Over this route, even if it were unmolested and 
the weather continued dry, it would be utterly im- 
possible tQ convey supplies sufficient to subsist 
Rosecrans's command. Bragg, well aware of the 
fact, sat in grim quiet within his works, refusing 
to waste the lives of his men in needless conflict 
while famine was doing his work for him. 

A large amount of supplies in wagon trains ac- 
cumulated at Anderson's. General Bragg, to 
hasten the period of starvation, directed General 
Wheeler to destroy the stores at Anderson's, and 
then, in conjunction with Roddy and Lee. who 
were to cross the river at points below Bridgeport, 



154 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

to destroy thoroughly the railroad from Bridgeport 
as far toward Nashville as practicable. On the ist 
of October General Wheeler crossed the Tennessee 
below Washington, about fifty miles above Chatta- 
nooga, moved rapidly over to Anderson's cross- 
roads, and next day fell upon the parked trains. 
The little train guard made a gallant defense, but 
were soon overcome. Wheeler burned three hun- 
dred loaded wagons and killed many mules. Leav- 
ing a detachment to complete the destruction, he 
moved up the valley with one division and sent the 
other to destroy the railroad. Colonel E. M. Mc- 
Cook, leaving Bridgeport early in the morning of 
the 2d, came upon the burning trains in the after- 
noon, drove the Confederate force, rescued eight 
hundred mules, and saved a remnant of the train. 
Pressing on, he overtook Wheeler's rear guard, 
and v/ith a saber charge drove them upon the main 
body. Wheeler, dividing his force into detach- 
ments, approached many points at the same time, 
and succeeded in sacking and burning McMinn- 
ville, Shelbyville, and some smaller settlements, and 
hastily damaging the railroad. Mitchell, Morgan, 
and Crook, with separate commands, as well as 
McCook, followed the marauding parties night and 
day, and gave them no rest. Mitchell severely 
routed Wheeler near Shelbyville, as Crook did at 
Farmington, and there were encounters every day. 
Wheeler lost all his captures, four of his guns, and 
most of his command. The worn-out remnant 
escaped across the river, near Rogersville, on the 
9th of October. General Roddy crossed the Ten- 
nessee near Guntersville, but accomplished noth- 
ing, and Lee did not cross the river. 

The rainy season set in. The diminished sup- 
ply trains were still diminishing, as the half-fed 
mules toiled wearily, hauling loaded wagons slowly 
over the slippery rocks of Walden's Ridge, and 
died in their traces. Rations in Chattanooga were 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 



155 



cut down till hunger was a pain. But the feeble 
bodies inclosed stout hearts, and the resolve to 
hold the place never wavered. General Thomas 
telegraphed to Grant on the 19th of October that 
he had two hundred and four thousand rations in 
store and expected ninety thousand more next day, 
and to General Halleck on the 22d, " We are get- 
ting supplies enough, notwithstanding the bad con- 
dition of the roads." 

In the Army of the Potomac out in \'irginia the 
Eleventh Corps, commanded by General Howard, 
lay in camp, and the Twelfth Corps, General Slo- 
cum, was out on picket, on the 24th of September, 
w^hen orders came from Washington that the two 
corps should be ready to embark on trains of cars 
next day. On the same day General Hooker was 
assigned to command the two corps, and dispatches 
were sent to quartermaster generals, masters of 
transportation, and railroad presidents from Wash- 
ington. Baltimore, and Philadelphia to St. Louis 
and Xashville for organization, equipment, and 
movement of trains from \*irginia to Bridgeport, 
on the Tennessee. Over five hundred cars carried 
the troops to Bellaire, where the soldiers marched 
over a bridge constructed after they had begun 
the journey, and found other trains awaiting them 
on the Ohio shore. At Indianapolis they again dis- 
embarked, marched across the city to another relay, 
and, on reaching the Ohio River, they were fer- 
ried over and found the fourth provision of cars 
ready for them. The Government took possession 
of the road from Louisville to Bridgeport and the 
entire equipment, and changed the gauge of the 
road from Louisville to Nashville, and of all its 
rolling stock. The Eleventh Corps was at Bridge- 
port on the 2d of October, and the Twelfth Corps 
halted at Stevenson immediately after. 

On the i6th of October the President made an 
order combining the Departments of the Cumber- 



156 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



land and the Tennessee into a military division — the 
Military Division of the Mississippi — appointing 
General Grant commander of the division, reliev- 
ing General Rosecrans from command of the De- 
partment of the Cumberland, and appointing Gen- 
eral Thomas in his place. On the 19th Grant and 
Thomas assumed their respective commands. 

General Grant reached Chattanooga on the 
23d of October. At midnight of the 27th the bri- 
gades of Generals Hazen and Turchin were roused. 
General Hazen with eighteen hundred men em- 
barked in sixty boats, thirty in each boat, and at 
3 A. M. cast loose and floated down the river, while 
the rest of the brigade marched across the neck 
of Moccasin Point to Brown's Ferry, carrying ma- 
terials for a bridge. The floating party, keeping 
close to the right bank of the river, and maintain- 
ing absolute silence, escaped notice by the Con- 
federate pickets who lined the left bank. At about 
4.30 A. M. the head of the flotilla reached the left 
bank where the road to Brown's Ferry comes down 
to the river. The men were fired on by the pickets 
as they landed, but dashed up the high and steep 
hills on each side of the road and gained posses- 
sion. The boats ferried over the other troops. An 
attack by a force called by the firing was repulsed, 
and the position fortified. The boats were floated 
into position, and before noon a bridge was con- 
structed. 

General Hooker crossed the river at Bridgeport 
on the 27tli with the Eleventh Corps and part of 
Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps. Early in 
the morning of the 28th he marched toward Look- 
out Valley. The Eleventh Corps halted at 5 p. m. 
near the mouth of Lookout Creek. Geary, form- 
ing the rear of the column, halted at Wauhatchie, 
three miles up the valley. At midnight Longstreet 
made a fierce attack upon Geary. The opposing 
lines fired at the flashes of each other's cams. The 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 157 

conflict lasted three hours, when the enemy with- 
drew. A brig-ade sent by General Howard to 
Geary's aid came upon another detachment and de- 
feated it. Longstreet recalled his troops across 
the creek and burned the bridge, leaving Hooker 
in possession of all west of the creek. Geary re- 
ported that his parties buried one hundred and 
fifty-three Confederates in his front, captured fifty- 
two wounded and fifty unhurt prisoners, and three 
hundred and fifty muskets. 

A road was constructed from Kelly's F"erry to 
Brown's, eight or nine miles. The stores accumu- 
lated at Stevenson were transported on two steam- 
boats to Kelly's, and carried thence by the short 
haul to Chattanooga. The blockade was raised. 
Abundant supplies had easy access to the be- 
leaguered city. 

General Sherman, seated with his family in his 
pleasant quarters on a plantation near the Big 
Black River, was startled by receiving from Gen- 
eral Grant on the 22d of September an order to 
send a division to Chattanooga immediately. Os- 
terhaus's division Isroke camp, marched to Vicks- 
burg, arriving the same evening, and embarked for 
Memphis. Next day Sherman, summoned to 
Vicksburg. found Grant still in bed ill, and learned 
from him that on the previous day dispatches had 
arrived from Washington, and that he had sent 
orders to Hurlbut at Memphis to organize two di- 
visions from the troops in his district and send 
them to Rosecrans; had sent an order to General 
John E. Smith, who with his division of the Sev- 
enteenth Corps had gone to Arkansas to aid Gen- 
eral Steele, to abandon that design and hasten to 
Chattanooga ; to General Banks, who was impor- 
tuning for re-enforcements, that none could be 
sent, for he could make no disposition of troops 
that could endanger the success of Rosecrans ; and 
that he had ordered the seizure of all boats on the 



158 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

river to facilitate transportation. Finally, Grant 
told Sherman to go in person, taking his corps, 
leaving one of his divisions at Vicksburg, and tak- 
ing in its place John E. Smith's division, which was 
already on the way. General Sherman returned 
to camp on the 25th, and selected the divisions of 
Giles A. Smith and John M. Corse to go and Gen- 
eral Tuttle to remain. The last of the command 
was in Vicksburg for embarkation on the 28th. 

The general's daughter Minnie had been very 
ill. but was convalescent. On the boat his son 
Willie, the darling of his heart, was seen to be un- 
well. On the way up the river he grew worse, and 
the disease was found to be typhoid fever. The 
best medical aid in Memphis was called, but the 
boy died soon after landing. When the boat left 
for Ohio, bearing the dear corpse and the pros- 
trate family, Sherman's grief was agony. But the 
pressing duty of the hour required instant action. 
General Halleck dispatched that the road from 
Nashville must be reserved absolutely to carry sup- 
plies to Rosecrans, and Sherman must repair the 
road from Memphis as he advanced, and rely on 
it till a rise in the Ohio and Tennessee would allow 
boats to ascend the river. 

. The railroad was in good condition as far as 
Corinth, though ill supplied with rolling stock. 
When Sherman left Memphis on the nth of Octo- 
ber on a train with his headquarters and a battalion 
of the Thirteenth regular infantry, Osterhaus and 
John E. Smith were already at Corinth, Giles Smith 
well on his way, and General Corse's division had 
just started on foot. Arriving at Colliersville, 
twenty-six miles from Memphis, about noon, he 
learned that a large cavalry force with artillery was 
approaching the post. The clerks and orderlies 
were armed, and with the Thirteenth Infantry and 
the garrison manned the works. All preparations 
were completed before the advance of the enemy 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 



159 



appeared. A brisk skirmish began and lasted 
through the afternoon, till the approach of Corse's 
division, hastened by telegrams sent by Sherman 
on the first news of the danger, caused the enemy 
to withdraw. The locomotive and train, damaged 
by artillery fire, were repaired next day, and pro- 
ceeded to Corinth. Here General Ewing, who ac- 
companied Sherman, superseded Corse in the com- 
mand of the fourth division. 

S. D. Lee, joined by Wheeler, commanded a 
large cavalry force. Tearing up the railroad and 
continually skirmishing with the head of the col- 
umn impeded the advance. Osterhaus and Smith, 
repairing the road and pushing back the cavalry, 
continued their slow advance, and reached Tus- 
cumbia on the 27th. Sherman reached luka on the 
19th, and learned next day of the arrival of two 
gunboats at Eastport, and a few days later received 
news of Grant's appointment to command the mili- 
tary division and his own appointment to command 
the Department and the Army of the Tennessee. 
General Blair was placed in command of the Fif- 
teenth Corps. General Hurlbut was ordered to 
select eight thousand men to form two divisions, 
to be called Sixteenth Corps, to be commanded 
by Dodge, and to march as far east as Athens. 

General Ewing crossed the river by the aid of 
the gunboats on the 24th, and moved east on the 
north side of the river. On the 27th Sherman re- 
ceived orders from Grant to drop all work on the 
railroad and hurry eastward with all possible dis- 
patch toward Bridgeport. General Blair, having 
just reached Tuscumbia on the 27th, began his re- 
turn to Eastport on the 28th. General Roddy — who 
had been on the north of the Tennessee unmolested 
for two weeks, whose locality was a mysterv and 
whose personality almost a myth ; who was always 
in no particular place, but just somewhere else ; 
whom many had heard of, but no one had seen — 



l6o GENERAL SHERMAN. 

finally recrossed the Tennessee in time to join S. 
D. Lee on the 27th, and worry General Blair's 
flank on the march on the 28th. The three remain- 
ing divisions crossed by boat at Eastport and 
hastened to overtake Ewing. Sherman crossed on 
the I St of November. Elk River being found to 
be swollen by rain and not fordable, the command 
marched up stream to the stone bridge at Fayette- 
ville. Here Sherman received another dispatch 
from Grant to push his advance. Dividing the 
troops over three roads to expedite the march, he 
rode to Bridgeport with his staff, arriving on the 
13th of November. 

At Bridgeport he found an order to leave his 
troops and report in person immediately at Chatta- 
nooga. Taking a little steamboat, he went up the 
river in the night to Kelly's Ferry, where he found 
an orderly and horses awaiting him. A ride over 
the road to Brown's Ferry and to Chattanooga 
brought him into the city in the morning. He 
walked out with Grant and Thomas to Fort Wood, 
and from that commanding height surveyed the 
situation. Grant told him that he had proposed to 
assault Missionary Ridge with the force then in 
hand, but that a thorough reconnoissance showed 
that to be impracticable. And it appears in the 
records that General Grant dispatched to General 
Burnside on the 7th of November, " I have ordered 
an immediate movement from here to carry Mis- 
sionary Ridge " ; and on the 8th, " Thomas will 
not be able to make the attack of which I tele- 
graphed you until Sherman gets up." 

Sherman went then to the north side of the 
river to see the part allotted to him. General W. 
F. Smith, known as Baldy Smith, chief of engineers 
to the Army of the Cumberland, who had planned 
the capture of Brown's Ferry, was of the party. 
He was making a large number of pontoons in 
Chattanooga, which were to be carried over the 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. i6l 

river, and hidden from view by a range of hills, to 
a creek emptying into the river from the north, 
four miles above the mouth of the Chickamauga. 
The boats were to be kept hid some miles up the 
creek until the time for attack. Sherman's com- 
mand was to cross by the bridge at Brown's Ferry 
and bivouac out of view behind the hills. When 
the attack was to be delivered a detachment would 
fill the boats and in the night float down the creek 
and the river and disembark. The boats would 
then bring the rest of the troops across the river, 
and be immediately built into a pontoon bridge. 
The route was explored. The secret harbor in the 
creek, the points of embarkation, and the site of 
the bridge were visited, and from cover of shrub- 
bery on the river bank the place of landing on the 
farther shore and the point proposed for assault 
were reconnoitered. 

General Sherman remounted his horse and rode 
back to Kelly's Ferry. The steamboat was gone. 
He took a .rough boat with some soldiers to pull 
the oars. They were unused to the work, and Sher- 
man from time to time relieved one or another of 
the inexperienced oarsmen by taking a pull him- 
self. Reaching Shellmound at midnight, a good 
crew was obtained, and Bridgeport was reached by 
daylight. Ewing's division was immediately put in 
motion and directed to approach Lookout Moun- 
tain by the road leading to Trenton, threatening 
to gain or cross the mountain far to the rear of 
the force which held the summit. The movement 
caused some anxiety to the Confederate com- 
mander, and parties were sent out to reconnoiter 
the country about Trenton after Ewing had passed 
down Lookout Valley and reached Brown's Ferry. 
The hastily constructed bridge at Bridgeport gave 
only impeded passage to the troops, and the worn- 
out road, encumbered by slow-moving trains, made 
the march toilsome and difficult. The other three 



l62 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

divisions of the corps were strung along the poad 
from Wauhatchie to Bridgeport. Friday, the 20th, 
General Grant's order issued Wednesday, the i8th, 
for a combined attack on Missionary Ridge by 
Sherman and Thomas early Saturday morning, the 
21 st, was found to be impossible of execution. 
Sherman finally had three divisions in place hidden 
behind the hills on the 23d, and when night came 
he sent Giles Smith with his brigade (for Morgan 
L. Smith had reported and taken command of the 
division) to the secreted pontoon boats. General 
Osterhaus not being able to cross at Brown's, the 
bridge being carried away by the freshet, Jeff C. 
Davis's division of Palmer's corps was temporarily 
assigned to Sherman's command and Osterhaus's 
to General Hooker's. 

Reports that Bragg was evacuating were so 
positive and direct that General Grant, early on 
the 23d, ordered General Thomas to make a dem- 
onstration to test the report. Granger's corps, two 
divisions, formed in line with skirmishers in front, 
and Howard's two divisions massed in reserve in 
the rear, stood on the plain as if on parade, while 
Generals Grant and Thomas, the Assistant-Secre- 
tary-of-War Dana, Quartermaster-General Meigs, 
and a brilliant array of officers viewed the spectacle 
from Fort Wood, and a more numerous body, the 
Confederate army, leaned upon their intrenchments 
and gazed with complacent interest, as if the dis- 
play were for their entertainment. At command 
the array moved forward with precision, captured 
the advanced pickets, and while the enemy, now 
aroused, poured a fire of artillery and musketry 
from all the intrenchments, pushed with greater 
speed and with one great rush surmounted and 
captured the fortified high rugged hill. Orchard 
Knob, and the long rocky ridge extending from 
it to the south, about halfway between Fort Wood 
and the base of Missionary Ridge. A battery of 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 163 

six guns was taken to the summit, and the hill and 
ridge intrenched and occupied by General Gran- 
ger's corps, the divisions of Thomas J. Wood 
and Sheridan. 

In the morning General Cleburne was at Chick- 
amauga station, getting on to trains his own di- 
vision and Buckner's division, then commanded 
by Bushrod Johnson, under orders to proceed to 
re-enforce General Longstreet in front of Knox- 
villc. All of Johnson's division except Reynolds's 
brigade had embarked when order was received 
from General Bragg : " The general commanding 
desires that you will halt such portions of your 
command as have not left Chickamauga ; such as 
may have left halt at Charleston." Two of John- 
son's brigades had gone ; one, Reynolds's, re- 
mained with Cleburne. The arrangements had 
hardly been made and dispatch to Johnson sent be- 
fore another dispatch came : " Order Johnson's 
troops at Charleston back here. Move up rapid. y 
to these headquarters." And a few minvites later : 
" We are heavily engaged. Move rapidly to these 
headquarters." Reynolds's brigade was put into 
the intrenchment at the base of Missionary Ridge 
just south of Bragg's headquarters, and Cleburne's 
division went into bivouac in rear of the ridge. At 
dawn of the 24th Cleburne set his division erect- 
ing new intrenchments and batteries along the crest 
of the ridge from Bragg's headquarters toward the 
south. Before this work was completed he was 
informed that the national troops had crossed the 
Tennessee above and below the mouth of the 
Chickamauga, and was ordered to send a brigade 
and a battery to the bridge over the Chickamauga. 

At midnight of the 23d Giles Smith embarked 
his brigade, floated silently down the creek and 
down the river, landed two regiments above the 
mouth of Chickamauga River to gather up the 
Confederate pickets, and construct a bridge across 



104 



l.FNKUAl SHKRMAN. 



tluit slroani near iis mouth, and hiiulod the rest 
ot his brigade below. The boats, aided hiter in 
the day by a steamboat, used such expedition 
imder the inmiediate supervision of Cieneral \\\ F. 
Smith that by noon (.reneral Sherman w ith tlie three 
divisions of the Fifteenth Corps with the batteries 
were aeross. and (.lenoral Jell C Pavis followini;- 
elose upon them. 

Fhe landing was upoui a square plain, about a 
mile and a half to a side. The northern end of 
Missionary Ridge runs parallel to the Tennessee 
River, and about a mile and half from it. the course 
of both being nearly north and south. The Chicka- 
mauga. which with many ctu'ves has a general 
course to the north along the eastern base of the 
ridge, turns sharp to the west around its northern 
terminus, and continues west to the Tennessee. A 
short spur extends east from the northern extrem- 
ity of the ridge to the Chickamauga, its perpen- 
dicular face of rock rising sheer from the water of 
the stream, securing the position from risk of being 
turned. The railroad turned, pierced the ridge 
about a mile and a half south of the northern ex- 
tremity, passing under a depression or valley, atid 
just north of this depression is Tmmel Hill, the 
highest point in the locality. Standing aloof in 
front of the main ridge is an isolated hill, long 
and narrow, parallel to the main ridge aitd sepa- 
rated from it by a deep hollow. A cleft in the main 
ridge, wide enough to give passage to a road, gave 
communication from the exterior to a small valley 
inclosed by the main ridge and spurs extending 
from its rear. 

Gt?neral Sherman reports his advance with the 
three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps: "A light 
drizzling rain prevailed and the cloutls hung low, 
cloaking our movements from the enemy's tower 
of observation on Lookout Mountain. We soon 
gained the foothills : our skirmishers crept up the 



CIIATTANDrxlA AND Ml'.KIDIAN. 165 

face of the liills, followed by their supports, and 
at 2.30 I'. M. we had ^'ained, with no hjss, the de- 
sired jKjint. A ]jri,:;ade of each division was pushed 
rapidly to the to]) of the hill, and the enemy for 
the first time seemed to realize the movement, hut 
loo late; \vi- vNcre in ])ossession. lie opened with 
artillery, hnt I'Avini;- soon j^ot some of ('ajjtain 
Jxichardson's Lnins np the stee]) hill anrl ^ave hadc 
artillerv. and the enemy's skirmishers made one or 
two ineffectual dashes at General i.ij^hthtn-n, who 
had swei)t around and p^ot a farther hill, which was 
the real continuation of the ridj^e. I'Voni studying 
the maps, J had inferred that Missionary J'iidge was 
a continuous hill, but we found ourselves on two 
high p(jints, with a deep depression between us 
and the fjne immediately over the tunnel, which 
was my chief objective ])oint. 'J'he ground we had 
gained, however, was so inijxjrtant that I coidd 
leave nothing to chance, and ordered it to be forti- 
fied during the night. One brigade of each divi- 
sion was left on the hill, one oi Cleneral Morgan 
L. wSmith's closed up the gap to Chickamauga 
Creek, two of General John i'^. Smith's were drawn 
back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's 
right was extended down into the plain, thus cross- 
ing the ridge in a general line, facing sfjutheast." 

(jeneral Howard reported to General Sherman 
in the evening with two lirigades, and, leaving one 
to take part in the assault, and the other to make 
connection between the annies of Sherman and 
I'hfjmas, returned to his corj)s. The brigades of 
Jeff C. Davis were disj)osed to i)rotect connnunica- 
tion between the assaulting force and the bridge. 
Word was received from Grant that .Sherman was 
to attack at dawn and Thomas would attack early 
in the day. 

General T'ragg had not apprehenrled attack on 
the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge. iJut 
perceiving indications of some movement in that 



1 66 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

direction, he took General Hardee from Lookout 
Mountain on the afternoon of the 23d and trans- 
ferred him to the extreme right of his army, at 
the same time transferring Walker's division from 
Lookout with him. In the night Polk's brigade 
and a battery were detached from Cleburne's divi- 
sion on Missionary Ridge and reported to Hardee. 
In the morning of the 24th Wright's brigade of 
Cheatham's division, summoned from Charleston 
by telegraph, arrived, was sent to the mouth of 
the Chickamauga to see if any National troops were 
attempting to cross, and, if so, to prevent them. 
He found an unexpected number already across 
and withdrew, retiring to the hills. At 2 p. m. Cle- 
burne's division was taken from Missionary Ridge 
and hurried to Hardee, and placed on his rip^ht, 
next to the Chickamauga. At midnight LevVis's 
brigade was taken from Bate's division on Mis- 
sionary Ridge and sent to'*report to Cleburne. A 
little later Stevenson's division, evacuating Look- 
out Mountain, marched to the right and reported 
to Hardee, and Cheatham with his three brigades 
from Lookout Mountain reported to Hardee in the 
morning of the 25th, and was placed in line between 
the force engaged about Tunnel Hill and Ander- 
son's division on Missionary Ridge. 

While Bragg was hurrying troops to meet 
Sherman's attack, he was sustaming a sore defeat 
at the other extremity of his line. Longstreet soon 
after his night attack on Hooker had been sent by 
General Bragg up into East Tennessee to capture 
or defeat General Burnside. General Hardee be- 
came commander of the point with three divisions. 
When General Hardee was transferred to confront 
Sherman, and took one division with him, the com- 
mand at Lookout Mountain devolved upon Gen- 
eral Stevenson, with his own division and three 
brigades of Cheatham's division. General Howard 
having moved by Brown's Ferry over into Chat- 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN, 167 

tanooga. General Hooker's command in Lookout, 
Valley consisted of General Geary's division of the 
Twelfth Corps, two brigades of General Cruft's di- 
vision of the Fourth Corps, and Osterhaus's divi- 
sion of two brigades from the Fifteenth Corps. 

About dawn Osterhaus, having the extreme 
left of the command, drove off the Confederate 
pickets near the partially destroyed bridges across 
Lookout Creek and repaired them. Cruft with one 
brigade moved up the stream and built another 
bridge. His other brigade reported to Geary, who 
marched some miles up the valley and built bridges 
there for his crossing. The enemy, occupied with 
Osterhaus and Cruft, did not perceive the move- 
ment of Geary. An observer on the high summit 
of Lookout heard the sound of Geary's pioneers 
chopping down trees, but noticed that the pickets 
paid no attention. Geary's command passed over 
the completed bridges and formed a line stretch- 
ing from the palisade, the vertical cliff of rock, 
down toward the creek. The troops of the ex- 
tended Confederate line posted along the west slope 
of the mountain, finding themselves unexpectedly 
assailed on the flank and in rear, fell back in con- 
fusion. The fire of Hooker's batteries planted on 
the heights west of the creek prevented their at- 
tempting to rally. The guns on the summit of 
the mountain could not be sufificiently depressed to 
reach the pursuers, and the heavy clouds of mist 
that settled on the summit prevented the sharp- 
shooters from taking any part. Cruft crossed his 
bridges as Geary approached, and joined him in 
gathering up prisoners and pushing back those 
who were not captured. The guns of the heavy 
batterv on Moccasin Point and a battery near Gen- 
eral Hooker's headquarters with their crossfire en- 
filaded all the w^orks upon the plateau and slopes 
of the northern point of the mountain, and made 
them untenable. Osterhaus crossed and mounted 



l68 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

to the plateau in time to join Geary as he arrived. 
On the plateau opposing lii;es were formed and 
the Confederates forced back, till about 2 p. m., 
when the cloud of mist settling down from the 
summit, enveloping the combatants, closed the con- 
test. There was some irregular firing into the fog, 
but the battle was over. Hooker had pushed his 
way dangerously near to the road which descended 
from the mountain to the Chattanooga Valley, and 
Carlin, who with his brigade had crossed Chatta- 
nooga Creek near the city, and was engaged with 
the Confederate troops near the base of the east- 
ern slope of the point, was also approaching the 
road. General Bragg ordered evacuation. Through 
the night until after midnight the defenders were 
descending the winding road to the plain and mov- 
ing on their way to Bragg's extreme right to op- 
pose the assault of Sherman. The troops in the 
intrenchments in the valley, the divisions of Stew- 
art and Bate, constituting Breckenridge's corps, 
moved to Missionary Ridge. A detachment of the 
Eighth Kentucky climbed to the summit of Look- 
out Mountain, and at dawn planted their colors 
in view of the valley below. 

At sunrise of the 25th both armies caw the Na- 
tional flag floating over the summit of Lookout, 
and the long line of Confederate intrenchments 
traversing the valley and encircling the city aban- 
doned. General Bragg, who five weeks before 
held Thomas's army in his grip, and grimly refused 
to waste the lives of his men in useless attack, pre- 
ferring to let famine surely do the work without 
loss to him, now saw his grip shaken off, his be- 
sieging works captured, his whole force contracted 
on to Missionary Ridge, and more than one 
half of it congested on the northern extremity, not 
to threaten his antagonist, but to defend a vital 
point from assault. 

In the forenoon of the 25th Hardee assembled 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 169 

and placed his command : Cleburne with his four 
brigades and Wright's brigade, brought down from 
Charleston, and Lewis's brigade of Bate's division 
occupied from the tunnel to the northern ex- 
tremity of the ridge. Stevenson with his four bri- 
gades was on Cleburne's left ; next was Walker 
with three brigades ; and finally Cheatham with 
three brigades, reaching nearly to the right of the 
line facing Chattanooga. Here Anderson's four 
brigades occupied all the space north of Bragg's 
headquarters, except an interval left vacant im- 
mediately north of Bragg's headquarters, upon re- 
quest of General Anderson, in order that Reynolds's 
brigade, when obliged to leave the works at the 
base of the ridge, might take position there. Im- 
mediately south of Bragg's headquarters was 
Adams's brigade of Stewart's division temporarily 
assigned to and constituting part of Anderson's 
command. Next was General Bate with his own 
brigade, commanded by Colonel Tyler and two 
regiments of his Florida brigade, and on his left 
Stewart with two of his brigades. In the trenches 
at the base were Reynolds's brigade, one of Stew- 
art's, three regiments of Bate's Florida brigade 
and details from Anderson's division. General 
Sherman had eight brigades in his own three divi- 
sions — five brigades in General Howard's two di- 
visions and three in General Jeff C. Davis's divi- 
sion. General Thomas had in his line Baird's di- 
vision, three brigades, and Johnson's division, two 
brigades of the Fourteenth Corps, and the divisions 
of T. J. Wood and Sheridan of the Fourth Corps, 
three brigades each. Hooker was on the way from 
Lookout Mountain around by the way of Ross- 
ville Gap to take the southern extremity of the 
ridge with the three divisions of Osterhaus, Geary, 
and Cruft. 

Early in the morning of the 25th General Sher- 
man disposed his force. His own three divisions, 



lyo GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Buschbeck's brigade of the Eleventh Corps, and 
Plant's battery from Jeff C. Davis's division consti- 
tuted the attacking force ; Davis continued pro- 
tecting communication with the Tennessee River, 
and General Howard, who arrived in the morning 
with the rest of his corps, guarded the rear toward 
the Chickamauga. Batteries were hauled up to 
the summits of the isolated ridge held by Ewing 
and the hill held by Lightburn. While these two 
points were held in force. Colonel Loomis adv-anced 
to assault the tunnel gorge. Corse the northern 
slope of Tunnel Hill, and Morgan L. Smith's di- 
vision the ridge north of Tunnel Hill. 

Corse passed across the deep hollow, carrying 
a line of intrenchments thrown up by Smith's 
Texas brigade, climbing the steep hillside, almost 
gaining the summit. A persistent and obstinate 
engagement ensued. Corse was wounded and car- 
ried ofif. Walcutt took his place and continued the 
struggle. He could not get his men over the edge 
of the crest, and the defenders could not dislodge 
them from the slope. The National batteries on 
the two hills played upon Swett's battery on the 
summit of Tunnel Hill, so that no defensive work 
could be thrown up for its protection ; the officers 
of the battery were disabled, and command de- 
volved upon a corporal, and so many of the gun- 
ners were killed or wounded that infantry had to 
be detailed to work the guns, and finally the bat- 
tery was relieved by another and retired. Colonel 
Loomis, out in the open plain, w^as ordered to ad- 
vance and take position in front of the tunnel gorge. 
Brushing away the hostile skirmishers, he advanced 
under heavy fire, and taking the position assigned 
in face of the opposing line, which extended along 
beyond his right as far as he "bould discern the 
ridge, made his command throw up such cover 
as was practicable, and maintained his position. 
His left fiank being threatened bv a force issuing 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 171 

from the tunnel gorge, he procured re-enforce- 
ments from Buschbeck's brigade and drove back 
the assailants. Being still pressed, General John 
E. Smith sent two brigades, Mathias and Raum. 
These joined in the assault upon Tunnel Hill, and, 
aided by a fire from troops in the works captured 
from the Texans, succeeded in pressing nearly to 
the summit of the hill. Hardee sent a brigade in 
aid, but it retired after an ineffective effort. Colo- 
nel McConnell led his Georgia regiment up to take 
part ; McConnell was shot through the head and 
his regiment withdrew. A brigade from Steven- 
son's division and from Walker's reported in sup- 
port. General Cummings with two Georgia regi- 
ments made two abortive charges. Finally, a force 
suddenly appearing upon the flank took the gal- 
lant brigades in flank and rear. The surprise broke 
their order, and they fell back in confusion, pur- 
sued by their assailants down into the plain. The 
Confederates in their ardor followed them past the 
isolated hill held by Ewing. Being now in turn 
taken in flank and rear by Ewing and Loomis, they 
hastily returned to the ridge, followed by the ral- 
lied brigades of Mathias and Raum, though Raum 
was too severely wounded to return with them. 

General Sherman had been anxiously waiting 
for the attack by the Army of the Cumberland, 
promised by General Grant to be made early in the 
day. At half past two o'clock he saw, far off down 
the ridge, puffs of white smoke ; then the distant 
roar of artillery, and he knew that the assault was 
begun. Grant's order of the i8th for a joint as- 
sault on Missionary Ridge on the 23d had not been 
revoked, but only postponed to the 25th ; and on 
the evening of the 24th General Thomas directed 
his command to " have everything ready for an of- 
fensive movement early to-morrow morning." 
News coming on the morning of the 25th of the 
evacuation of Lookout Mountain, leaving Hooker 



172 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



free, he was ordered to march up the valley, cross 
Chattanooga Creek, proceed to Rossville Gap, the 
southern terminus of the ridge, and sweep up the 
ridge upon Bragg's left flank. The time of Thom- 
as's assault was held for Hooker's co-operation. 
It was learned that the destruction of the bridge 
across the creek delayed his march. To build a 
new one took three hours. Word came that the 
bridge was finished and Hooker was crossing. His 
approach was assured, and the time for attack had 
come. 

Grant and Thomas, with a splendid group of 
generals and dignitaries, were on Orchard Knob, 
whence a complete survey was enjoyed of the val- 
ley, the heights, and of the plain on which Sher- 
man had formed his command. The four divisions, 
comprising eleven brigades, had been deployed, 
Baird's division on the left, T. J. Wood on his right, 
then Sheridan, and Johnson on the extreme right. 
Each brigade had a front of two to four regi- 
ments in line, with skirmishers in front, and the 
remaining regiments in column in support, mak- 
ing a battle array three miles in front. The mag- 
nificent splendor of the spectacle impressed both 
friend and foe. General Bate says in his report : 
" The enemy, like a huge serpent, uncoiled his 
massive folds into shapely lines in our immediate 
front," and " seemed confidently resting, as a giant 
in his strength." The eight brigades and two regi- 
ments in the works on the summit being deployed 
in line without reserves, extended on both flanks 
beyond the line of assault. The order to deliver 
the assault was verbal. General Grant says in his 
report that Hooker's " approach was intended as 
the signal for storming the center in strong col- 
lunns," and, on being satisfied that Hooker was 
on his way from Rossville, " Thomas was accord- 
ingly directed to move forward his troops . . . 
and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 173 

Ridge, and when carried to reform his Hnes on the 
rifle-pits, with a view to carry the top of the ridge." 
General Thomas says only that as soon as Baird 
got into position " orders were then given him to 
move forward on Granger's left and within sup- 
porting distance against the enemy's rifle-pits on 
the slope and at the foot of Missionary Ridge. 
General Baird says : " A staff officer from General 
Thomas brought me verbal orders to move for- 
ward to the edge of the open ground which bor- 
dered the foot of Missionary Ridge, within striking 
distance of the rebel rifle-pits at its base, so as to be 
ready at a signal, which would be the firing of 
six guns from Orchard Knob, to dash forward 
and take those pits. He added : This was intended 
as preparatory to a general assault on the moun- 
tain, and that it was doubtless designed by the 
major general commanding that I should take part 
in the movement, so I would be following his wishes 
were I to push to the summit." The order re- 
ceived by General Johnson was " to form my com- 
mand in two lines, resting my left on the right 
of General Sheridan's division, and to conform to 
his movements." The order reached the Fourth 
Corps in a different form. General Granger says : 
" General Sherman was unable to make any prog- 
ress in moving along the ridge during the day, as 
vihe enemy had massed in his front ; therefore, in or- 
der to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demon- 
stration on the works of the enemy directly in my 
front, at the base of Missionary Ridge." And being 
ordered to make a demonstration upon the rifle- 
pits, " I accordingly directed Major-General Sheri- 
dan and Brigadier-General Wood to advance their 
divisions at a given signal, moving directly forward 
simultaneously and briskly to attack the enemy, 
and, dd-iving him from his rifle-pits, to take pos- 
session of them." 

Upon the signal, the firing of six guns on Or- 



174 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



chard Knob, the entire Hne moved forward with 
precision and brushed away the Confederate 
skirmishers. The furious fire of all the batteries 
of the ridge incited the line to a double-quick ; as 
they neared the intrenchments, musketry was 
added. But the charge continued so solid and bal- 
anced that the works were reached by unbroken 
ranks, that swept as an avalanche over the barriers. 
A staff officer sent by General Sheridan brought 
back answer from General Granger that it was the 
works at the base of the ridge that were to be car- 
ried. This answer brought back some who were 
on their way to the summit. But immediately Cap- 
tain W. L. Avery. Granger's aid, brought word to 
Sheridan to carry the works on the summit if he 
thought he could. Granger sent all his staff to 
Wood and Sheridan with the same order, fearing 
some might miscarry. 

There was no need to reform. There were no 
broken ranks ; there were no laggards. There was 
no need of order to advance. Some with order, 
some without order, some against order, but all in 
unison, all aflame, in one mighty upheaval surged 
up the mountain side. The ascent was steep, 
rugged, and encumbered. The stout color bearers 
mostly pushed foremost. The stronger gathered 
about them ; the weaker followed as they could, till 
regiments assumed the form of wedges, apex in 
front. Clambering up over works and gullies, 
through the murderous fire from above, they ap- 
proached the crest, panting and jaded. It seems 
that the fresh defenders of the ridge might have 
fixed bayonets, and with an impetuous charge have 
swept the exhausted assailants down the slope. But 
dazed by the audacity and unexpectedness of the 
assault, unnerved by the impressive mass covering 
the mountain side, depleted by the large detach- 
ments sent to re-enforce the right against Sher- 
man's persistent attack, and discouraged by the 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 175 

sight of Lookout Mountain and the sweep of in- 
vestment works across the valley, abandoned and 
captured, they stood irresolute till the bold assail- 
ants were in their midst. 

Hazen's brigade, or perhaps the two brigades 
of Hazen and Willich, first climbed over the works 
in Anderson's division, just north of Dent's bat- 
tery, and north of Bragg's headquarters. Facing 
to the right and left, and turning Dent's guns upon 
their late support, they drove the Confederate 
troops along and down the eastern slope of the 
ridge. General Bate, ordered by General Bragg 
to go to Anderson's aid, gathered up the frag- 
ments of Reynolds's brigade, which had streamed 
up from the captured works at the base, formed 
them in his rear, led them as far as they could ad- 
vance north of Bragg's headquarters, and, leaving 
them, returned to his own hard-pressed command. 
The line was breaking farther south and farther 
north, as brigade after brigade impetuously rushed 
over the works. The end had come. Bragg or- 
dered Bate, who had the only coherent force within 
reach, to cover the retreat to the bridge over the 
Chickamauga. General Bragg says in his report : 
" A panic which I had never before witnessed 
seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and 
each seemed struggling for his personal safety, re- 
gardless of his duty or character. . . . Those who 
reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaus- 
tion from the great physical exertion in climbing 
which rendered them powerless, and the slightest 
effort would have destroyed them." 

General Turchin, commanding the right bri- 
gade of Baird's division, reached the summit first 
in the division. Part of the Confederate troops es- 
caped down the eastern slope, part retired toward 
the north, over a depression in the ridge, to a forti- 
fied position still held in front of A^anderveer's bri- 
gade, which was approaching it. There was a short 



i;6 GEXKKAI. SHKRMAN. 

contlicr. another retreat. The forces on both sides 
cotitiuually increased as the Confederates fell back 
upon supports, and finally Phelps's brig-ade com- 
pleted the ascent. Hardee, alarmed at the steady 
approach toward his position, made Cheatham 
changV front of his division, so as to face to the 
south, striding* the ridge. Hrowu's brigade and 
Cummings's were brought up to support Cheat- 
ham, and the struggle contiiuied at this point till 
dark. This line remained m position while Hardee 
was drawing the rest of his conuuand across the 
Chickamauga, and then followed. 

General Hooker, having constructed his bridge 
and crossed, Osterhaus in advance, found a consid- 
erable force with artillery posted in Rossville Gap, 
and quickly routed it. Osterhaus was sent through 
the gap, then north along the eastern base of ]Mis- 
sionary Ridge. Cruft north along the crest of the 
ridge, and Geary by the western base. They en- 
countered and surprised a portion of Stewart's di- 
visiott on its way to escape by Rossville Gajv and 
captured substantially the whole force. 

Sherman's army went into bivouac where they 
lay. and Thomas on Missionary Ridge, except that 
Sheridan with a portion of his command followed 
Bate, who was covering the retreat from Rragg's 
headquarters, and having combats, when Hate 
found opportunity to stand, until dark. At mid- 
night he resumed pursuit, and pressed Bate to and 
across the Chickamauga, saving the bridge and 
capttiring a large quat\tity of stores. The Con- 
federates trudged wearily through the night, aided 
by the full light of the moon, dropping, as they 
trudged, guns, caissons, wagons, small anus, and 
all the debris of a rout. 

In the night General Grant ordered pursuit by 
all the forces of both armies, except the portion de- 
tailed to march to the relief of Knoxville. Hooker 
marched in the morning with Palmer's corps added 



CIIATTANOOCJA AND MERIDIAN. 177 

to his coinniand, and, delayed by destroyed bridges 
and occasional skirmishes, halted lor the night 
about five miles from Ringgold. Next day he over- 
took Cleburne at Ringgold, ])osted in a very deep 
and narrow gorge, a cleft in the mountain, and on 
the heights on each side, lie charged, Osterhaus 
leading, and after a severe engagement, with heavy 
loss on both sides, Cleburne retired to Dalton. 
Hooker, in pursuance of orders, remained in ob- 
servation toward Tunnel Hill till the 30th of No- 
vember, and then retm-ned to Chattanooga. 

Cencral Davis, of Sherman's command, crossed 
the Chickamauga near its mouth before dawn of 
the 26th, and was followed liy Howard and lUair. 
Next morning, after a brisk skirmish, a Confed- 
erate force that was destroying the stores of the 
depot at Chickamauga station was driven off and 
a portion of the stores saved. On the 27th Gen- 
eral Sherman sent Howard to Red Clay to destroy 
the railroad there, and the next day l)lair per- 
formed the same work on the track from below 
(iraysville north to the State line. On the 2()th 
Howard, lUair, and Davis moved from Graysville 
by different roads to Cleveland, and there com- 
pleted the destruction of railroad which had already 
been extensively wrought by General Long and 
his cavalry brigade. The trains and artillery hav- 
ing gone direct to Chattanooga, the conunand 
reached Charleston, on the Hiawassee, on the 30th, 
without liains or tents. pr(,)visions or baggage. 
The Confederate troops ])osted there left too hastilv 
to destroy the bridges comi)letely, and leaviuj.^- five 
carloads of subsistence. ( )n the same day Bragg 
was relieved from conunand by President Davis 
upon his own request. The campaign was ended. 

The casualties in the five days — 23d to tlie 27th 
of November, both inclusive — were: In Sherman's 
force, killed, one hmidred and twenty; wounded, 
eight hundred and fifty-three ; missing, one hun- 



178 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

dred and thirty-nine ; total, eleven hundred and 
twelve. In Thomas's immediate command, killed, 
five hundred and five ; wounded, thirty-one hun- 
dred and twenty-three ; missing, one hundred and 
sixty-five ; total, thirty-seven hundred and ninety- 
three. Hooker, killed, one hundred and twenty- 
eight ; wounded, seven hundred and forty-six ; 
missing, forty-five ; total, nine hundred and nine- 
teen. Total killed, seven hundred and fifty-three ; 
wounded, forty-seven hundred and twenty-two ; 
missing, three hundred and forty-nine ; aggregate, 
fifty-eight hundred and twenty-four. The Confed- 
erate loss reported by General Hardee : Killed, 
three hundred and sixty-one ; wounded, twenty-one 
hundred and eighty ; missing, forty-one hundred 
and forty-six ; total, sixty-six hundred and eighty- 
seven. But General Grant states in his report the 
number of prisoners captured was sixty-one hun- 
dred and forty-two, of whom two hundred and 
thirty-nine were officers, and in his indorsement 
upon General Hookers report objects to the state- 
ment therein that Hooker's command captured 
sixty-five hundred and forty-seven prisoners. Be- 
sides forty pieces of artillery, sixty-nine gun car- 
riages, and seven thousand small arms, wagons, 
and supplies captured, there was a vast loss by 
burning, breaking up, and casting away of every- 
thing pertaining to the equipment of an army. The 
camps and all the roads from Missionary Ridge to 
Ringgold, and as far beyond as reconnoissance was 
pushed, were a pitiful chaos of wreck. 

In one of General Cleburne's reports — the re- 
port of his fight with Hooker at Ringgold — is a 
sentence which throws some light upon what is 
meant by the statement in Confederate reports of 
the number of men in a command. The statement 
is : "I took into the fight in Polk's brigade, five 
hundred and forty-five ; Lowry's brigade, thirteen 
hundred and thirty; Smith's (Texas) brigade, 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 



179 



twelve hundred and sixty-six ; Liddell's brigade, 
ten hundred and sixteen effective men, making a 
total of forty-one hundred and fifty-seven bayo- 
nets." " Effectives," then, means men who carry 
bayonets, and, unless the contrary is stated, the 
number of men given means the number of bayo- 
nets. The same appears from abstracts of returns 
of the army. The abstract of returns of the 31st of 
October shows sixteen officers and no enlisted men 
present for duty at army headquarters, and shows 
no effectives. It is the same for corps headquar- 
ters. In the return of effectives, all headquarters 
report none, there being only officers and detailed 
men at headquarters. The returns of divisions go 
further. The first division in the abstract gives, 
present for duty, four hundred and forty-two offi- 
cers and forty-six hundred and fifty-three men, and 
gives effective total present, forty-five hundred and 
thirty-one. Deducting all the officers and one hun- 
dred and twenty-two men from the present for 
duty, gives the total effective present. The same 
appears in the other divisions, and in the abstract 
of returns of the loth of December. There is no 
objection to such report ; it has some advantages ; 
but as it is different from the mode of stating the 
nvmibers used in the National army, it is worth 
bearing in mind. 

From the beginning President Lincoln had been 
solicitous about East Tennessee, Abdiel of the se- 
ceding States. He required military considera- 
tions to bend before the sacred duty of guarding 
the loyal mountaineers from rapine. After the cap- 
ture of Corinth by Halleck, he insisted that the 
security of East Tennessee must be a feature of 
whatever plan of campaign was adopted. When 
Grant repaired to Chattanooga, he seldom received 
a telegram from the President or General Halleck 
which did not contain a reminder of Knoxville and 
Burnside. Accordinglv, when the assault of Mis- 



l8o GENERAL SHERMAN. 

sionary Ridge was about to be delivered, Grant 
directed General Thomas to send a force, consist- 
ing of Granger's corps and enough other troops to 
make twenty thousand men, to the relief of Burn- 
side, then closely besieged in Knoxville. In the 
order for the pursuit of Bragg, made in the night 
of the 25th, this relieving column was excepted 
from the order to march in the pursuit. 

Grant returned to Chattanooga in the night of 
the 28th, and found that Granger had not started 
and was not ready. He made an order requiring 
General Sherman to go with his command, in ad- 
dition to Granger's column, and take command of 
the expedition. He sent a copy of Granger's in- 
structions, and also stated that the latest informa- 
tion from Burnside was that his provisions would 
last only until the 3d of December. General Wil- 
son arrived at Charleston and delivered the papers 
on the 30th of November. Colonel Orlando Smith, 
under direction of General Howard, began imme- 
diately the repair and reconstruction of the bridges. 
Before dawn of the ist of December the troops 
began to cross, and marched to Athens before halt- 
ing for the night. Next day Howard pushed for 
Loudon and its environs by night ; Blair marched 
to Philadelphia. 

In the night Sherman ordered General Long 
to select the best of his cavalry and make all speed 
to Knoxville, forty miles away, regardless of dif- 
ficulty or opposition, and reach Knoxville with his 
command or a fragment of it, and communicate 
with General Burnside by night. General Howard 
made a bridge supported by wrecked wagon beds 
repaired, and General Wilson with General Blair 
made a bridge some miles farther up. The river 
was crossed on the 4th, and Granger's force met 
Sherman's command at Marysville on the 5th. 
Here an oi^cer of General Burnside's stafT ap- 
peared and announced that Longstreet had aban- 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. igl 

doned the siege and withdrawn from Knoxville the 
previous night. He brought an invitation from 
General Burnside to General Sherman for a per- 
sonal interview. 

General Granger's corps, the original relieving 
force, was ordered to continue to Knoxville, the 
rest to remain at Marysville. General Sherman 
rode to Knoxville on the 6th. General Burnside 
said he would not require more than Granger's 
corps to aid him in the pursuit of Longstreet. 
Sherman marched the rest of his command back 
to Chattanooga, where the tired men returned to 
their proper commands, enjoyed with the relish 
of long abstinence, food, clothing, shelter, and 
rest. 

General Grant established his headquarters at 
Nashville ; General Thomas remained at Chatta- 
nooga ; General Sherman distributed the Fifteenth 
Corps, now commanded by General Logan, along 
the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur, and the 
portions of the Sixteenth Corps, under the com- 
mand of General Dodge, from Decatur to Nash- 
ville, to prepare the roads for the heavy draught 
that was to be made upon their capacity. The 
Seventeenth Corps at Vicksburg, commanded by 
General McPherson, and the large body of troops 
in Memphis and West Tennessee, under command 
of General Hurlbut, called the Sixteenth Corps, 
were on garrison duty, protecting the navigation 
of the Mississippi from incursions by the Confed- 
erate force in Mississippi. The railroads running 
east and west through Jackson and Meridian to 
Mobile, and north and south the length of the 
State through Jackson and also through Meridian, 
gave the Confederates facilities for rapid transporta- 
tion of infantry and supplies, and constituted a 
continual menace. The destruction of the rail- 
roads would be such a relief that a large part of 
the garrisons of Vicksburg and Memphis could 



l82 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

be removed to fields where they were needed for 
active operations. 

General Sherman went to Nashville to consult 
with General Grant, and then took a leave to spend 
Christmas with his family at Lancaster. The visit 
was as brief as it was happy, and on the 3d of Jan- 
uary he was at Cairo on his way down the Missis- 
sippi. It was the famous cold January of 1864. 
As low down the river as Vicksburg ice floated 
in the river. Many Northern ladies were then vis- 
iting their husbands, officers in the army. They 
received calls on New Year's Day, as was then 
their usage at home, and one of the mots of the 
day was, " Even the climate is putting on North- 
ern airs." General McArthur and his stafif gave 
a ball New Year's night. The supper was served 
in a suite of hospital tents adjoining headquarters, 
and another suite was floored for dancing. The 
cold was so extreme that guests made brief visits 
to the supper tents, and the dancers quickly ad- 
journed to the headquarters building. 

It was the determined purpose of the Govern- 
ment and General Grant to make the ensuing cam- 
paign decisive. But they were confronted by the 
appalling fact that the term of service of the men 
who in the first half of 1861 enlisted for three years, 
and who not only constituted numerically a large 
proportion of the troops in the field, but were also 
the seasoned, disciplined corps d'clite of the army, 
would expire in the coming sunmier, in the mid- 
dle of the campaign. It was clearly better to have 
a temporary disbandment of the army before the 
campaign than risk a total disbandment in the mid- 
dle of it. Accordingly, the Government offered a 
furlough of thirty days and a bounty of three hun- 
dred dollars to every man who, having enlisted for 
three years, and having only ten months or less to 
serve, should re-enlist for the remainder of the war. 
The mass of those who were entitled re-enlisted. 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 183 

The main stimulus was a sober, relentless purpose 
to carry the war to a successful termination ; but the 
proposed visit home made it easier, and various 
motives co-operated. A rep;^iment in a brigade en- 
camped on the Big Black River held back. A ser- 
geant, vigorous, handsome, a born leader, but will- 
ful, took umbrage at something and refused. The 
other men generally followed his example. An 
order was made in the brigade that men who had 
re-enlisted as veterans might be permitted to shoot 
at wild ducks on a pond beyond the river, and just 
outside of the picket line. The sergeant, not know- 
ing the limitation, asked for leave and was refused, 
and told the reason. He would not submit to see- 
ing others enjoy a privilege from which he was 
debarred, and at once re-enlisted. The rest of the 
regiment with great satisfaction did the same. 

General Sherman put General William Sooy 
Smith in command of all the cavalry in the De- 
partment of the Tennessee, and directed him with 
a selected force, which he estimated would be seven 
thousand men, to start from Memphis the ist of 
February, crush Forrest, tear up the Mobile and 
Ohio Railroad, and join Sherman at Meridian about 
the loth of February. General Hurlbut was sent 
to Vicksburg with two divisions. With these, and 
General McPherson with two divisions of the Sev- 
enteenth Corps and Winslow's cavalry, Sherman 
left Vicksburg on the 3d and crossed the Big Black 
the same day. A brigade of Armstrong's cavalry 
hovered about the front in observation. On the 
morning of the 5th a well-served battery posted 
upon a hill in front fired fatally upon the advance 
of McPherson's corps as it moved out from biv- 
ouac, and falling back, but halting and firing from 
each successive vantage ground, scarcely impeded 
the steady march. Hurlbut came up on the flank 
of the Confederates, and they summarily withdrew. 
A brigade of the Seventeenth Corps pushed on to 
13 



l84 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Jackson and occupied it in the night. The roads 
beyond Jackson were execrable. Swamps, quag- 
mires, holes, gullies, and rocks often kept the rear 
of the. column till after midnight before going into 
tentless bivouac. The reports of the Confederate 
cavalry officers especially complain of the difficulty 
of the roads. 

General Sherman was again near being cap- 
tured. Halting at a house by the wayside at a 
crossroads as the rear of the Sixteenth Corps was 
passing, he detached the rear regiment to remain 
until the Seventeenth Corps should come up. The 
colonel of the regiment, seeing some of General 
McPherson's staff coming up the road, took for 
granted that the corps was at hand, and resumed 
his march. General Armstrong, who was on the 
crossroad with part of his force, seeing the oppor- 
tunity, charged upon the wagons and the nmles. 
The sound of the firing and of bullets startled Sher- 
man and his attendants. They gathered what fire- 
arms they could find and barricaded themselves in 
an outbuilding, while an aid-de-camp scurried 
down the road and brought back the regiment upon 
a full run. 

On the 14th of February there was an interest- 
ing encounter between infantry and cavalry. Gen- 
eral McPherson on the afternoon of the 13th or- 
dered General Leggett to leave his first brigade at 
a point four miles in rear of the corps, to proceed 
at daylight next morning to the railroad crossing 
over Chunky River, eight miles to the south, and 
destroy the bridge. At 6 a. m. the brigade, re- 
enforced by two companies of cavalry, began the 
march. On the way information was received from 
inhabitants that General S. D. Lee was at the sta- 
tion with the cavalry brigades of Wirt Adams and 
P. B. Starke. This information is shown by the 
records to be correct, except that General Lee had 
left the command about daylight, summoned to a 



CHATTANOOGA AND MERIDIAN. 185 

personal interview with General Polk at Meridian. 
A mile and a half from the station a heavy, fresh 
trail came into the road from the west, cut so deep 
into the earth as to show that a large body of cav- 
alry had passed. There was no chance for any suc- 
cess except by surprise. The command loaded, 
and were ordered to move with absolute silence. 
The captain commanding the cavalry reported that 
his advance had discovered a picket on post with- 
out being observed, and stated that his men had 
no sabers and could not make a charge. Without 
pausing in their march, the first two regiments of 
infantry deployed on a double-quick, one on each 
side of the road, while skirmishers were thrown 
out to the front on a full run. The line, advancing 
at double-quick, emerged from the timber and saw 
the hostile cavalry at hand along the bank of the 
river. The Confederates, startled at seeing with- 
out warning the long ranks, perfectly aligned and 
rapidly advancing, sounded their bugles ; but be- 
fore they could form the charging line was upon 
them, and drove them in confusion across the 
stream. A quick fire scattered them, and then 
the other two regiments, left behind by the rapid 
movement of the deployed line, appeared in col- 
umn of fours debouching from the woods. The 
enemy, supposing a large force was at hand, with- 
drew. Starke with his brigade reached the out- 
skirts of Meridian in time to engage Sherman's 
advance on the eastern environs of the city, his ar- 
tillery went to the south, toward Enterprise, with 
the other brigade. Seven loaded baggage wagons, 
which were not harnessed, were captured, and the 
railroad bridge was burned. 

General Smith, obeying what' he says was the 
express verbal order of General Sherman, waited 
in Memphis for the brigade of Colonel Waring, 
which was detained up the Mississippi by ice, and 
did not reach Memphis till the nth. The plan of 



1 86 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

his campaign was deranged. He did not crush 
Forrest, did not destroy the railroad, and did not 
join Sherman at Meridian. He had an unsuccess- 
ful engagement with Jackson at West Point, and 
retreated, followed by Jackson with daily combats, 
in which both lost men, and Smith lost artillery. 

General Polk evacuated Meridian on the morn- 
ing of the 14th of February. Sherman entered 
later in the day, and immediately spread his forces 
out along the railroads in all directions, and prose- 
cuted the work of destruction until the 20th. 
Tracks, culverts, and bridges were so largely extir- 
pated that to a large extent the roads were not 
used again for military purposes during the war. 
Meanwhile nothing was heard of General Smith. 
After anxious waiting and inquiry, the expedition, 
having accomplished its purpose, turned home- 
ward, the Seventeenth Corps taking the most di- 
rect route to Canton, Hurlbut coming farther to 
the north, and the cavalry swinging still farther 
northward, in the hope of joining Smith or getting 
news of him. All converged at Canton on the 
26th, without having gained any information. Gen- 
eral Sherman left Canton for Vicksburg on the 
27th of February. Hurlbut brought the expedition 
in on the 3d of March. The re-enlisted veterans 
left Vicksburg to spend their thirty days' furlough 
in visiting home, and then go to new fields. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 

General Sherman reached Vicksburg at the 
end of his Meridian campaign on the last day of 
February, and, finding there letters from Grant di- 
recting him to co-operate in an expedition up the 
Red River, to be conducted by General Banks, in 
whose Department of the Gulf the theater of opera- 
tions lay, he took steamer at once for New Orleans. 
Reaching that city on the 2d of March, he spent a 
couple of days in consultation with Banks, and, 
with his usual restless energy, was on his way back 
to Vicksburg on the 4th, not waiting for the cere- 
monies which w^ere to inaugurate on that day a 
loyal State government for Louisiana. 

The plan arranged with Banks included a loan 
for thirty days from the 7th of March of two divi- 
sions from the Department of the Tennessee — one, 
under General Mower, from the Sixteenth Corps, 
and one from the Seventeenth Corps, under Gen- 
eral Kilby Smith, the two constituting a temporary 
corps, under General A. J. Smith. The expedition 
was to be a mixed military and naval one, a fleet 
of gunboats under Admiral Porter co-operating 
with the land forces, and convoying the numerous 
transports. It was expected that a column under 
General Steele, commanding the Department of 
Arkansas, should meet Banks at Shreveport, some 
three hundred miles up the Red River, and that 
this junction of forces should release Smith's corps, 

187 



1 88 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

which would then immediately return to Shermart, 
who was hurrying his preparations to have the 
Army of the Tennessee in North Alabama ready 
to open the general campaign under Grant before 
the 1st of May. 

With fullest confidence in the good faith and 
right purposes of General Banks, Sherman knew 
so well the difficulty of reclaiming a detachment 
once committed to a distant expedition, that he 
sought by most explicit written arrangements with 
Banks and directions to Smith to secure the prompt 
return of his two divisions at the appointed time.* 
But the expedition did not turn out successfully, 
the junction with Steele at Shreveport was not 
made, and upon his retreat Banks could not spare 
Smith's corps until the army reached the Missis- 
sippi again. The Atlanta campaign had then 
opened, and through the whole of it the Army 
of the Tennessee was weaker by the two divisions 
than Sherman had meant to have it. 

Still greater changes were in store for him. 
On his way to Memphis he was met, on the loth 
of March, by a letter from Grant announcing his 
own promotion to the rank of lieutenant general. 
Four days later Grant, on his return from a rapid 
journey to Washington, summoned Sherman to 
meet him at Nashville. The visit of the lieutenant 
general to Washington was followed by his assign- 
ment, on March 12th, to the command of the armies 
of the United States under the President. General 
Halleck was announced as chief of staff in Wash- 
ington, Sherman succeeded to the Military Division 
of the Mississippi, and McPherson to the Depart- 
ment and Army of the Tennessee. f The same day 
Grant started westward again to meet Sherman at 
Nashville, and to have his final consultations with 
his subordinates before taking the field with the 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 494, 514. f Id., pt. 7, p. 5S. 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 189 

Army of the Potomac, as he had resolved to do. 
Grant's order assuming command of all the Na- 
tional armies was not issued until the 17th, from 
Nashville, and Sherman's was dated the 18th, from 
the same place.''' 

The possibility of this change had, of course, 
been known, for the bill to revive the rank of lieu- 
tenant general had been introduced by Mr. Wash- 
burne on the 14th of December, and passed the 
House of Representatives on the ist of February, 
with a recommendation to the President to give 
the appointment to Grant. Although it did not 
pass the Senate and become a law till nearly a 
month later, it was a foregone conclusion, and 
General Grant had planned the spring campaign 
in the West with a view to this contingency. With 
his habitual reticence, he kept his own counsels 
as to his personal part in the next year's work, 
though there is little doubt that his predilection 
was to remain in the West. The only thing he was 
fully resolved on was, as he said in his letter of 
March 4th to Sherman, that he would accept no 
appointment which would require him to make 
Washington his own headquarters. Pie was de- 
termined to remain in the field. 

During most of the winter the discussion of 
the organization of the principal Western army and 
its component parts had gone on, therefore, with a 
more or less clearly acknowledged reference to 
what became the actual situation at the beginning 
of March. At first Grant seems to have thought 
it possible that he might lead the Western army 
without any intermediate commander between him- 
self and the three department commanders of the 
Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio. While 
this point of view prevailed, he thought of Mc- 
Pherson for the command of the Army of the Ohio, 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 83, 87. 



190 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



from which General Foster asked to be relieved 
on account of his health. He had also thought of 
General W. F. Smith for the place, and as early 
as November had asked to have him booked for 
the first vacancy in the rank of major general.* 
Toward the end of December Halleck had sug- 
gested General John M. Schofield for the Depart- 
ment of the Ohio. Grant reserved his response to 
this till the middle of January, after a personal visit 
to Foster at Knoxville, when he renewed the recom- 
mendation of General Smith, if the latter might be 
given the appropriate rank, to date so as to be 
senior to other major generals in the department. 
He added that, if it were contemplated to give Gen- 
eral Smith a still higher command, he would be 
content with either of the other general officers 
named, or with General J. G. Parke, who was with 
the Ninth Corps in Tennessee. f The reference to 
a " still higher command " for General Smith is 
understood to mean that his appointment to com- 
mand the Army of the Potomac had been under 
consideration. 

To date back a commission so as to give an 
officer formal seniority over others already in serv- 
ice was several times done, notably in the case of 
General Rosecrans, who was thus made to outrank 
Thomas in the Army of the Cumberland, but the 
irritation it caused did not commend it for repeated 
use. It shows that Grant shared the current mis- 
apprehension among army officers in regard to the 
effect of the date of a general's commission when 
the officer was assigned to special duty by the 
President. It was frequently claimed that such as- 
signment could not override mere seniority in com- 
mission, and the question was several times raised 
before it was officially settled, in accordance with 
the plain meaning of the statute, that the assign- 

* O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, pp. 122, 277. f Id., pp. 529, 571. 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 191 

nieiit by the President to a department, an army, or 
a corps gave precedence over all officers of the same 
grade not themselves thus specially assigned. 
When once this principle was settled, our army 
system acquired an admirable flexibility, for it en- 
abled the President to select any major general to 
command an army, giving to such officer what 
amounted to a temporary grade so long as his com- 
mand actually lasted. This was a better system 
than that of the Confederates, and would have left 
nothing to desire if the temporary power had been 
accompanied by the temporary title of lieutenant 
general or general. 

By the end of January Grant found the arrange- 
ment as to the commanders of departments and 
armies easy to settle. A plan was on foot to trans- 
fer the Ninth Corps to the East, where Burnside 
should resume the command of it, and it should be 
enlarged to a strength of twenty-five or thirty thou- 
sand men, with the prospect of becoming a separate 
army on the Carolina coast, where it had first won 
renown. General Parke went with it, and resumed 
his old relations to Burnside as chief of stafif. Gen- 
eral W. F. Smith was also indicated for transfer 
to the East. The probability that McPherson 
would soon be promoted to the head of the Army 
of the Tennessee was so great that Grant no longer 
hesitated as to the Army of the Ohio, and on Janu- 
ary 27th he telegraphed a request that General 
Schofield be assigned to the Department of the 
Ohio, which was promptly done.* Schofield's serv- 
ice had been in Missouri, where he had been upon 
the stafif of General Lyon at the battle of Wilson's 
Creek, and had been on active duty from the first 
organization of Union troops in that State. Since 
May, 1863, he had been in command of that de- 
partment, and had established a high character for 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 229, 230. 



192 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



judgment and ability in administering its affairs. 
His full sympathy with the President's conciliatory 
policy toward conservative Union men had brought 
upon him the strenuous opposition of radical lead- 
ers in Missouri and Kansas, and these had pre- 
vented the confirmation of his promotion to the 
rank of major general. Mr. Lincoln, well know- 
ing that the contest was rather with himself than 
with Schofield, had renewed the nomination, but 
was not unwilling to find a way of conciliating op- 
position by sending General Rosecrans to Missouri 
and transferring Schofield to the Department of 
the Ohio. 

The Department and Army of the Cumberland 
was by far the larger part of the combined forces 
in the Military Division of the Mississippi. It was 
reckoned that it would put into the field sixty thou- 
sand soldiers of the hundred thousand with which 
the active campaign would be opened. From a 
purely military point of view this great dispropor- 
tion between the three organizations of equal grade 
in the grand army was very objectionable, but there 
were other considerations wdiich overrode the ob- 
jections. Each of the armies had its history and its 
strong esprit dc corps. Such pride in its organiza- 
tion is so powerful a stimulus to every soldier, from 
the ranks upward, that the morale of an army may 
be seriously impaired by discouraging it. The 
whole country had gloried in Thomas's stubborn 
courage at Chickamauga, and in his assurance 
afterward that he would hold Chattanooga till the 
army starved. A general public sentiment, which 
no prudent administration or commander could af- 
ford to ignore, demanded that the Army of the 
Cumberland, with Thomas at its head, should re- 
main intact as the preponderant unit m the Army 
of the West. With this sentiment Grant was in full 
accord. His strong, practical sense in military mat- 
ters made him always averse to meddling unneces- 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 



193 



sarily with existing organizations, and he instinc- 
tively felt that the best way to avoid dissensions and 
remove the jealousies which always spring up when 
one army is merged in another, is to avoid every 
change in form which would wound the pride of 
the soldier. Thomas was a noble and patriotic 
man, but he felt as keenly as any one his personal 
dignity, and resented as warmly as any a slight to 
it. Grant respected and sympathized with this feel- 
ing, and does not seem to have debated even the 
necessity of leaving the organization of the Cum- 
berland army as it was. Sherman fully agreed with 
him in this, and received the chief command with 
this question of organization definitively settled. 

The War Department at this time made an at- 
tempt to relieve the army of a congestion in the 
upper grades, which gave little hope of promo- 
tion to meritorious officers in the field. General 
officers who for any cause had dropped out of active 
employment and were awaiting orders were as- 
signed to the different armies, to take any service 
suitable to their rank. Major generals could claim 
no command greater than a division, and briga- 
diers must be content with a brigade if divisions 
were not vacant. A few resigned rather than take 
a command of less importance than that which they 
had last exercised. In the West the most promi- 
nent officer in this situation was General Buell, who 
had been relieved from the command of the Army 
of the Cumberland at his own request, under a 
pressure which was much more political than mili- 
tary. A court of inquiry had, in substance, justified 
his conduct of the campaign of 1862, and, though 
he had declined some overtures looking to active 
service. Grant and Sherman were both disposed to 
find an acceptable position for him. Sherman, with 
the assent of Thomas, had suggested that he be 
assigned to the Fourteenth Army Corps in the 
Cumberland army ; but, on hearing the rumor that 



194 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



Buell was to be employed, Andrew Johnson, as 
military governor of Tennessee, protested. This, 
joined with the strong hostility of Governor Mor- 
ton, of Indiana, made an array of political influence 
quite strong enough to account for the order of 
the War Department mustering him out of service 
a few weeks later.* 

The difhculty growing out of the general order 
assigning olificers to active duty was complicated 
by the fact that a number who had been relieved 
from duty in the Eastern armies were ordered to 
the West, and reported to army commanders who 
had been sifting their own organizations to make 
them more efificient, and were anything but pleased 
to assign to brigades and divisions men who were 
strangers to them, and against whom was the pre- 
sumption arising out of the fact that they were not 
retained in the army where they had served and 
were known. When, therefore, a number of gen- 
eral ofBcers were sent out to Grant, and he asked 
Thomas whether he wanted any of them, the latter 
very frankly said he must first know who and what 
they were — some men he would be very glad to 
get, others he would not choose to have at all. 
" The colonels I have in command of brigades," 
he said, " are all efficient men, and I would not care 
to exchange them for worthless brigadiers." He 
afterward emphasized this by giving his reasons 
for objecting to some who were suggested to him.f 

Several changes were made among the corps 
commanders also. General Hooker was in com- 
mand of two corps — the Eleventh, under Howard, 
and the Twelfth, under Slocum — which he had 
brought to the West from the Army of the Po- 
tomac. The anomaly of having an intermediate 
commander between the army commander and the 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 221, 278, 292, 304, 306, 320, 323. 
f Id., pt. 2, pp. 131, 142. 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 195 

heads of the corps was a fruitful cause of cUafing, 
and, after some correspondence with Washington 
on the subject, it was finally adjusted by consolidat- 
ing the two corps into one, commanded by Hooker, 
and known as the Twentieth. Howard was trans- 
ferred to the Fourth, which General Gordon Gran- 
ger vacated, taking a leave of absence, and Slocum 
was sent to take command at Vicksburg.'*" Sheri- 
dan would have been the natural successor to 
Granger in the Fourth Corps, where he command- 
ed a division, but Grant had already determined to 
give him the command of the cavalry in the Army 
of the Potomac. In the Army of the Tennessee the 
promotion of McPherson and the wide separation 
of the column in Georgia from the troops left in 
the Mississippi Valley led to a partial reorganiza- 
tion, in which General Logan was assigned to the 
Fifteenth and General Blair to the Seventeenth 
Corps. In the Army of the Ohio, General Scho- 
field retained the immediate command of the 
Twenty-third Corps in the field, as well as that of 
the army, and General Stoneman was transferred 
to the cavalry corps of that army. These changes 
completed the larger organization of the forces 
before Grant went East, or were made in pursu- 
ance of arrangements settled with him. Sherman 
retained the organization as he found it, till the 
progress of the campaign naturally caused some 
modifications. 

When Sherman met Grant at Nashville on the 
17th of March, he learned authoritatively the pur- 
pose of the lieutenant general to take the field with 
the Army of the Potomac, and that the independent 
command of the western army would fall upon his 
shoulders. To save time for consultation, he ac- 
companied Grant to Cincinnati, as the latter was 

* O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, p. 397 ; xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 313-315 ; Id., pt. 
3. P- 253. 



196 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

in haste to get back to Washington. Far from 
showing any wish to assume the higher position, 
Sherman had urged that Grant should stay with 
the army at Chattanooga and personally lead it. 
The letters which passed between them when Grant 
sent the news of his promotion (so often quoted) 
reveal their close relations of friendship and confi- 
dence as nothing else can do.* Grant's departure 
from his habitual reticence to speak of his indebt- 
edness to Sherman and McPherson was a remark- 
able exhibition of feeling on his part. The warmth 
of Sherman's reply does not surprise us or seem 
so unexpected, but it was no less sincere. He 
opened a window into tlie recesses of his heart and 
mind when he said, " Until you had won Donelson, 
I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array 
of anarchical elements that presented themselves 
at every point, but that admitted the ray of light 
which I have foUow^ed since." His wishes for the 
future he puts in frankest and strongest form, and 
the vehemence of feeling grows as he writes : 
" Don't stay in Washington. Halleck is better 
qualiiied than you to stand the buffets of intrigue 
and policy. Come West; take to yourself the 
w^hole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead 
sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slopes and the Pa- 
cific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the 
limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. 
. . . For God's sake and your country's sake, come 
out of Washington ! I foretold to General Halleck 
before he left Corinth the inevitable result, and I 
now exhort you to come out West. Here lies the 
seat of the coming empire, and from the West, 
when our task is done, we will make short work 
of Charleston and Richmond and the impoverished 
coast of the Atlantic." 

Grant's impulses urged him in the same direc- 

* O. R., x.xxii, pt. 3, pp. 18, 49. 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE xMISSISSIPPI. 197 

tion. but his visit to Washington had given him 
conchisive pubHc reasons why he should lead the 
great army in X'irginia. It was the logical result 
of tliis that Sherman should command the com- 
bined armies of the West. The time had passed 
when he shrunk from responsibility. A laudable 
ambition would prompt him to rejoice at the op- 
portunity to conduct the western campaign. But 
he was not even consulted. Friendship and a high 
estimate of Sherman's capacity united to fix Grant's 
choice. There was neither hesitation nor second 
thought. At his request the appointment was 
made, and the notice of it was the of^cial order 
promulgated by the War Department on the 12th 
of March. 

Sherman and General George H. Thomas were 
old friends and classmates. Thomas's appointment 
as brigadier general of volunteers had been decided 
by Sherman's influence. He served in Kentucky, 
in 1861, under Sherman's command. The fortunes 
of war reversed the relation, and put Sherman sub- 
ordinate to Thomas after the battle of Shiloh. They 
had again been equal department commanders 
under Grant at Alissionary Ridge, and now Sher- 
man was again to become the commanding officer 
over his friend. Sherman often said that, had such 
been the order, he would have served with com- 
pletest content and cheerfulness under Thomas in 
these final campaigns. In their private intercourse 
they were the schoolmates of boyhood, and the 
cadet nicknames were those they used to each 
other. Their friendship was ended only by death. 

There were not wanting to Thomas admiring 
friends who thought he was " overslaughed " in the 
new assignments to duty, and these were not al- 
ways judicious in expressing themselves. They 
found a mouthpiece in Andrew Johnson, wdio tele- 
graphed to the President his opinion that Thomas 
ought to be independent in his command and re- 



198 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



port direct to Washington.* This would mean, of 
course, a scheme of separate small campaigns, such 
as had so often been disastrous in the past, instead 
of the strong combined effort which Grant had 
planned, There is no evidence that Thomas fa- 
vored such folly for a moment. 

The two men, both very able, were very un- 
like in temperament. Sherman was impulsive and 
demonstrative ; Thomas was impassive and phleg- 
matic. Sherman was lithe and wiry ; Thomas was 
massive and slow of motion. Sherman was fest- 
less and aggressive ; Thomas was deliberate and 
inclined to the defensive. Sherman grew more 
cjuiet when the excitement of a crisis in battle gave 
vent to his nervous strain, as escaping steam stops 
when the engine begins its motion ; Thomas was 
quickened by such a crisis into more active move- 
ment of mind and body. They supplemented each 
other admirably, but there can now be little doubt 
that Sherman's restless energy, his physical in- 
ability to tolerate a standstill, was the quality which 
made it possible to continue the advance in Georgia, 
where the army was dependent on a single line of 
communications reaching to the Ohio River, four 
hundred miles away. It is not worth while to dis- 
cuss the possible results of a different choice of 
commanders. Sherman's selection was justified by 
the best of all possible military tests — a glorious 
ending of the campaign and of the war. 

The plan of campaign which Grant had outlined 
for himself before his transfer to the East was com- 
municated to Thomas as early as the 19th of Janu- 
ary, in a letter which said, *' I look upon the line 
for this army to secure in its next campaign to be 
that from Chattanooga to Mobile. Atlanta and 
Montgomery being the important intermediate 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 105. 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 



199 



points." * This had been fully discussed by Grant 
and Sherman, and, when the latter succeeded to 
the command, Atlanta remained the goal to be first 
reached, though Grant was explicit in saying that, 
beyond indicating Johnston's army as the true ob- 
jective, he left his subordinate free to execute his 
work in his own way.f Sherman had been ex- 
pected to concentrate the Army of the Tennessee 
at Huntsville, Ala., Thomas that of the Cumber- 
land at Chattanooga, and Schofield to bring the 
Army of the Ohio to Cleveland, Tenn., still farther 
to the east. A converging advance upon Rome, 
Ga., had been indicated as the opening movement. 
In writing to General Robert Allen, chief quarter- 
master at Louisville, Ky., Sherman had said, on 
March 24th, that his principal depots would be at 
Nashville, Chattanooga, Huntsville, and Decatur, 
the first two the principal ones. In the same letter 
he said, " We are on the offensive, and should not 
think of any defensive measure;" J an expression 
very like one which brought upon General Pope 
unmeasured and unmerited criticism in 1862. 

Could the army be supplied by the line of rail- 
road? That was the burning question. From 
Louisville on the Ohio to Chattanooga through 
Nashville was three hundred and thirty-seven miles. 
From Chattanooga to Atlanta would be a hundred 
and thirty-five more — four hundred and seventy- 
two in all, a single track, and every mile of it liable 
to raids by the enemy's cavalry. Of course, Nash- 
ville and Chattanooga, the principal depots, must 
be fortified and garrisoned, so that supplies and 
munitions could be accumulated there as a reserve 
in case of any interruption of communication be- 
tween these places and the base. Colonel D. C. 
McCallum, the general manager of military rail- 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, p. 143. f Id., pt. 3, p. 246. 

X Id., pt. 3, p. 142. 



200 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

ways, had come West in January to study the situ- 
ation, and great improvements had been made in 
the railway management before the mihtary divi- 
sion was turned over to Sherman.* But the best 
estimates of the number of cars and locomotives 
lacking were so great that the problem seemed al- 
most insoluble. More than a hundred locomotives 
and twenty-five hundred cars, in addition to the ex- 
isting rolling stock, were necessary, the experts 
said, to insure the delivery at the front of the one 
hundred and fifty carloads per day, which were the 
measure of the wants of an army of a hundred thou- 
sand men. The purchase or construction of the 
extra equipment during the winter and spring was 
out of the question. 

Sherman took the matter in hand with char- 
acteristic vigor. The management of the railways 
was connected directly with his own headquarters. 
He limited the use of the trains to the absolute 
necessities of the army. Private trade and trans- 
portation must find other channels. Passenger 
trafBc was strictly limited. Strangers and visitors 
were not permitted to come to the front. The full 
motive power and the car space were devoted to 
military work. The issue of army rations to citi- 
zens at military posts had grown into a great abuse. 
This was stopped. Colonel Adna Anderson, mas- 
ter of railway transportation, zealously and untir- 
ingly enforced Sherman's orders, but it was not 
yet enough. The general then quietly arranged 
with Mr. Guthrie, the president of the Louisville 
and Nashville Railway, to keep on the line south 
of the Ohio the rolling stock received from North- 
ern railways, and, while the " car accountants " 
were gradually finding out that their equipment 
did not come back to their roads, and were fuming 
over the delay, the depots at Nashville and Chatta- 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, p. 143. 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 20I 

nooga were accumulating rations and ammunition. 
No one enjoyed the humorous side of a situation 
more than Sherman, and his eyes twinkled with 
fun as he reckoned up the profits of his ruse in the 
growing possibihties of an early opening of the 
spring campaign. 

Of course, there was an outcry. " Imploring 
appeals " to Mr. Lincoln moved his kind heart to 
ask Sherman whether he could not modify his 
order. The latter answered : " It is demonstrated 
that the railroad can not supply the army and the 
people too. One or the other must quit, and the 
army don't intend to unless Joe Johnston makes 
us." * Sherman was stoutly backed at Washing- 
ton by General Meigs, the quartermaster general, 
and was allowed to have his way.f He foresaw, 
what turned out to be true, that the private busi- 
ness of the country could accommodate itself to the 
situation with but little individual suffering if his 
system was firmly and honestly carried out. The 
supply problem was solved if the army itself could 
be kept from overburdening itself with impedimenta, 
as every army is prone to do. Writing to General 
Thomas on this subject, Sherman said: "When 
we move we will take no tents or baggage, but one 
change of clothing on our horses or to be carried 
by the men, and on pack animals by company of- 
ficers, with five days' bacon, twenty days' bread, 
and thirty days' salt, sugar, and cofifee ; nothing 
else but arms and ammunition proportioned to our 
ability." X As the campaign lengthened, this scale 
had to be modified, but it was the standard for use 
in the frequent instances when the railway had to 
be left for some turning or flanking movement. 

On the Confederate side, General Joseph E. 
Johnston had been in command since the middle 

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 25, 33. f Id., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 434. 
X Id., xxxii, pt. 3, p. 323. 



202 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

of December, and his troops were in the strong 
intrenched camp in front of Dahon, about forty 
miles from Chattanooga. General Polk had a small 
army in Alabama and Mississippi, and Longstreet 
another on the confines of Virginia and East Ten- 
nessee. President Davis began urging an aggres- 
sive winter campaign as soon as Johnston assumed 
command, and indicated his preference for a plan 
by which Johnston should turn Thomas's position 
at Chattanooga by moving to the eastward of it 
by way of Cleveland, Tenn., while Longstreet came 
down the Holston Valley and united with him for 
a dash through the mountains into middle Tennes- 
see. There were strong reasons in favor of this 
plan, and it was supported by the authority of 
General Lee. It was reckoned that by re-enforce- 
ments from Polk and from Beauregard's forces on 
the Atlantic seacoast Johnston's column could 
start seventy-live thousand strong, and be increased 
to nearly a hundred thousand by the junction with 
Longstreet.* 

Johnston's real preference was for the defensive 
policy, tempting Sherman to assault his impreg- 
nable position at Dalton, and watching for a favor- 
able opportunity for a decisive return blow when 
his opponent's impetuosity should have led to some 
disaster to the National army. He presented with 
force the objections to the plan proposed to him, 
the need of assured supplies for the opening steps 
of such a campaign, and expressed a preference 
for a line of operations by Rome, Guntersville, 
and Huntsville, by which he should turn Thomas's 
position by the south and west, instead of the east 
and north. His own choice, however, would have 
been to go still farther west and make northern 
Mississippi his base of operations if he must aban- 

* O. R., xxxi, pt. 3, pp. 843, 856 ; xxxii, pt. 3, pp. 592, 594, 
614. 



MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI. 203 

don the waiting and defensive strategy which he 
thought wisest of all.* 

The strained relations which notoriously ex- 
isted between Davis and Johnston gave to this cor- 
respondence a very formal air on the part of the 
general at least, and one is impressed in reading it 
with the conviction that the latter was willing to 
gain time by the discussion, and let the delay bring 
about the adoption of his own plan. Anyhow, 
this was what happened, and Grant and Sherman 
were allowed to use the winter for the Meridian 
expedition and in the preparations for a spring 
campaign. Johnston remained cjuietly within his 
formidable lines at Dalton, only sending Hardee 
with re-enforcements for Polk when Sherman 
threatened to march from Meridian into Alabama. 
As the spring approached, Longstreet was ordered 
to join Lee in Virginia, and any thought of his 
again uniting with Johnston was given up. Polk 
prepared to carry a corps of fourteen thousand men 
to Johnston as soon as active operations should 
begin. Regiments and brigades were carefully 
culled out from garrisons on the Gulf coast, and 
within the fifst week from the beginning of Sher- 
man's operations in May, Johnston had in hand the 
seventy-five thousand men which the Richmond 
government had calculated upon as the maximun 
force that could be furnished him.f Sherman had 
estimated very accurately the numbers under the 
Confederate colors in April, but was not fully aware 
of the extent to which re-enforcements were ready 
to reach his adversary in the first weeks of May. 
He was entirely free from the too common fault of 
exaggerating the forces of an opponent. He did 
not magnify his task for the sake of greater glory 
in success, nor did he see lions in his path. 

* O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 510, 559, 644. 

f Id., pt. 3, p. 866 ; xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 670, 737, 740. 



CHAPTER IX. 

CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 

General Grant had planned a simultaneous 
advance of the National armies early in May, and 
on the 4th of the month, as the Army of the Po- 
tomac was crossing the Rapidan, Schofield's Army 
of the Ohio was crossing the boundary of Georgia, 
coming out of Tennessee to become, at Red Clay, 
the left of Sherman's line. Thomas was concen- 
trating the Army of the Cumberland with his cen- 
ter at Ringgold, some twenty miles in front of 
Chattanooga, his left at Catoosa Springs, and his 
right feeling its way southward toward Trickum. 
The Army of the Tennessee, under McPherson, 
was moving from Chattanooga by the rear of 
Thomas's army, to come into position as Sherman's 
right wing near Villanow. 

Several parallel mountain ridges, running from 
northeast to southwest, lay between Chattanooga 
and Dalton, a small town in the valley of the Con- 
nasauga River, where the Confederate forces under 
Johnston lay. The last of these ridges, Rocky 
Face, was an almost perpendicular barrier, cleft 
by the deep gorge of Mill Creek, down which ran 
the Atlanta Railroad after piercing the ridge of 
Tunnel Hill. On the 7th Thomas demonstrated 
against Tunnel Hill with Palmer's corps (Four- 
teenth), while his left, under Howard (Fourth 
Corps), turned the position on the north and forced 
the enemy to retire within their Rocky Face lines 
through the crooked and fortihed gorge, with the 
204 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 205 

precipitous heights of Buzzard's Roost looking 
down upon it. 

For two days Sherman tested the strength of his 
adversary's position from the west and north in 
sharp combats, in which only small bodies could 
find foothold. He was convinced that he could 
not carry Johnston's lines from this side witliout 
very great loss of life, and pressed the march of 
McPherson's army in a flanking movement by his 
right, according to the general plan which he had 
announced to Grant on taking the field.* McPher- 
son was sent through Villanow to Snake Creek 
Gap, an almost unknown pass and ravine turning 
the south end of Rocky Face ridge, twelve or fif- 
teen miles below Dalton. and leading to the town 
of Resaca, in the angle at the junction of the Con- 
nasauga with the Oostanaula River. Sherman 
hoped that McPlierson would be able to reach and 
disable the railroad, but Resaca was found in- 
trenched and garrisoned by four thousand men 
under General Cantey, and, after a strong recon- 
noissance, McPherson retired and went into posi- 
tion at the eastern mouth of the gap in Sugar 
Valley. 

Without wasting time in regrets, Sherman has- 
tened the transfer of his whole army to McPher- 
son's position, leaving Howard's corps and the 
cavalry of the Army of the Ohio under Stoneman 
to cover the communications with Chattanooga. 
Johnston meanwhile was equally busy in retreating 
from Dalton on Resaca by the shorter interior 
route, and in throwing up fieldworks on lines pre- 
viously marked out by his engineer, extending the 
Resaca intrenchments northward on the line of 
hills between the Connasauga River and Camp 
Creek. 

The passage of a large army through a narrow 

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, p. 25. 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA, 207 

road and trestle bridges. Hooker's corps was 
taken from the center and passed to the extreme 
left. Howard stretched his line so as to relieve the 
Twenty-third Corps troops on his right, and these 
were marched to Hooker's support on the flank, 
together with Schofield's reserve division. Step 
by step this flank pushed forward, till near night 
it gained advantages which threatened the enemy's 
rear. Threatened now on both flanks, with a river 
behind him, Johnston was again forced to retreat. 
He had laid a pontoon bridge in the night of the 
14th above the others, and out of McPherson's 
range. All these were put to use in the night of 
the 15th, and next morning the National troops 
entered the place. A thousand prisoners and two 
batteries of artillery were among the trophies, but 
the lists of Sherman's killed and wounded approxi- 
mated four thousand.* 

The railway bridge at Resaca had been burned, 
but the wagon bridge was uninjured, and Sherman 
had laid two pontoon bridges across the Oostanaula 
below the mouth of Snake Creek. He pressed the 
pursuit in several columns, first sending a division 
of the Fourteenth Corps to support the cavalry 
far on the right in a direct movement on Rome. 
He saw with unwillingness his long line of com- 
munications growing longer, and ordered his sub- 
ordinates to attack without delay if Johnston any- 
where made a stand, trusting to his ability to con- 
centrate in time to make a success of any battle 
when once it was opened. The country between 
the Oostanaula and the Etowah was an open one 
compared with the mountainous region north of 
Resaca, and, though Johnston had thought of of- 
fering battle at Adairsville, about halfway between 
the streams, he found on inspection that it was 
too open a situation, and continued his retreat to 

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 4, pp. 201, 202. 



2o8 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Cassville, where he issued formal orders for battle 
on the 19th. 

Sherman's center, under Thomas, had followed 
the " broad trail " of the enemy along the railroad 
to Kingston, where it turned sharply to the east. 
Schofield's line of march, four or five miles east- 
ward, led more nearly in the direction of Cassville, 
and he was ordered to move straight on that place. 
McPherson, equally far away on the west, was 
called in to Kingston, while the center took roads 
which would meet Schofield in front of the enemy. 
Johnston's position at Cassville was on a com- 
manding ridge behind the town, but Polk and 
Hood, who held the center and right of his line, 
protested so vigorously that the center was en- 
filaded by the artillery of Sherman's left that John- 
ston yielded his opinion, and ordered a continua- 
tion of the retreat across the Etowah, where the 
railway passes through the defile of Allatoona. 
Johnston tells us that he never ceased to regret that 
he did not give battle as he first intended.* Sher- 
man also regretted it, for his policy was to bring 
the campaign to a decisive issue as soon as possible. 

Sherman followed the enemy through Carters- 
ville with a division of Schofield's corps, and when 
the railway bridge was found to be burned he 
quickly turned his columns toward Kingston, and 
secured crossings of the river above and below that 
place. The Resaca bridge was already rebuilt, and 
Kingston was made the field depot of supplies. 
Twenty days' rations were in the wagons, herds 
of cattle were driven near the columns, and the 
army plunged into the wild and tangled country 
between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee. The 
gorge of Allatoona, Kennesaw Mountain, and Lost 
Slountain made a group of strong positions around 
the town of Marietta, and Johnston planned to 

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 3, p. 616. 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 2C9 

make of them a new intrenched camp, while he 
would meet Sherman on advanced lines westward, 
near Dallas and along Pumpkin \'ine Creek. 

On the 25th of ]^Iay the National columns were 
converging on Dallas, intending to follow the 
main road from that place to Marietta. Johnston 
was also in motion for the same place. At the 
crossing of the Pumpkin \'ine near Owen's Mills, 
Hooker, who had the advance in the center, found 
the bridge burning, and indications of a strong 
force on the road to New Hope Church. The lire 
was put out. the bridge quickly repaired, and his 
head of column turned in that direction from the 
Dallas road. It was Hood's corps of the Confed- 
erates which was going into position around the 
church on the heights east of the valley. Hooker 
made a headlong attack, but was met with a wither- 
ing fire, which checked his advanced division. The 
rest of the corps went in to the support of their 
comrades, but it was already late in the afternoon. 
a heavy downpour of rain delayed the approaching 
columns, and the affair was limited to a bloody 
combat between the two corps. 

During the night Sherman hurried forward his 
troops, while Johnston was doing the same, and 
the next day found the two armies facing each 
other across a narrow valley from Dallas north- 
east in the direction of Ackworth on the railroad. 
Then began a systematic warfare of intrenched 
lines, with only occasional serious efforts at direct 
attack, in which the assailing party pretty uniformly 
got the worst of it. Sherman steadily pushed for- 
ward and extended his left, seeking to renew his 
connection with the railroad at Ackworth. Each 
day the cavalry would feel for the end of the ene- 
my's line in the dense forest and thickets, and the 
infantry would advance to a brisk skirmishing at- 
tack, pushing the Confederates back and intrench- 
ing every foot that was gained. For six weeks, 



2IO GENERAL SHERMAN. 

amid the constant rains of an unusually wet season, 
this work continued. 

On the 27th of May Howard's corps tried the 
fortunes of a direct attack upon a projectnig angle 
of the Confederate line near Pickett's Mill, but was 
repulsed. On the 28th Johnston sought to check 
the movement toward the left by an attack upon 
McPherson's right at Dallas, made by Hardee's 
corps. He in turn suffered a bloody repulse, and 
Sherman's transfer of troops from right fiank to 
left went steadily on. On June ist Stoneman's 
cavalry corps occupied the Allatoona pass, and the 
rebuilding of the Etowah railway bridge was im- 
mediately begun. By the 4th Sherman's lines had 
advanced so far as to threaten Johnston's connec- 
tion with Marietta, and the latter retreated to a new 
line previously laid out within the old, and ex- 
tending from Kennesaw Mountain west to Pine 
Mountain, and thence south to Lost Mountain. 
A strip of country several miles wide was thus given 
up, but Johnston's new position was wonderfully 
strong, and admirably covered the railroad from 
Kennesaw to the Chattahoochee. 

Sherman now made Schofield's Army of the 
Ohio his pivot on the left, and passed around it 
successively Thomas's and McPherson's armies. 
McPherson covered the Ackworth station on the 
railroad on the 7th of June, and the next day Gen- 
eral Frank P. Blair joined him with the Seven- 
teenth Corps, coming from the north by the way 
of Rome, the only considerable re-enforcement 
Sherman received during the campaign. A new 
field depot of supplies was soon established on the 
railroad, McPherson's lines were advanced close 
to Kennesaw on the north, and a new swinging 
movement by the right now began, Thomas being 
the center as usual, but Schofield being the extreme 
right and traversing the outer arc of the circle. 

Day by day the sharp combats went on, mile 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 21I 

by mile the right flank swung southward, till the 
old Sandtown road was occupied to the crossing 
of the highway from Marietta to Powder Springs. 
On the 14th of June Johnston found his position 
at Pine Mountain untenable, and in the last recon- 
noissance he made from its summit General Polk 
was killed at his side by a cannon ball. In him 
Johnston lost not only a stanch subordinate, but 
a friend who had been the peacemaker with Presi- 
dent Davis. The corps passed for a time to the 
command of General Stephen D. Lee. 

In a day or two Lost Mountain had to be left 
to the Confederate cavalry to defend it, the infan- 
try line not reaching beyond the Powder Springs 
road, and the flank being near the upper waters 
of OUey's Creek, which runs southwestward into 
the Chattahoochee. These movements had been 
hastened by the aggressive vigor of Sherman's 
troops, pushing from hill to hill, fording stream 
after stream all flooded by the constant rains, get- 
ting artillery positions w'hich enfiladed portions of 
the intrenchments, and making rushes for any 
point which seemed weakened. Although no gen- 
eral engagement took place, these daily combats 
often became considerable affairs, in which a di- 
vision or a corps was involved. 

Hardee's corps was the left of Johnston's line 
till the 2 1 St, when the extension of Sherman's right 
threatened to outflank the position at the Powder 
Springs road, and Johnston ordered Hood to 
march his corps in the night from the e.xtreme right 
to the left. In the morning of the 22d Hooker's 
corps was extending the right of Thomas's army 
southward, and Schofield, passing still farther be- 
yond, planted his right at Cheney's house, where 
the old Sandtown road crossed that running from 
Marietta to Powder Springs. In the afternoon, 
without orders from Johnston, Hood made an im- 
petuous attack with his whole corps upon the right 



212 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

of Hooker and left of Schofield at Gulp's farm, on 
the ridge between Noyes's (commonly called 
Nose's) Creek and Olley's. The vigor and per- 
sistence of the attack seemed to indicate that John- 
ston was taking the aggressive with his whole 
army, but it was not followed up by any other than 
Hood's troops, which were repulsed with heavy 
loss. 

Sherman had hoped to advance his left wing 
when his adversary stretched so far in the opposite 
direction, but the enemy's positions on Kennesaw 
Mountain and Brush Mountain were so strong that 
a small force could hold them, and Johnston seemed 
able to keep pace with the National army in stretch- 
ing to the southwest. He had received consider- 
able re-enforcements, and the Georgia militia had 
been called out and were joining him ; but Sher- 
man still felt himself superior in force, and sure 
that the enemy must be drawn out in a very thin 
line without reserves. The truth was that the least 
assailable parts of Johnston's fieldworks were held 
with strong skirmish lines, while reserves were 
made of the troops thus saved, and these were 
placed at central positions in support, so that they 
could be quickly hurried to any point which might 
be attacked. It had seemed to Sherman, there- 
fore, that by combined attacks along the line he 
ought to be able to find the weak points and break 
through. He chafed at the growing unwillingness 
to assault, knowing that it is when one's adversary 
is broken that the advantages are obtained which 
pay for the losses in the attack. He had steadily 
kept in mind that the Confederate army was his 
principal objective, and was not content with the 
prospect of following it up in slow and indefinite 
retreat. In deference, however, to the opinions of 
his subordinates, he had arranged to transfer Mc- 
Pherson's army from the left to the extreme right, 
so as still more to threaten Johnston's connection 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 213 

with Atlanta and force him to retreat. This in- 
volved the accumulation of supplies enough to leave 
the railroad temporarily, as he had done at Dalton 
and at the Etowah, but the persistent rains had 
foundered the whole country, and the wagon trains 
could hardly supply the troops in their present 
camps. Such a deadlock was intolerable, and he 
reverted to the plan of a direct assault of John- 
ston's lines. 

Orders were issued for an attack on points to 
be selected by army commanders, one from Mc- 
Pherson's front and two from Thomas's. Schofield 
was to make a demonstration with his left, while 
his right made an effort to find a way to turn the 
enemy's extreme flank. The tactics of the assaults 
were left to the corps commanders. On Monday, 
June 27th, the advance was made with splendid 
courage by the brigades detailed for the purpose, 
who pushed their way through the abattis close to 
the enemy's parapets, and, though they were not 
able to break through, they held the ground they 
gained, and did not allow a head to show itself 
above the breastworks. Sherman thought that a 
second line charging over the first would have en- 
tered the works, and this was the opinion of some 
of the best officers who took part in the attack ; 
but it was not done, and the brave men in the ad- 
vance made cover for themselves where they lay, 
and their positions w^ere connected with the lines 
on right and left. 

From the right Schofield had advanced one of 
his divisions over Olley's Creek, had carried an 
intrenched hill held by the Confederate cavalry, 
and seized a strong position commanding the 
Nickajack Valley, where the direct highway from 
Marietta joins the Sandtown road. From this po- 
sition the topography showed that Johnston's left 
could not be easily extended in that direction, and 
that a promising flanking movement there would 



214 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



be a much shorter one than had been supposed. 
Sherman acted upon it at once. Hooker's hne was 
stretched so as to relieve part of Schoiield's corps, 
and the whole of this was used to make strong the 
new position on the flank. Johnston saw that the 
time had come to let go his hold on Kennesaw, and 
had marked out new lines beyond the Nickajack. 
Into these he marched on the night of the 2d of 
July, while McPherson was transferring the Army 
of the Tennessee to Schofield's right. The attack 
upon Kennesaw had cost Sherman twenty-five hun- 
dred casualties, a much larger number than the 
enemy had sufifered, sheltered as they were behind 
strong works, but the general result had been the 
retreat of Johnston's army, and the moral elifect 
on the National forces was that of victory. Sher- 
man had shown that he was not discouraged at 
any obstacles, but that on being checked in one 
direction he would find a way to his object in an- 
other. 

On the 4th of July McPherson's advance drove 
the enemy from a line of rifle pits on the Sandtown 
road, Thomas's columns pushed through Marietta 
along the railroad, and Johnston retired within his 
new line of works, carefully prepared to cover the 
crossing of the Chattahoochee River. These in- 
trenchments began at the river about a mile above 
the railway bridge, and followed the trend of the 
heights bordering the stream, continued about six 
miles to the southwestward, the lower part being 
along the Nickajack Creek, which for the last two 
or three miles of its course is nearly parallel to the 
Chattahoochee. Within this line was a shorter 
one, a bridge-head covering the peninsula at the 
crossing, and protecting the transfer of the army 
to the south side whenever it should become neces- 
sary. 

These works were too formidable for a direct 
assault ; their extension along the river toward 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA, 215 

Sandtown would make difficult any attempt to turn 
them on that side, involving the uncovering of the 
railway line and long journeys of wagon trains. 
After careful reconnoitering, Sherman decided to 
make his crossing by his left, but kept up lively 
cavalry demonstrations on both flanks of his army 
to hide his purpose. On the 7th of July the rail- 
way had been repaired, so that supplies were deliv- 
ered at the army lines, Schofield's corps was at 
Smyrna camp ground, and he had selected the 
mouth of Soap Creek, about six miles above the 
railway bridge, as a favorable place to force the 
passage of the river. The next day the enemy's 
outpost there was surprised, two pontoon bridges 
were laid before night, and Schofield held the hills 
beyond in force. In the night of the 9th Johnston 
retreated across the river and burned the railway 
bridge, taking up a line along Peach Tree Creek 
to cover Atlanta. 

Some days were now used in getting up sup- 
plies and loading wagon trains for another sepa- 
ration from the railway. Schofield was re-enforced 
by Howard's corps, McPherson took position at 
Roswell, some ten miles farther up stream, while 
threats of crossing below, near Sandtown, were 
also kept up. On the 17th of July everything was 
ready for the advance by Sherman, when the Con- 
federate commander was more grievously sur- 
prised than by the crossing of the Chattahoochee. 
He received telegraphic orders to turn over the 
command of his army to General John B. Hood. 
Dissatisfaction with his defensive policy and con- 
tinued retreat was the reason assigned. Hood was 
known as a sharp critic of his commander's meth- 
ods, and was himself regarded as a type of aggres- 
sive generalship. General Cheatham took Hood's 
corps, and General A. P. Stewart succeeded S. D. 
Lee in command of Polk's. 

Johnston had himself planned to take the ag- 



2i6 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

gressive as soon as Sherman should advance south 
of the river, and gave Hood the benefit of his in- 
formation and purposes. These were, in substance, 
adopted by the latter. On the i8th Sherman's col- 
umns advanced. Thomas had laid a pontoon 
bridge at Pace's Ferry, only two or three miles 
above the railway bridge, and Schofield replaced 
his canvas pontoons with a wooden trestle. The 
whole army was to execute a wheel to the right on 
Palmer's corps of the Cumberland army, Hooker's 
keeping touch with his right, Howard's marching 
on Buckhead, Schofield passing through Cross 
Keys toward Decatur, and McPherson taking the 
still longer circuit toward Stone Mountain and the 
Augusta railroad, which he cut before evening. 

On the 19th the wheeling movement continued, 
Thomas getting the heads of each of his three corps 
across Peach Tree Creek, with a stubborn opposi- 
tion which indicated that the enemy's position was 
not far away. The movement had opened a con- 
siderable gap between Sherman's wings. Hood 
ordered Cheatham to hold fast a salient in this in- 
terval, near Jones's Mill, on Clear Creek, and his 
other two corps to attack Thomas's army obliquely 
on its left flank. Schofield's march that day brought 
him over the south fork of Peach Tree, about two 
miles from Decatur, and one of McPherson's corps 
(Dodge's) connected with his left. Wheeler's cav- 
alry had tried in vain to check their advance. 

On the 20th Sherman continued the movement 
of his left wing, threatening Cheatham's flank, and 
the whole Confederate army had to take ground 
to the right. The attack which Hood had ordered 
for one o'clock was thus delayed, but soon after 
three it fell with great fury on the left of one of 
Howard's divisions, and progressed along the front 
of this and Hooker's divisions in succession. The 
battle was persistently renewed and stubbornly 
continued till nightfall, but Thomas's men held 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 21/ 

their ground and repulsed Hood with great loss 
to him. Meanwhile Sherman was hurrying forward 
Schofield and McPherson, and they were rattling 
Wheeler's cavalry back beyond Cheatham's flank 
so fast that, although the latter was stretched al- 
most to the breaking point, he could not reach far 
enough to check the National troops, and Hood 
was forced to order away a division from Hardee 
to support the cavalry and hold the commanding 
hills at the very gates of Atlanta. 

The engagement on the Confederate side was 
a general one, intended by Hood as a decisive ef- 
fort to drive Sherman back, and it had failed with 
a loss to the Confederates of five or six thousand 
men. As usual, the attacking columns suffered 
most, and Sherman's casualties did not exceed two 
thousand, of which by far the greater part was in 
Hooker's corps. 

On the 2 1st Sherman closed in upon the ene- 
my's positions in front of Thomas and Schofield, 
while he brought forward McPherson's men on 
the left. Blair's corps carried a bald hill, which 
was the extreme right of the Confederate line south 
of the Augusta Railway, and intrenched it. Gar- 
rard's cavalry was sent to destroy this railway more 
thoroughly for some distance eastward, as there 
were constant rumors of re-enforcements coming 
to Hood that way. 

Hood retired within the fortifications of Atlanta 
in the night, sending Hardee's corps through the 
city and out by roads leading to the southeast to 
turn and attack McPherson in flank and rear. 
Cheatham's corps he held ready to attack McPher- 
son from the city side when Hardee's battle should 
be joined. Stewart's corps, with the Georgia mili- 
tia, held and strengthened the works on the north- 
east and north of the place. 

In the early morning of the 22d of July the 
National army advanced in line over the abandoned 



MAP No. II 

ATLANTA CAMPAIG:N^ 



1 2 3 4 5 



SCALE OF MILES EXPLANATION; 

I Union norl-s /''^ 

'° Confederate H'orks '>V\ 







Army of the Ohio 

" '^ Tennessee 

" Cumberland 



.J 

■ \ 

/'Rcd Bua( ; 



/ ■Sy"',9y-^0Staii' / /Si,nnj:town^\//' \ 

/ / P.O. 

/ /' 

Ar^ r ' //~'^\ Adai,sviliy(i '. 

yT -/ I ^^/ '^Nauirit P.O. VS; I 




CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 



219 



be taken to support him and of his confidence that 
he would make the Army of the Tennessee victori- 
ous. A division of Schofield's was ordered to re- 
enforce Logan, part of it going to cover and pro- 
tect the army trains. Schofield's Hne was thinned 
out to fill the gaps thus made in it, and Thomas 
was directed to seize any opportunity to turn the 
tables on the enemy's left. 

About three o'clock Hood sent Cheatham's 
corps forward to strike Blair's and Logan's corps 
in rear as they were engaged with Hardee in front. 
He w^as a little too late. Hardee had been beaten 
off, and the invincible troops in the trenches leaped 
back to the other side and met Cheatham as they 
had met Hardee. A momentary break occurred at 
the railroad, but Sherman was looking down upon 
the spot from the Howard house, and, calling for 
Schofield's artillery to mass there, he personally 
directed an overwhelming fire of canister, which 
drove back the assailants and enabled Logan to 
restore his line. Before nightfall Hardee retired, 
and Hood's decimated corps were withdrawn into 
the city. The second costly effort to take the ag- 
gressive had failed. The penalty was a casualtv 
list of ten thousand for Hood, of which over three 
thousand were killed and two thousand were pris- 
oners. On the National side the loss was thirty- 
five hundred killed, wounded, and missing.* A 
great part of the enemy's loss was verified by 
Logan's formal delivery of the dead under a flag 
of truce. 

As it became evident that Hood meant to hold 
fast at Atlanta, considerations of protecting the 
line of communications with the rear, and reach- 
ing by shortest direction the railways southwest 
of the place, determined Sherman to extend his 
line by the right rather than the left. The x\ugusta 



* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 3, p. 21. 



220 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Railroad was broken up for thirty miles eastward, 
and the cavalry on both flanks were set to work 
to reach the railways beyond the city. General 
Howard had succeeded IVIcPherson in command 
of the Army of the Tennessee, and was ordered to 
transfer it to the extreme right. The three corps 
passed behind the rest of the army on the 27th, 
coming successively into line on the extension 
around the city of the works of the Cumberland 
army. Schofiield was ordered to stretch the Army 
of the Ohio so as to make a show of holding the 
ground to the Decatur road and the battlefield of 
the 22d. Anticipating such a movement. Hood's 
engineers were already laying out a new defensive 
line, leaving the old at a salient in the western 
suburbs of the city on the Lickskillet road, and 
running thence southwest, parallel to the Atlanta 
and Western Railway, and about a mile from it. 
The intention of this was, of course, to protect 
the railroads and prevent the complete investment 
of the place. 

Howard's movement was not completed on the 
27th, but next morning it was still in progress, and 
Logan's corps was just reaching the crossroads at 
Ezra Church when it was violently attacked. Hood 
had sent General S. D. Lee (now the commandant 
of Hood's own corps) with his own and part of 
Stewart's corps to make another fierce effort to 
roll back the flank of the National army. The 
battle lasted through the afternoon, but Logan 
held his position without difiiculty, and Howard's 
artillery and reserves completed the bloody repulse 
of the enemy. Toward sunset the discouragement 
of tjie Confederate troops was such that regiments 
doggedly refused to follow their officers in the 
hopeless and destructive charges. Sherman and 
Howard were both on the ground, and the com- 
mander had planned a return blow on the flanks 
of the disheartened enemy, but the detached troops 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 221 

missed the road and did not arrive. Again Hood 
had lost more than five thousand men, while How- 
ard's casualties were less than six hundred. The 
Union troops were grimly exultant at the outcome 
of the change of tactics by the enemy, and proud 
of the ability shown by Sherman in forcing the 
abandonment of position after position with losses 
that had been small in comparison. Jefferson 
Davis began to doubt the wisdom of his change of 
Johnston for Hood, and telegraphed, " The loss 
consequent upon attacking him (Sherman) in his 
intrenchments requires you to avoid that if prac- 
ticable." * 

The cavalry expeditions had disappointed Sher- 
man, and the infantry operations, patiently and 
persistently pushed forward, were his sole reliance. 
Schofield's corps was transferred from left to right, 
Howard's recurved right fiank was swung forward, 
and on the new line Schofield reached the north 
fork of Utoy Creek. Sherman thought that two 
corps operating as a unit might seize the railroad, 
and directed Palmer to report to Schofield for th's 
purpose. Palmer disputed Schofield's seniority in 
rank, and, when Sherman decided against him, de- 
manded leave to retire from the army. The at- 
tempted movement was balked in consequence, the 
enemy had time to intrench an advanced line on 
the Sandtown road, and one of Schofield's brigades 
lost three hundred men in a forced reconnoissance 
of the new position on the 6th of August. 

Sherman now realized, as at Marietta, that the 
stretching of his lines had gone about as far as it 
could. A fortnight was spent in rectifying posi- 
tions, pushing back Hood's outposts, and bring- 
ing our trenches as close as possible to the forti- 
fications of the place. Provisions were accumu- 
lated in the camps, and everything indicated prepa- 

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 5, p. 946. 



222 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

ration for some decisive movement. For several 
days the place was cannonaded with heavy guns. 
Schofield cautiously but steadily advanced his 
flanking division to the crossing of the Campbell- 
town and East Point roads, and on the i8th pushed 
it three quarters of a mile still farther forward to- 
ward East Point, where it intrenched in a half 
circle, and became, a week later, the pivot on 
which the army was swung to the south of At- 
lanta. 

Hood's cavalry under Wheeler was operating 
on Sherman's communications in northern 
Georgia, annoying small posts and making mo- 
mentary breaks in the railroad ; but Wheeler now 
marched into East Tennessee, and his absence 
gave Sherman the desired opportunity to move 
with some secrecy. Hooker's corps (now under 
General Slocum) was marched into works covering 
the Chattahoochee railway bridge on the night of 
the 25th, and the rest of the army swung in a great 
wheeling march behind Schofield toward Jones- 
boro. Hood thought Wheeler had seriously broken 
our communications, and that want of food was 
forcing Sherman to retreat by way of Sandtown. 
He persisted in this illusion till the 30th, when, 
instead of making an attack on Schofield's corps, 
which was that day three miles from any supports, 
he hurried off Hardee with his and Lee's corps to 
Jonesboro, and ordered an attack there upon the 
outer flank of Sherman's army. 

On that day Howard had got Logan's corps 
over Flint River after a sharp affair with the Con- 
federate outposts, and it was intrenched on the high 
ground between the river and the railroad. The 
other two corps under Howard were in support 
on right and left, having bridges over the river. 
On the 31st Hardee's troops had assembled at 
Jonesboro and marched against Howard. Lee's 
corps had the brunt of the attack and Logan's of 



CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. 



223 



the defense, and the Confederates were repulsed, 
leaving four hundred dead upon the field, and hav- 
ing probably two thousand wounded. Sherman 
was marching with Thomas's columns, and did 
not get the news of the enemy's being in force at 
Jonesboro till late in the afternoon. 

Schofield had been pushing the left flank of 
the army forward that day toward Rough and 
Ready station on the railway by the road through 
Morrow's Mills, and carried an intrenched posi- 
tion a little south of the station in a sharp combat. 
Thinking Atlanta was now to be attacked from the 
south. Hood ordered Lee's corps to march back 
from Jonesboro that night. As two corps were 
known to be in Jonesboro at nightfall, the strange 
recall of Lee was not foreseen, and Sherman bent 
all his efforts to concentrate upon them. Hood's 
movements of Lee's and Stewart's corps in the 
night and next day were thus unknown, and it 
was not till Sherman joined Howard in the after- 
noon of the 1st of September that the mysterious 
disappearance of Lee's corps was learned. Then 
he pressed everything to envelop and destroy 
Hardee, who was isolated. Thomas's Fourteenth 
Corps (now under General J. C. Davis) was first 
up, and made a brilliant attack about sunset, carry- 
ing a salient of the enemy's works, killing over 
three hundred and capturing nearly two thousand, 
including the wounded prisoners. The National 
loss was one thousand. 

Getting better knowledge in the course of the 
day,. Hood halted Lee's corps between Jonesboro 
and Atlanta to cover the evacuation of the city 
and the concentration at Lovejoy's station on the 
Macon road, which he had now determined on. 
His trains of ordnance stores and supplies were de- 
stroyed, and, marching hard, he passed to the east- 
ward of Sherman's army in the night and reunited 
with Hardee at Lovejoy's on the 2d of Septem- 



224 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



ber. His curious changes of purpose which grew 
out of his misconception of Sherman's movements 
had served him better than any ruse, and the time 
necessarily lost by Sherman in trying to find out 
what his adversary was about had finally enabled 
the latter to make his hasty retreat beyond Jones- 
boro. 

The explosions of the ammunition in the night 
had been heard by Slocum as well as Sherman, 
and the Twentieth Corps, approaching the city 
from the north, was met by the mayor, who sur- 
rendered Atlanta to him in form. Sherman fol- 
lowed Hood to Lovejoy's station, and recon- 
noitered the position there. The task which had 
been definitely allotted him was accomplished by 
the capture of Atlanta and the disjointing of the 
Southern system of railway connections, and he 
felt the need of mature study of a new campaign 
and of full understanding with General Grant in 
regard to it. He therefore determined to give his 
army a little rest, and concentrated his forces about 
Atlanta — the Cumberland army in the fortifications 
of the city, that of the Tennessee about East Point, 
and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur. His success 
was hailed with popular exultation throughout the 
North, and Congress vied with the President and 
the general in chief in thanks and congratulations 
to Sherman and his army. 



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CHAPTER X. 

CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. — DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
MARCH TO THE SEA. 

The undisguised discouragement of the Con- 
federate officers and men was the best evidence of 
the importance of Sherman's success. Hood tele- 
graphed that his army was no longer equal to of- 
fensive operations against his opponent, and that 
strong re-enforcements were necessary to prevent 
the country from being overrun. Hardee, tem- 
porarily separated from his chief, sent similar ill 
tidings to the Confederate President, saying, 
" Never, in my opinion, was our liberty in such 
danger." * After the first reaction, Hood tried to 
minimize the results of his own errors, and re- 
curred to his unfortunate habit of seeking scape- 
goats to bear the blame; but the fact was apparent 
that a great campaign was lost, and the future was 
lowering with storm clouds. Davis explained with 
patient dignity that the resources of the Confed- 
eracy offered little prospect of re-enforcement ex- 
cept by stringent measures to bring absentees back 
to the ranks, f Hardee had for some time been 
urgent to be relieved from service under Hood, 
but Davis had begged him to waive his objec- 
tions. Now,_Jiowever, the effort of Hood to hold 
Hardee responsible for defeat forced the issue, and 
Davis reluctantly assigned the latter to the De- 
partment of the Carolina and Georgia Coast.;]; 

Sherman was no sooner in position at Atlanta 

* O. R., xxxviii, pt. 5, pp. 1016, 1018. f Id., p. 1021. 

X Id., xxxix, pt 2, pp. 832, 880. 

225 



226 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

than he opened with General Grant the discussion 
of the next campaign. At the beginning of the 
one just closed Grant had sent him a map marked 
to indicate graphically his plans. On it Atlanta 
was Sherman's first local objective, and the tak- 
ing of Wilmington, N. C., Savannah, Ga., and Mo- 
bile, Ala., were indicated as the establishment of 
bases from which operations might be conducted 
auxiliary to Grant's own when Richmond should 
be taken, and to Sherman's after he should reach 
Atlanta. While it was perfectly true that the great 
Confederate armies were the primary aim and ob- 
jective, the conditions of an insurrectionary war 
made territorial occupation of much greater im- 
portance than in a war between independent na- 
tions. Crushing a rebellion is, in fact, a war of 
territorial conquest. To separate the rebellious 
States, to cut their communications, to reduce the 
limits from which supplies for their armies must 
be drawn, was upon land quite as important as the 
blockade by sea. To eliminate Georgia and the 
Gulf States from the direct rule of the Confederacy 
and from its sources of supply was to kill the re- 
bellion. The Confederate Government had ex- 
plicitly recognized this in pointing out to John- 
ston at the beginning of the year the vital impor- 
tance of carrying the war into Tennessee. To lose 
it and Georgia was, Davis said, to lose the fields 
from which the rations of their armies came.* 

Sherman's part in the programme was com- 
pleted far in advance of any other. Grant had 
not taken Richmond, and neither Wilmington, Sa- 
vannah, nor Mobile were in our hands. As Grant 
wrote to Halleck on October 4th. " When this 
campaign was commenced nothing else was in 
contemplation but that Sherman, after capturing 
Atlanta, should connect with Canby at Mobile." f 

* O. R., x.\xi, pt. 3, p, S57. f Id., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 63. 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 22/ 

It had been assumed as a precedent condition of 
Sherman's further advance that he should have an 
assured new base of supphes, either upon the Gulf 
or on the Atlantic. What should be done now 
that neither was provided ? 

On the loth of September Sherman wrote to 
Grant succinctly analyzing the situation. Forrest's 
cavalry was breaking the railroad in Tennessee, 
and Wheeler's cavalry was not yet disposed of. 
He could not depend on the railroad for operations 
further in advance. He could march to Milledge- 
ville and compel Hood to give up Augusta or 
Macon. But this would be by abandoning his 
communications. He could live on the country in 
marching, but when he halted he would starve. If 
Grant could secure the Savannah River as far up 
from the ocean as Augusta, or the Chattahoochee 
as far from the Gulf as Columbus, he would sweep 
the whole State of Georgia, but otherwise his whole 
army would be imperiled for want of food by 
going far from Atlanta.* The essence of the prob- 
lem could not be better put. 

Grant replied that he saw plainly the difficulty, 
and the misfortune it was that the collateral parts 
of his general plan had been unavoidably delayed. 
He could not see what Sherman was to do, and 
could only trust to his fertility of resource. He 
hoped by the 5th of October Mobile or Savannah 
would afford the necessary new base.f On the 
20th of September Sherman restated the problem 
at greater length, indicating his preference for a 
march eastward if Savannah were first reduced. 
" It once in our possession," he said, " and the 
river open to us, I would not hesitate to cross the 
State of Georgia with sixty thousand men, haul- 
ing some stores, and depending on the country for 
the balance. . . . The possession of the Savannah 

* O. R , xxxix, pt. 2, p. 355. f Id., p. 364. 



228 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

River is more than fatal to the possibility of a 
Southern independence: they may stand the fall of 
Richmond, but not of all Georgia." * The march to 
the sea was taking definite shape in his mind, but 
as yet the reduction of Savannah was a condition 
precedent. It was assumed by both generals that 
Hood would be drawn by necessity into an effort to 
obstruct the movement or to follow it. But the 
problem was soon to take a new shape, the ex- 
treme peril of the Confederacy giving birth to a 
new and desperate effort. First, however, Sher- 
man had to dispose of some subordinate matters. 

In whatever direction he might make his next 
movement from Atlanta, that place must be made 
a fortified depot, in which supplies could be ac- 
cumulated as was done at Nashville and Chatta- 
nooga, making the army secure as to its rations in 
any temporary break the enemy might make in the 
railroad. This involved two things : First, the ex- 
tent of the fortifications must be so reduced that 
a comparatively small garrison would make it safe 
from a coup dc main; and, second, that he should 
not have to feed a resident population who would 
be shut off from trade and manufactures. The 
first was put into the hands of Captain Poe, the 
chief engineer. The second was met by sending 
the civilians beyond the lines or to the rear, ac- 
cording to their preferences. The stern military 
necessity for the last was regretted, and the exe- 
cution of it was made as tolerable for the families 
as possible. Could Sherman have foreseen that 
his adversary would soon make it feasible for him 
to discard any base in northern Georgia, the toil 
of his troops upon the new intrenchments and the 
discomfort of the Atlanta people would both have 
been spared. 

The changes which he made a month before in 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 2, p. 412. 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 229 

the commanders of the Army of the Tennessee 
and the Twentieth Corps had not been a pleasant 
task for him, but they showed his capacity to de- 
cide such questions firmly, according to his view 
of the requirements of the public service, ignoring 
his own predilections and the personal annoyance 
which might incidentally come to himself. While 
he thought that General Logan lacked the intel- 
lectual breadth and reliable judgment necessary for 
an independent command, he fully appreciated the 
dashing soldierly qualities which had made Logan 
a brilliant division and corps commander, and was 
willing to trust him as McPherson's successor. 
He knew that Logan and Blair were antipathetic 
in character, and were bad yoke-fellows ; but he 
would still have given Logan the command but 
for the vehement remonstrance and protest of Gen- 
eral Thomas, whom Logan had seriously offended 
before the opening of the campaign.* Hooker, 
as the senior corps commander in the whole army, 
was in the order of rank, but his vanity and queru- 
lousness made him a dif^cult subordinate and a 
mischief-maker. After canvassing with Thomas 
the major generals seriatim. General Howard was 
chosen as best combining the experience and abil- 
ity required, with the personal qualities which make 
an officer reliable and cheerful in co-operation and 
subordination.! It was probable that Hooker 
would ask to be relieved from service in the army, 
and, when he did so, the appointment of General 
Slocum, as commandant of the corps, who had 
violently quarreled with him when formerly his 
subordinate, was in the nature of a severe retort. 
As early as the 6th of September General For- 

* See p. 332. 

f To understand Hooker's characteristics it is only necessary 
to read his letters to the War Department and to Senators Wilson, 
Wade, and Chandler — e. g., O. R., xxxii, pt. 2, pp. 467^469 ; Id., 
xlv, pt. 2, pp. 109, 112, 246, 283. 



230 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



rest had ofifered to make a raid upon Sherman's 
railways and posts in Middle Tennessee, taking 
four thousand cavalry and six guns.* His pro- 
posal was gladly accepted, but his outfit was not 
ready till the 20th, by which time Wheeler joined 
him at Tuscumbia, in northwest Alabama, with a 
mere remnant of the force with which he had left 
Atlanta on the expedition which had proved so 
much more harmful to Hood than to Sherman. 
Wheeler was ordered back to Georgia, and Hood 
moved his army across to Palmetto, near the Chat- 
tahoochee, about the same distance from Atlanta, 
but where he hoped to give Sherman cause for 
uneasiness as to his railway to Chattanooga, while 
Forrest was making mischief in Middle Tennessee. 

Sherman rated the danger from Forrest far 
above that from other Confederate raiders, and 
when news came that the daring cavalryman was 
over the river, he sent a division of the Fourth 
Corps to Chattanooga and one of the Fifteenth 
Corps to Rome to co-operate with General Rous- 
seau, who was in command at Nashville. General 
Thomas himself was sent to Chattanooga on the 
29th of September, and two or three days later to 
Nashville. Forrest was checked by Rousseau at 
Pulaski after he had burned a number of trestle 
bridges on the Decatur road, but no damage was 
done the direct line between Nashville and Chat- 
tanooga. General Schofield had gone northward 
to look after the affairs of his department and take 
a short leave of absence. For the time, therefore, 
the Army of the Ohio was in command of Scho- 
field's next in rank. General Cox. 

From the 27th onward there had been growing 
rumors of Hood's crossing the Chattahoochee 
below Campbelltown, and on the date named Sher- 
man had sent to Washington a Macon newspaper 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 2, pp. 818, 859. 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 



231 



giving a report of a speech there by Mr. Davis on 
the 22d. Sherman was now on the alert for a 
movement toward Tennessee, which was foreshad- 
owed, and on the 30th, in giving Thomas informa- 
tion of Hood's crossing the Chattahoochee, he 
added that if the latter moved his whole force to 
Blue Mountain, Ala., " I will take advantage of his 
opening to me all of Georgia." * His mind re- 
verted to the march to the sea as if drawn to it 
by a lodestone. He instinctively felt that great 
results lay that way. The next day, in giving to 
Generals Howard and Cox intimations of the work 
before them, in confidential notes he said that, 
while he should turn upon Hood if he aimed at 
the railroad south of Kingston, on the other hand, 
if Hood tried to get into Tennessee through Ala- 
bama, he might send back Thomas's men from 
Kingston and above, destroy Atlanta, and make 
for Savannah or Charleston. " We could make 
Georgia a break in the Confederacy by ruining 
both east and west roads, and not run against a 
single fort till we got to the seashore and in commu- 
nication with our ships."! The prior reduction of 
Savannah no longer seemed to him absolutely 
necessary. A few hours before he had given one 
of these subordinates warning to be ready for 
" some quick countermoves east and southeast," 
adding that these would " make Hood recall the 
whole or part of his army." J 

The plan needed the assent of General Grant, 
and Sherman briefly laid it before him on the ist 
of October, urging that " we can not remain on 
the defensive." To Thomas he repeated the sub- 
stance of this, with his belief that " Hood would 
be puzzled and would follow me, or, if he entered 
Tennessee, he could make no permanent stay." * 



* O. R., xxxix, pt. 2, p. 532. + Id., pt. 3, p. 6. 

X Id., pt. 2, p. 540. * Id., pt. 3, pp. I, 13. 

16 



232 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Halleck discussed the subject in a long letter to 
Grant on the 2d, strongly urging the movement 
toward southern Alabama instead of Savannah. It 
was to this that Grant answered, in the words al- 
ready quoted, that Mobile had been assumed to 
be the ultimate aim after Atlanta should be taken ; 
but he now saw very strong reasons for thinking 
Sherman's plan the better one, as it certainly was 
the bolder, and he thought Savannah might be 
taken by troops under General Foster on the South 
Carolina coast, re-enforced by a corps from the 
Potomac army, but he reserved decision till he 
could visit Washington for consultation. He 
thought that " whichever way Sherman moves he 
will undoubtedly encounter Hood's army."* The 
discussion is a fine example of clear thinking and 
of noble, patriotic aims. 

But Hood interrupted the discussion. At the 
visit of President Davis to the camp at Palmetto 
on the 25th and 26th of September, Hood's plan 
of crossing the Chattahoochee and operating 
against Sherman's communications had been ap- 
proved, but it was followed by an order making both 
his and General Taylor's department in Alabama 
and Mississippi subordinate to General Beaure- , 
gard. In his outline of plan Hood provided for 
the contingency of Sherman's marching in the 
other direction by saying that in that case " I shall 
follow upon his rear." f He crossed the river on 
the 1st of October, was at Flint Hill Church, five 
or six miles west of Powder Springs, the next 
night, and on the 3d sent forward Stewart's corps 
with the cavalry toward Ackworth, on the rail- 
road. After making a temporary break in the rail- 
road and capturing a few prisoners. Stewart on the 
5th rejoined Hood near Lost Mountain. 

Sherman had warned his garrisons at AUa- 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 63. f Advance and Retreat, p. 253. 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 233 

toona and Rome of Hood's being in motion, and 
had instructed them to concentrate if either posi- 
tion were attacked. On the 3d the Twentieth 
Corps was made the garrison of Atlanta and of 
the fortifications at the Cnattahoochee bridge, and 
the rest of the forces in hand were directed to 
march northward, provided with ten days' rations. 
A severe storm had set in, and the streams were 
up, the Chattahoochee sweUing with a freshet. 
This retarded movements, and Sherman directed 
the Army of the Ohio not to break camp till the 
4th, and then to unite with the rest of the forces at 
Kennesaw Mountain on the following evening. 
He was himself at Kennesaw early in the afternoon 
of the 5th, and was witness of the distant battle 
at Allatoona, where French's division was attack- 
ing the fort. General Corse had followed his in- 
structions by going in person from Rome with one 
of his brigades by rail to the assistance of Colonel 
Tourtelotte, another being ordered to follow. The 
re-enforced garrison beat off the Confederates after 
a brilliant and stubborn fight, and Hood reassem- 
bled his army on the 6th near Dallas. The com- 
bat at Allatoona had cost him over two hundred 
and thirty in killed, four hundred prisoners, and a 
large proportionate list of wounded. The casual- 
ties of the defenders were seven hundred and five 
in killed and wounded. 

On the 6th Sherman sent the Twenty-third 
Corps on a reconnoissance in force to the west- 
ward, and learned from it the actual position of 
Hood's army. He watched the movement and its 
signals of smoke from the top of Pine Mountain, 
and realized how perfectly Johnston had watched 
him from that station four months before. Strong 
details of woodsmen got out ties for the railway 
repairs. Hood was moving westward, and Sher- 
man sent Corse back with his division to hold 
Rome, and waited, intensely observant, and in- 



234 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



wardly wishing that his opponent would commit 
himself to the movement which he had said would 
leave him free to put into execution his own far- 
reaching plan. The writer recalls with keen pleas- 
ure a visit from the commander at Allatoona, when, 
in conversation before the evening camp fire, the 
general, with open heart and genial frankness, 
talked of the great prospects of gain to the coun- 
try's cause the situation was opening. 

Hood had not accomplished what he had hoped 
for, since Sherman held fast to Atlanta, and was 
now at Allatoona ready to meet him either at Rome 
or elsewhere. The freshets had done more dam- 
age to the railway than the Confederates, for the 
bridge at Resaca was partly carried away, that at 
the Chattahoochee was damaged, and half a dozen 
smaller ones were washed out. Colonel Wright 
Avith his construction corps were busy as nailers 
mending the breaks. Sherman saw that Hood did 
not want a battle, and the wide scattering of an- 
noying raids looked like resort to guerrilla war- 
fare, without fixed bases anywhere. As he tele- 
graphed Grant, " The whole batch of devils are 
turned loose, without home or habitation," and he 
renewed his proposal to strike out for the sea.* 
On the loth of October he heard from Rome that 
Hood was preparing to cross the Coosa a dozen 
miles below, and, while waiting for Grant's de- 
cision, he pushed his whole army in that direction. 

Hood tells us himself that the rest of his cam- 
paign was an afterthought, into which he was led 
by the apparent opportunities. His professed in- 
tention had been to offer a decisive battle to Sher- 
man when, as he hoped, the latter's forces would 
be scattered by the necessities of covering the rail- 
way lines. Thus the raid on Allatoona led to one 
on Resaca, and disappointment in this led to the 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 162. 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 235 

final and fatal move westward to the border of Mis- 
sissippi, hopelessly abandoning his original purpose 
of keeping where'he could hang on Sherman's rear 
if he turned toward the coast.* The unfitness of 
his army to cope with Sherman was acknowledged, 
and he was simply leading a dance that looked 
merry enough for the moment, but in which Sher- 
man was to give new point to the proverb that 
" He laughs best who laughs last." 

A strong reconnoissance on the 13th from 
Rome down the Coosa had proved that Hood had 
gone north in the narrow Chattooga Valley west of 
the Oostanaula River, which was also on the ram- 
page, and Sherman, sticking to his interior line of 
railway communication, sped the bulk of his force 
toward Chattanooga. On the 12th Hood in per- 
son with Lee's corps had appeared before Resaca 
and demanded its surrender ; but when Colonel 
Weaver defied him. he did not assault, but moved 
on to Dalton, where he scared a small garrison 
into surrender, while at Tilton, Colonel Archer, 
with two hundred men in a blockhouse, resisted 
and delayed him for several hours, till the wooden 
fort was knocked to pieces by a cannonade. But 
Sherman was now upon his heels, and Schofield, 
on his way back to the army, was at Chattanooga, 
where, at Thomas's request, he took command of 
the troops in that vicinity and blocked Hood's fur- 
ther progress northward. The latter now doubled 
the range of Taylor's ridge by the north end, and 
hurried back to Gaylesville, Ala., and thence to 
Gadsden, where he had left his wagons and most 
of his artillery in the last rapid expedition. Sher- 
man cut out the timber blockade which Hood had 
left in Snake Creek Gap, followed through that de- 
file, and pursued in two columns, one by the Chat- 
tooga Valley, in which Hood had marched, and 

* Advance and Retreat, pp. 253, 258. 



236 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



the other in the valley next east of it. On the 
20th Hood was at Gadsden consulting with Beau- 
regard, and Sherman at Gaylesville, eagerly trying 
to determine whether the time had fully come for 
him to put his plan in execution. 

In Hood's conference with Beauregard at Gads- 
den it was arranged that Forrest, who was in West 
Tennessee gathering supplies and conscripts, 
should, after completing that task, cross the Ten- 
nessee, join Hood in the middle part of the State, 
and then come under the orders of the latter. 
Hood was to cross the Tennessee River at Gun- 
tersville and carry the Avar northward. It was as- 
sumed that this would be followed by the evacua- 
tion of Decatur by the National troops, and Tus- 
cumbia would become Hood's depot of supplies, 
using the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to 
Decatur or beyond.* But before leaving Gadsden 
on the 22d of October, Hood made out his orders 
for his troops to march by Blountsville to Ole- 
ander on the way to Decatur, leaving the Gunters- 
ville road at Bennettsville, a day's march out.f 
He thus deliberately gave Beauregard the slip, 
and, when the latter hurried after him to Decatur, 
it was too late to resume the original plan. Beau- 
regard swallowed his wrath as best he could. 
Hood was rebuffed by a stubborn garrison at De- 
catur, and marched away to Tuscumbia, where the 
railroad approaches the Tennessee River below 
Muscle Shoals. Reaching there on the 30th, he 
promptly laid a pontoon bridge at Florence, and 
gave orders to cross the river and begin the ad- 
vance on the 5th of November.;}: But the news 
he got before that day seems to have paralyzed him 
for nearly three wrecks. 

Sherman was resolved that if Hood crossed 
at Guntersville he would follow, and, by concen- 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 810, 815, 837, 845, 853. 
f Id., p. 841. t Id., pp. 880, 881. 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 237 

trating Thomas's forces on the north, inclose and 
destroy his adversary. To do this would leave 
fewest contingencies in his subsequent campaign, 
and he strongly expressed his wish that Hood 
would enter Tennessee by this route. He jocu- 
larly told his subordinates to *' invite him in." * 
Hood instinctively shunned the danger, even at 
the cost of breaking up without permission a plan 
deliberately arranged with Beauregard. On the 
day that the Confederate generals were in consulta- 
tion at Gadsden Thomas telegraphed to Halleck, 
" I feel confident that I can defend the line of the 
Tennessee with the force General Sherman pro- 
poses to leave with me." f This included the 
Fourth Corps, besides the troops already in the 
State, with about five thousand of Sherman's con- 
valescents, the recruits arriving, and two divisions 
under A. J. Smith coming from Missouri. A few 
days later Sherman determined to send back the 
Twenty-third Corps also, and Thomas then felt 
that he had " men enough to ruin " his adversary. J 
Grant had consistently supported Sherman's 
plan, but on the nth of October he was obliged 
to inform Sherman that an expedition by sea to 
take Savannah could not be organized. The dif- 
ficulties seemed to multiply, and he found doubts 
recurring as to Thomas's ability to prevent Hood 
from going north.* Sherman's courage rose with 
the danger, and he strongly reviewed the situa- 
tion. He still thought Hood would have to follow 
him, and with characteristic point said : " Instead 
of being on the defensive, I would be on the of- 
fensive ; instead of guessing at what he means to 
do, he would have to guess at my plans. The dif- 
ference in war is full twenty-live per cent." Grant 
yielded, saying, " If you are satisfied the trip to 
the seacoast can be made, holding the line of the 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 311, 333. f Id., p. 389. 
X Id., p. 75G. * Id., p. 202. 



238 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Tennessee firmly, you may make it, destroying all 
the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga as 
you may think best." * As he thought upon it, 
Grant's strong military judgment went more de- 
cidedly with Sherman. On the 12th he tele- 
graphed : " On reflection, I think better of your 
proposition. It would be much better to go south 
than to be forced to come north." The President 
and Mr. Stanton felt " much solicitude," and that 
" a misstep by General Sherman might be fatal 
to his army." But Grant replied to them, " On 
mature reflection, I believe Sherman's proposition 
is the best that can be adopted," and the same day 
he directed Halleck to provide vessels and sup- 
plies to meet Sherman on the Georgia coast.f 

For a few days after the 22d of October Sher- 
man was uncertain whether Hood would cross the 
Tennessee at Guntersville, but his quartermaster, 
Colonel Easton, was crowding the capacity of the 
railroad to get affairs ready for either contingency. 
Sherman got from Thomas detailed statements of 
the force he had, of the new troops arriving, and 
of his estimated wants. In the evening of the 25th 
Thomas, in sending a long and very detailed state- 
ment, added : " With Fourth Corps and enough of 
the new regiments to make up an active force of 
twenty-five thousand infantry, I will undertake to 
clear the rebels out of West Tennessee, and draw 
ofif enough of Hood's army from you to enable 
you to move anywhere in Georgia or Alabama you 
may wish without difficulty." J 

With Thomas thus confident of his ability to 
bear his end of the burden, Sherman felt that his 
way was clear, though he still reminded Thomas 
that defending the line of the Tennessee was 
Grant's condition in assenting. Telegraphing to 
Halleck on the 27th, he said he would wait yet a 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, p. 202. f Id., pp. 222, 239. 

t Id., p. 433- 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 



239 



few days to hear what head Hood might make 
about Decatur, " and may yet turn to Tennessee ; 
but it would be a great pity to take a step back- 
ward. I think it would be better even to let him 
ravage the State of Tennessee, provided he does 
not gobble up too many of our troops. General 
Thomas is well alive to the occasion, and better 
suited to the emergency than any man I have. He 
should be strengthened as much as possible, as the 
successful defense of Tennessee should not be left 
to chance." * 

In the anxiety to give Thomas even more than 
the latter thought necessary Sherman now deter- 
mined to send back the Twenty-third Corps also ; 
but this was done upon considerations presented 
by Schofield, and not by Thomas, though the latter 
was very glad of the increase of force, especially 
after he learned that there must be some delay in 
the arrival of the re-enforcement under A. J. Smith. 
Sherman now confidentially informed Colonel Beck- 
with,f his commissary, that he might reduce his 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 448, 461. 

+ Sherman to Beckwith, id., p. 477. Before deciding to send 
Schofield back, the computation by which Sherman expected to 
make up his army was the following, as shown by the official re- 
turns for the last of October. (Id., pp. 555, 563, 569, 573) : 

^ . r , r^ ^ 1 J \ Fourteenth Corps, ii,Q'i3 

From Army of theCumberland -j Twentieth Corps, 13,843 

25,796 

.,, T, ^ Fifteenth Corps, 15,721 

From Army of the Tennessee . Seventeenth Coi-ps. 9,138 

24,859 

From Army of the Ohio (Cooper's and Cox's divisions), 10,788 

Total infantry and artillery 61,443 

Cavalry (Kilpatrick's division) 3>928 

Total 65,371 

Deduct those sent back, fit for garrison duty (O. R., 

xxxix, pt. 3, p. 40S) 5,000 

Leaving the marching column 60,371 

But when Schofield's 10,788 (infantry and artillery) were taken 
out, the aggregate was a little under 50,000, as Sherman said to 



240 GENERAL GHERMAN. 

estimates for supplies to enough for fifty thousand 
men, though the unexpectedly rapid return of fur- 
loughed men crowding forward enthusiastically on 
the rumor of great things to happen raised the 
force again nearly to the former point. He re- 
iterated to Thomas the strong advice to abandon 
minor points, concentrate his troops about Colum- 
bia, get together the largest possible army from 
his department, and take the field in person.* 
Once more for a moment Grant hesitated to say 
the word " Go," but, upon Sherman giving him 
another succinct analysis of the situation, he came 
back to his original sound judgment and said, 
" Go as you propose." f 

Finally, on the 12th of November, the wires 
were cut, and the march to the sea was begun be- 
yond the possibility of a recall. The conception 
of the plan was hardly grander than the faith which 
had clung to it for two months in the face of op- 
position, of doubt, and of discouragement from 
quarters worthy of respect. In arguing the mat- 
ter with the authorities, civil and military, he care- 
fully confined himself to the first part of his task — 
that of reaching the Atlantic and establishing a 
base upon the coast. To his immediate subordi- 
nates, however, he opened also the final campaign 
of the march northward upon Columbia and 
Raleigh, and the decisive results which it involved. 
Military history is full of proofs that the responsi- 

Colonel Beckwith. The fine eagerness of men absent on their 
" veteran furlough " to join their regiments is shown by the returns, 
which were, for November loth, 59,545 ; for November 30th, 62,- 
204; for December 20tl), 60,598. (O. R., xliv, p. 16.) As com- 
munications were cut on November 12th, the increase in the three 
days from the loth to the I2tli inclusive was that which appears 
in the return for the 30th. Comparing the aggregates of infantry 
and artillery, in which alone the reduction was made by sending 
back Schofield's divisions, the totals were, for November lOth, 
54.584, and for November 30th, 57,141. 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 468, 476, 497, 498. 

f Id., pp. 576, 594. 



CAMPAIGN OF OCTOBER. 24I 

ble commander in the field sees more clearly than 
any spectator the difficulties of his enterprise and 
the obstacles to be overcome. Nothing is more 
common than to have daring plans thus " sicklied 
o'er with the pale cast of thought." The rare 
thing, the signal proof of highest soldierly quality, 
is the steadfast resolution which, weighing all the 
risks, still sees, the prize worth the venture, and 
goes forward without swerving. 

Sherman had based his purpose on sound and 
broad military principles. He must retain the ag- 
gressive. He must not allow his adversary to lead 
him back to Tennessee and begin over again the 
work of the past year. If possible, he must find 
a more decisive return blow for the audacity of 
Hood, providing reasonably for hindering the lat- 
ter from doing fatal mischief meanwhile. All these 
are strictly military considerations, and placing 
himself on the line of communications of Lee's 
army was, by common assent of military experts 
the world over, a masterpiece of strategy. As a 
subordinate consideration, he added to all this 
what he rightly called " statesmanship " — the moral 
effect to be produced upon the Confederacy by 
the demonstration of the resistless power of the 
National Government.* 

Leading Southern ofihcers saw clearly that a 
mortal blow had been struck when, with the rail- 
ways of Georgia destroyed behind him, Sherman, 
two months later, was preparing to resume his 
march northward from Savannah, and there was 
no army that could cope with him between Georgia 
and Virginia. General Richard Taylor, son of 
President Zachary Taylor, and brother-in-law of 
Davis, thought " the game was over." f General 
Johnston says that " the Southern cause must have 
appeared hopeless then to all intelligent and dis- 

* O. R., xxxix, pt. 3, pp. 659, 660. 

f Destruction and Reconstruction, p. 218. 



242 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



passionate Southern men." * General Lee, speak- 
ing of his own judgment at the time, said of Sher- 
man's movements, " It was easy to see that unless 
they were interrupted I should be compelled to 
abandon the defense of Richmond." f The view 
of competent critics across the ocean was embodied 
in the editorial statement of the London Times, 
on getting the first news of his start from Atlanta : 
" That it is a most momentous enterprise can not 
be denied. ... It may either make Sherman the 
most famous general of the North, or it may prove 
the ruin of his reputation, his army, and even his 
cause together." J 

* Narrative, p. 372. 

f Letter of July 27, 1868, quoted in Sherman's Memoirs, 2d 
ed., ii, p. 467. 

$ London Times, December 3, 1864. 



CHAPTER XI. 

THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 

The Twentieth Corps being still at Atlanta and 
the Fourteenth about Kingston, the Fifteenth 
Corps began march from Gaylesville for Kings- 
ton, the Seventeenth leaving the same clay for the 
railroad about Marietta. The march was delib- 
erate and easy. The Confederate cavalry hovered 
about the flanks, picking up many foragers and 
making an occasional dash at some unguarded 
wagon. There was nothing to call for more than 
ordinary discipline. There was an. incident which 
is worth mentioning only as bearing on the remark 
that used to be made. " The western army can 
march and fight, but has no discipline." Every 
night an order was sent from division to brigade 
headquarters prescribing the order of march next 
day. On the morning of the 2d of November the 
advance brigade of Leggett's division moved out 
on time, but the brigade which was to follow next 
was not ready. An aid-de-camp notified the com- 
mander to move in five minutes or fall to the rear; 
at the expiration of five minutes the tardy brigade 
was still not ready, and the one which was to have 
formed the rear took its place. On reaching camp 
in the evening, an order was issued relieving the 
commander and returning him to his regiment, 
disbanding the brigade, and assigning the regi- 
ments to one of the other brigades, and directing 
the headquarters' records and furniture to be 
packed in a wagon in the division train. 

243 



244 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



By the 2d of November Colonel Wright with 
fifteen hundred men had repaired the break of 
fifteen miles extending north from Dalton, and the 
road was open for trains from Atlanta to Chatta- 
nooga. On that day Sherman received the tele- 
gram from Grant which closed with " I do not see 
that you can withdraw from where you are to fol- 
low Hood without giving up all we have gained 
in territory. I say, then, go on as you propose." 
Immediately the work began of dismantling At- 
lanta and all posts to the north of it, and shipping 
to Chattanooga garrisons and all munitions and 
property that were not to be carried along in the 
proposed campaign. 

The soldiers now became aware that they were 
about to go upon an expedition, away from all sup- 
port and to an unknown destination. Pay was 
many months in arrears. Men were harrowed by 
letters from their wives, who were without means 
of support in the approaching winter. The pay- 
masters who arrived on the 6th of November were 
welcomed with extravagant joy. The work of 
paying was continued day and night, and was bare- 
ly finished when the last train left for the North. 
The Methodist chaplain of the Thirty-first Illinois 
and the Roman Catholic chaplain of the Seven- 
teenth Wisconsin undertook to carry home the 
pay of their men, and many others availed them- 
selves of the opportunity. They carried a very 
large sum of money in multitudinous small pack- 
ages, and all reached their destination, bringing 
unimagined relief to households in every corner 
of the two States. The presidential election was 
held in camp on the 8th, under provision made for 
it by the States, and was regular and orderly as 
those held at home. The paymasters with all their 
diligence had not yet paid all. Some few of the 
disappointed ones imputed their ill fortune to the 
Government, and in despite voted against Mr. Lin- 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 245 

coin. They were paid in time, and repented sorely 
their impatience. 

The following order was issued to corps and 
division heackiuarters on the 8th of November, but 
was not i)ublished till the JOth: 

Hkauquarters Military Uivisio.m of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, Kin(;ston, Ga., Nov. 8, 1864. 

The general commanding deems it proper, at this time, 
to inform the officers and men of the P'(jurteenth, Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Twentieth Corps that he has organized 
them into an army for a special purpose, well known to the 
War Department and to General Grant. It is sufficient for you 
to know that it involves a departure from our present base, 
and a long and difficult march to a new one. AH the 
chances of war have been considered and provided for, as 
far as human agency can. All he asks of you is to maintain 
that tliscipline, patience, and courage that has characterized 
you in the past ; and he hopes, and through you, to strike a 
blow at our enemy that will have a material effect in pro- 
ducing what we all so much desire — his overthrow. Of all 
things, the most important is that the men, during marches 
and in camp, keep their places, and do not scatter about as 
stragglers and foragers, to be picked up by a hostile people 
in detail. It is also of the utmost importance that our 
wagons should not be loaded with anything but provisions 
and ammunition. Ail surplus servants, noncombatants, and 
refugees should now go to the rear, and none should be en- 
couraged to encumber us on the march. At some future 
time we will be able to provide for the poor whites and 
blacks who seek to escape the bondage under which they 
are now suffering. With these few sinii)le cautions, he hopes 
to lead you to achievements equal in importance to those ot 
the past. 

pjy order of Major-General W. T. SHERMAN. 

L. M. Dayton, Aid-de-canip. 

On the loth General Corse, who still com- 
manded the post at Rome, evacuated and moved 
to his position on the railroad. He destroyed all 
foundries, machine shops, depots, and such, and 
ordered the provost marshal and officers of the 
rear guard to exercise the severest and most sum- 
mary means to prevent disorder, and not hesitate 



246 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

to shoot any one caught firing private houses 
or pillaging helpless and inoffensive families. 
General Thomas sent a dispatch on the 12th, in 
which he said : " I have no fears that Beauregard 
can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to 
follow you I will follow him as far as possible. 
If he does not follow you, I will then thoroughly 
organize my troops, and believe I shall have men 
enough to ruin him unless he gets out of the way 
very rapidly." Sherman answered, " Dispatch re- 
ceived ; all right," and then the telegraph wire was 
severed. All communication between him and the 
North ceased utterly. No Southern newspaper 
that went North made mention of him. He was 
not heard of again for a month. He was as if the 
earth had opened and swallowed his command. 

The four corps strung along the railroad began 
at once the work of destruction. The bridge at 
Allatoona was taken apart in sections and shipped 
North ; the road from the Etowah to Allatoona 
was thoroughly wrecked. Road ties were piled 
up and burned ; rails laid across the burning piles 
were heated in the middle, were seized at both 
ends, and bent till the ends lapped ; some, instead, 
were bent spirally. By the 14th the work was 
done, and the general and his army were assem- 
bled at Allatoona. 

The army comprised four corps — the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth. The 
Fifteenth and Seventeenth, commanded by Gen- 
erals Osterhaus and Blair, constituted the Army of 
the Tennessee, or the right wing, which was com- 
manded by General O. O. Howard. The Four- 
teenth (General Jef¥ C. Davis) and Twentieth (Gen- 
eral Williams) formed the Army of Georgia, or 
the left wing, commanded by General H. W. Slo- 
cum. All invalids, all superfluous employees, all 
personal baggage, and all artillery except one bat- 
tery to each division, had been sent to the rear. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 



247 



The vacancy left by the invahds was fully made up 
by men returning- from furlough and by recruits. 
The cavalry, one division, comprising two brigades, 
was commanded by General Judson Kilpatrick. 
He was daring, enterprising, untiring ; but he was 
a man of questionable personal habits, and his reck- 
lessness or negligence brought upon him some dis- 
astrous surprises. The Northern army was an ath- 
lete stripped for contest. 

Before starting on the march. General Sherman 
published the following order. In connection with 
it are given here two letters : one the well-known 
letter to the mayor of Atlanta, the other to a lady 
whom Sherman knew when, as a young lieutenant, 
he was on duty at Charleston, S. C. The three to- 
gether present a full explanation of his conception 
of the mode of carrying on war and concluding 
peace : 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, Kingston, Ga., No7>. g, 1S64. 

1. For the purpose of military operations the army is 
divided into two wings, viz : 

The right wing, Major-General O. O. Howard command- 
ing, composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; the 
left wing, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, com- 
posed of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps. 

2. The habitual order of march will be, whenever prac- 
ticable, by four roads as nearly parallel as possible, and con- 
verging at points hereinafter to be indicated in orders. The 
cavalry, Brigndier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will re- 
ceive special orders from the commander in chief. 

3. There will be no general train of supplies, but each 
corps will have its ammunition train and provision train, 
distributed habitually as follows : Behind each regiment 
should follow one wagon and one ambulance; behind each 
brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wag- 
ons, provision wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger 
each corps commander should change his order of march 
by having his advance and rear brigades unencumbered by 
wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at 7 
A. M., and make about fifteen miles per day unless otherwise 
fixed in orders. 

17 



248 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



4. The army will forage liberally on the country during 
the march. To this end each brigade commander will or- 
ganize a good and sufficient foraging party under the com- 
mand of one or more discreet officers, who will gather, near 
the route of travel, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any 
kind, vegetables, corn meal, or whatever is needed by the 
command, aiming at all times to keep in the wagons at 
least ten days' provisions for his command and three days' 
forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhab- 
itants or commit any trespass, but during the halt or camp 
they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other 
vegetables, and to drive in stock in sight of their camp. To 
regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering 
of provisions and forage at any distance from the roads 
traveled. 

5. To corps commanders alone is intrusted the power to de- 
stroy mills, houses, cotton gins, etc., and for them this general 
principle is laid down. In districts and neighborhoods where 
the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property 
should be permitted ; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers 
molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges or 
obstruct roads or otherwise manifest local hostility, the army 
commanders should order and enforce a devastation more 
or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility. 

6. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the 
inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely 
and without limit ; discriminating, however, between the rich, 
who are usually hostile, and the poor and industrious, usually 
neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or 
horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve 
as pack mules for the regiments or brigades. In all forag- 
ing, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from 
abusive or threatening language, and may, where the officer 
in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the 
facts, but no receipts, and they will endeavor to leave with 
each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance. 

7. Negroes who are able-bodied and can be of service to 
the several columns may be taken along ; but each army 
commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is 
a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those 
who bear arms. 

8. The organization at once of a good pioneer battalion 
for each army corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should 
be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance 
guard, repair roads, and double them, if possil^le, so that the 
colunnis will not be delayed after reaching bad places. 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 



249 



Also, army commanders should practice the habit of giving 
the artillery and wagons the road, marching their troops on 
the side, and instruct their troops to assist the wagons at 
steep hills or bad crossings of streams. 

9. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, will assign to 
each wing of the army a pontoon train, fully equipped and 
organized, and the commanders thereof will see to their 
being properly protected at all times. 

Bj order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

L. M. Dayton, Aid-dc-camp. 

Headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, 
In the Field, Atlanta, Sept. 12, 1S64. 

James M. Calhoun, Mayor, E. E. Rawson, and S. C. 
Wells, representing City Council of Atlanta. 
Gentlemen: I have your letter of the nth, in the 
nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the 
inhabitants from Atlanta, i have read it carefully, and give 
full credit to your statements of the distress that will be 
occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order simply 
because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities 
of the case, but to prepare tor the future struggles in which 
millions, yea hundreds of millions, of good people outside ot 
Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not 
only in Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must 
stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored 
country. To stop the war we must defeat the rebel armies 
that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all ' 
must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must 
prepare the way to reach them in their recesses provided 
with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish 
our purpose. Now I know the vindictive nature of our 
enemy, and that we may have many years of military opera- 
tions from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and pru- 
dent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for a warlike 
purpose is inconsistent with its character as a home for fami- 
lies. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agricul- 
ture here for the maintenance of families, and, sooner or 
later, want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go 
now when all the arrangements are completed for the trans- 
fer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending ar- 
mies will renew the scenes of the past month } Of course, I 
do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, btit you 
do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I 
can not discuss this subject with you fairly, because I can 
not impart to you what I propose to do ; but I assert that 



250 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go 
away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make 
their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as pos- 
sible. You can not qualify war in harsher terms than 1 will. 
War is cruelty, and you can not refine it, and those who 
brought war on our country deserve all the curses and male- 
dictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in 
making this war, and I know that I will make more sacri- 
fices than any of you to-day to secure peace. But you can 
not have peace and a division of our country. If the United 
States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go 
on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The 
United States does and must assert its authority wherever 
it has power; ifjt relaxes one bit to pressure it is gone, 
and I know that such is not the National feeling. This 
feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to 
that of Union. Once admit the Union, once acknowledge 
the authority of the National Government, and instead of de- 
voting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses 
of war, I and this army at once become your protectors and 
supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what 
quarter it may. I know that a few individuals can not resist 
a torrent of error and passion such as swept the South into 
rebellion, but you can point out, so we may know, those who 
desire a government and those who insist on war and its 
desolation. 

You might as well appeal against the thunderstorms as 
against the terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, 
and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope to live in 
peace and quiet at home is to stop this war, which can 
alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is per- 
petuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your 
horses, or your land, or anything you have ; but we do want 
and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United 
States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction 
of your improvements we can not help it. You have here- 
tofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by 
falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek the truth 
in other quarters the better for you. 

I repeat, then, that by the original compact of Govern- 
ment the United States held certain rights in Georgia which 
have never been relinquished, and never will be ; that the 
South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom- 
houses, etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and 
before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I my- 
self have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mis- 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 25 1 

sissippi hundreds and thousands of women and children flee- 
ing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with 
bleeding feet. In Memphis, V'icksburg, and Mississippi we 
fed thousands upon thousands of families of rebel soldiers 
lett on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now 
that war comes home to you, you feel very different ; you 
deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent 
carloads of soldiers and ammunition and molded shells and 
shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and deso- 
late the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, 
who only asked to live in peace at their old homes and under 
the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons 
are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached 
through Union and war, and 1 will conduct war purely with 
a view to perfect and early success. 

But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may 
call on me for anything. Then I will share with you the last 
cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and fami- 
lies against danger from every quarter. Now you must go, 
and take with you the old and feeble ; feed and nurse them, 
and build for them, in more quiet places, proper habitations 
to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of 
men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more 
to settle on your old homes at Atlanta. 
Yours in haste, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-Gcncral. 

Headquarters Military Divisio:i of the Mississippi, 

In the Field, near Marietta, Ga., June ^o 1S64. 
Mrs. Annie Oilman Bower, Baltimore, Md. 

Dear Madam: Your welcome letter of June i8th came 
to me amid the sound ot battle, and, as you say, little did I 
dream when I knew you, playing as a schoolgirl on Sullivan's 
Island beach, that I should control a vast army pointing, 
like the swarm of Alaric, toward the plains of the South. 
Why, oh why, is this .'' If I know my own heart, it beats as 
warmly as ever toward those kind and generous families that 
greeted us with such warm hospitality in days long past 
but still present in memoiy ; and to-day were Frank and 
Mrs. Porcher, or Eliza Oilman, or Mary Lamb, or Mar- 
garet Blake, the Barksdales, the Ouarles, the Poyas, indeed, 
any and all our cherished circle, their children, or even their 
children's children, to come to me as of old, the stern feelings 
of duty would melt as snow before a genial sun, and I be- 
lieve 1 would strip my own children that they might be shel- 
tered. And yet they call me barbarian, vandal, a monster, 



252 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

and all the epithets that language can invent that are sig- 
nificant of malignity and hate ! All 1 pretend to say, on 
earth as in heaven, man must submit to some arbiter. He 
must not throw off his allegiance to his Government or his 
God without just reason or cause. The South has no cause, 
not even a pretext. Indeed, l)y her unjustifiable course siie 
has thrown away the proud history of the i)ast, and laid open 
her fair country to the tread of devastating war. She has 
l)antered and l)ulHed us to the conflict. Had we declined 
battle America would have sunk back coward and craven, 
meriting the contempt of all mankind. As a nation we were 
forced to accept battle, and that once begun it has gone on 
till the war has assumed proportions at which we, in the 
hurly-burly, sometimes stand aghast. I would not subjugate 
the South in the sense so offensively assumed, but 1 would 
make every citizen of the land obey the common law, sul)mit 
to the same that we do — no more, no less — our ecjuals and 
not our su]:)eriors. I know and you know that there were 
young men in our day, men no longer young but who control 
their fellows, who assumed to the gentlemen of the South a 
superiority of courage, and boastingly defied us of Northern 
birth to arms. God only knows how reluctantly we accepted 
the issue, but once the issue joined, like in other ages, the 
Northern races, though slow to anger, once aroused are more 
terrible than the more inflammable of the South. Even yet 
my heart bleeds when I see the carnage of battle, the deso- 
lation of homes, the bitter anguish of families ; but the very 
moment the men of the South say that instead of appealing 
to war they should have appealed to reason, to our Congress, 
to our courts, to religion, and to the experience of history, then 
will I say peace, peace. Go back to your points of error and 
resume your places as American citizens, with all their |)roud 
heritages. Whether I shall live to see this period is problem- 
atical, but you may, and may tell your mother and sisters 
that I never forget one kind look or greeting, or ever wished 
to efface its remembrance, but putting on the armor of war I 
did it that our common country should not perish in infamy 
and disgrace. I am married — have a wife and six childn n 
living in Lancaster, Ohio. My career has been an eventful 
one, but I hope when the clouds of anger and passion an; 
dispersed, and truth emerges bright anci clear, you and all 
who knew me in early years will not blush that we were once 
close friends. Tell Eliza for me that I hope she will live to 
realize that the doctrine of secession is as monstrous in our 
civil code as disobedience was in the divine law. And 
should the fortunes of war ever bring your mother or sisters 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 253 

or any of llic:; old clique under the shelter of my authority, I 
do not believe they will have cause to regret it. 

Give my love to your children, and the assurance of my 
respect to your honored husband. Truly, 

W. T. Sherman, Major-Ccncral. 

These together repeat the ancient maxim, De- 
bellare snpcrbus, parccrc victis — relentless war was 
against the armed foe, grace and mercy to the con- 
quered who submit. 

On the 14th Colonel i'oe, with a working party, 
destroyed the railroad depot, machine shops, and 
other structures that would aid the operations of 
war, leaving untouched dwellings, stores, churches, 
municipal buildings. Next day the army moved. 
The numijcr of men in the command, commis- 
sioned officers and enlisted, on detail or present for 
duty was : In the Army of the Tennessee, 28,365 ; in 
the Army of Georgia, 28,708 ; in Kilpatrick's com- 
mand, including a four-gun battery, 5,130; total, 
62,204. These numbers are taken from the report 
of the 30th of November. 

The troops took the road, ignorant whither 
they were going, but buoyant, confident, expect- 
ing to reach the sea at some point, sure of dimin- 
ishing the territory from which Lee could draw 
recruits and supplies, and some sanguine of reach- 
ing Richmond in time to take part in an engage- 
ment which would end the war. The Army of 
Georgia moved to the east, apparently striking for 
Augusta ; the Army of the Tennessee to the south, 
in the direction of Macon, with its right flank cov- 
ered by Kilpatrick. 

The Fourteenth Corps thoroughly destroyed 
the railroad at Madison, and a division was sent 
beyond to the Oconee to destroy the "railroad 
bridge there. Turning south, all reached Milledge- 
ville on the 23d. The Fourteenth Corps moved 
eastward as far as Covington, and thence south- 
east to Milledgeville, arriving there on the 23d. 



254 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



The Seventeenth Corps marched sonthcast by 
Jonesboro and McDonough to the crossinjj^ of the 
Ockmuli^ee, at Planter's J'^actory, and the I'^ifteenth, 
taking" at iirst a more southerly course, changed 
direction so as to join the Seventeenth at the cross- 
ing. Kilpatrick, covering the right flank of the 
army, continued south to Lovejoy's, where a por- 
tion of Wheeler's conmiand held the old works. 
Dividing his force into two columns, one dis- 
mounted, charged upon and carried the works, 
while the other jjursued the artillery and captured 
two guns, lie then turned and reached I'lanter's 
Factory, while the infantry were still crossing. 'Jlie 
farther bank of the river was high, steep, and of 
clay, made slippery by rain. The troops had to 
help the mules to get wagons up the ascent. The 
Seventeenth Corps reached Cordon, on the Macon 
and Savannah Railroad, twelve miles south of Mil- 
ledgeville. Part of the Fifteenth Corps was guard- 
ing and aiding trains over the im])assable road, 
while C. R. Woods's division moved to guard the 
rear toward Macon. Hardee had been relieved 
of the command of a corps in 1 Food's army and ap- 
pointed to command a department comprising 
Savannah and adjacent territory in Georgia and 
South Carolina. When Sherman left Atlanta the 
whole field of operations in Georgia was added to 
the department. Hardee was in Macon on the 
2ist with Governor IJrown, of Georgia, and learned 
that the only force in his department besides Mc- 
Law's division, which was the garrison of Savan- 
nah, was Wheeler's cavalry and Smith's division 
of Georgia militia. Feeling sure that Macon was 
not threatened, he ordered Smith to vVugusta, and 
at once returned to Savannah. 

On the 22d Kilpatrick made a dash upon the 
railroad near Macon. Wolcutt's brigade, sent out 
by General Woods to reconnoiter toward Macon, 
pushed back a detachment of Wheeler's cavalry, 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 2; 



33 



and fell back to Griswold. Wolcutt placed his com- 
mand in the edge of the timber, with swampy land 
on each flank, and awaited the advance of Smith's 
division, which approached supported by Wheel- 
er's cavalry. The Confederate infantry advanced in 
three lines, and reached with little loss a ravine or 
depression parallel with Wolcutt's line, and only 
seventy-five yards from it. When the Confederate 
lines appeared cmerj^ing from the hollow, so deadly 
a fire at short range met them that they fell back 
in disorder to shelter. Three times the assault was 
made, and every time Vvith disastrous loss. They 
withdrew, leaving, the reports say, three hundred 
dead on the field. 

Detailed foraging parties brought in abundant 
supplies of corn and fodder for the animals, and 
sv»'eet potatoes, corn meal, bacon, and poultry for 
the men. Fine mules took the place of the jaded 
animals in the teams, and horses were found to 
replenish the cavalry and artillery. Napoleon says, 
in his maxims, there are two ways of maintaining 
an army in the enemy's country — one, by requisi- 
tion on municipal authorities ; the other, by direct 
seizure. In Georgia there was no choice; direct 
seizure was the only resource. But pillaging from 
dwellings was prohibited, and an order prescribed 
death as the penalty for any one convicted by court- 
martial of such offense. A soldier of the first divi- 
sion of the Seventeenth Corps was charged with 
stealing a quilt from a dwelling near Gordon. The 
court-martial found him guilty, and sentenced him 
" to be shot to death by musketry, at such time and 
place as the commanding general may direct." The 
proceedings and findings were approved, but Gen- 
eral Howard commuted the sentence to imprison- 
ment during the war at Drv Tortugas, Fla. The 
prisoner was taken by guards to Tortugas, and re- 
mained imprisoned there until released by order of 
the adjutant general of the army, dated May 27, 1865. 



256 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

The army assembled at Milledgeville and Gor- 
don on the 23d, and resumed the march on the 
24th. The right wing followed the Savannah Rail- 
road, destroymg it on the way. The left wing 
moved by roads north of the railroad, and generally 
parallel to it. The Oconee was swollen, and with a 
rapid current. General H. C. Wayne with a small 
force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery held the 
railroad crossing of the Oconee and fortified it. 
But General Howard succeeded in laying two pon- 
toon bridges, one four miles above and the other 
below, while engaging Wayne in his works, and 
crossed one corps on each bridge. Kilpatrick was 
sent to destroy the important railroad bridge 
over Brier Creek, on the branch road to Augusta. 
Wheeler, with the Confederate cavalry, a large 
body, started in pursuit, overtook in the night 
Kilpatrick's rear guard of two regiments, ran over 
them, and drove them on to the mam body. Kil- 
patrick was so pushed that he barely set lire to the 
bridge, and had to turn to the south. He was reck- 
less enough to sleep one night in a house distant 
from his camp, having one regiment for guard. 
Wheeler, learning the fact, dashed in the night upon 
the little camp so suddenly that commander and men 
rushed from their sleep, and ran to the woods in 
rout. After this Kilpatrick brought his men, jaded 
and thinned by loss, to the lines of the army. Gen- 
eral Sherman ordered captured horses to be turned 
over to him. After a few days' rest, the cavalry 
set out again to burn the bridge and to fight Wheel- 
er. Coming upon him near Waynesboro, Kil- 
patrick broke his line, put him to retreat, and drove 
him through Waynesboro. Wheeler took position 
beyond and awaited attack. Kilpatrick, coming 
up on the 5th of December, finding that Wheeler's 
line outreached his on both flanks, massed, and 
with a rush broke through Wheeler's center, and 
forced him to retreat. Kilpatrick this time de- 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 257 

stroyed the railroad bridge and smaller bridge over 
Brier Creek. He returned to the route of the 
army, and there was no more fighting till Savannah 
was reached. Kilpatrick had been expected to 
reach Millen in time to release the prisoners of 
war confined there. But his protracted engage- 
ments with Wheeler gave opportunity to the Con- 
federate authorities to remove the ten thousand 
National soldiers confined there to Florence, in 
South Carolina, and when the Seventeenth Corps 
reached Millen, on the 3d of December, the prison 
was empty. 

Up to this date the Confederate authorities 
were uncertain as to Sherman's destination. When 
Augusta seemed to be his objective point. Presi- 
dent Davis sent Bragg thither, and gave him com- 
mand to the coast, including Savannah and Hood. 
When the probability inclined to Savannah, Beau- 
regard's jurisdiction was extended to the Atlan- 
tic, embracing Bragg and Hood, so that his au- 
thority extended from the coast of Georgia to the 
western boundary of Texas. Beauregard insisted 
that Sherman's ultimate design was to Ee-enforce 
Grant before Richmond. He ordered Hood to 
move into Tennessee to make a diversion in relief 
of Lee, and when he learned that A. J. Smith was 
leaving Missouri to report to Thomas, he ordered 
Kirby Smith, who was in command west of the Mis- 
sissippi, to send two divisions to the aid of Hood, or 
else to invade Missouri himself and compel the 
return of A. J. Smith in Missouri. 

The four corps were abreast at Millen, the Fif- 
teenth Corps south of the Ogeechee,the Seventeenth 
north of and near to the river, and the Twentieth 
and Fourteenth four and ten miles to the north, 
presenting a front of twenty miles. From Millen 
onward the two rivers Savannah and Ogeechee ap- 
proach each other, restricting the field for forag- 
ing, and the substitution of rice fields in place of 



258 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



corn and potatoes very largely cut off the supply 
of subsistence. The roads passed at times through 
fragrant pine forest, whose tall trunks stood far 
apart, though the dense foliage far overhead inter- 
laced and shut out the sun. At other times the 
struggle to wade through and get the trains through 
deep and tangled swamps kept weary columns on 
the march till late in the night. On the 5th of De- 
cember the Seventeenth Corps came upon some 
fieldworks thrown up by McLaws's division, but 
abandoned. On the 7th and 8th the roads were 
found obstructed by felled trees. The men who 
did the work were ascertained, and their houses 
were burned by order. On the 8th a newspaper 
was found which gave in one paragraph a brief 
account of Hood's bloody repulse at Franklin, 
and of the loss of thirteen of his general olBcers 
killed or wounded. With the rejoicing over the 
victory was regret at the death of some familiar 
names, especially General Cleburne, commander of 
" Cleburne's Fighting Division." 

On the 9th a torpedo exploded in the road, kill- 
ing a staff officer and his horse. General Sherman 
sent the prisoners to the front with spades to dig 
up any more that might be found. But there were 
no more. In the afternoon, the head of the col- 
umn having advanced into a swamp, found that a 
battery at the exit on the other side commanded 
the road. The troops, diverging from the road to 
right and left, protected from view by the dense 
growth, emerged on the flanks of the works, and 
found them abandoned. Warned by the plashing 
and crackling, the defenders had evacuated and 
taken a waiting train for Savannah. On the loth 
the army was deployed in front of the defenses of 
the city, and on the 12th was in position. 

The sources of a small creek which, flowing 
north, emptied into the Savannah River about three 
miles above the citv. interlaced the head of a still 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 259 

smaller stream, which, flowing south through a 
swamp, formed the Little Ogeechee. The low flat 
of land on each side had been turned into rice 
fields, and a system of embankments kept the water 
in the creek about seven feet, and on the sub- 
merged land about four feet deep. The water sur- 
face varied from two hundred to five hundred yards 
in width, and was crossed only by a few roads, each 
built upon an embankment, and having a bridge 
over the channel of the creek. The shore toward 
Savannah was lined with infantry intrenchments, 
and batteries crowning every rising ground and 
every jutting point swept with cross fire the roads 
and the water surface. The batteries were armed 
with eighty-one siege guns and forty-eight field- 
pieces, and the force that defended this line num- 
bered something over twelve thousand officers and 
men. The besiegers were not in a continuous line, 
but encamped in groves of timber adjoining the 
water, out of view, and with trenches for shelter 
during cannonade. Batteries mounting fifty-six 
guns were placed at convenient points to engage 
the batteries across the water. The Twentieth 
Corps, on the extreme left, threw some troops upon 
the islands in the river. On its right was the Four- 
teenth, then the Seventeenth and Fifteenth, which 
stretched to Kings Bridge over the Ogeechee, 
twelve miles from Savannah. 

Subsistence was nearly exhausted, animals were 
living partly and men almost wholly upon rice. 
The first necessity was to open communication 
with the fleet, which had already been advised of 
Sherman's arrival, and which was supposed to be 
in Ossabaw Sound, the mouth of the Ogeechee. 
The passage down the river was obstructed by Fort 
McAllister on its bank, just below the great bend. 
General Sherman promptly on arriving directed 
General Howard to repair Kings Bridge, which had 
been partially destroyed, and send a division to 



26o GENERAL SHERMAN. 

capture the fort. The repairs were finished by the 
night of the I2th, and General Hazen's division 
marched over at sunrise on the 13th to the right 
bank of the river. 

The fort was an irregular quadrilateral, stand- 
ing upon the river bank. The front and the flanks 
were solid ramparts, armed with heavy guns. The 
gorge was closed by lighter intrenchment, with 
fieldpieces in barbette. The armament was eleven 
siege guns, one ten-inch mortar, and twelve field- 
pieces. The work was surrounded by a ditch, with 
a stout palisade along the middle. The adjoining 
ground had been covered by a forest of live oaks. 
The branches of those near the fort had been cut 
and used in constructing a heavy abattis, while the 
stumps were left standing. The ground was thickly 
planted with torpedoes. The garrison comprised 
over two hundred men, commanded by Major 
Anderson. 

Hazen formed his three brigades in three sepa- 
rate lines," facing respectively the rear and the flanks 
of the fort. General Sherman, who had ridden in 
the saddle down the left bank of the river and taken 
a position upon a lookout on the Cheves planta- 
tion, across the big bend, getting anxious when the 
sun had declined till it was only an hour high, sig- 
naled to Hazen to attack at once. The three lines 
issued simultaneously from the surrounding woods, 
each preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, and 
advanced rapidly, converging upon the fort. Artil- 
lery and musketry fire poured from the ramparts, 
and as the assailants approached torpedoes ex- 
ploded beneath their tread. The skirmishers, tak- 
ing shelter behind the standing trunks, drove the 
artillerists from their guns and silenced the mus- 
ketry. The lines rushed into the ditch, tore down 
the palisades, and clambered over the walls. 

Anderson refused to surrender, and the fight- 
ing continued till the defenders separately surren- 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 26 1 

dered. Hazen lost twenty-four killed and one hun- 
dred and ten wounded ; the loss of the garrison 
was forty-eight. General Sherman found a row- 
boat and was rowed down to General Hazen's tem- 
porary headquarters, then walked to the fort, and 
was rowed six miles down the windings of the 
river until he came upon a small steamer, the Dan- 
delion, which had been sent up from the fleet for 
news. After writing hasty dispatches to the Secre- 
tary of War, General Grant, Admiral Dahlgren, 
and General Foster, he returned to the fort and to 
General Hazen's headquarters. He took his place 
on the floor, where Hazen and his staff were lying 
asleep, but before long was roused by a messenger 
from General Foster, who was an invalid on a 
steamer below, and begged an interview. While 
hearing Foster's report, he continued the voyage 
till Admiral Dahlgren was found on his flagship 
in Wassabaw Sound. Arrangements were made by 
General Foster to forward the supplies accumu- 
lated at Port Royal in anticipation of Sherman's 
arrival, and adding to them some siege guns. The 
admiral undertook to provide light-draught steam- 
ers for their transport, and Sherman returned, ar- 
riving at the lines by noon of the 15th. 

On the i6th steamboats began to arrive with 
supplies. One of them brought mail. Colonel 
Markland, special mail agent for Sherman's army, 
had been at Baltimore gathering in mail matter for 
all members of the army, and took the accumula- 
tion to Port Royal on the first intimation of Sher- 
man's approach to the coast. Ambulances carried 
the assorted mails to every brigade headquarters. 
Few men received nothing. Over fifty thousand 
sat by the evening camp fires poring over their 
letters, transported for the time to their homes and 
families. Sherman received two letters from Gen- 
eral Grant, one dated the 3d, the other the 6th of 
December. In the latter Grant said : " My idea 



2^2 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

now is that you establish a base on the seacoast, 
fortify and leave it all your artillery and cavalry, 
and enough infantry to protect them, and at the 
same time so threaten their interior that the militia 
of the South will have to be kept at home. With 
the balance of your command come here by water 
with all dispatch. Select yourself the officer to 
leave in command, but you I want in person unless 
you see objections to this plan which I can not 
see. Use every vessel going to you for the purpose 
of transportation." This letter was a crushing dis- 
appointment to Sherman. He felt that the march 
to Savannah was only the preliminary step to his 
plan. The main achievement was to be a march 
across the Carolinas, abbreviating day by day, by 
every day's march, the field of supplies for Lee, 
gradually isolating him from support, and bring- 
ing in re-enforcement to Grant an army complete, 
compact, inured to fatigue, and exultant. To give 
up this, to dismember his command, and take a 
fragment, jaded by a sea voyage, to join the disci- 
plmed and equipped Army of the Potomac, seemed 
a poor exchange. 

But a soldier has only to obey. Immediately 
on reading Grant's letter, Sherman began to carry 
out its directions. Before the day was over he had 
selected Fort McAllister as the site of his fortified 
base, determined its general design, and ordered 
Colonel Poe, his chief engineer, to reconnoiter the 
ground for the purpose. On the same day he wrote 
to General Grant a report in brief of his march, 
with a full statement of his present situation and 
the steps he had already taken to carry out the plan 
of operations as indicated by General Grant. Of 
the campaign of which he had proposed for him- 
self, he said : " Indeed, with my present command 
I had expected, after reducing Savannah", instantly 
to march to Columbia, S. C, thence to Raleigh, and 
thence to report to you. But this would consume, 



THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 263 

it may be, six weeks' time after the fall of Savan- 
nah, whereas by sea I can probably meet you with 
my men and arms before the middle of January." 

Meanwhile there was no relaxation in the siege. 
He distributed and mounted siege guns that he ob- 
tained from General Foster, and made incessant 
reconnoissance to find some practicable passage 
over to the enemy's lines. On the morning of the 
17th, he sent by flag of truce to General Hardee a 
summons to surrender. Next morning came the 
answer, a refusal. 

An assault must be made. But first he deter- 
mined that a road by which Hardee could escape 
should be occupied. Hardee could lay a pontoon 
bridge from the city across the river, and by a mud 
road for twelve miles gain the railroad. General 
Slocum desired to take from his army sufificient 
force — an entire corps, if needed — cross the river, 
and seize the road. He had captured two of the 
gunboats which Hardee had in the river, one of 
which was burned and the other disabled, had oc- 
cupied the islands opposite his flank, and planted 
a brigade on the farther shore. But the enemy still 
had four gunboats, and Sherman preferred to get 
General Foster to land a force from seaward and 
occupy the road. On the evening of the i8th he 
left for Hilton Head, when General Foster heartily 
promised to give the co-operation desired. Late in 
the evening of the 20th the pickets of Geary's di- 
vision of the Twentieth Corps and of Leggett's di- 
vision of the Seventeenth Corps heard sounds of 
evacuation, and the two divisions, starting at day- 
light, found the city abandoned by Hardee, who had 
left with his garrison and light artillery. Geary 
having but three miles to march, while Leggett had 
six, entered first. General Sherman, returning in 
the evening of the 21st, was met on the way by a 
messenger with the news of the occupation of the 
Southern city. 



264 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



To the damage done in the march by the de- 
struction of two hundred miles of railway, with 
bridges, trestles, depots, and auxiliary structures, 
and the capture of thousands of horses, mules, and 
cattle, as well as enormous quantities of subsistence, 
was now added in the capture of Savannah the cap- 
ture of two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, 
with large stores of ammunition and locomotives 
and cars, and four steamboats, besides the destruc- 
tion of an ironclad gunboat and a ram, destroyed 
by Hardee to prevent their capture. General Sher- 
man's dispatch to the President, " I beg to present 
you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with 
one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of am- 
munition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales 
of cotton," reached Mr. Lincoln Christmas Day, and 
spread joy through the land. 

Savannah was under military laws. General 
Geary was the first commander. Subject to mili- 
tary law, the mayor and council resumed their func- 
tions, the municipal courts were opened, schools 
and churches were fdled, customers thronged the 
shops, and the streets, enlivened by soldiers in uni- 
form, had the appearance of a holiday. All was 
peace, harmony, and ease. General Sherman pub- 
lished an order prescribing the limits of privilege, 
and the city resumed a share of prosperity. On 
the nth of January the Secretary of War arrived, 
accompanied by the quartermaster general and the 
adjutant general of the army, and by a retinue of 
civilians, who came to take possession of the cap- 
tured property and to administer the affairs of the 
Confederate city. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE CAROLINAS. 

General Grant's letter to Sherman, notifying 
him to bring his army by sea to Richmond, was 
written on the 6th of December, four days before 
Sherman reached the defenses of Savannah. On 
the i8th he wrote that it would take too long to 
move the army by sea by obtainable transporta- 
tion, and it seemed better that Sherman should, 
after capturing Savannah and its garrison, operate 
in South Carolina. Receiving Sherman's sugges- 
tion of a march across the Carolinas, he at once, on 
the 27th of December, wrote in hearty concurrence, 
and on the 21st of January advised Sherman of his 
co-operation, ordering General Schofield's entire 
corps to the East, to advance up the Neuse River 
by Newbern to Goldsboro, and General Alfred H. 
Terry, who had already captured Fort Fisher, to 
take Wilmington, and to proceed thence to the 
same rendezvous. 

Recruits came from the North, and men re- 
turning from furlough and from hospitals. The 
morning report of the ist of February showed in 
the command fifty-eight thousand nine hundred 
and twenty-three infantry, forty-four hundred and 
thirty-eight cavalry, and seventeen hundred and 
eighteen artillery; total, sixty thousand and sev- 
enty-nine. The six-mule wagons numbered about 
twenty-five hundred ; there were six hundred two- 
mule ambulances, sixty-eight guns, with six horses 
to each, and sixty-eight four-horse caissons. No 
tents were carried but one office tent to each head- 

265 



266 GENERAL SHERMAN, 

quarters. On the march each corps was to move 
by a separate road, and only artillery, ambulances, 
and wagons were to use roads ; troops were to 
make their way alongside. Each division had its 
own supply train. As nearly as practicable, twenty 
days' rations of bread and about twenty days' of 
coffee, sugar, and salt were taken. But little meat 
was carried in the wagons ; some divisions carried 
none. Reliance was placed on cattle driven and 
on foraging. The wagons were loaded very light, 
the strongest carrying little more than a ton. The 
roads in lower South Carolina were known to be 
miserable, but it was impossible to form a concep- 
tion of their indescribable execrableness without 
actual experience. 

The advance of the Seventeenth Corps left Sa- 
vannah on the 4th of January, 1865, embarked in 
the night at Thunderbolt, and reached Beaufort 
next evening. The whole of the corps was on the 
island by the evening of the 6th. On the 14th the 
corps crossed by a pontoon bridge from the north- 
ern end of the island, and pushed out toward Poco- 
taligo. The Confederate cavalry made a gallant 
resistance, and were aided by defensive works 
strongly placed, as well as by the natural difiticulties 
of morass and lagoons. By sunset the enemy was 
pushed into a strong work with massive ramparts, 
armed with seventeen guns, some of them of heavy 
caliber, and protected by a very wide and deep 
wet ditch. The work was evacuated after mid- 
night and the armament carried off. Next morn- 
ing the corps occupied Pocotaligo station on the 
railroad. 

General Logan returned from leave and resumed 
command of the Fifteenth Corps. This corps pro- 
posed to join the Seventeenth by marching from 
the bank of the river opposite Savannah over a 
strip of ground bordered by swamp on both sides. 
John E. Smith had hardly started when a continu- 



THE CAROLINAS. 267 

ous deluging rain turned the soil to ooze. The 
rising water broke the dikes, flooded the road near 
the river, and threatened to sweep away the divi- 
sion ; they barely succeeded in struggling to solid 
ground. Corse's division marched up the bank 
of the Savannah to Sisterville with the left wing 
and Kilpatrick. The other two divisions of the 
Fifteenth Corps proceeded by boat to Beaufort, 
and joined General J. E. Smith at Coosawhatchie, 
near Pocotaligo. 

General Blair, while filling his trains and con- 
structing fortifications and intrenchments to be oc- 
cupied by General Foster's troops, made demon- 
strations from time to time at points on the Salkie- 
hatchie River, to keep up the impression that 
Charleston was the point aimed at. Meanwhile 
General JefT C. Davis was toiling at the task of 
building a pontoon bridge over the Savannah, a 
large river, whose banks v>-ere several feet deep 
under the overflow, and, after the flood subsided, 
clearing out miles of road filled with a mass of drift, 
compacted with artificial obstructions and planted 
with torpedoes. 

Part of the left wing was across the river by the 
4th of February, and ready to march on the 5th. 
Order to move on the 5th of February was issued, 
and the campaign for Columbia was begun while 
the Confederates were speculating whether Au- 
gusta or Charleston was the objective point. Blair 
marched northwest along the swamp of the Salkie- 
hatchie, while Logan, with three divisions of his 
corps, moved by parallel courses, about fifteen miles 
away, along the swamp of the Coosawhatchie. The 
troops plunged and staggered through the mud, 
pausing to remove the felled trees that obstructed 
the way, and sku-mishing all the while with the 
cavalry that pertinaciously opposed their progress. 
Blair reached Whippy Swamp where it joins the 
Salkiehatchie at 8 p. m. 



268 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Next morning the first and fourth divisions 
crossed Whippy Swamp and proceeded to Rivers's 
Bridge over the Salkiehatchie. The third division 
continued along the outer border of Whippy 
Swamp, with directions to cross at Anglesea Post 
Office, and hold the bridge at that point till the 
Fifteenth Corps should arrive on its way to Bu- 
ford's Bridge. At Rivers's Bridge the Salkiehatchie 
spreads in winter into a number of streams, wind- 
ing between bars of mud, supporting a thick growth 
of trees, making a tangle of swamp and water a 
mile and a half across. The only passage was a 
straight causeway, with bridges over the streams, 
which was commanded its whole length by a bat- 
tery erected on the farther bank. 

The cavalry which had doggedly contested 
Blair's progress was so closely followed by Blair's 
advance that all the bridges, except the main one 
close under the battery, were saved. The guns of 
the battery opened fire, and killed and wounded 
some of the pursuers before they could leap from 
the causeway down into the swamp. Colonel 
Wager Swayne, a most valuable officer and most 
estimable man, was severely wounded. Mower's 
division above the bridge and Giles A. Smith's 
below, by wading, cutting ways through the woods, 
and building bridges, forced their way over on the 
3d of February, and emerged on dry land. The 
works, being entirely open at the rear, were flanked 
and abandoned. The forces holding works defend- 
ing Buford's Bridge above and Broxton's Bridge 
below at the same time evacuated and withdrew. 
General Howard reports the loss, all of which was 
in Mower's division, as ten or twelve killed and 
about seventy wounded. Colonel Harrison, who 
commanded the Confederate troops, reported his 
loss as eight killed, forty-four wounded, and fifteen 
missing. 

General Logan, reaching the bridge over Whip- 



THE CAROLINAS. 269 

py Swamp held by the third division, passed on 
to Buford's Bridge over the Salkiehatchie, and 
found it destroyed and the works guarding it aban- 
doned. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps 
moved on the 6th, through rain and mud and 
swamp, to the crossings of the Little Salkiehatchie. 
Both corps found the bridges destroyed. Logan 
pushed his troops through the streams and swamp, 
and, emerging from them in front of a long line 
of intrenchment, charged upon the works and car- ] 

ried them. The Seventeenth Corps found the * 

bridge in its front destroyed and abandoned. On 
the 7th both corps reached the railroad running 
from Branchville to Augusta, making the connec- 
tion between Charleston and Augusta. General 
Corse, who had left the Savannah River in rear of 
the Twentieth Corps, and for part of the way had 
dragged through swampy road, made deep quag- 
mire by the heavy rains and the passage of two j 
army corps, did not overtake Logan until the nth. 
The Twentieth Corps, diverging to the left from 
the Fifteenth at Buford's Bridge, struck the rail- 
road at Blackville on the 9th ; Kilpatrick reached 
it at Barnwell on the same day. The Fourteenth 
Corps, after crossing the Savannah at Sister's 
Ferry, and moving out to solid ground, marched 
up the river, approaching Augusta, reached the 
railroad at Williston on the 12th. The railroad was 
thoroughly destroyed for a distance of forty miles. 
It was apprehended that this important road might 
not be yielded without a battle. General Howard, 
when he had approached within five miles of it, 
began to deploy. Just then a horseman in tattered 
clothing, one of the foragers, came galloping from 
the front and called to him : " Hurry up, general ; 
we have got the railroad." 

It had been learned that rails merely bent could 
be put through a rolling mill and straightened, while 
if they were given a spiral twist they would have to 



270 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

be melted and run out again. Accordingly, in this 
campaign the twist was required. In one case a 
brigade failed to observe the order, and was re- 
quired to return and do the work over. To collect 
fuel to straighten the rails after heating them, and 
then give them the required twist, was a very dif- 
ficult task. The engineer regiment had implements 
made for the purpose. The soldiers fastened rail- 
road chairs with telegraph wire to poles ; clamping 
one to each end of a heated rail, and pulling them 
around in opposite directions, gave the required 
twist. 

While Sherman's army was at work destroying 
the communications of the State as it advanced, 
the Confederate commanders were taking account 
of their resources. Generals Beauregard, Hardee, 
and D. H. Hill held a conference in Georgia, near 
Augusta, on the 2d of February. They estimated 
Hardee's available " effective " in South Carolina 
at fourteen thousand five hundred ; Georgia militia, 
fourteen hundred and fifty ; the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, ten thousand eight hundred ; and Wheeler's 
cavalry, sixty-seven hundred ; aggregate, thirty- 
three thousand four hundred and fifty. But the 
wreckage of Hood's army was drifting across north- 
ern Georgia, to be finally stranded in North Caro- 
lina. Each corps commander still bore his flag, and, 
gathering his remaining followers under it, main- 
tained the name and organization of a corps. At 
the time of the conference only Lee's corps had 
arrived. Generals Cheatham's and Stewart's came 
in detachments from time to time, the last report- 
ing at Bentonville. 

Having completed the destruction of the road, 
and impressed the defenders of Augusta that they 
were Sherman's aim, he set out definitely for Co- 
lumbia. Kilpatrick, to continue the impression, 
was sent to Aiken, close to Augusta, and General 
Howard turned eastward to Orangeburg, also to 



THE CAROLINAS. 271 

break up the railroad at that point, and destroy the 
communication between Cokmibia and Charleston. 
The Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps resumed the 
march on the 9th. They found the bridges over 
the south fork of the Edisto destroyed, and troops 
in intrenchments defending the crossings. Logan's 
men waded the streams ; Blair found a place where 
solid land extended to the river confined to one 
stream. Mower laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed 
after nightfall. On the farther side the land was 
covered with thick timber and flooded with the 
overflow. The division marched through icy water, 
w^aist deep, and the darkness till solid ground was 
reached. The gleam of moonlight upon their rifles 
disclosed their presence, and while they plodded on 
with frozen clothing the enemy withdrew. 

Both corps started for the north fork of the 
Edisto on the morning of the nth, the Seventeenth 
Corps taking the direct road to Orangeburg. The 
foragers in advance came soon upon the enemy's 
mounted scouts, forced them back upon the main 
body of cavalry, and sent back for re-enforcements. 
The Ninth Illinois mounted infantry went to the 
front and pushed the cavalry to the shelter of a 
light intrenchment. The infantry column then 
coming up, the cavalry broke into retreat. The 
Twentieth Ohio infantry was detached, and, pur- 
suing at a double quick, saved the small bridges 
over the smaller currents of the river till, coming 
to a bend in the road, the men found themselves 
near to the main stream and its bridge, with a bat- 
tery on rising ground beyond. A skirmish line 
was pushed forward in the overflowed forest to the 
edge of the main stream, and, standing in the cold 
water, skirmished with the Confederate line across 
the river, and prevented parties from approaching 
the bridge to burn it. General Giles A. Smith com- 
ing up with his division, placed a battery in a field 
where it could command the bridge and reach the 



272 



GENERAL SHERMAN, 



Confederate works. But after dark a small party 
made a hasty dash to the bridge and lighted a fire, 
which burned some of the planking, but did not 
injure the timbers. 

An exploring party from the third division 
found, less than a mile below the bridge* a place 
where solid ground extended to the river, while a 
swamp covered the farther shore. A road was 
made in the night to the spot. Next morning the 
third division crossed by pontoons, and waded 
through the swamp to a great field which extended 
to the high ground near the bridge. A squad with 
one gun was firing across the bridge at Smith's di- 
vision. One brigade was sent by a crossroad di- 
rectly to the railroad and began its destruction. 
The first brigade in column of regiments marched 
to the heights. The gun squad then, perceiving the 
approaching column, fired a few wild shots at it, 
and quickly withdrew. Colonel Proudfit, of the 
Tv/elfth Wisconsin, was appointed provost marshal, 
and his regiment detailed as police, and the rest 
of the brigade proceeded to destroy the railroad. 
Smith quickly repaired the bridge, and the rest of 
the corps and the trains passed over it by evening. 
The force defending Orangeburg comprised John- 
son's (formerly Stowall's), Palmer's, and Pettus's 
brigade of Lee's corps, and a portion of Young's 
cavalry. The loss of the third division was two 
wounded ; the known loss of the Confederates was 
six killed, fourteen wounded, and twenty-six taken 
prisoners. 

At the same time General Logan forced a cross- 
ing a few miles farther up the river. The bridge 
being destroyed, one division forced its way across 
above the bridgeway and the other below. The 
Confederates were driven from their works at 2.30 
p. M., many throwing their arms away in their 
haste. General Logan's loss was one man killed 
and five wounded ; the Confederates, three killed, 



THE CAROLINAS. 



273 



wounded unknown, and eighty prisoners. About 
two hundred stand of arms were taken. 

General Howard marched easily on the 13th and 
14th, destroying the railroad between Orangeburg 
and Columbia. On the 15th General Logan, hav- 
ing the advance, found his progress stoutly con- 
tested, but pushed his opponents steadily back to 
Congaree Creek, which empties into Congaree 
River, about six miles below Columbia. Hampton's 
cavalry crossed the creek, destroyed the bridge 
over it, and took post behind a line of intrench- 
ment, with artillery. Logan sent a brigade up the 
creek far enough to cross beyond the extremity 
of the intrenchment, and when the enemy with- 
drew to another line nearer the city the Fifteenth 
followed, and drew up before it by nightfall. The 
Confederates abandoned this line in the night, 
crossed the river, and burned the bridges. Next 
morning an artillery fire, ineffective, opened from 
the city across the river. A few responsive guns 
replied. Soldiers could be seen loitering by the 
river bank, and smoke rising in portions of the 
city. The Congaree was quite too wide and rapid 
to be bridged by resources within reach of the 
army. The Fifteenth Corps moved up above the 
junction of the Saluda and Broad, the confiuents 
of the Congaree, built with ease a bridge across the 
Saluda, and afterward constructed another over the 
Broad with great dilftculty and under sharp opposi- 
tion. The troops on the way to the crossing passed 
by Camp Sorghum, where twelve hundred ofificers, 
prisoners of war, had marched to an open field, and 
then, without shelter, lay on the ground, under the 
burning sun and dews of night, and rain and wind, 
except a few who were able to scratch holes in the 
ground and cover them with brush. The bridge 
over the Broad was completed in the night of the 
1 6th, and early next morning the troops began to 
cross. Stone's brigade of Woods's division leading. 



274 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



The mayor of Columbia met General Woods 
and surrendered the city to him ; Stone's brigade 
was put on duty to preserve order. Cotton was 
burning in piles in the streets. A violent wind- 
storm whirled flaming bunches through the air. 
People to ingratiate the guards supplied them with 
whisky. Houses caught fire. Undoubtedly men 
who had been prisoners of war and escaped aided 
the spread of the flames. It is not unlikely that in 
Sherman's army there were some soldiers who did 
the same. Stone's brigade was relieved ; the rest of 
Woods's division and Hazen's finely disciplined di- 
vision were brought into the city. General Sher- 
man, General Howard, General Logan, and his 
division commanders personally directed and super- 
intended the efforts to stay the spread of the con- 
flagration and to remove furniture from houses. 
But all efforts were futile against the great sheets 
of flame driven by the blast, until after midnight 
the windstorm lulled. The greater part of the city 
was a mass of cinder. 

General Sherman gave up his own quarters to 
homeless families, and divided his own provisions 
with them and others. A preposterous story was 
started that General Sherman ordered the burning 
of the city ; the order that he made is the following : 

Special Field Orders, No. 26. 

I. General Howard will cross the Saluda and Broad 
Rivers as near their mouth as possible, occupy Columbia, 
destroy the public buildint^s, railroad properties, manufactur- 
ing- and machine shops, but will spare libraries and asylums 
and private dwellings. He will then move to Winnsboro, 
destroying en roi/fe utterly that section of the railroad. He 
will also cause all bridges, trestles, water tanks, and depots 
on the railroad back to the Wateree to be burned, switches 
broken, and such other destruction as he can find time to 
accomplish consistent with the proper celerity. For move- 
ments of his armv, he will select roads that cross the Wateree 
to the south of Lancaster. 



THE CAROLINAS. 



275 



General Slocuni with the head of the left wing 
reached the Saluda a few miles higher up. He 
crossed the Saluda and the Broad on the 20th, and 
destroyed the railroad down nearly to Columbia. 
He moved next day to Winnsboro, and destroyed 
thence northward the Charlotte and South Caro- 
lina Railroad, and on the 22d began crossing the 
Catawba at Rock Mount Ferry. The river was 
swollen and rapid and filled with drift, and when 
the Twentieth Corps, the cavalry, and one division 
of the Fourteenth Corps had crossed, the bridge 
gave way, and much of it was swept ofif by the 
current. General Williams, commanding the 
Twentieth Corps, continued on his route, and, 
being obliged to corduroy the impassable road 
most of the way, made only sixteen miles by the 
26th. General Slocum, learning here of the de- 
tention of the Fourteenth Corps, halted the Twen- 
tieth and returned to the river. Fortunately the 
river fell, the bridge was repaired, and the water- 
bound divisions crossed. The two corps. Four- 
teenth and Twentieth, marching by dififerent roads 
over oozy soil, saturated by continuous rain, im- 
peded by creeks swollen to torrents, with banks 
submerged, reached Sneedsboro on the Great 
Pedee, above Cheraw, on the 4th of March. One 
day the Twentieth Corps advanced only five miles, 
being obliged to corduroy the entire distance. 

The Seventeenth Corps left Columbia on the 
1 8th and reached Winnsboro on the 22d, having 
destroyed the railroad the entire distance, and on 
the 23d reached the Wateree. The progress to 
Winnsboro was stubbornly contested by Wade 
Hampton's cavalry and Lee's corps. Most of the 
prisoners taken belonged to Lee's corps. The Fif- 
teenth Corps, leaving Columbia, proceeded down 
the river, destroying the railroad for twenty miles, 
then turning to the north, joined the Seventeenth 
Corps, on the river called there the Wateree, but 



276 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



named the Catawba farther up. The river was 
swollen by heavy rains ; the pontoons of both corps 
were required to bridge it. The troops began to 
cross before noon, and the rear was over by nine 
o'clock next morning. The third division of the 
Seventeenth Corps waited till the pontoons were 
taken up and packed, and camped at night at Rus- 
sell Corner, eight miles in rear of corps headquar- 
ters, and the bridge train three miles in rear of the 
division. Next day the road was worse. One bri- 
gade was ordered to give aid where wagons were 
mired beyond the power of the teams to pull them 
out ; the other brigade was required to repair 
impassable places in the road. Four miles of cor- 
duroy were made. The division camped at night 
ten miles in rear of corps headquarters, and the 
bridge train five miles in rear of the division. The 
division went into camp next night at Little Lynch's 
Creek, and was there overtaken by the bridge train. 
The men worked until 1.30 a. m. constructing 
causeway and bridge, and resumed march before 
daylight, having made fires to light the wagons 
over the narrow track in the dark and fog, and 
overtook the corps at Lynch's Creek in the after- 
noon. 

General Giles A. Smith with the advance of the 
corps reached Lynch's Creek by noon of the 26th 
of February, and found the bridge standing in the 
middle of a great expanse of water a mile wide. 
A regiment waded over the submerged roadway to 
solid ground. The First Michigan engineer regi- 
ment, working all night, constructed a footway for 
troops by next morning, and Mower's division 
crossed. Working from both shores during the 
whole of the 27th, about twenty-five hundred ofili- 
cers and men, standing in water waist deep in 
places, completed by 5 p. m. eight hundred and 
fifty feet of bridging and seven thousand feet of 
corduroy road laid on stringers. Next day, the 



THE CAROLINAS. 277 

28th, the remainder of the corps crossed, and, after 
marching nineteen miles, the corps went into camp 
thirteen miles from Cheraw. 

Tidings came that Hardee evacuated Charles- 
ton when he learned of Sherman's entry into Co- 
lumbia, and was now in Cheraw with his whole 
command. General Sherman was with Slocum and 
the left wing. General Howard was with Logan, 
whose corps was struggling to effect a crossing 
over Lynch's Creek farther down. Blair in- 
trenched, reconnoitered, and waited ; Logan crossed 
on the 2d of March, and Blair moved on the 3d. 
The rear of Hardee's command crossed the Pedee 
and set fire to the bridge saturated with combusti- 
bles as the head of Blair's column drew near. 

The railroad from Charleston ended at Cheraw, 
and, as it was impossible to move stores by wagon 
as fast as they were brought by rail, a great amount 
accumulated. The capture included twenty-five 
pieces of artillery, five thousand rounds of artillery 
ammunition, twenty thousand rounds of infantry 
ammunition, two thousand stand of small arms, 
one thousand sabers, thirty-six hundred barrels of 
powder, and a great store of C. S. A. cotton. All 
was destroyed except three guns carried off as 
trophies. 

The Fourteenth Corps, constructed a bridge ten 
miles above Cheraw, and crossed on the 7th of 
March. The Twentieth Corps moved down to 
Cheraw, and crossed on the bridge of the right 
wing. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth crossed in 
detachments, and, moving a few miles each day, 
assembled about Bennettsville on the 6th. The 
country between Columbia and Cheraw was scanti- 
ly supplied with subsistence, and the foragers gath- 
ered little. The supplies in the wagons were nearly 
exhausted. Coffee and sugar remained, and a small 
amount of bread reserved for emergency. The 
men were hungry. The country from Cheraw to 



278 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

Bennettsville and a day's march beyond abounded 
with subsistence. It was a feast at the end of each 
day's march. 

The foragers consisted regularly of parties of an 
officer and a dozen men or less from each regiment, 
who reported to the provost marshal of the divi- 
sion before setting out in the morning. At first 
they were on foot, and visited only plantations near 
the road. But soon they all had horses, and their 
explorations extended ten miles off from the flanks. 
They brought in ham, bacon, and poultry, sweet 
potatoes and corn meal, horses and mules, and 
sometimes impressed vehicles to convey their cap- 
tures to camp. Occasionally a grist-mill was found. 
The party would proceed to grind corn and send 
to camp for wagons to take the meal. They seemed 
to have instinctive perception of the selection of 
camping ground, and never failed to report with 
their spoils. Sometimes they reached the ground 
along with the staff officers, who rode in advance 
to select the ground and assign place to the divi- 
sions. When ground was designated for each bri- 
gade, the forage parties, knowing the relative posi- 
tion of the regiments in the brigade, would repair 
each to the line of its own regiment. The weary 
troops, dragging in through the night, would find 
fires glowing with cheer^ and piles of food giving 
welcome. 

The foragers often came upon parties of Con- 
federate cavalry miles away from the line of march. 
Whether it was a solitary forager or a party, every 
one fired at the enemy before falling back. Every 
forager within hearing of the report galloped to re- 
enforce. As the noise of the skirmish grew, the 
number of combatants increased, and so increased 
that the Confederate cavalry was never able to pene- 
trate within sight of Sherman's column. 

Taking articles not needed for the subsistence 
of the army was prohibited. There were, of course, 



THE CAROLINAS. 



279 



violations of this order, bat violations when re- 
ported were punished. A man who was convicted 
of taking a watch from the person of a citizen was 
drummed out of the army. In another case, where 
a man was court-martialed for stealing some article 
from a house, his captain was put in arrest for hav- 
ing failed to report the case promptly. 

The irregularity in reaching camp all through 
the night gave rise to a practice that was adopted 
in some divisions. Before breaking camp in the 
morning, the detail for picket for the ensuing night 
was made, and marched at the head of the division 
for the day. There it was ready to serve as a skir- 
mish detail if needed. In the afternoon, when the 
stafT ofificers rode forward to select ground for 
camp, the picket detail followed them and went on 
post by daylight, while the troops arriving late had 
no concern about being called for duty. 

A few days through a series of swamps in con- 
stant rain brought the army to Fayetteville, N. C, 
on the Cape Fear River. The foragers entered first, 
but were driven back by Wade Hampton and his 
cavalry rear guard. Hampton crossed the bridge 
and burned it just before the Fourteenth Corps 
arrived. The other corps followed, coming in by 
different roads ; finally Kilpatrick appeared, and 
General Sherman's army was assembled on the 
nth of March. 

Kilpatrick had not been in view on the march, 
but had rendered important service. His persist- 
ent advance and attacks close to Augusta kept 
troops held there under apprehension that Sherman 
was behind him advancing upon the city. During 
the march to Columbia, and thence to the crossing 
of the Catawba, he interposed between the left 
wing and the cavalry of Butler and Hampton, cov- 
ering the rear as well as the flank. The encounters 
were daily, and serious engagements not infrequent. 
His impetuosity seemed reckless, but was always 
19 . 



280 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

carefully calculated. His men caught his spirit, 
and were always ready to charge upon any force, 
no matter what the disparity in numbers might be. 
On the night of the loth Kilpatrick again slept 
in a house away from his camp. Hampton broke 
into his camp after midnight, captured his artillery 
and headquarters, and swept in many prisoners. 
Kilpatrick escaped into the swamp. Many of his 
men did the same, taking their arms with them. 
The men rallied, formed, and charged upon the 
Confederates, who were busy gathering horses and 
other booty. Taken by surprise, the Confederates 
gave way. The recaptured battery was turned upon 
them at close quarters. Hampton withdrew, carry- 
ing one hundred and three prisoners and a number 
of horses. He left behind eighty killed, a consid- 
erable number wounded, and thirty men captured. 
Kilpatrick lost nineteen killed, sixty-eight severely 
wounded. 

A party from the third division of Blair's corps 
captured a small steamboat a few miles below the 
city. The value of the capture dropped next day, 
the 1 2th, just after noon, when a steamboat arrived 
bearing dispatches from General Terry, at Wil- 
mington, in response to notice sent to him by 
Sherman by courier. The words " News from 
home " ran like wild fire through the camp. Men 
who had opportunity to see a newspaper were ora- 
cles of intelligence to the rest. The boat was sent 
back at six o'clock with dispatches from General 
Sherman. He wrote to the Secretary of War, Gen- 
eral Grant, and General Halleck, and also to Gen- 
eral Schofield in North Carolina, and General Fos- 
ter in South Carolina, now department command- 
ers under him : and also to his quartermaster and 
commissary ofificers. There was need of clothing, 
as well as of rations. The men, marching outside 
of the road and late into the night, lost their shoes 
in the mire, their hats were brushed ofT and lost in 



THE CAROLINAS. 28 1 

the thickets, and their clothing tattered. They were 
a sorry sight. On the 14th a tug boat came up 
with a supply of oats, a little coffee and sugar, no 
bread, an inadequate supply of shoes, and no cloth- 
ing, there being none in Wilmington. One divi- 
sion received and issued four hundred and ninety- 
four pairs of shoes, leaving still one hundred and 
seventy-two men barefoot. 

Four hundred and fifty refugees having been 
sent down the river on boats on the 13th, the re- 
maining multitude, comprising the army of colored 
people who had accumulated on the march, went 
down to Wilmington by land with a cavalry escort. 
On the 15th the advance was resumed. It became 
known that General Joseph E. Johnston was now 
in command of the entire force in front. There 
was a visible bracing up. a watchful readiness in 
the troops, in recognition of the ability of their an- 
tagonist in the Atlanta campaign. General Sher- 
man took notice also of the fact that General Bragg 
had reported to Johnston with the army that had 
contested Schofield's advance from the coast, and 
sent an order to Schofield to meet him at Goldsboro 
on the 20th. 

Each corps being on a separate road, the Twen- 
tieth was on the left and the Seventeenth on the 
right. The enemy encountered by the Seventeenth 
was bad roads. This may be appreciated by tak- 
ing a few extracts from a pocket diary kept at the 
time : 

15th of March, marched via Blockersville to South River. 
Thunderstorms at noon killed one and hurt two men of the 
Seventy-ei.o-hth Ohio. Rained after that all day and night. 
Soil melted like sugar. Laid three miles of corduroy, and 
repaired much. Wagons kept sticking. Men toiled terribly. 
I came to camp and went to bed at 2 A. M. None of the 
second brigade or of their section of the train in yet. 

i6th. At 5 A. M. I sent two regiments, that had had some 
sleep, to help the second brigade. All in by 9 A. M. Then 
sent Twelfth Wisconsin to help pontoon train in. Rained 



282 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

all day. Train packed and awaiting completion of a bridge. 
Pulled into road at 2 p. M. Bridge extended. Crossed at 
7 P. M. Marched six miles. Crossed a creek, bridge not 
burned. Went to bed at 3 A. M. ; hall" of the section of train 
guarded by first brigade not in. 

17th. Rear of train and Twelfth Wisconsin in camp at 
6 A. M. Marched at 7 A. M. via Owenville, crossed Cohena 
on a bridge built by fourth division. Marched within five 
miles of Clinton and turned to Beaman's Crossroads. 
Marched nineteen miles. Last part of train now coming in 
— 2.30 A. M. 

1 8th. Last wagon of supply train came in just as head ot 
column moved. P'ine weather. Organized two large bri- 
gade pioneer parties. They with the division pioneers, col- 
ored pieneer battalion, and from two to four regiments at 
work ; got along very well. 

Expecting to find resistance on his left, General 
Sherman directed General Slocum to put four di- 
visions, two from each corps, on the outer road, 
the extreme left, and the rest of the troops, as well 
as the trains, on a road to the right. On the i6th 
the advance met the Confederates where North 
River approaches to the Cape Fear. With a some- 
what sttiliborn resistance they fell back fighting till 
they reached a line of intrenchment. Here they 
made a stand. Slocum brought up his artillery, and 
a brisk combat ensued. Upon the suggestion of 
General Sherman, a brigade was moved to the left 
to look for Hardee's flank. It was found that the 
intrenchment did not extend to the river. The bri- 
gade passed to the rear, and Hardee fell back to 
another fortified line. Slocum followed, but did 
not press the attack that night. Next morning the 
works were found evacuated. The National loss 
was ninety-five killed, five hundred and thirty-three 
wounded, and fifty-four missing. Of the Confed- 
erates, one htmdred and twenty-eight dead were 
buried on the battlefield, one hundred and seventy- 
five prisoners were taken, and three guns captured. 
General Hardee's report is : " My loss is between 
four hundred and five hundred. Among the miss- 



THE CAROLINAS. 283 

ing is Colonel Rhett, commanding brigade, and 
among the killed, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert de 
Treville. Two pieces of artillery were abandoned." 
The march of the i8th brought the head of 
Slocum's column so near to Bentonville that Gen- 
eral Sherman, satisfied that there would be no seri- 
ous opposition, crossed over at night to the other 
wing and joined General Howard. Next day the 
resistance to the advance was so obstinate that 
General Slocum was ready to believe the statement 
of a captured Confederate that Johnston was pres- 
ent with his entire army concentrated. In fact, 
Johnston at Raleigh was kept advised every day of 
the position of every part of Sherman's army, and 
had recalled Bragg, who was opposing the ad- 
vance of Schofield up the Cape Fear and the Neuse 
Rivers. He resolved to strike while Sherman's 
corps were apart on different roads, and crush 
them separately before they could concentrate. At 
the rate at which Slocum was advancing, he should 
make a junction with Howard in the neighl^orhood 
of Cox's bridge over the Neuse by the night of the 
19th. Johnston moved rapidly south from Smith- 
field, crossed the Neuse, and took the road which 
crossed Mill Creek at Bentonville, and. continuing 
south, crossed the Averysboro road nearly at a right 
angle. He had Bragg, Hardee, and Stuart, whose 
force he estimated at fifteen thousand " effectives," 
besides the cavalry of Hampton and Wheeler. On 
the 19th, in the forenoon, General Bragg took po- 
sition across the Averysboro road at right angles 
with it, about half a mile west of the Bentonville 
road, interposing between it and the advancing 
National columns. General Stewart formed on 
Bragg's right, along the north side of Cole's farm. 
Hardee, who did not get into position till 3 p. m., 
joined his left to Stewart's right. The general 
formation was a re-entrant angle, Stewart at the 
apex, Bragg and Hardee along the sides, and the 



284 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

extreme flanks refused. Except the road and Cole's 
farm, the ground was mostly covered by forest and 
dense thickets of scrub oak, very difficult to move 
through. 

General Sherman, satisfied that the danger point 
was passed, left Slocum early in the morning of 
the 19th, and rode across the country to join Gen- 
eral Howard. The Confederate cavalry disputed 
even more obstinately than on the precedmg day 
the advance of the two divisions of the Fourteenth 
Corps. A strong skirmish line pushed them stead- 
ily back, though slowly. Toward noon Hobart's 
brigade of Carlin's division was deployed and came 
upon a line of intrenchment across the road. The 
hne could be seen extended along the farther 
boundary of Cole's farm toward the north and west, 
while Hobart's skirmishers found it in the woods, 
reaching to the south. Carlin, still satisfied it was 
only cavalry in his front, deployed his division and 
charged. He was met by volleys immediately from 
infantry rifles. 

Buell's brigade, sent to find and turn the flank 
of the works on the farther side of Cole's farm, was 
charged by the Confederate force and driven across 
the field. Stewart suffered severely from the fire 
of a battery as he crossed the field, but prevailed in 
pushing Hobart back nearly a mile, and captured 
the battery on the way. Davis called on Fearing's 
brigade, and Fearing, by an impetuous charge, 
rolled up General Stewart's left and pressed him 
into the swamp. 

There was a lull on the field. A brigade of 
Jackson's division of the Twentieth Corps (Robin- 
son's) took position on the Morris farm about a 
mile south and west from the Cole house, on rising 
ground covered with pines, and with a marsh in 
front. The batteries of the corps joined the bri- 
gade. Carlin's brigades — Buel, Hobart, and Miles 
— assembled on the left, and Fearing, of Morgan's 



THE CAROLINAS. 285 

division, on the right, and all intrenched. Morgan 
drew back his two remaining brigades and in- 
trenched, leaving a gap between the left of this line 
and the right of Fearing. Two brigades of Jack- 
son's division — Hawley and Selfridge — coming up 
later, were posted in rear and to the left of Robin- 
son, and Cogswell's brigade of Ward's division was 
added to the right of Morgan's line, but did not 
sufitice to fill the gap between it and Fearing. John- 
ston ordered attack along the whole line. Bragg, 
getting partially into the rear of Morgan, com- 
pelled successive regiments to refuse, until the 
whole line was gradually wheeled to the rear. 
Hardee gained temporary advantage, but was re- 
pelled in repeated assaults by the well-posted and 
well-served artillery of the Twentieth Corps. It 
was dark when assaults ceased. In the night John- 
ston fell back to a new line. The apex was north 
of Cole's house, and the flanks, curving back, were 
continued nearly to Mill Creek. Slocum adjusted 
his line. 

Sherman and the Army of the Tennessee heard 
the sound of Slocum's guns. But he had heard 
much the same when only cavalry with their artil- 
lery had doggedly attempted to delay the left wing. 
So late as 5 p. m. he received a dispatch from Slo- 
cum stating that only cavalry with their artillery 
was in his front. He received in the night a sec- 
ond dispatch, announcing that Johnston with his 
whole army had been encountered. Hazen's divi- 
sion was nearest to Slocum. Sherman's order to 
march at once in relief reached him on the road 
about midnight. He reported to Slocum at dawn, 
having marched twenty miles since sunset, and 
took position on Slocum's right. General Sher- 
man joined Logan, and the Fifteenth Corps arrived 
on the ground in the morning and connected with 
Hazen. Later in the day General Howard brought 
up the Seventeenth, the most remote of the corps, 



286 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

placed the fourth division on Logan's right, and 
put the first and third in camp in reserve. The 
Army of the Tennessee and Johnston's left wing, 
facing each other, occupied with their works the 
bluff banks of a marshy valley, along which flowed 
to the north a brook that joined Mill Creek near 
Bentonville. 

General Blair, about noon of the 2ist, directed 
the first and third divisions to form on the right 
of his fourth division. General Mower, command- 
ing the first division, always eager for fight, and 
seeing a chance for turning Johnston's flank, 
pushed on. The marsh was impassable for horses ; 
officers dismounted, and all waded through. As- 
cending the bluff, and taking a line of rifle pits, 
he was, without knowing it, in rear of the Confed- 
erate line, about two hundred yards from John- 
ston's headquarters, and within musket shot of the 
bridge over Mill Creek, which constituted the only 
line of retreat. The sound of a skirmish in that 
quarter created a panic among the teamsters, and 
the wagons dashed pell-mell for the bridge. John- 
ston gathered up his reserves and cavalry and at- 
tacked. Just at that moment General Cheatham, 
with two divisions which had left Meridian, Miss., 
on the 24th of January, and had been striving to 
make a junction, arrived and reported at Johnston's 
headquarters. Sherman, hearing of Mower's peril, 
and having given notice that he would not have 
an engagement, but would only force Johnston 
across the Neuse, and not aware of Mower's actual 
situation, sent orders of recall, opened fire along 
his whole line, and pushed his skirmishers close up 
to the enemy's works to make a diversion in Mow- 
er's favor. Fighting with a bold front, and at the 
same time moving by the left flank, brigades pass- 
ing alternately in rear of those at halt and en- 
gaged, he reached his assigned position without 
disaster. 



THE CAROLINAS. 287 

Johnston withdrew in the night, and crossed the 
Neuse to Smithfield. The reported National loss 
in the three days was : Killed, one hundred and 
ninety-four ; wounded, eleven hundred and twelve ; 
missing, two hundred and twenty-one ; total, fif- 
teen hundred and twenty-seven. The reported Con- 
federate loss was : Killed, two hundred and thirty- 
nine ; wounded, sixteen hundred and ninety-four; 
missing, six hundred and seventy-three ; total, 
twenty-six hundred and six. 

The Confederate reports state that nine hundred 
and three prisoners were captured. The National 
reports do not give the number of Confederates 
captured. While the National reports of casual- 
ties were, as a rule, certainly made out with greater 
care and accuracy than the Confederate, they were 
by no means infallible. General Sherman in his 
report says that General Howard reported twelve 
hundred and eighty-seven prisoners captured by 
his command at Bentonville. General Howard's 
report gives twelve hundred and eighty-seven as 
the number captured by his command from Savan- 
nah to Goldsboro, while Logan and Blair, the corps 
commanders, give the number of prisoners taken 
bv their respective corps as : By Logan, six hun- 
dred and forty ; by Blair, three hundred and eighty, 
in the entire campaign. 

Easy marches brought the army to Goldsboro 
on the 24th, where General Schofield had just ar- 
rived with Generals J. D. Cox and Terry, com- 
manding the Twenty-third and the Tenth Corps. 
When the Army of the Tennessee approached the 
city. General Sherman sent an order for trains to 
move aside and troops to close up, and stood by 
the roadside, accompanied by Schofield, Cox, and 
Terry. As the trooi^s passed in columns of fours, 
an embryo review. General Howard and the corps 
and division commanders took their places as their 
commands passed. Many being barefoot, some 



288 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

with bare legs, most with clothes torn, and heads 
covered with a grotesque variety of gear, they 
made a sorry array of apparel, but they marched 
jubilant, stalwart, masterful. 

The Tenth and Twenty-third Corps were in 
Goldsboro as a part of General Grant's co-opera- 
tion with Sherman's plans. He sent General Terry 
with a land force to capture Fort Fisher, a strong 
fortress commanding the mouth of Cape Fear 
River. Admiral Porter, with a fleet of sixty vessels, 
assisted. On the 15th of January a terrific bom- 
bardment by the fleet, followed by a rushing charge 
by the troops and a fierce fight within the fortress, 
captured the works with the garrison and arma- 
ment. The other forts about the mouth of the 
river were evacuated, and the river was open to 
the National fleet. 

General Schofield in Tennessee received orders 
to repair to the east to proceed against Wilming- 
ton and Newbern, and effect a junction with Sher- 
man. He was with his corps in Washington and 
Alexandria on the ist of February ready to embark, 
but detained by ice in the river and lack of trans- 
portation. He embarked on the 4th with Cox's 
division, leaving the rest to follow, and landed at 
Fort Fisher on the 9th. Terry was in front of Gen- 
eral Hoke, whose intrenchments extended from the 
east or left bank of the Cape Fear River to a large 
lagoon. After ineffectual efforts to reach Hoke's 
rear, Schofield took Cox to the west or right bank, 
to proceed against a force posted farther up the 
river. Placing part of his command in front of the 
works, which extended from the river to a large 
pond, he made a detour of fifteen miles around the 
pond. The Confederate commander, finding his 
rear threatened, abandoned the fort, leaving the 
armament, and retreated eight miles up the river 
to a position behind Town Creek. Hoke at the 
same time retreated to a new position on a line 




SAVANJ^AII 

TO 

COLIMBIA 

EXPLANATION 

lithArmy Corps 

fSlh ' ' 

/7(A " " ■ 

20tk " " , 

Cavalry 

SCALE OF MILES 

5 10 15 PO 



THE CAROLINAS. 289 

with Town Creek, on the opposite side of the river, 
having his front protected by a creek, his right by 
the river, and his left by a swamp. Terry followed 
and intrenched. 

Colonel Simonson, who in the absence of Gen- 
eral Hagood commanded the Confederate force on 
the right bank of the river, took position on the 
north bank of Town Creek, a few miles from the 
river, upon a blnff, where he had a battery with 
artillery. A bridge crossed the creek at this point, 
approached by a causeway through a swamp. Cox 
posted his artillery on the nearest firm ground in 
front of the Confederate works, and, leaving Colo- 
nel Henderson with a brigade at this point, led 
his other three brigades lower down the stream. 
Early in the morning of the 20th Henderson opened 
fire with his guns upon Simonson's battery, and 
advanced a heavy line of skirmishers wading 
through the swamp to the shore of the creek, dis- 
abling Simonson's heaviest gun, and compelled his 
men to keep covered behind the shelter of his 
works. Cox meanwhile, with a flatboat able to 
carry fifty men at a load, was diligently passing his 
command over, without exciting alarm or sus- 
picion. By the middle of the afternoon the three 
brigades were over. Cox pushed through the 
swamp to Simonson's rear and captured him, three 
hundred and seventy-five of his men, and his guns. 

Next day Cox marched up the river, and, re- 
constructing a partially destroyed pontoon bridge, 
occupied the marshy island in the river in front 
of Wilmington. Soon heavy columns of smoke 
were seen rising, indicating preparations for evacu- 
ation. Next morning, the 22d of February, Gen- 
eral Cox completed the crossing and entered the 
abandoned city. 

The next step was to capture Kinston, a point 
accessible both by water and rail from the sea, lying 
farther inland, and nearer than Wilmington to 



290 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



Goldsboro. Three divisions were added to the 
force under Schofield, and Cox was called from 
Wilmington to take immediate command of the 
expedition. The railroad from Newbern to Kins- 
ton ran from Newbern to Southwest Creek, three 
miles from Kinston, through a continuous swamp. 
West of Southwest Creek was solid ground. About 
two miles east of the creek, and parallel to it, a 
ridge of firm ground extended into the swamp from 
the bank of Neuse River. Halfway between the 
creek and this ridge a dirt road, called the British 
road, ran across the swamp from north to south. 

On the 7th Cox rapidly moved the divisions 
of Carter and Palmer out to the ridge, where they 
threw up works facing west about a mile apart, 
Palmer at the north covering the railroad, and Car- 
ter at the south, crossing and covering the Dover 
road. This road leaving Kinston ran east, cross- 
ing Southwest Creek on a bridge, and crossing 
British road, continued through the swamp toward 
Newbern. Colonel Upham was posted with two 
regiments at the crossing of the Dover and British 
roads, and a regiment of New York cavalry was 
detached to watch the crossings of Southwest 
Creek, which was not fordable. General Ruger 
with his division was stationed about three miles 
in rear of Palmer, where he could protect the work- 
ing party repairing the railroad, and also be in 
readiness to go to the support of Palmer or Carter 
if needed. 

On the morning of the 8th Bragg crossed 
Southwest Creek with Hoke's division and the 
fragment of Hood's army, still styled the Army of 
the Tennessee. The cavalry disappeared without 
giving warning. Bragg fell upon Upham's two 
regiments of fresh recruits. Upham got away with 
his own regiment; the other was almost wholly 
captured. Bragg then advanced against Carter, 
who, being intrenched, made defense. Cox, who 



THE CAROLINAS. 29I 

was at the time in consultation with General Scho- 
fielcl, sent Rnger forward in support. Palmer was 
ordered to send one brigade rapidly to aid Carter, 
and with the rest of his division to make a demon- 
stration toward Southwest Creek. Ruger filled the 
space between Palmer and Carter, and quickly 
threw up defensive works of logs. Bragg reformed 
his lines, made assault, and was repulsed. There 
was skirmishing on the 9th, and extension and 
strengthening of the National lines. Bragg made 
repeated assaults on the loth, and was repulsed 
at every attempt. Colonel McQuiston made a sally 
from General Cox's left, fell upon Bragg's right, 
routed it, and returned with two hundred and sixty- 
six prisoners captured, in time to aid in repelling 
an assault upon the center and right. Bragg found 
it was impracticable to advance through the swamp 
and thickets and attack intrenchments with success. 
The re-enforcements sent by Johnston had come 
with orders to hold the railroad trains ready to 
bring them back immediately after the fighting 
was over to participate in his concentration before 
Sherman. Bragg withdrew in the night with the 
entire force, and joined Johnston in time to take 
part in the battle at Bentonville. 

The casualties on the National side, as shown 
by the revised consolidation of the returns, were : 
Killed, sixty-five ; wounded, three hundred and 
nineteen ; missing, nine hundred and fifty-three ; 
total, thirteen hundred and thirty-seven. The Con- 
federate reports consist of a few brief telegrams 
from Bragg to Johnston, which give no informa- 
tion as to casualties, and the report of D. H. Hill, 
temporary commander of Lee's corps, which is too 
spiteful to be quite trustworthy. He reports that 
the corps, comprising five brigades, numbered 
thirteen hundred and twenty-eight " effectives, " 
and that the casualties were eleven killed, one hun- 
dred and seven wounded, and sixteen missing. . In 



292 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



his report of the battle of Bentonville, he states 
that the corps went into battle on the 19th num- 
bering twenty-six hundred and eighty-seven " ef- 
fectives." Johnston, in a report to General Lee, 
dated nth of March, said that General Bragg's loss 
in the recent engagement was about five hundred. 
Hoke's command was larger than Hill's. Its re- 
turn for the 17th of March, after the battles of Wil- 
mington, Kinston, and the first day of Benton- 
ville, was : " Effectives," forty-seven hundred and 
seventy-five infantry ; artillery, seven hundred and 
eighty-two ; total, fifty-five hundred and fifty-seven. 
Schofield repaired the railroad to Kinston. He 
ordered Terry to advance from Wilmington by the 
railroad to Goldsboro, to which point he proceeded 
in person with Cox's command, arriving there on 
the 2 1 St. The campaign of the Carolinas was defi- 
nitely concluded on the 24th of March, when the 
six corps — the Tenth, Fourteenth. Fifteenth, Sev- 
enteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third — assembled 
there about their leader. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

THE END OF THE WAR. 

At Goldsboro Sherman came into full com- 
munication with the world. He found there Gen- 
eral Grant's aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Dunn, with 
letters. In one Grant, mentioning the co-operative 
movement on foot, said : " Wilson started on 
Monday with twelve thousand cavalry from East- 
port. Stoneman started on the same day from East 
Tennessee toward Lynchburg. Thomas is mov- 
ing the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap. Canby is 
moving with a formidable force on Mobile and the 
interior of Alabama. I ordered Gillmore, as soon 
as the fall of Charleston was known, to hold all 
important posts on the seacoast, and to send to 
Wilmington all surplus forces. Thomas was also 
directed to forward to Newbern all troops be- 
longing to the corps with you. I understand this 
will give you about five thousand men, besides 
those brought East with Meagher. I have been 
telegraphing Meigs to hasten up locomotives and 
cars for you." 

General Sherman determined to have personal 
consultation with General Grant while his army 
grouped around Goldsboro was getting supplied. 
As soon as the last rail was laid in repairs, leav- 
ing General Schofield in command, he started on 
the evening of the 25th on a locomotive for New- 
bern. At Moorhead City he took boat to General 
Grant's headquarters at City Point. When he en- 
tered Grant's quarters, they grasped hands and 

293 




294 



THE END OF THE WAR. 295 

Stood in silence, eye to eye, soul to soul, in closer 
communion than words could utter. 

Sherman had two long interviews with Presi- 
dent Lincoln on his boat. Admiral Porter was 
present at one. Both Sherman and Porter have 
made record of the conversation. Both mention 
the tender earnestness with which the President 
pressed and repeated his hope that there w^ould be 
no more slaughter, his wish that the war might 
close without another battle, and the disbanded 
soldiers return home to their farms and work- 
shops. General Sherman also relates that the Presi- 
dent, by telling a story, intimated that he would 
be glad if Jefferson Davis should get away, pro- 
vided he escaped " unbeknownst." Arrangements 
being made for the organization and supply of his 
army, Sherman undertook to be ready to move on 
the loth of April, and returned to Goldsboro, ar- 
riving there on the 30th of March. 

The army, as in the Atlanta campaign, com- 
prised a center and right and left wings. General 
Schofleld commanded the center, or the Army of 
the Ohio ; General Howard, the right wing, or the 
Army of the Tennessee ; and General Slocimi, the 
left wing, which had heretofore been called, but 
was now regularly constituted, the Army of 
Georgia, a separate army in the field. The Army 
of the Tennessee comprised the Fifteenth Corps, 
commanded by General Logan, and the Seventeenth, 
commanded by General Blair, and numbered 
twenty-eight thousand one hundred and seventeen 
infantry, fifty-three cavalry, and six hundred and 
sixty-four artillery. The Army of the Ohio com- 
prised the Tenth Corps, commanded by General 
Terry, and the Twenty-third, commanded by Gen- 
eral Cox, and numbered twenty-five thousand seven 
hundred and twenty-seven infantry and six hun- 
dred and sixty-five artillery. The Army of Georgia 
comprised the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by 
20 



296 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

General Davis, and the Twentieth, commanded by 
General Mower, and numbered twenty-seven thou- 
sand one hundred and twenty-four infantry and 
nine hundred and thirty-nine artillery. In addi- 
tion, General Kilpatrick's cavalry division con- 
tained fifty-four hundred and eighty-four cavalry 
and one hundred and seventy-five artillery. The 
aggregate was, on the loth of April : Infantry, 
eighty thousand nine hundred and sixty-eight ; 
cavalry, fifty-five hundred and thirty-seven ; artil- 
lery, twenty-four hundred and forty-three; aggre- 
gate, eighty-eight thousand nine hundred and forty- 
eight. The artillery had ninety-one guns. 

News came to Goldsboro on the 6th of April 
that Lee had evacuated Richmond and was hurry- 
ing away with his army and the Confederate Gov- 
ernment. A dispatch was received from Grant on 
the 8th, ending, " Rebel armies now are the only 
strategic points to strike at." Throwing up the 
plan of campaign published in field orders on the 
5th, he started on the loth direct for Johnston in 
his camp at Smithfield, which was found the next 
day abandoned, and the bridge across the Neuse 
burned. In the night Sherman received news of 
the surrender of Lee. On the march next day the 
tidings was given to the columns on the march. 
The men were wild with joy. The universal shout 
was, " Lee has surrendered, and we are going 
home ! " An ambitious desire to have one fight with 
Lee's army had been quite generally felt, but it 
was agreed about the camp fires that night that it 
was better that the Army of the Potomac should 
have achieved its final victory without extrane- 
ous aid. 

On the 14th a flag of truce came from General 
Johnston proposing a suppression of hostilities, and 
that General Grant be requested to " take like 
action in regard to other armies, the object being 
to permit the civil authorities to enter into the 



THE END OF THE WAR. 



297 



needful arrangement to terminate the. existing 
war." Sherman replied : " That a basis of action 
may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms 
and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and 
Lee at Appomattox Courthouse on the 9th instant 
relative to our two armies ; and, furthermore, to 
obtain from General Grant an order to suspend 
any movement of our troops in the direction of 
Virginia." 

On the morning of the 17th, as General Sher- 
man was entering the car to go out and meet Gen- 
eral Johnston, the telegraph operator asked him to 
wait till he received an important cipher dispatch 
from Mr. Stanton. It was the announcement of 
the murder of Lincoln. When the two generals 
met and withdrew to a little farmhouse which was 
vacated for them, Sherman showed the dispatch ; 
Johnston was shocked, and did not attempt to con- 
ceal his distress, and denounced the act as a dis- 
grace to the age. There was much serious con- 
versation upon the horrible deed before the busi- 
ness of the interview was reached. Then Sherman 
urged that Johnston could with propriety do what 
Lee had already done ; Johnston agreed to this, but 
thought that, instead of surrendering piecemeal, 
terms might be arranged which would embrace all 
the Confederate armies, and, upon his undertaking 
to procure authority from Jefferson Davis, the 
conference was adjudged till noon next day. 

Next morning the tidings of the murder of the 
President was promulgated in orders. The men 
sat all day, each in front of his shelter tent, somber, 
brooding, silent. The stillness was appalling. A 
word would have sent eighty thousand furious men, 
a whirling tornado, desolating the land. Sherman, 
accompanied by a party of officers, went on his er- 
rand of peace to negotiate the surrender of the 
Confederate armies. When the two generals met, 
Johnston proposed that General Breckinridge 



298 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



should be admitted to the conference, not as a 
member of the Confederate Government, but as an 
otificer in the Confederate army. Breckinridge was 
an adroit poHtician, and as he presented the propo- 
sition of making- terms of an immediate termina- 
tion of the war and the spread of universal peace, 
General Sherman's imagination so took fire at 
the prospect of such a boon to the weary nation 
that he drafted the following articles to be sub- 
mitted to the Government at Washington. They 
were at once accepted : 

1. The contending armies now in the field to maintain 
the sfiitii quo until notice is given by the commanding gen- 
eral of any one to its opponent, and reasonable time — say, 
forty-eight hours — allowed. 

2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be dis- 
banded and conducted to their several State capitals, there 
to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenal, 
and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement 
to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of the 
State and Federal authority. The number of arms and 
munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at 
Washington city, subject to the future action of the Con- 
gress ofthe United States, and in the meantime to be used 
solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the 
States respectively. 

3. The recognition by the Executive of the United States 
of the several State governments on their officers and legis- 
latures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of 
the United States, and, where conflicting State governments 
have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be 
submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. 

4. The re-establishment ol all the Federal courts of the 
several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of 
the United States and of the States respectively. 

5. The people and the inhabitants of all the States to be 
guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights 
and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, 
as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of 
the States respectively. 

6. The Executive authority of the Government of the 
United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of 
the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain 



THE END OF THE WAR. 



299 



from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence 
at the place of their residence. 

7. In general terms — the war to cease ; a general am- 
nesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can com- 
mand, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate 
armies, the distribution of the arms, and the resumption of 
peaceful pursuits by the officers and men hitherto composing 
the armies. 

Not being fully empowered by our respective principals 
to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge 
ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to 
carry out the above programme. 

General Sherman was at fault ; of course he, 
only the commander of one of the armies in the 
field, had no authority to make any such an ar- 
rangement or enter into any such negotiation, and 
the terms were not such as should have been made. 
But it was in accord with his uniform declarations 
through the war. While prosecuting war with 
rigor, he said on every occasion that he was ready 
to give fullest amnesty to all who should surrender 
and submit to the National Government. He was 
confident that he was only carrying out the earnest 
wish and purpose of President Lincoln as ex- 
pressed in the conversation at City Point. He had 
received no such warning as was sent to Grant — to 
restrict his action to the surrender of Lee's army, 
and to leave all other matters to the Executive. 
He knew that after Lee's surrender General Weit- 
zcl had convened the Confederate Legislature in 
Richmond, and had not heard that Weitzel's order 
had been disapproved and rescinded. And, finally, 
he acted the more freely because his action was 
only provisional, and without effect unless ratified. 

But he was sure that he was right, and elated 
that he was the instrument of bringing such a 
boon to the country. He sent Alajor Hitchcock 
with the articles of agreement to General Grant on 
the 20th. When Grant read them he sent the paper 
with his disapproval to the Secretary of Vv'ar, with 



30O 



GENERAL SHERMAN, 



recommendation to submit it at once to President 
Johnson and the whole Cabinet. Grant was or- 
dered to proceed at once to Sherman's headquar- 
ters, terminate the truce, and direct the move- 
ments of the army. 

Early in the morning of the 24th Major Hitch- 
cock appeared on his return, and with him was 
General Grant. The general directed General 
Sherman to give at once notice to terminate the 
truce at the end of forty-eight hours, and then 
resume hostilities and press pursuit. The notice 
was immediately sent, and at the same time a de- 
mand for surrender of Johnston's army on the same 
terms as were given to General Lee at Appomat- 
tox. At the same time orders were issued to be 
ready to move on the expiration of forty-eight 
hours. Message was sent to the same effect to 
General Gillmore in South Carolina, with instruc- 
tions to send the same to General Wilson in 
Georgia. On the 25th word came from Johnston 
requesting another interview next day. On the 
26th Johnston surrendered the troops under his 
command upon the terms granted by Grant to Lee. 
General Grant approved, and took the agreement 
of capitulation with him to Washington on the 
27th. Sherman made the necessary orders to carry 
out the terms of the capitulation, appointed Gen- 
eral Schofield to superintend the details, and started 
for Savannah to insure communication with Gen- 
eral Wilson. The incident was closed. 

The murder of Lincoln, the attempted assassina- 
tion of Seward, and the purposed murder of other 
high ofificials horrified the people and unnerved the 
Cabinet. Vice-President Johnson, who succeeded 
to the presidency, was known to be loyal to the 
Union, but otherwise was, to the people, an un- 
known quantity. Doubt and distrust and vague 
apprehension prevailed. Stanton, with his intense 
loyalty to the nation, could be arbitrary and cruel, 



THE END OF THE WAR. 



301 



and could trample on plans and persons whom he 
deemed inimical to the nation. He seems, all at 
once, to have lost faith in Sherman's loyalty, as 
well as his discretion. He immediately dispatched 
to General Dix, who gave it to the New York 
papers, the following communication : 

Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived from 
General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hos- 
tilities, and a memorandum of what is called a basis for 
peace, had been entered into on the i8th inst. by General 
Sherman, with the rebel General Johnston. Brigadier-Gen- 
eral Breckinridge was present at the conference. 

A cabinet meeting was held at eight o'clock in the even- 
ing, at which the action of General Sherman was disap- 
proved by the President, by the Secretary of War, by General 
Grant, and by every member of the Cabinet. General Sher- 
man was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and was 
directed that the instructions given by the late President in 
the following telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln 
himself at the Capitol on the night of the 3d of March, were 
approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated 
to govern the action of military commanders. 

On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln 
and his Cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General 
Grant was brought to the Secretary of War, informing him 
that General Lee had requested an interview or conference 
to make an arrangement for terms of peace. The letter of 
General Lee was published in a letter to Davis and to the 
rebel Congress. General Grant's telegram vv-as submitted 
to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few minutes, took up 
his pen and wrote with his own hand the following reply, 
which he submitted to the Secretary of State and Secretary 
of War. It was then dated, addressed, and signed by the 
Secretary of War, and telegraphed to General Grant : 

Washington, March 3, 1863 — 12 p. m. 

Lteutennnt-General Grant : 

The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you 
to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the 
capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or 
purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you 
are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political ques- 
tions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, 
and will submit them to no military conferences or convcn- 



302 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



tions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your mili- 
tary advantages. 

Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman, to 
withdraw from Salisbury and join him, will probably open the 
way for Davis to escape to New Mexico or Europe with his 
plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not 
only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accu- 
mulations. 

A dispatch received by this department from Richmond 
says : " It is stated here, by respectable parties, that the 
amount of specie taken South by Jeff Davis and his par- 
tisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the 
Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, 
it is said, to make terms with General Sherman, or some 
other commander, by which they will be permitted with 
their effects, including this gold plunder, to go to Mexico or 
Europe. Johnston's negotiations looked to this end." 

After the Cabinet meeting last night General Grant 
started for North Carolina to direct operations against John- 
ston's army. The reasons for disapproval were : 

1. It was an exercise of authority not vested in General 
Sherman, and on its face shows that both he and Johnston 
knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter into 
any such arrangement. 

2. It was a practical acknowledgment of the rebel gov- 
ernment. 

3. It undertook to re-establish the rebel State govern- 
ment that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many 
thousand loyal lives and an immense treasury, and placed the 
arms and munitions of war in the hands of the rebels at 
their respective capitals, which might be used as soon as the 
armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to 
conquer and subdue the loyal States. 

4. By the restoration of the rebel authority in their re- 
spective Stales, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery. 

5. It might furnish a ground of responsibility for the 
Federal Government to pay the rebel debts, and certainly 
subject the loyal citizens of rebel States to debts contracted 
by rebels in the States. 

6. It would put in dispute the existence of loyal State 
governments and the new State of West Virginia, which had 
been recognized by every department of the United States 
Government. 

7. It practically abolished the confiscation laws and re- 



THE END OF THE WAR. 303 

lieved the rebels of every degree, who had slaughtered our 
people, from all pains and penalties for their crimes. 

8. It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, 
and solemnly retused by President Lincoln, and better terms 
than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous 
conditions. 

9. It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but re- 
lieved the rebels from the presence of our victories, and left 
them in condition to renew their efforts to overthrow the 
United States Government, and subdue the loyal States 
whenever their strength was recruited and any opportunity 
was offered. 

General Halleck was relieved from his position 
as chief of staff and appointed commander of the 
MiHtary Division of the James, comprising the 
State of Virginia and so much of North Carohna 
as was not occupied by Sherman. Generals Meade 
and Sheridan came under his command. General 
Grant dispatched to Halleck on the 22d of April 
from Fortress Monroe : " The truce entered into 
by General Sherman will be ended as soon as I can 
reach Raleigh. Move Sheridan w^ith his cavalry 
toward Greensboro as soon as possible. I think 
it will be well to send one corps of infantry with 
the cavalry. The infantry need not go farther 
than Danville unless they receive orders hereafter." 
Johnston was at Greensboro and Sherman at 
Raleigh, with their respective commands disposed 
in front of each. 

General Halleck on the same day ordered Sheri- 
dan : " You will move with your cavalry immedi- 
ately on Greensboro. You will then act as circum- 
stances seem to require, unless you receive instruc- 
tions from General Grant, who is on his way to 
Raleigh. General Meade has been directed to place 
i an infantry corps under your direction. It is said 
here that there is a large amount of specie on the 
road between here and Charlotte. It is supposed 
to hnve been taken at different points from the rail- 
road. . . . While pushing sotith with all possible 



304 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



dispatch, look into these things." Sheridan prom- 
ised to be ready to move on the 25th. 

On the 23d Halleck dispatched to Sheridan : 
" Pay no attention to the Sherman and Johnston 
truce. It has been disapproved by the President. 
Try to cut off Jefif Davis's specie." Plallcck being 
advised that CJeneral Meade had received notice 
from the Confederate commander that a second 
truce had been arranged between Johnston and 
Sherman, dispatched to him on the 26th : " To 
avoid all misunderstanding, telegraph again to 
General Wright to observe no truce not made by 
General Grant, but do all in his power to cut off the 
enemy's retreat. General Grant has reached Ra- 
leigh, and ordered an immediate resumption of hos- 
tilities. The enemy's ol^ject now is to permit the 
leaders to escape South l)y their dilatory negotia- 
tions." On the 27th Meade telegraphed to Gen- 
eral Wright that he was not to pay any attention 
to dispatches concerning truces without official 
instruction from General Grant or General Sher- 
man, and informed General Plalleck that he had 
sent such instructions. Halleck replied to Meade 
the same day : " Impress upon General Wright 
and General Sheridan that they are not to regard 
any dispatches from General Sherman, direct or 
through rebel authorities. They will obey only the 
orders from General Grant or myself. They will 
push on with all possible dispatch and carry out 
their original orders without regard to General 
Sherman's arrangements." General Sheridan found 
obstacles which prevented his reaching Danville, and 
Wright claimed that if he was to advance against 
Johnston at Greensboro he should do so only in 
connection with a simultaneous movement by Sher- 
man. In the night of the same day Meade sent Hal- 
leck's last dispatch to Wright, and next morning, 
the 28th, Halleck notified Meade of the surrender, 
recalled Sheridan, and stayed Wright at Danville. 



THE END OF THE WAR. 305 

On the 27th Secretary Stanton sent a second 
letter to General Dix, which was also published in 
the papers. It reads : 

The department has received the following dispatch 
from Major-General Halleck, commanding the Military Divi- 
sion of tiie James. Generals Canby and Thomas were in- 
structed some days ago that Sherman's arrangements with 
Johnston were disapproved by the President, and they were 
ordered to disregard it, imd push the enemy in every direc- 
tion : 

Richmond, Va., April 2b — 9.30 p. M. 

Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright are acting under 
orders to pay no regard to any truce or orders of General 
Sherman respecting hostilities, on the ground that Sherman's 
agreement could bind his command only, and no other. 

They are directed to push forward, regardless of orders 
from any one except from General Grant, and cut off Gen- 
eral Johnston's retreat. 

Beauregard has telegraphed to Danville that a new ar- 
rangement has been made with Sherman, and that the ad- 
vance of the Sixth Corps was to be suspended until further 
orders. 

I have telegraphed back to obey no orders of Sherman, 
but to push forward as rapidly as possible. 

The bankers have information to-day that Jeff Davis's 
specie is moving south from Goldsboro in wagons as fast as 
possible. 

1 suggest that orders be telegraphed through General 
Thomas that Wilson obey no orders from Sherman, and 
notifying him and Canby, and all commanders on the Mis- 
sissippi, to take measures to intercept the rebel chiefs and 
their plunder. The specie taken with them is estimated here 
at from six to thirteen million dollars. 

General Sherman on the 28th appointed Gen- 
eral Schofield, with the aid of General Cox, to take 
charge of paroling the surrendered troops and 
make arrangements for their departure, and di- 
rected General Howard to take the right and left 
wings by easy marches to Richmond, where he 
could rejoin them on his return from the South. 
Next day he left for Charleston and Savannah. He 



3o6 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

read in the newspapers with amazement the com- 
munications of Stanton and Halleck, and the in- 
flammatory editorials in the newspapers. He did 
not heed the shameful insinuation of personal in- 
terest in the phantom treasure of the fleeing Presi- 
dent, but to be denounced by authority and vilified 
by the press as a military outcast, incapacitated to 
make a valid order, stung him to the quick. 

The paroling of Johnston's army and detach- 
ments occasioned some relaxation of the terms of 
the surrender. Enlisted men, as well as olBcers, 
were allowed by General Schofield to take home 
horses and other property belonging to them. The 
total number of paroles, as ascertained by revision 
of the rolls, is thirty-nine thousand and twelve. 

The march from Petersburg, beginning on the 
1st and arriving on the 7th of May, was a contrast 
with the march across South Carolina. Good roads 
and fine weather made easy marching and early 
camps. There was absolutely no foraging, either 
authorized or illicit. There was no straggling. At 
every halt the men stacked arms and remained by 
their stacks. They had marched far and toiled and 
suffered much to reach Richmond, and at last they 
were to meet their comrades of the Army of the 
Potomac. General Howard, on reaching Peters- 
burg, reported his arrival to General Halleck. 
Halleck's greeting came promptly : " Your com- 
mand will be encamped at or near Manchester, and 
not be permitted to enter Richmond until prepared 
to march through the city." The command went 
into camp about Manchester, across the river from 
Richmond, and found guards posted across every 
road to prevent any member of Sherman's army 
from going into the city. 

When General Sherman returned from the 
South, he was met by a note from General Halleck 
professing friendship, and asking him to be his 
guest while in Richmond. Sherman declined both 



THE END OF THE WAR. 



307 



the invitation and the friendship. On the nth. 
General Logan having been appointed commander 
of the Army of the 1 ennessee in place of General 
Howard, who had been called to Washington to 
organize the Freedman's Bureau, the army passed 
through Richmond on its way to Washington, with 
colors furled, equipped for march, at route step, 
and with trains in the column. 

The army reached the neighborhood of Alex- 
andria on the 19th of May, and went into camp. 
Orders had been sent from Raleigh for uniforms, 
hats, equipment, headquarter colors, and every- 
thing required to make the troops presentable for 
the final review. The supplies were arriving, and 
all was busy preparation. General Sherman was 
invited to the city by many friends. General Grant 
met him. The President and members of the Cabi- 
net received him cordially, and voluntarily assured 
him that they knew nothing of Stanton's mem- 
oranda before they were seen in the newspapers. 
On the 23d, the day of the review of the Army of 
the Potomac, Sherman's army moved nearer to the 
city, and went into bivouac between Four Mile 
Run and the Long Bridge. 

Early the next morning the troops crossed the 
bridge and massed in open ground north and east 
of the Capitol. At nine o'clock General Sherman, 
accompanied by General Howard and followed by 
his staff, moved, leading the column of the Fif- 
teenth, Seventeenth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth 
Corps, marching division front, two companies 
abreast. As they turned the Capitol grounds into 
Pennsylvania Avenue a thrilling spectacle came 
into view. As far as the eye could reach toward 
the Treasury Building the sidewalks were packed 
with a dense multitude, which the lines of cavalry 
stationed along the sides to keep the roadway clear 
could hardly prevent from bulging into the street. 
Every step and porch and doorway, every balcony 



3o8 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

and window, the roofs where parapets made it prac- 
ticable, were mosaic of human heads. 

The men were inspired by the view. Elate, 
erect, eyes steady to the front, they moved with 
alert and vigorous step, lines dressed with abso- 
lute precision, and intervals perfectly preserved. 
The reviewing stand was in front of the White 
House, where the President stood with his Cabi- 
net and other high officials, and Mrs. Sherman and 
other ladies. Facing this, on the other side of the 
avenue, were long ranks of seats, filled with the 
diplomatic corps and other notabilities, and thou- 
sands of others. The steady tide passed between 
for six hours and a half without a flaw. When Gen- 
eral Sherman took his place the President, the 
members of the Cabinet, and others pressed for- 
ward to welcome him. He had hearty greeting 
from all, till Mr. Stanton approached with out- 
stretched hand. Sherman declined and refused to 
recognize him. The army passed by. Armies, 
corps, and divisions filed off as guided to designated 
camp grounds in the outskirts of the city. Gen- 
eral Sherman's " bummers " reposed in the grounds 
and groves of the country seats surrounding the 
Capitol, and there read the farewell address of their 
great commander : 

The g^eneral commanding announces to the Armies of 
the Tennessee and Georgia that the time has come for us to 
part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy 
us. Some of you will go to your homes, and others will be 
retained in military service till further orders. And now that 
we are about to separate, to mingle with the civil world, it 
becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation of 
National affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we 
were gathered about the cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all 
the future was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty. 

Three armies had come together from distant fields, with 
separate histories, yet bound by one common cause — the 
union of our country and the perpetuation of the Govern- 
ment of our inheritance. There is no need to recall to your 



THE END OF THE WAR. 



309 



memories Tunnel Hill, with Rocky Face Mountain and Buz- 
zard Roost Gap, and the ugly forts of Dalton behind. We 
were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, 
but dashed through Snake Creek Gap and fell on Resaca; 
then on the Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesavv ; and the heats of 
summer found us on the banks of the Chattahoochee, far 
from home and dependent on a single road for supplies. 
Again we were not to be held back by any obstacle, and 
crossed over and fought four hard battles for the possession 
of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of our history. 
A doubt still clouded our future, but we solved the problem, 
destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of Georgia, 
severed all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and Christ- 
mas found us at Savannah. 

Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we 
again began a march which, for peril, labor, and results, will 
compare with any ever made by an organized army. The 
floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Combahee and 
Edisto, the " high hills " and rocks of the Santee, the flat 
quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear Rivers, were all 
passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the face of 
an accumulating enemy ; and, after the battles of Averys- 
boro and Bentonville, we once more came out of the wilder- 
ness to meet our friends at Goldsboro. Even then we 
paused only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our 
wagons, again pushed on to Raleigh and beyond, until we 
met our enemy suing for peace instead of war, and offering 
to submit to the injured laws of his and our country. As 
long as that enemy was defiant, nor mountains, nor rivers, 
nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold had checked us ; but 
when he who had fought us hard and persistently offered 
submission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him 
farther, and negotiations followed, which resulted, as you all 
know, in his surrender. 

How far the operations of this army contributed to the 
final overthrow of the Confederacy and the peace which now 
dawns upon us, must be judged by others, not by us ; but 
that you have done all that men could do has been admitted 
by those in authority, and we have a right to join in the uni- 
versal joy that fills our land because the war is over, and our 
Government stands vindicated before the world by the joint 
action of the volunteer armies and navies of the United 
States. 

To such as remain in the ser\'ice, your general need only 
remind you that success in the past was due to hard work 
and discipline, and that the same work and discipline are 



3IO GENERAL SHERMAN. 

equally important in the future. To such as go home, he 
will only say that our favored country is so grand, so exten- 
sive, so diversihed in climate, soil, and productions, that 
every man may hnd a home and occupation suited to his 
taste ; none should yield to the natural impatience sure to 
result from our past life of excitement and adventure. You 
will be invited to seek new adventures abroad ; do not yield 
to the temptation, for it will lead only to death and disap- 
pointment. 

Your general now bids you farewell, with the full belief that, 
as in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will 
make good citizens ; and if, unfortunately, new war should 
arise in our country, " Sherman's army " will be the first to 
buckle on its old armor, and come forth to defend and main- 
tain the Government of our inheritance. 

By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman. 
L. M. Dayton, Assista?ii Adjutant-General. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

POST BELLUM. 

The great review at Washington was hardly 
over when Sherman took advantage of the oppor- 
tunity to throw off the harness and enjoy the " twen- 
ty days' leave of absence to see the young folks," 
which, in September of the preceding year, he had 
jocularly written to Grant they might hope for 
after the one had received Lee's surrender and the 
other had marched to the Atlantic. It was barely 
more than twenty days, for on the 27th of June 
the peace establishment of departments was an- 
nounced, and under the same title as his last glori- 
ous war command, the West and Northwest, to 
the Rocky Mountains, was organized as the Mili- 
tary Division of the Mississippi, and assigned to 
him, with his headquarters at St. Louis. 

He settled his family there, with bright hopes 
of happiness in the home life which would be per- 
mitted him by the routine duties of a time of peace. 
His house was a solid square mansion, with its 
pleasant garden, and in a bright working room with 
cheerful outlook, with books, maps, and papers 
about him, he was soon making his leisure hours 
profitable by systematizing the files of his private 
papers, and arranging the material out of which 
afterward came his Memoirs. 

The inspection of the frontier posts, visits to the 
Indian tribes under his care, and to the Union Pa- 
cific Railway, as its construction was vigorously 
pushed toward the mountains, gave him enough 
21 3" 



312 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



outdoor work to satisfy his active habit of body, 
and left him still time " to rest, study, and make 
the acquaintance of my family," which he naively 
told the President he really wanted. A year of 
thorough enjoyment of this uneventful though 
quietly busy life passed, when he found himself in- 
voluntarily drawn into the vortex of turbulent 
political conflict which marked the administration 
of President Johnson. In September, 1866, he was 
summoned in haste from the mountains of New 
Mexico to Washington for the purpose, as it turned 
out, of being put in command of the whole army 
for a time, while General Grant should go upon a 
special mission to escort the minister (Mr. Camp- 
bell) accredited to President Juarez, of Mexico, who 
was keeping up a show of resistance to the P'rench 
occupation and the rule of Maximilian. The grade 
of general had been conferred on Grant by law, 
and Sherman had succeeded to that of lieutenant 
general, and, had the temporary change been made 
with Grant's consent, there would have been noth- 
ing noteworthy in the matter. 

But Sherman found Grant full of the conviction 
that some sinister purpose was at the bottom of 
what he considered an improper effort to send him 
out of the country. Supposed intrigues with re- 
gard to the next term of the presidency were more 
or less involved, and Grant was resolved that he 
would take the consequences of a refusal to obey 
the President's order, on the ostensible ground that 
such a personal escort, without troops, was not a 
military duty of the general in chief. While Sher- 
man thought it a mistake on Grant's part to enter- 
tain the idea of being a presidential candidate, their 
friendship was such that he placed himself by 
Grant's side the moment an issue was joined. He 
went to the President, and so strongly opposed the 
idea of forcing upon the general an unwelcome duty 
of questionable legality that Johnson yielded on 



POST BELLUM. 



313 



condition that Sherman himself would go with Mr. 
Campbell. The result was an official promenade 
to Cuba, and thence to Vera Cruz, Tampico, and 
Brazos Santiago, without finding the Mexican 
President. The demonstration was part of the 
diplomatic pressure upon Louis Napoleon which 
constrained him to withdraw his army and caused 
Maximilian's downfall. 

Grant and Sherman had both been regarded as 
friendly to President Johnson's theory of restora- 
tion of the rebellious States, and in the first stages 
of the quarrel between the President and Secretary 
Stanton both sided with the President. They 
strongly resented Stanton's concentration of all 
military power in the War Office, and his habit of 
ignoring the general in the peace administration of 
army affairs. Both were strong advocates of the 
plan of having all stafif bureaus report through the 
general, so that he might not only have knowledge 
of whatever affected the army, but might be regu- 
larly heard upon all important matters of adminis- 
tration before they were decided upon. Every of- 
ficer in turn who has commanded the army, from 
General Scott downward, has protested against a 
system which has practically resulted in making 
the staff bureaus independent of the military head 
of the army, and in allowing an adjutant general, 
who might have the ambition to do so, to use the 
whole power of the Secretary and reduce the gen- 
eral in chief to a nullity.* The antagonism between 
Grant and Stanton was such that when the latter 
abandoned the President's policy and went into op- 
position but still refused to resign his place in the 
Cabinet. Grant was quite willing to assist Mr. John- 
son in testing the constitutionality of the Tenure of 
Office Act in the courts. He accepted the position 

* For a full discussion of this subject, see General Schofield's 
Forty-six Years in the Army, chapters xxii and xxvi. 



314 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

of Secretary of War in the interim when the Presi- 
dent removed Mr. Stanton, but, on more carefully 
studying the law when the Senate refused to consent 
to the removal, he declined to carry resistance to 
Stanton's return as far as Mr. Johnson thought he 
had agreed to do. Differences between him and 
the President began here, which grew rapidly larger 
as events more and more indicated Grant to be 
the almost inevitable candidate of the Republican 
party for the presidency if he avoided open quarrel 
with the party leaders in Congress. He believed 
the Tenure of Office Act to be impolitic, if not un- 
constitutional, and when he became President he 
was not long in compassing its repeal ; but he saw 
no reason for making himself a champion of oppo- 
sition to it in the peculiar condition of affairs which 
then existed. He believed that Stanton was under 
moral, if not legal, obligation to relieve the Presi- 
dent of the embarrassment of his presence in the 
Cabinet after the rupture between them, but he 
declined to defy the law and make himself liable 
to its penalties. He and his advisers thought there 
was the same kind of political finesse in this matter 
that they had seen in the plan of sending him to 
Mexico, and their distrust of Johnson soon over- 
shadowed that which they had felt toward Stanton. 
Many circumstances tended to make General 
Sherman influential with President Johnson and a 
useful peacemaker. Their opinions on the solution 
of the great political problem of the day were not 
far apart. The President had assured the general 
that he had known nothing of Mr. Stanton's pub- 
lished strictures on the Johnston convention till he 
saw them in print.* Sherman had as early as No- 
vember, 1865. called his brother's attention to the 
drift of Mr. Johnson toward the basis of settlement 
indicated in the terms he offered to the Confederate 
general. f He had, with characteristic point, put 

* Memoirs, ii, 375. f Sherman Letters, p. 257. 



POST BELLUM. 



315 



the situation tersely in the same correspondence. 
" We can not keep the South out long," he had said, 
" and it is a physical impossibility for us to guard 
the entire South by armies ; nor can we change 
opinions by force, . . . and for some time the 
marching of State governments must be controlled 
by the same class of whites as went into the rebellion 
against us." * " It is surely unfortunate," he said 
again, " that the President is thus thrown seem- 
ingly on the old mischievous anti-war Democrats, 
but from his standpoint he had no alternative. To 
outsiders it looks as though he was purposely forced 
into that category." f 

When, therefore, President Johnson found him- 
self in strained relations to Grant, it was almost in- 
evitable that he should turn to General Sherman 
for aid in breaking the deadlock in the War Depart- 
ment. The resolution of the Senate refusing con- 
sent to Johnson's removal of Stanton was passed 
on January 13, 1868. Sherman, who was in Wash- 
ington attending meetings of his commission to 
revise the army regulations, had known of Grant's 
opinion that he must not be put in antagonism to 
Congress by continuing to exercise the office of 
Secretary, had prompted Grant to have an under- 
standing with the President on the subject, and was 
present at a subsequent interview between them 
when their conversation indicated a fair mutual un- 
derstanding. Grant had expected that Stanton 
would notify him a couple of days in advance of 
his demand for restoration to his office, according 
to the precedent Stanton himself had set in yielding 
the office to Grant, ad iiitcriiii, in the previous 
August. This would have allowed time for the 
attorney general to take the case into court upon 
application for an injlmction, or, if that could have 
been arranged, for Mr. Stanton to apply for a man- 

* Sherman Letters, p. 254. f Id., p. 264. 



3l6 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

damns. But the course actually taken was to serve 
upon General Grant a copy of the resolution of the 
Senate as soon as passed ; and he, having been per- 
suaded that he should incur the penalties of a law- 
breaker if he delayed acquiescence, turned over the 
keys of the office to the adjutant general at once.* 

Sherman was strong in the conviction that only 
mischief to the country and to the army could re- 
sult from the effort to nullify the authority of the 
President over the army or to force into intimate 
Cabinet relations to him one who was personally 
hostile. He was earnestly active in trying to find 
some solution of the difficulty. His own relations 
to Stanton had become pleasant, they having tacitly 
agreed to ignore the incidents attending the con- 
vention with Johnston, and he offered to go to 
Stanton, either with Grant or alone, and to say to 
him that he ought to resign. He suggested to 
Grant, and they both urged upon the President, 
that he should send to the Senate the name of a 
person to be Secretary of War who, as they thought, 
would be acceptable, and whose confirmation would 
effect a change without the rougher form of re- 
moval. They did not know that the person they 
named had been engaged in a friendly correspond- 
ence with Mr. Johnson, urging him to find some 
reasonable method of avoiding sharp antagonism 
with Congress, and had perhaps given offense in 
that way. That they did not know this was good 
evidence of their avoidance of even usual personal 
conferences, as was also the fact that he they named 
never knew of it till their correspondence found 
its way into print nearly twenty years afterward, f 

The well-meant effort at conciliation failed, and 
affairs drifted on to the attempted impeachment of 
Mr. Johnson — to intelligent lovers of their coun- 

* General E. D. Townsend's Anecdotes of the Civil War, p. 124. 
f North American Review, July, 1886, p. 83. 



POST EELLUM. 317 

try the nightmare period of our politics. Sherman 
found it hard to overcome his aversion to meddhng 
v/ith poUtics at all ; but the army was so directly in- 
volved in the controversy that he thought it a sort 
of oflficial duty to do what he could to make decent 
administration possible, and this, with his friend- 
ship for Grant, overcame his scruples. He wrote 
to the latter : " I'm afraid that acting as a go-be- 
tween for three persons I may share the usual fate 
of meddlers, and at last get kicks from all. We 
ought not to be involved in politics, but for the 
sake of the army we are justified in trying at least 
to cut this Gordian knot."* The efforts were not 
wholly without fruit. A little later Mr. Evarts re- 
newed them, and a compromise was arranged by 
which General Schofield became Secretary of War 
and Mr. Stanton retired.f 

One phase of the estrangement between the 
President and General Grant disturbed him more 
than all the rest. In his irritation at finding the 
War Department and the army taken practically 
out of his executive control, Mr. Johnson conceived 
the idea of making Sherman brevet general, and 
assigning to him the duties of general in chief. 
Sherman met this wnth the refusal of the promo- 
tion, and even wrote to his brother, the Senator, 
asking him earnestly to oppose the confirmation if 
his name should be sent to the Senate. He was 
resolved not to suffer himself to be put in antag- 
onism or rivalry to Grant, and declared with reso- 
lute purpose that he would resign his commission 
in the army and retire to a life of poverty rather 
than allow himself to be made use of to humiliate 
his friend. J He had taken this position early, for 
no sooner had he completed his march to the sea 



* Memoirs, ii, 424. 

+ Schofield, Forty-six Years in the Army, p. 413. 

j^ Sherman Letters, pp. 282, 297, 303. 



318 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



than suggestions were made of giving him addi- 
tional rank as evidence of popular appreciation. 
He wrote to John Sherman from Savannah, in Jan- 
uary, 1865 : " I deem it unwise to make another 
lieutenant general, or to create the rank of gen- 
eral. I will accept no commission that would tend 
to create a rivalry with Grant. I want him to hold 
what he has earned and got. I have all the rank 
I want. ... Of military titles I have now the 
maximum, and it makes no difference whether that 
be major general or marshal. It means the same 
thing. I have commanded a hundred thousand 
men in battle and on the march, successfully, and 
that is enough for reputation."* As to political 
ofifices, he desired it to be known that he would be 
offended by any mooting of his name in connection 
with them. 

General Sherman had been summoned to Wash- 
ington when he was at a council with the chiefs 
of the tribes of Indians who had been making des- 
ultory war on the frontier, but who had been 
induced to meet the peace commission of the United 
States, at the head of which the general was. The 
meeting was at North Platte, in Nebraska, and the 
leading men of the Ogallala, Brule Sioux, and the 
Cheyennes met them there. The great and burn- 
ing question was the demand of the Indians that 
the construction of the Powder River and Smoky 
Hill Railroads be abandoned because they broke 
up and frightened away the bufYalo herds. The 
meeting was a noteworthy one for the importance 
of the personages, red and white ; for Spotted Tail, 
Man-afraid-of-his-horses, Swift Bear, Big Mouth, 
Pawnee-killer, and others represented the Indians, 
while Generals Sherman, Harney, Terry, and Augur 
of the army were there, with Senator Henderson, 
Commissioner Taylor, and other noted civilians. 

* Shemian Letters, p. 245. 



POST BELLUM. 



319 



Henry M. Stanley was there, beginning his travels 
and adventures, and giving us a picture of the ne- 
gotiations, which is one of the best extant repre- 
sentations of an Indian council.* 

There was plain talk on both sides. The In- 
dians seemed to realize that the time had come when 
they must perish along with the wild game unless 
they could stop the progress of the whites. Their 
first speaker said : " Ever since I've been born I 
have eaten wild meat. My father and grandfather 
ate wild meat before me. We can not give up 
quickly the customs of our fathers." This was the 
keynote. The conditions of Indian life could not 
be preserved unless the building of railroads was 
stopped. 

Sherman told them frankly that it was vain to 
hope to stop the spread of the white people. They 
should be paid damages for the loss to them, but 
the only hope for their future was in learning to 
till the earth and to raise cattle. He pointed to 
the increased travel across the country which they 
themselves had seen, and told them they could see 
for themselves that " the slow ox wagon will not 
answer the white man. We build iron roads, and 
you can not stop the locomotive any more than 
you can stop the sun or moon." He urged them 
to agree upon reservations of good land at once. 
" You see for yourselves that the white men are 
collecting in all directions in spite of all you can 
do. The white men are taking all the good land. 
If you don't choose your homes now, it will be 
too late next year." It was a pathetic, hopeless 
sort of discussion, in which these children of wild 
Nature and of the boundless prairies argued for 
their right to remain what they were, and to bid 
a resistless tide of change to stand still. 



* My Early Travels and Adventures. By Henry M. Stanley, 
vol. i, p. 197, etc. 



320 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



The characteristics of the general were never 
more clearly shown. His honest, square dealing 
sought no subterfuge. He tried to make them 
realize the truth, unwelcome as it might be, that 
their only salvation was in getting into some sort 
of harmony with the civilization of the white men. 
Stanley has gone back with evident interest to this 
his first close contact with uncivilized man, after 
his romantic explorations of darkest Africa had 
opened the way for still more vast experiments in 
the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest 
between the progressive and the unprogressive 
races. It is safe to say that in all his wanderings he 
nowhere saw franker dealing with the weaker peo- 
ples or heard more sincere warning of the destruc- 
tion which must inevitably follow their brave but 
hopeless efforts to stop the progress of a world. 

The summer of 1868 brought the nomination 
of Grant for the presidency, and his election in the 
autumn was a notice to Sherman that his quiet 
home life in St. Louis must soon be broken up. 
He had been kept busy with the perplexing strife 
at the National capital, and had not had the full 
measure of rest which he had wished for ; but it was 
always a relief to him to feel that when the duty 
that summoned him to Washington was done he 
could get away from the intrigue and turmoil of 
the capital to the peace of his family circle, and to 
the healthful ranging of the great plains, visiting 
his military posts, where the moral tone was the 
wholesome one begot by plain living and the hon- 
est performance of the soldier's duty. The thing 
which most chafed him at Washington was the 
constant urgency of selfish personal reasons to 
override the discipline, system, and order which 
are the essence of good military administration. 

The social life of the place was attractive to 
him, and intercourse with statesmen and diplo- 
matists gave delightful stimulus to his own powers 



POST BELLUM. 32I 

of thought and conversation, especially as he could 
not be insensible to the fact that his society was 
eagerly sought by the ablest and most brilliant 
people. His unreserved freedom of expression and 
his racy way of hitting off the point of discussion 
had a never-failing charm and freshness. It was 
the same originality of view and power of reach- 
ing the heart of things by a happy phrase which is 
found abundantly in his familiar correspondence, 
as when he said, apropos to the notion that legisla- 
tion accomplishes everything, that " as long as 
cases have to be tried by juries, all laws counter to 
the prejudices of the whole people are waste 
paper " ; or, again, when speaking of conflicts be- 
tween principle and prejudice, he said, " A voter 
has as much right to his prejudices as to his vote." * 

In Washington, however, he found it impossible 
to apply his working hours to the efficient perform- 
ance of duty. He was constantly besieged by all 
sorts of people to let some pressure of personal 
favor overcome his ideas of right system. The 
resistance to importunity vexed him, and left his 
mind too much disturbed to resume the calm con- 
sideration of large questions. He was very loath, 
therefore, to consider the necessity of making his 
residence in Washington when General Grant 
should become president, as it was evident he 
would have to do. 

Shortly after the November election a meeting 
of soldiers of the Western volunteer armies was 
held at Chicago, which was the most notable re- 
union of the sort ever held. It was, in fact, a great 
celebration of the elevation to the presidency of 
the general who had built up his renown in leading 
them to victories from Donelson to Missionary 
Ridge, and yet everything which could be called 
politics was carefully excluded. Sherman himself 

* Sherman Letters, pp. 288, 298. 



322 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



had originated the plan, and had fixed the joint 
anniversary of the battle of Nashville and the oc- 
cupation of Savannah as the time for the renewal 
of comradeship, while Grant was still the general 
of the army. The invited guests included the army 
and corps commanders of the Eastern armies, the 
general officers of the regular army, and civil of- 
ficials of the nation and of the States which had 
given their quotas to the National defense. Gen-- 
eral Thomas was made the chairman of the public 
meeting, and was supported by Grant on his right 
and Sherman on his left. The latter presided at the 
banquet. Nearly every soldier of distinction in 
the rosters of the civil war was there. Sherman's 
address of welcome struck nobly the keynote of 
patriotic devotion, of the citizenship of the Ameri- 
can soldier, and the perpetuation of the National 
union. It was a great love-feast of the men who 
had saved the country, and most of whom had put 
off the uniform and resumed the industries of civil 
life. They now met again to hail with boundless 
enthusiasm the great commanders who had led 
them to victory. 

In the moments of private conversation which 
Grant and Sherman could snatch from the festivi- 
ties of the occasion, the President-elect outlined his 
purpose as to army organization, and informed Sher- 
man that he would be called to Washington to suc- 
ceed to the office of general, and to carry into ef- 
fect changes which Grant had urged since 1866 
aflfecting the scope of the general's authority. He 
also indicated his purpose to give Sheridan the 
position of lieutenant general, to become vacant by 
Sherman's promotion. This last was a matter fruit- 
ful in heartburnings. Halleck and Meade were 
Sheridan's seniors as major generals in the regular 
army, and Thomas had many friends who claimed 
that injustice had been done him when Sheridan 
had been promoted first to this rank. They urged 



POST BELLUM. 323 

that the appointment of Thomas as lieutenant gen- 
eral would be but the correction of an old injus- 
tice. In this matter Thomas had the sympathies 
and good wishes of most of theofifiicers and men who 
had served under Sherman ; but Grant seems to 
have decided the question according to his candid 
judgment as to the power of prompt initiative and 
vigorous aggressive action which the general in 
chief ought to have. He had reached the settled 
conviction that, next to Sherman, Sheridan of all 
tjie generals, tested by large responsibilities, had 
shown the highest qualities for supreme command. 
There was room for honest difference of opinion 
among those competent to judge, but Grant can 
not be blamed for acting on his own judgment, the 
law having cast on him the responsibility. 

In the organization of his Cabinet, President 
Grant retained General Schofield for a time in the 
War Department, where he was serving under the 
arrangement negotiated for Mr. Johnson by Mr. 
Evarts. This was for the purpose of getting fairly 
launched the plan for rearranging the relations of 
the general of the army with the Secretary of War, 
which Schofield thoroughly approved. On the day 
after the President's inauguration an order was pre- 
pared and issued under his instructions by General 
Schofield, which briefly and comprehensively gave 
to Sherman " command of the army of the United 
States," and directed the chiefs of staff corps, de- 
partments, and bureaus to report to and act under 
his orders ; business requiring the action of the 
President or Secretary would be submitted by the 
general to the Secretary, and all orders from them 
would be transmitted through the general.* 

Sherman, of course, issued his own formal order 
assuming the command and directing the method 

* Schofield's Forty-six Years in the Army, p. 421. Sherman's 
Memoirs, ii, 441. 



324 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



of action under the presidential order. As the plan 
was Grant's own, the result of his experience both 
as general and as acting Secretary — a plan he had 
for years wished to see in operation, and believed 
to be necessary for the public interests, as well as 
those of the army — it certainly looked as if a re- 
form in administration had never been introduced 
with a better prospect of permanence. Eight years 
of Grant's incumbency would smooth difficulties, 
remove obstacles, educate a class of stafY and bureau 
officers, who would be habituated to the system 
and know its value. Sherman settled himself to his 
work with the feeling that his strong desire to 
make our little army a model of efficiency and in- 
telligent organization was in the way of speedy ac- 
complishment. 

The reform lasted just three weeks. Within 
that time General Rawlins, Grant's confidential 
staff officer through the whole war, was appointed 
to the Cabinet place, and was at once surrounded 
by interested persons, military and civil, in Con- 
gress and in the army, who dinned into his ears 
the assertion that his office had been emasculated, 
and that the War Department had lost all its power 
and dignity. No one knew better than Rawlins the 
intolerable position in which Grant had found him- 
self under the peace establishment as a general 
without real command, but he was a sick man, soon 
to drop into his grave, and did not meet the in- 
sidious suggestions as he would have done when 
in healthy vigor. 

On the 27th of March another order was is- 
sued from the War Department, made like that of 
the 5th, " by direction of the President," rescinding 
the whole of the earlier one except the personal 
assignment of Sherman to the command of the 
army, and restoring the old system of independent 
staff bureaus dealing directly with the Secretary of 
War. It need not be said that Sherman was as- 



POST BELLUM. 325 

tounded and distressed beyond expression. The 
sudden wreck of his hopes of improvement of the 
army was accompanied by a wound to his personal 
feeHngs which seemed incredible. To the country 
he seemed to be exhibited as a man who had by 
some indirect means grasped a power which the 
President never intended to confer, and who was 
so quickly made to lay it down again with utter 
humiliation. 

A painful interview with the President followed. 
It began as an informal conversational discussion 
between intimate friends. The President repeated 
the familiar complaints of congressmen, that their 
personal requests and desires could not be pre- 
sented to a military officer guided by military rules 
as they were to civil heads of departments, and 
that doubts might exist as to the legal right thus 
to control the bureaus. Sherman reminded him 
that all those things had been considered and dis- 
posed of long ago — as early, indeed, as January, 
1866, when Grant had written a clear and strong 
communication to Mr. Stanton on the subject. 
The points had been talked over many times since 
then, and always with the strong reiteration of 
Grant's conviction that what he had now done on 
the 5th of March ought to be done. This was in- 
disputable, and brought out other reasons. " Raw- 
lins," said Grant, " feels badly about it ; it worries 
him, and he is not well." " But, Grant," replied 
Sherman, " ought a public measure that you have 
advocated for years, and which he has known you 
were determined upon, to be set aside for such 
a reason? Ought he not to acquiesce in what he 
knew was your fixed purpose, and what was done 
before he entered the War Department?" " Yes," 
said Grant, " it would ordinarily be so, but I don't 
like to give him pain now ; so, Sherman, you'll have 
to publish the rescinding order." " But, Grant, it's 
your own order that you revoke, not mine, and 



326 



GENERAL SHERMAN, 



think how it will look to the whole world ! " In 
the dire strait between judgment and feeling, Grant 
became a little testy, and replied, " Well, if it's my 
own order, I can rescind it, can't I ? " Sadly, Sher- 
man dropped the familiarity of comradeship, and, 
rising, bowed formally, saying: "Yes, Mr. Presi- 
dent, you have the power to revoke your own order ; 
you shall be obeyed. Good morning, sir." Such 
was the interview as Sherman told it to a friend 
within a few hours, while he was still deeply agi- 
tated by it. 

During the few weeks that Rawlins was able 
to attend to business, he strove to make Sherman's 
position more tolerable by voluntarily sending 
through army headquarters the orders and com- 
munications which affected discipline and organiza- 
tion, and, no doubt. Grant urged this mode of soft- 
ening the effect of what had been done ; but Raw- 
lins died early in September. General Belknap, his 
successor, had commanded a brigade in the Army 
of the Tennessee, and had been distinguished for 
bravery in the field, but it must be said that he was 
spoiled by his elevation to the War Department. 
The old method of ignoring the general in chief and 
consulting only with bureau subordinates was soon 
in vogue again, and Sherman found himself in the 
humiliating position of learning from the news- 
papers of orders and decisions relating to the dis- 
cipline of the army issued without his knowledge, 
though sometimes in his name. 

After less formal protests had failed, Sherman 
put the whole subject before the Secretary of War 
in a formal communication on the 7th of August, 
1870, and transmitted a copy to the President. The 
latter replied, promising to bring the Secretary and 
general together, and at least to define clearly the 
duties of each. Admitting that his views as gen- 
eral had been essentially the same as Sherman's, 
he still urged that it was supposed that some recent 



POST BELLUM, 327 

acts of Congress were partially inconsistent with 
these, and must control, even if they were wrong.* 
But such recent acts had been made at the instance 
of the Secretary, and with the presumed assent of 
the President. Nothing was, in fact, done to meet 
the general's views, and matters went from bad to 
worse, till near the close of Grant's second term, 
in 1876, when the country was shocked by Gen- 
eral Belknap's downfall and his confession of mal- 
versation in office. 

In July, 1871, Sherman wrote to his brother: 
" My office has been by law stripped of all the in- 
fluence and prestige it possessed under Grant, and 
even in matters of discipline and army control I 
am neglected, overlooked, or snubbed." f Later, 
he wrote to another friend : " There is, in fact, no 
use for a general now, provided the law and cus- 
tom sanction the issuance of orders direct by the 
adjutant general in the name of the Secretary of 
War, and, should a fair opportunity offer, I would 
save Congress the trouble of abolishing my office." 
Vexatious as all this was personally, the real grief 
to him, as his whole correspondence shows, was 
that all his hopes of improving the army itself in 
the ways Grant and he had so often discussed and 
so thoroughly agreed upon, were dashed to the 
ground. He resolved that he would ask leave to 
remove his personal headquarters again to St. 
Louis, unless the coming year should show a 
marked change for the better. 

An opportunity to visit Europe under attract- 
ive circumstances offered in the fall of 1871, and 
he took a leave of absence for a year, making the 
tour of the Continent. His reception was so cor- 
dial and appreciative that the journey was every 
way most enjoyable. He returned in September, 

* Sherman's Memoirs, ii, 446, 450. 
f Sherman Letters, p. 331. 
22 



328 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

1872, refreshed and invigorated, and hopeful that 
in the second term of his administration President 
Grant would revert to the good principles of army 
organization which he really believed in. When 
he had heard abroad of the curious turn of events 
in the candidacy of Greeley, he had, in a letter to 
Senator Sherman, hit ofif the situation with char- 
acteristic wit and penetration. " Grant, who never 
was a Republican," he said, " is your candidate, 
and Greeley, who never was a Democrat, but quite 
the reverse, is the Democratic candidate." * 

Finding even less prospect of satisfactory defi- 
nition of his duties than when he went away, his 
purpose took shape to cut loose, as far as possible, 
from apparent responsibility for what he condemned 
and could not control. He arranged to dispose of 
his Washington house, and in the summer of 1874 
applied for leave to remove his headquarters to St. 
Louis, which was granted. 

The first months of Sherman's return to the 
quiet life of his St. Louis home gave him the op-, 
portunity for a final revision of his Memoirs, and 
at the beginning of 1875 he yielded to a very gen- 
eral wish that its publication might not be delayed. 
He wrote to his brother on the 23d of January, 
" You will be surprised, and maybe alarmed, that 
I have at last agreed to publish in book form my 
Memoirs." His career had given rise to so much 
discussion, and his breach with the Secretary of 
War and a knot of ofBcers who affected to repre- 
sent the President was so pronounced, that it would 
not have been strange if the Senator had been 
alarmed at the inevitable storm of criticism and 
controversy which would follow the printing. In 
the same letter the general said that he had " care- 
fully eliminated everything calculated to raise con- 
troversy, except where sustained by documents em- 

* Sherman Letters, p. 337. 



POST BELLUM. 329 

braced in the work itself, and then only with minor 
parties." * Reading this in the light of the fuller 
knowledge we now have, we can see that it showed 
the rule which he had sincerely followed. He 
meant to be frank in his judgments and honest in 
his revelations of his own heart and intellect in 
his great career, but he aimed at waiving discus- 
sion over all matters in which he could not pro- 
duce written evidence for his conclusions. 

The book was originally written for posthumous 
publication, and was designed, as it should be, to 
give that intimate view of his career and of the 
events in which he had an important part, which 
he wished to leave behind him as the authoritative 
exposition of his own actions, purposes, and mo- 
tives. Had it been written with a view to present 
publication, it would naturally have been more 
guarded in its trenchant passages, and therefore less 
valuable as a revelation of his own opinions, though 
it would have avoided much controversy. Speak- 
ing of this in a letter to a friend, written in the 
height of the din of criticism, he adhered to his 
judgment that a true history of the war must needs 
cause some chafing. He illustrated it by a refer- 
ence to Van Home's History of the Army of the 
Cumberland, then just published, saying : " Van 
Home has done well, but his universal praise and 
evident partiality for the Army of the Cumberland 
makes too smooth a tale for one of war and con- 
flict ; still, for his comfort it was the best course." 

The class of criticisms which stung him most 
were those which seemed ingeniously contrived to 
put him in antagonism to Grant and Thomas, and 
he was fully convinced that there was something 
very like a conspiracy in the circle already men- 
tioned to estrange the President from him by in- 
sinuations that he had arrogated to himself credit 

* Sherman Letters, p. 343. 



330 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

which had belonged to the general in chief. Such 
efforts, however, failed, and General Grant was 
frankly explicit in praise of the candor and ac- 
curacy of the Memoirs. Sherman did not allow 
himself to be seriously disturbed by criticism which 
he knew to be unfair, saying that the common sense 
of the people would dispose of that. He brushed 
it aside with a humorous contempt, as when he 

said of one of the most persistent assailants, " 

is a most pestiferous newspaper bee, and has the 
perseverance of the ant." Candid efforts to cor- 
rect him he took with perfect kindness, and soon 
announced that he should revise the work in a sec- 
ond edition and add an appendix, in which he 
would give opportunity for explanation to some 
whom he had been obliged to blame, and supply 
some omissions which had been inadvertently left 
in the first writing. " In the text," he said, " I 
would omit some personal expressions which I 
ought not to have used, but would leave the narra- 
tive substantially unchanged, save where manifest 
errors have been proved." In the unpublished let- 
ter from which this is quoted, he explained the 
general purpose of his appendix by a reference to 
the 1823 edition of Napoleon's Memoirs, of which 
" several volumes contain letters of parties who took 
issue with him on certain points, written subse- 
quent to the publication, and simply embodied for 
what they are worth. It occurred to me," he added, 
" that forty to sixty pages of fine print might be 
added which would satisfy parties." 

It will give unity to the effort to understand his 
character to pass on to some of his latest expres- 
sions of his judgment in regard to men and events 
which had been brought into controversy after the 
publication of the Memoirs, and his frankness in 
discussing his own qualities. In 1882 the volume 
Atlanta, in the Scribners' series of Campaign His- 
tories, appeared, and led to renewed correspondence 



POST BELLUM. 



331 



between him and its author. " As to your per- 
sonal description of myself," * he said, " it is suf- 
ficiently flattering to gratify a reasonable pride, 
but I would prefer to go down in history not as 
irritable, but impatient of restraint or contradiction. 
After I have laid awake all night thinking of some- 
thing to be done, and have resolved on the steps, 
I admit that it ruffles me to have suggestions some- 
times from parties not in possession of all the facts." 
In the description referred to he had not been 
called irritable, but a nervous temperament, with 
a tendency to irritability, had been ascribed to him, 
and used to heighten the efifcct of his calm and 
equable self-control in the crisis of really great 
events.f Few, if any, great soldiers could be 
named whose bearing toward subordinates was 
more truly considerate and personally kind. 

In the same volume the statement of his action 
in supplying the vacancy made by McPherson's 
death, J had suggested to those who could read 
between the lines that the whole story of that 
change had not been told, and this drew out from 
Sherman an explanation more full than he has else- 
where given : " I don't know that I ever revealed to 
you what transpired at the time I recommended that 
Howard should succeed McPherson. When I suc- 
ceeded Grant at Nashville, I found that consider- 
able feeling existed between the Armies of the Ten- 
nessee and Cumberland — an old feud, probably be- 
ginning at Shiloh, when the Cumberland claimed 
to have saved us from destruction, and did not 
give us credit for the hard fighting of that first day. 

* Atlanta, p. 21. 

•f The suggestion quoted from his letter was simply a bit of 
candid introspection on his part, and not a complaint at impartial 
judgment by another. In the same letter he said : "Asa matter 
of course I had to be a central figure, and you have drawn a por- 
trait more to my liking than others I have seen." 

X Id., p. 178. 



332 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

While I was down the Mississippi (Meridian ex- 
pedition), and before McPherson had joined at 
Huntsville, Logan was in command of that part of 
the Army of the Tennessee which was posted along 
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, about Pulas- 
ki, Huntsville, etc., and claimed with a show of jus- 
tice that in the matter of supplies and railroad facili- 
ties his men and officers were discriminated against 
in favor of the Cumberland, who claimed to own the 
Nashville road. That was the reason of my order 
assuming to myself absolute control of railroads, 
and putting all army and corps commanders on a 
perfect equality in the matter of passes or orders 
for supplies. Thomas was very angry with Logan, 
accused him of meddling and of bitter jealousy. 
When McPherson was dead, and another com- 
mander was indispensable, I was disposed to leave 
Logan in command of the Army of the Tennessee, 
and called Thomas and Schofield for consultation 
to Thomas J. Wood's camp, near the left of Thom- 
as's army. When I told Thomas, he was unusually 
emphatic that he never could or would act in unison 
with Logan ; indeed, that he would not stay if he 
was to be brought in contact with him as an equal. 
Thomas, instead of being so equable as his reputa- 
tion makes him, had a good many crotchets, and 
his army was so large, so compact, and had in him 
justly such faith that I could not risk his displeas- 
ure. The result was as you know, and I had to 
stand the brunt of Logan's anger and hatred, which 
has been constant, and may be eternal. I first 
thought of calling on the President for a successor, 
leaving him to act ; but there was no time for delay, 
and, as Howard fell under my personal observation 
on the Knoxville march and afterward, I knew that 
he was skillful, and would obey orders as to the 
nice marches which I knew lay before us, so I 
recommended him. On this point, however, I am 
well satisfied with your text." 



POST BELLUM. 



333 



The bill for retiring army officers was then be- 
fore Congress, and so evident was the advantage 
to the country to be found in the tested abilities of 
the general, his great prestige with the whole civi- 
lized world, and his hold upon the nation's confi- 
dence, that there was a widespread feeling that an 
ordinary rule for retiring officers should not apply 
to him. It was for the public advantage that his 
genius should continue to direct the army if we 
should be again involved in war. Especially did 
this seem true in view of the recent example of 
Moltke, past seventy, conducting the great h'ranco- 
German campaign. Physical strength and activity 
were doubtless needed in subordinate places, but 
wisdom and experience combined with such force 
of will as Sherman's was of inestimable value at the 
head of the army. In these circumstances he was 
urged to allow the truth to be made known to 
Logan, whose influence in the Senate on military 
matters was properly large, so that he might not be 
affected by old irritations. 

In his very prompt reply he said : " I have never 
told Logan about Thomas, for when an order is 
made I assume all the responsibility, and have too 
much pride to explain the reasons to one who feels 
aggrieved. The order was made by President Lin- 
coln as the consequence of a telegraphic dispatch 
from me, simply advising that Howard should 
succeed McPherson ; and I hold, as Howard ful- 
filled well my purpose, and my purpose worked 
great good, that I am bound to apologize to no 
man on earth. ... I have not asked a favor of 
a man in Congress, and scorn to do it, for I 
believe they should make just and fair laws for all 
alike." 

The final form of the law was one in which 
Sherman acquiesced, and it should also be said 
that when the collisions and cross-purposes of 
active public life were over, his genial and placable 



334 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



spirit found satisfaction in burying differences, 
and his last years witnessed a cordial understand- 
ing with General Logan and a renewal of their 
early friendship. 

The correspondence of the same season drew 
from him some emphatic statements of his object 
and aim in his march to the sea, which ought to be 
preserved in his own words, though they are in 
accord with the account given in an earlier chap- 
ter. " Howard can tell you," he wrote, " that I 
informed him long before we left Atlanta that if I 
could place our army at Columbia, S. C, the war 
would be substantially concluded, because Lee 
could not remain longer in Richmond, and preced- 
ing events had demonstrated that the Southern 
Army of Virginia had lost confidence in its ability 
to fight the Army of the Potomac outside of in- 
trenchments, in the same ratio that the latter had 
gained confidence. Therefore I believe that moral- 
ly the war zuas over when I reached Columbia free 
to follow up to Virginia Lee's only line of supply. 
This was my firm belief from the day Hood began 
his desperate attempt to force me to retreat from 
Atlanta by getting on our railroad. Having this 
grand purpose in mind, the details are as you know 
them. I did not and could not foresee the thou- 
sand things that might happen, but I did tenacious- 
ly hold fast to the purpose to reach Lee's line of 
supply and follow it up to a conclusion. Halleck 
may, in his mind, have contemplated such a possi- 
bility, so may Buell, so may Rosecrans, so may 
Grant, but I did it, and chose the time, place, and 
manner. This is all I claim as to the origin of the 
march to the sea. . . . The process of condensing 
history has begun, and will proceed even further, 
till chapters become paragraphs, and paragraphs 
mere sentences. The results clearly stated, with 
the causes which produced those results, will be 
all the next generation will ask. The fame or gen- 



POST BELLUM. 335 

eral reputation of the leaders will not be much 
changed." 

The same season witnessed the publication of 
the second volume of Badeau's Military History of 
Gfant and Van Home's Life of Thomas, and, as 
these were nearly coincident with the appearance of 
another volume in the Scribners' series of cam- 
paigns narrating his March to the Sea, it very natu- 
rally drew from Sherman a letter commenting on 
the claims made by the several writers for the sub- 
jects of their memoirs. He had expressed his grati- 
fication that his actions, fully explained as to mo- 
tives, had been allowed to speak for themselves, 
without adulation, and the letter is so sincere a bit 
of autobiography that its value will warrant its 
quotation at length : 

" In Washington the wise men say, ' Don't 
hurry, let your letters remain a week, and they an- 
swer themselves.' But for better or worse, my hab- 
its are fixed, and I find that when I enact my own 
part it harmonizes with the past and connects the fu- 
ture. . . . With emphasis and without qualification 
I re-echo your sentiment that both Grant and 
Thomas will be damaged by the fulsome flattery of 
their eulogists and historians Badeau and Van 
Home. Man is mortal and full of infirmity. To 
paint him as unerring, as perfect in judgment, tem- 
per, and action, at all times and under all circum- 
stances, must with the wise raise doubts. Such a 
man is too good for this world, and the reader gets 
palled with adulation and flattery. Many a good 
man felt a sense of relief when he learned that Wash- 
ington swore at Lee at Monmouth, and I have been 
more moved to attempt great things by drop ex- 
pressions of a common soldier. ' I'll be glad to live 
on rice chafif if LTncle Billy can only take Savannah,' 
than by the declaration of the London Times, ' The 
act, if a failure, will be adjudged the act of a mad- 
man ; if successful, it will take rank with the deeds of 



336 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

great men ' — this before the event of my coming out 
of the wilderness at Savannah.* I know how I felt 
in October, 1864, when I pleaded for the privilege 

* The editorial of the Times wliich Sherman briefly p»ra- 
phrases was in the issue of December 3, 1864, upon the report of 
his cutting loose from Atlanta. It has been already referred to 
{vide p. 242), and began with a statement of the fact. " It is 
commonly believed that Sherman has plunged either into Alabama 
or Georgia, and that he will appear on the coast of one of those 
States in due time. In this case, however, how will it fare with 
him ? ... lie would be throwing himself headlong into a hostile 
country of immense extent without any line of communications. 
He has cut himself off from his base so completely and deliber- 
ately that he can not even send intelligence of his movements. 
He has converted his entire army into a flying column for an ex- 
pedition involving most formidable distances. . . . The roads may 
be broken up, bridges destroyed, and provisions carried away, 
while it is certain that even if the Federal commander should ul- 
timately appear before Charleston, a hard siege would still await 
him at the end of his unparalleled march. Nevertheless, he is 
beyond doubt both an able and a resolute soldier, and he may 
know better than any of his countrymen what are the real chances 
of his enterprise. That it is a most momentous enterprise can not 
be denied ; but it is exactly one of those enterprises which are 
judged by the event. It may either make Sherman the most 
famous general of the North or it may prove the ruin of his repu- 
tation, his aiTny, and even his cause together." 

When the news came that he had reached the sea, the Times 
of January 5, 1865, said : " General Sherman's campaign in Geor- 
gia will undoubtedly rank hereafter with the most memorable 
operations of modern war. ... It speaks well for Sherman's dis- 
cernment and resolution that he could plunge into such a region 
with unwavering confidence. . . . Still, the great fact that after 
marching nearly a hundred miles — from Chattanooga to Atlanta — 
he should then have marched two hundred and fifty more, and 
brought his army, after all, in good condition and efficiency to 
the seacoast, is a testimonial to professional qualities of no com- 
mon order." 

Returning to the subject on January 9th, the Times said: 
" The capture of Savannah completes the history of Sherman's 
march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of the 
most singular, militai-y achievements of the war. . . . The march 
through the whole of Georgia, ending in the capture of the chief 
city of the State, is an exception to nearly all the events of the 
previous campaigns that keep any place in the memory. . . . The 
most remarkable exploit during four years of conflict has been 
achieved by a comparatively small army with a loss of only a 
fiftieth part of its numbers." 



POST BELLUM. 



337 



of marching a thousand miles through an enemy's 
country to help the Army of the Potomac, then 
checkmated at Petersburg, and I know how I felt 
when Badeau demonstrated long afterward that I 
was only doing what I was bid to do at the divine 
inspiration of a superior. Grant says nothing; 
there is wisdom in this. I spoke out and recorded 
my thoughts over my own signature. This may 
have been impolitic, but a hundred years hence it 
will seem very different. The truth is mighty and 
will prevail. Your two books are links in the chain 
which will be strengthened by every line and para- 
graph written at that day. I thank you for not in- 
dulging in flattery, for that is not only obnoxious 
to me, but must be to all thoughtful men. 

" Grant had his qualities ; Thomas had his. Each 
is entitled to high honor for their deeds in aiding 
to put down a rebellion which, if successful, would 
have been horrible in its after results. But when 
the historian comes to paint the portraits of the 
general actors, he errs quite as much in overcolor- 
ing as in neglecting important incidents. 

" I knew Thomas as a boy at West Point. We 
recited together four years in the same section, 
served as lieutenants in the same regiment ten 
years, and for Van Home to paint him for vie seems 
an arrant piece of presumption. I am glad of the 
fame and hold his memory has on the public, for 
this is a bond of union, a piece of valuable property 
to every American ; but when Van H. intimates 
that Grant and I did not do him full justice, he 
simply is ridiculous. Thomas leaned on me, and 
never to the hour of his death did he have reason 
to believe that his memory was less precious to me 
than my own. Never since the world began did 
such absolute confidence exist between commander 
and commanded, and among the many mistakes I 
made I trace some to his earnest, vehement advice. 
. . . Those who attributed to Thomas that calm. 



338 GENERAL SHERMAN. 

gentle, yet forcible character, entirely miscon- 
ceived the man. No man in my army had more 
little causes of grievance ; none chafed more over 
little things. When Sheridan was made lieutenant 
general, I was the peacemaker between him and 
Grant. Thomas was vehement, abusive, and vio- 
lent. Grant was kind, firm, and conciliatory. But 
I am sure in your studies you have hit on episodes 
which prove what I write. Thomas was too slow in 
his combinations at Nashville, and the impatience 
of Grant, Lincoln, and all in the East was natural. 
The glorious result at Nashville was partly the re- 
sult of accident and partly of design — a truth that 
may be said of ah collisions. But Nashville was 
not as conclusive as Van Home thinks he has 
proved. The final result was Richmond, and there 
I think Grant is entitled to all honor. Whether 
Appomattox would have been had I stayed at At- 
lanta or followed Hood westward, I do not believe ; 
but I leave that to those who study cause and effect. 
I think you have given a clear, impartial narrative 
of events, and those who come after us and reap 
the fruits of our labors must in time settle the rela- 
tive merits of each. I know that Thomas had he 
been in my place would never have gone beyond 
Atlanta, had he gone that far. I know that Grant 
had no faith that I could reach Goldsboro in time 
to co-operate with his spring campaign. What in- 
fluence my personal action had on the grand final 
result I have my own thoughts and convictions, but 
I do not ask anybody to adopt them. The deeds 
are in the past, the record is sufficiently clear, and 
I am willing to abide the final judgment of man- 
kind." 

General Sherman's quiet life in St. Louis was 
rudely interrupted by the impeachment and resig- 
nation of the Secretary of War in March, 1876, as 
Grant's administration was entering upon the last 
year of his second term. As a matter of politics, 



POST BELLUM. 339 

the embarrassment of the situation was compHcated 
with the approach of the presidential election, pre- 
ceeded by nominating conventions. It was not only 
known that a tliird term was desired by the Presi- 
dent, but it was matter of common fame that mem- 
bers of the " whisky ring " excused their frauds on 
the plea that they were expending much money to 
organize the movement for a renomination. The 
embezzlements involved the reputation of more than 
one in close relations to the President besides Secre- 
tary Belknap. So far as the War Office was con- 
cerned, the opportunity for wrongdoing had grown 
directly out of legislation obtained by administra- 
tive influence, which had taken from the general 
of the army the right to be the medium of the trans- 
mission of orders to the army, and the appointment 
of post traders. The sale of these traderships had 
been the particular crime which ruined the Secre- 
tary of War. 

The air was full of rumors that Congress would 
pass some act or resolution compelling Sherman's 
return to Washington. Had this been done as part 
of a policy of correcting the blunder that had been 
committed, and of returning to the general by law 
the rights and responsibilities that had been taken 
from him. it would have been right. He, however, 
very naturally demurred to being called to a posi- 
tion where the public would assume that he was a 
check upon actions over which he had no control 
and of which he was not even informed. He wrote 
to his brother : " I will not go to Washington unless 
ordered, and it would be an outrage if Congress, 
under a temporary excitement, should compel my 
removal back. I came out at my own expense, and 
never charged a cent for transportation, which I 
could have done. I can better command the army 
from here than from there. The causes that made 
a Belknap remain and will remain." * 

* Sherman Letters, p. 349. 



340 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



The appointment of Judge Taft, of Ohio, to fill 
the vacancy in the War Department, however, did 
everything which personal selection could do to 
smooth the relations between the Secretary and the 
general. Mr. Taft was a gentleman of large mind 
and scholarly training, an able jurist, and a broad, 
judicial character, with the highest standards of 
public integrity and disinterestedness. He was, be- 
sides, fully appreciative of the great qualities of 
General Sherman, and sincerely desirous of having 
the benefit of his advice in performing the duties 
of his office. When such a man, With characteristic 
suavity and sincerity, asked Sherman to come back 
and try what mutual efforts to promote the public 
interests could do to remove the reproach from 
army administration, the general yielded at once to 
the appeal. A conference secured a cordial good 
understanding, and on the 6th of April Secretary 
Taft published a presidential order re-establish- 
ing the headquarters of tlie army at Washing- 
ton, and directing that all orders and instruc- 
tions relative to military operations or afifecting 
the military control and discipline of the army 
should be promulgated through the general, 
while the departments of the adjutant general 
and the inspector general should also report to 
him and be under his control in all matters re- 
lating thereto. 

This order included all that General Sherman 
desired, and put his personal and official relations 
to the War Department on a footing of unbroken 
cordiality during the whole of his service on the 
active list. But it must not be forgotten that, as 
the order was a voluntary concession of the Presi- 
dent and Secretary, it could be modified or revoked, 
openly or tacitly. Sherman's successors found that 
the tendency to ignore it and to return under one 
pretext or another to the former methods was too 
strong for them, so that the old troubles became 



POST BELLUM. 



341 



perennial for lack of legislative definition of au- 
thority.* 

In the unpublished private correspondence be- 
fore quoted Sherman spoke out his heartfelt satis- 
faction at the prospect of reform. Writing on April 
15th, he said: "I hope in recent events you will 
derive consolation and assurance that a better era 
is dawning on the country. If I can, you may be 
assured that everything like rorr^-'ption and the 
false glitter given by wealth basely acquired shall 
be punished in the army. Now the tongue of scan- 
dal is so loose that there is danger of even the best 
reputations suffering. Babcock is still so far de- 
tached from the army, being on civil duty, responsi- 
ble only to the President and Congress, that I could 
not if I would cause his arraignment and trial by a 
court-martial. A court of inquiry can only be or- 
dered by the President, or by a department or army 
commander on the demand of the accused. . . . We 
are all pleased with Judge Taft, who is a man of 
probity and learning. It is a pleasure to confer 
with such a man, who does not fear to seek advice 
of others in a sphere where he has had no experi- 
ence. Schofield's going to West Point will elevate 
the academy, and silence the little jealousies that 
have endangered its safety." 

The last sentence refers to the general's almost 
parental interest in the young men entering the 
army. His sympathy also with the junior grades 
of officers was of the same spirit, and his pride in 
them and faith in their patriotism and high ideal 
was very great. Returning to the subject on Octo- 
ber 24th, he wrote : " Our friend General Schofield 
has laid hold of his new charge, the Militarv Acad- 
emy, with his usual force, and I doubt not that in- 
stitution will receive a new impulse from his prac- 
tical sense and knowledge of the wants of our pro- 

• See Schofield's Forty-six Years in the Army, chapter xxii. 



342 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



fession. I also believe the army, especially in the 
junior branches, is as pure and honorable, as zeal- 
ous to do right, as in the brightest days of the 
republic. Surely it can not be, it must not be, that 
our young republic is declining in morals. Still, we 
are incident to human infirmities, and it may be 
that since the war our public men have not risen 
to the occasion or been equal to the emergency." 

It was, of course, inevitable that General Sher- 
man should be often approached with the sugges- 
tion that he should consent to be a candidate for 
the presidency. His real unwillingness to accept 
any political office was known to his close friends, 
but most people were disposed to think it might be 
overcome, or that, like the proverbial nolo cpiscopari, 
it might even cover a disposition to coquet with the 
idea. The better acquainted one becomes with his 
character, the more certain it is that his strong ex- 
pressions on this subject were, without exaggera- 
tion, the index of his inmost feelings and most fixed 
rule of life. 

As early as January, 1865, when his march to 
the sea was just completed, the quidnuncs began 
to talk of a political career for him when the war 
should be ended. " If you ever hear anybody use 
my name in connection with a political ofifice," he 
wrote to John Sherman, " tell them you know me 
well enough to assure them that I would be offended 
by any such association." * Again, in November, 
1866, he said, " I am determined to keep out of 
political or even quasi-political office." f When the 
end of Grant's first term approached, the question 
of his renomination was warmly discussed, and 
General Sherman, far out on the frontier of Texas, 
got copies of the New York Herald strongly advo- 
cating his own nomination. Once more he wrote 
to his brother (May 18, 1871), " You may say for 



* Sherman Letters, p. 245, f Id,, p. 28 2. 



POST BELLUM. 



343 



me, and publish it too, that in no event and under 
no circumstances will I ever be a candidate for 
President or any other political ofifice, and I mean 
every word of it." * Similar stptements which were 
published were interpreted by many to mean only 
that he would not allow himself to be used in rivalry 
to Grant, and the persistent recurrence of the elTort 
to bring him forward as a candidate drew from him, 
in 1874, the emphatic repetition of his decision that 
" no matter what the temptation, I will never allow 
my name to be used by any party." f He coupled 
this with the opinion that the obligation of the coun- 
try- to the army had been sufficiently recognized, 
" and the time has come to return to the civil list." X 

The topic came up with a sort of periodicity, 
drawing out from him always the same blunt, de- 
cisive negative, but in 1884 circumstances combined 
to make the effort to change his resolution a strong- 
er and much more determined one than ever be- 
fore. Though he had always refused to be regarded 
as a party man, his strong sympathy with all who 
had been most active in carrying the country 
through the civil war made him feel drawn toward 
the public men of the Republican party. The great 
prominence of his brother the Senator naturally 
counted for much in such circumstances. Without 
departing from the habitual rule of refusing to med- 
dle in politics, he would have been glad, no doubt, 
to see the highest civil honors fall to his brother, 
as he himself had reaped the military ones. But 
though this impulse would strengthen his fixed de- 
cision to refuse political ofifice, that decision was 
based on other reasons, and the event showed that 
it was set beyond reconsideration. 

As the time approached when nominations must 
be made, the fact that the general was now on the 
retired list of the army, while his mental and phys- 

* Sherman LeUers, p. 330. f Id., p. 340. :}: Id., p. 341. 
23 



344 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



ical vigor was unimpaired, led to a widespread dis- 
position to call upon him to complete the series of 
public stations in which he had, one by one, suc- 
ceeded to Grant. Mr. Blaine had the largest fol- 
lowing, but he was not certain of nomination, and 
frankly preferred General Sherman if he were him- 
self to be disappointed in the nomination. By the 
beginning of May matters had so far taken shape 
that Senator Sherman wrote to his brother: " It is 
certain that if Blaine is not nominated in the early 
ballots a movement will be made for your nomina- 
tion, and if entered upon will go like wild fire. . . . 
My own opinion is still that, while you ought not 
to seek, or even beforehand consent to accept a 
nomination, yet if it comes unsought and with cor- 
dial unanimity you ought to acquiesce. ... I see 
no prospect or possibility of my nomination, and 
not much of my election if nominated, but yours is 
easy. Blaine could readily turn his strength to you 
if he can not get a majority, and I think means to 
do so." The general replied : " The more I reflect, 
the more convinced I am that I was wise and pru- 
dent in taking the exact course I have, and that 
it would be the height of folly to yield to any false 
ambition to allow the use of my name for any politi- 
cal office. ... If you count yourself out, I will be 
absolutely neutral, and honestly believe we are ap- 
proaching that epoch in our history when King 
Log is about as good as King Stork." * 

The general was at this time in possession of a 
confidential letter from Mr. Blaine (afterward pub- 
lished by the consent of the latter) saying that, in 
the event of a break in the nominating convention, 
it was inevitable that his name would be used, and 
that he ought to regard a nomination in such a case 
as he would a soldier's detail to duty, which he 
must not decline. But General Sherman had taken 

■* Sherman Letters, pp. 359, 360. 



POST BELLUM. 345 

the most effective mode to prevent the offer, in de- 
claring that he would respectfully refuse it if made. 
As soon as the nomination of Blaine and Logan was 
announced, he wrote, " I feel such a sense of relief 
that I would approve of anything." Telling his 
brother the steps he had taken, and his forecast of 
what might happen, he added with unmistakable 
emphasis, " Anyhow, I escaped, and that to me was 
salvation." * He recognized the distinction be- 
tween his own position and that of Mr. Blaine and 
his brother, who had been long trained in political 
life, and said that their ambition to reach the high- 
est round of the ladder in their chosen career was 
legitimate and right. His decision of character was 
never better shown than in the unwavering confi- 
dence with which he adhered to a line of action he 
had resolved upon long years before. His bearing 
and action in the final decisive moment were ec|ually 
characteristic. The convention was in session, and 
he was in his study at St. Louis, smoking and chat- 
ting with his son Thomas. A telegraph messenger 
came in with a dispatch from the friend (Senator 
Henderson) who was his authorized representative 
in the convention. It was the announcement that 
the critical moment had come when his nomination 
would be carried by storm unless he peremptorily 
forbade. Without a change of coimtenance, he 
dashed off the prompt reply that if in spite of his 
declination he should be nominated, he would de- 
cline with an emphasis which might be construed 
as disrespectful. He passed the dispatch and his 
answer to his son to read, and without a comment 
resumed his cigar and the conversation, as if it were 
a matter of no consequence. 

Such was his final leave-taking of the fretting 
cares of public life. Some six years of retirement 
followed, in which he found enjoyment in the re- 

* Sherman Letters, p. 361. 



346 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



unions of his old comrades and in the public anni- 
versaries and functions for which he was always in 
great demand. His racy and trenchant style of ex- 
temporaneous dis(^ussion of every subject suggested 
by the occasion, or which was of current popular 
interest, offered a remarkable example of unreserved 
disclosure of a great man's heart and motives, and 
it became plainly apparent that the whole country 
felt honored at being thus taken into his confidence. 
In his most unguarded words his principles were 
always clear, noble, intensely patriotic, and his care- 
less colloquial expressions often covered a practi- 
cal wisdom and insight of a most striking kind. 
Every year added to the proof of his having chosen 
the better part in avoiding the conflicts of partisan 
politics, for he was right in his judgment that it 
mattered little whether King Log or King Stork 
were on the throne. The exuberant manifestations 
of popular good will were ahvays grateful to him, 
if sometimes a little fatiguing, and he could not be 
insensible to the proofs that his place was a warm 
and a safe one in the hearts of his countrymen. 

He had moved his home from St. Louis to New 
York in 1886, and gave a great deal of labor to the 
systematic filing and labeling of his voluminous 
papers and correspondence. He used to tell his 
friends that everything was there in order, every 
letter he had received and its answer, and every 
document that had any historical value. The same 
system and thrift marked all his private business. 
He enjoyed with his family and friends the full so- 
cial advantages that his means allowed, but he was 
one who had a horror of debt and of laxity in meet- 
ing business obligations, and was never tempted 
into pecuniary embarrassments or dangerous risks. 

Mrs. Sherman died in 1888, and though he had 
fully expected to precede her to the grave, and the 
loss of the good woman who had been the faithful 
companion of his whole career from the day when 




Tomb of Cieneral Sherman in St. Louis cemetery. 



POST BELLUM. 347 

his father's death left him an orphaned child, whom 
she at first welcomed as a brother in the Ewing 
home, was a loss that sadly bereaved him, yet he 
received the blow with patience, finding content; as 
he said, in the knowledge that " no mortal was ever 
better prepared to put on immortality," and that 
in due time he would resume his place by her side. 

Through the closing years he kept up his philo- 
sophic cheerfulness, often at the dinner table of de- 
voted friends, and cordially welcoming all who 
knew him to his own home. Only a week before 
his last illness he wrote to John Zherman, " I am 
drifting along in the old rut, in good strength, at- 
tending about four dinners a week at public or pri- 
vate houses, and generally wind up for gossip at 
the Union League Club." * The members of the 
club still love to point out his favorite corner where 
he sat nearly every evening in witty chat or wise 
discussion of things past and present, surrounded 
by an eager group of younger men, learning devo- 
tion to country by the best of all instruction, in 
word and in illustrious example. 

Returning home in the evening of February 4, 
1891, from a dramatic performance, he caught cold, 
and in a day or two erysipelas of the face and throat 
appeared, and he rapidly became very ill. his age, 
of course, telling against him. His seventieth birth- 
day came on the 8th, and, after several days of par- 
tial or complete unconsciousness, he died on the 
14th, having fully and greatly rounded out the nor- 
mal allotment of the years of man's life. He was 
modestly laid in the grave beside his wife's resting 
place at St. Louis, according to the directions he 
had minutely given, and the mourning of the whole 
land was heartfelt and deep. 

■■■■ Sherman Letters, p. 38 1. 



INDEX. 



Adams, John Quincy, 3. 
Adams, General Wirt, i84. 
AUatoona, battle of, 233. 
AUatoona Pass, 210. 
Allen, General Robert, 199. 
Anderson, Lars, 2g. 
Anderson, General Patton, 49, 

53. 57- 
Anderson, General Robert, 27, 

29. 31- 
Appomattox, surrender at, 296. 
Arkansas Post, 102. 
Armstrong, General, 150. 
Army of the Cumberland, 329, 

331. 332. 
Army of the Potomac, 307. 
Army of the Tennessee, 105, 

219, 2S5-287, 331, 332. 
Atlanta campaign, 204, 330. 
Atlanta captured, 224. 
Augusta captured, 269. 

Baird, General Absalom, 169. 
Banks, General N. P., 147, 157, 

187, 188. 
Bate, General W. B., 169, 172. 
Baton Rouge arsenal, ig. 
Baxter, Captain A. S., 73. 
Beauregard, General, 20, 22, 

24, 40, 51, 52, 59, 64, 66, 99, 

232, 270. 
Belknap, General, 326, 327, 339. 
Benton, Thomas H., 3, 9. 
Bentonville, battle of, 283. 
Biddle, Commodore, 9, 10. 
Blaine, James G., 344, 345. 
Blair, General F. P., 100, 159, 

195, 267. 



Bowen, General, 45. 
Bowling Green, Ky., 30, 36. 
Bragg, General Braxton, 14, 20, 

40, 62, 64, 75, 153, 163, 175. 
Breckenridge, General, 44, 59, 

60, 297. 
Buckland, General, 42, 43, 48, 

49- 54, 65. 
Buckner, Simon B., 29, 30. 
Buell, General Don Carlos, 14, 

18, 32, 37, 40, 65, 68, 80, 

193- 
Bull Run, battle of, 24, 25. 
Burnside, General, 160, 166, 

179, 180. 

Calhoun, John C, 3. 
Cameron, Simon, 31, 32. 
Camp Dick Robinson, 29. 
Chalmers, General, 43, 47, 58, 

59- 64, 65. 
Champion's Hill, 125, 126. 
Charleston evacuated, 277. 
Chattanooga, victory of, 175. 
Cheatham, General, 41, 45, 59, 

60, 176, 215, 216. 
Chickasaw Bayou, 99, 100. 
Churchill, General T. J., 102, 

103. 
Clark, General, 45. 
Clay, Henry, 3, 13, 27. 
Cleburne, General, 41, 44, 49, 

54, 163, 166, 178, 258. 
Columbia captured, 273. 
Corinth, capture of, 81. 
Corse, General, 158, 170, 233, 

245- 
Corwin, Thomas, 13. 

349 



350 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



Cox, General J. D., 2S7, 289, 

290-292, 305. 
Crittenden, General, 65, 67, 69. 
Crittenden, John J., 27. 
Crump's Landing, 37, 50, 73, 
Curtis, General, 36. 

]^ahlgren, Admiral, 261. 
Dana, Charles A., 162. 
Davies, General Thomas A., 

88. 
Davis, Jefferson, 30, 95, 164, 

221, 223, 267, 295, 297. 
Dix, General John A., 301, 305. 
Dodge, General G. M., 181, 206. 

Edwards Station, 128, 129. 
Evarts, William M., i, 317. 
Ewing, General Hugh, 105, 

159, 161. 
Ewing, Miss Ellen B., 6, 13. 
Ewing, Thomas, 2, 3, 13, 17. 
Ezra Church, battle of, 220. 

Farragut, Admiral, gS, 99. 

Fayetteville falls, 279. 

Floyd, John B., 18. 

Foote, Admiral, 36. 

Forrest, General, 95, 183. 

Fort Donelson, 36, 38. 

Fort Fisher, 28S. 

Fort Henry, 37, 38. 

Fort Hindman, 102. 

Fort McAllister, 262, 

Fort Moultrie, 6. 

Fort Pickering, 89. 

Fort Robinet, 88. 

Foster, General John G , igo, 

261, 263, 280. 
Fremont, General John C, 8, 

29, 30. 

Gardner, General Frank, 147. 
Geary, General, 157, 167, 264. 
Gettysburg, battle of, 147. 
Gibson, General R. L., 50, 62. 
Gladden, General, 64. 
Grand Gulf, 120. 
Granger, General Gordon, 163, 
195. 



Grant, General U. S., 30, 36-39, 
41-44, 60-62, 72, 73, 76, 77, 
94, 96-9S, 104, 105, 115, 143, 
156, 160, 162, 171-173, 181, 
188, 189, 195, ig6, 231, 240, 
261, 2S0, 293, 294, 299, 300, 
312, 313, 315, 316, 320, 322, 
324-326, 328, 335, 337. 

Grierson, General, 119. 

Guthrie, James, 30, 32, 200. 

Haines's Bluff, loi, 129. 
Halleck, General Henry W,, 32- 

37, 39-41, 43, 79, 179. 232, 

2S0, 303, 322. 
Hamilton, General C. S., 94. 
Hampton, General Wade, 275, 

279, 283. 
Hancock, General Winfield S., 

14. 
Hankinson's Ferry, 121. 
Hardee, General, 45, 57, 63, 

166, 176, 218, 223, 263, 270, 

277, 282. 
Harper's Ferry seized, 22. 
Harrison, General William H., 

2, 5- 
Harvard graduates, 12. 
Havre de Grace, 4. 
Hazen, General W. B., 156,260, 

261. 
Henderson, Senator, 345. 
Herron, General, 142, 146. 
Hickenlooper, Capt. A., 61, 130. 
Hildebrand, 42, 53, 54, 65. 
Hill, General D. IL, 270, 291, 
Hilton Head, 262. 
Hindman, General, 44, 62. 
Hoke, General, 2gO, 292. 
Holly Springs, 87, 8g, g6. 
Hood, General, 2og, 211, 215, 

216, 2ig, 221, 223, 224, 

232. 
Hooker, General Joseph, 11, 

156, 167, 195. 207. 
Howard, General O. O., 155, 

170, 195, 206, 268, 269. 
Hunter, Hocking, 3. 
Hurlbut, General S., 38, 50, 59- 

61, 183, 1S5. 



INDEX. 



351 



Jackson captured, 125. 

Jackson, General Andrew, 3, 59. 

Johnson, Andrew, 194, 197, 300, 
308, 312, 313, 315, 31b. 

Johnson, General Bushrod, 50, 
52, 59, 163, 

Johnston, General Albert Sid- 
ney, 5, 36, 40, 44, 46, 48, 60. 

Johnston, General Joseph E., 

24. 94, Q5- 118, 140, 143, 201, 
211, 212, 281, 297. 

Kearny, General, 8, 9. 
Kilpatrick, General, 269, 270, 

279, 296. 
King, James, 15. 
Knox, Thomas W., 113. 

Lancaster, Ohio, 2, 6. 
Lauman, General, 50, 77. 
Lee, General Robert E., 147, 

242, 292, 296, 297. 
Lee, General Stephen D., 159, 

160, 184, 211, 220. 
Leggett, General, 263. 
Lightburn, General, 165. 
Lincoln, Abraham, 22, 28, 114, 

179, 192, 294, 295, 299, 303. 
Little Ogeechee, 259. 
Logan, General, S3, 181, 195, 

218, 266, 332, 345. 
Long, General, 180. 
Longstreet, General, 157, 166. 
Lookout Mountain taken, 168. 
Lovejoy's station, 224. 

Mangum, Willie P., 3. 
March to the sea, 334. 
Mason, Colonel R. B., g, 10, 

II. 
McArthur, General, 50, 60, 182. 
McClellan, General George B., 

29, 32. 
McClemand, General John A., 

38, 49-52, 55, 67, 102-104. 
McCook, General Alexander 

McD., 31, 67-69. 
McDowell, General Irwin, 24, 

25, 55- 

McGofiin, Beriah, 27, 2S. 



McLaws, General, 25S. 
McPherson, General James B., 

35, 41, 83, iSi, 191, 205, 212, 

218, 331. 
Meade, General, 303, 322. 
Medill, Governor, 3. 
Meigs, General M., 14, 15, 162, 

201. 
Mexican War, 26. 
Mdliken's Bend, 98. 
Missionary Ridge, 168. 
Mitchell, General, 83. 
Monterey, Gal., 8. 
Morgan, General C. W., 98, 

154- 
Morton, Oliver P., 29. 
Mower, General, 187, 26S. 

Napoleon, Louis, 313. 

Nelson, General William, 29, 

31, 56, 65, 66, 69. 
New Hope Church, 209. 



Ord, General, 8g. 
Osterhaus, General, 
167. 



157, 159, 



Palmer, General John M., 205, 

221, 2go, 291. 
Parke, General J. G., 142, igo, 

191. 
Patterson, General Robert, 24. 
Pemberton, General, Sg, 118, 

125, 140, 143. 
Pillow, General Gideon J., 30. 
Pittsburg Landing, 39, 76. 
Polk, General L., 40, 48, 60, 63, 

185, 211. 
Pope, General John, 33, 34, 36, 

79, 199- 
Port Gibson, 120. 
Port Hudson, 147. 
Porter, Admiral, 103, 108, log, 

no, 118, 187, 288, 294, 2g5. 
Prentiss, General B. M., 3g, 41, 

50, 58-60. 
Price, General, 86, 87. 

Queen of the West, 117. 
Quimby, General, 105, io3. 



352 



GENERAL SHERMAN. 



Rawlins, General, 324, 326. 
Roddy, General, 153. 
Rosecrans, General, 83, 86, 

151, igo-192. 
Rousseau, General Lovell A., 

29. 
Ruger, General, 290, 291. 
Ruggles, General, 45, 62. 

Savannah captured, 263. 
Schofield, General, 190, 191, 
195, 206, 265, 280, 2S1, 292, 

317, 341. 

Scott, General Winfield, 8, 12, 
23, 24, 313. 

Seminole Indians, 5. 

Seward, William H., 300. 

Sheridan, General, 172, 173, 
303, 304, 322 

Sherman, Charles R., 1,3. 

Sherman, Edmund, i. 

Sherman, John, 22, 24, 318, 327, 
328, 342, 343, 347. 

Sherman, Mrs. W. T., 33, 308, 
34O. 

Sherman, Roger, i. 

Sherman, Taylor, i. 

Sherman, William Tecumseh, 
ancestors, i ; birth, 2 ; ap- 
pointed a cadet, 3 ; appears 
at West Point, 4 ; graduates, 
5 ; appointed lieutenant, 5 ; 
engaged, 6 ; at Fort Moultrie, 
6 ; at Marietta, Ga., 7 ; sails 
for California, 8 ; adjutant 
general, 9 ; arrests Nash, 10 ; 
sails for New York, 12 ; mar- 
riage, 13 ; appointed captain, 
14 ; sails for California, 14 ; 
returns to the East, 17; super- 
intendent of military school, 
iS ; resignation, 19; appointed 
colonel, 23 ; Bull Run, 24 ; 
brigadier general, 27 ; in 
Kentucky, 30 ; takes com- 
mand, 31 ; relieved, 32 ; in 
Missouri, 32 ; at Paducah, 35; 
at Pittsburg Landing, 39 ; at 
Shiloh, 41 ; his position. 42 ; 
engaged, 51 ; falls back, 55 ; 



meets Grant, 62 ; new posi- 
tion, 65 ; moves forward, 68 ; 
new command, 79 ; advises 
Grant, S3 ; at Memphis, 85 ; 
letter to mayor, 90 ; to Sec- 
retary Chase, 92; to the Yazoo 
98 ; defeated, loi ; falls back, 
102 ; commands Fifteenth 
Corps, 105 ; aids Porter, 110 ; 
writes to Rawlins, 112 ; in 
trouble with Knox, 113; 
writes to Grant, 115 ; moves 
on Jackson, 123 ; destroys 
public property, 125 ; moves 
against Vicksburg, 131 ; 
moves on Jackson, 147 ; pro- 
moted, 149 ; ordered to Chat- 
tanooga, 158 ; sent to relieve 
Burnside, 180 ; at home, 182 ; 
nearly captured, 184 ; in 
Vicksburg, 187 ; goes to Nev/ 
Orleans, 187 ; promotion, 188; 
at Nashville, 195 ; writes to 
Grant, 196 ; his character, 
I9S ; prepares for spring 
campaign, 200 ; Atlanta cam- 
paign, 204; Kennesaw, 213 ; 
Peach Tree Creek, 216 ; de- 
feats Hood, 217 ; Atlanta 
captured, 224 ; congratula- 
tions, 224 ; march to the sea, 
231 ; his order, 245 ; letter to 
mayor, 249 ; letter to Mrs. 
Bower, 251 ; arrives near Sa- 
vannah, 261 ; captures the 
city, 263 ; Christmas gift, 264; 
through the Carolinas, 265 ; 
capturing Columbia, 273 ; 
Fayetteville taken, 279 ; news 
from home, 280 ; battle of 
Bentonville, 283 ; meets 
Grant, 293 ; Healy's picture 
of 294 ; learns of Lee's sur- 
render, 296 ; hears of Lin- 
coln's death, 297 ; Sherman's 
mistake, 299 ; treaty revoked, 
300 ; marches to Virginia, 
305 ; review of his army, 

307 ; address to his troops, 

308 ; a new command, 311 ; 



INDEX. 



353 



visits Mexico, 312 ; as a peace- 
maker, 314 ; Indian treaty, 
318 ; at Chicago meeting, 322 ; 
becomes general, 323 ; pain- 
ful interview, 325 ; visits 
Europe, 327 ; removes to -St. 
Louis, 328 ; publishes mem- 
oirs, 329 ; returns to Wash- 
ington, 340 ; declines civil 
office, 342 ; retirement, 346 ; 
New York home, 346 ; his 
death and burial, 347. 

Sloat, Commodore, 8. 

Slocum, General, 155, 195. 

Smith, General A. J., 14,98, 187. 

Smith, General Charles ¥., 
37-40, 77. 

Smith, General Giles A., 271. 

Smith, General John E., 158, 
266. 

Smith, General Kilby, 187. 

Smith, General Morgan L., 170. 

Smith, General P. F., 11. 

Stanbery, Henry, 3. 

Stanley, Henry M., 319. 

Stanton, Edwin M., 297, 301, 
302, 308, 313, 314, 315- 

Steele, General, 157, 187. 

Steele's Bayou, 109. 

Stevenson, General, 166. 

Stewart, General A. P., 57, 62, 
169, 176, 215, 270. 

Stockton, Commodore, 8. 

Stoneman, General, 293. 

Stuart, Colonel David, 5, 42, 58, 
60. 

Sutter, Captain, 10, 12. 

Taft, Judge, 340, 341. 

Taylor, General Richard, 146, 

241. 
Taylor, General Zachary, 2, 7, 8, 

13, 241- 
Tenure of Office Act, 314. 
Terry, General, 265, 280, 287. 
Thirteenth Army Corps, 94. 



Thomas, General George H., 24, 
27, 31, 80, 155, 162, 192-194, 
197, 198, 201, 207, 322, 332, 

337, 338. 
Thomas, General Lorenzo, 31. 
Turchin, General, 156, 175. 
Tuttle, General, 157. 
Twiggs, General David E., 20. 
Tyler, General Robert O., 23, 

25- 

Union League Club, 347. 
United States Military Acade- 
my, 341. 

Van Buren, Martin, 3. 

Van Dom, General Earl, 85, 87, 

96. 
Van Vliet, General Stewart, 14. 
Veatch, General, 50, 57. 
Vicksburg assaulted, 131. 
Vicksburg besieged, 138. 
Vicksburg campaign, 117. 
Vigilance Committee, 15, 16. 
Von Moltke, Marshal, 333. 

Wallace, General Lewis, 38, 72, 

73- 
Wallace, W. H. L., 38, 56, C)3- 
Webster, Daniel, 2, 3, 13. 
Weilzel, General, 299. 
Wheeler, General Joseph, 153, 

154, 216, 217, 222, 270, 283. 
Williams, General, 98, 99, 275. 
Wilson. General J. G., 294. 
Wilson's Creek, 191. 
Winslow, General, 184. 
Withers, General, 45, 60, 64. 
Wood, General Thomas J., 31, 

32, 70, 163. 
Wood, John E., 16. 
W^right, Silas, 8, 304. 

Verba Buena, 11. 

Zollicoffer, Felix K., 29, 30. 



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